JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 21.10.1997 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Attrocities) Act Cases and Additional Sessions Judge, Dausa, thereby convicting and sentencing accused-appellant Bhagwan Sahay as below: Offence Sentence awarded Section 302, IPC Life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo 6 months' simple imprisonment. Section 452, IPC Rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 500/- in default thereof, to further undergo one month's simple imprisonment. Section 324 One year's rigorous IPC imprisonment Section 323 IPC Three months' rigorous imprisonment. 2. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 3. According to the prosecution case, one Badri Prasad lodged a written report, Ex. P2 on 11.8.1996 at Police Station Nangal Rajawatan, Dausa alleging therein that he runs his shop in Rahuvas. On 11.8.1996 at 7 p.m. while he and his brother Hanuman were inside the shop and one Kalu Ram Sharma was purchasing some items, accused Bhagwan Saiiay Dakot having knife with him came there and inflicted a knife blow on the hand of his brother, thereby causing serious injury. When Kalu Sharma tried to save his brother Hanuman Prasad, accused inflicted a knife blow in the stomach of Kalu Sharma, as a result of which he also became seriously injured. Both the injured were taken to Dausa for treatment. The cause of incident was stated to be previous enmity. 4. On the aforesaid report, police registered a case vide FIR No. 192/96, Ex. P3 for offence under Sections 307 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code and proceeded with the investigation. During investigation, the police collected the injury reports Ex. P1, Ex. P12 and Ex. P13 of injured Rajendra Prasad, Hanuman and Vinod Kumar, respectively, prepared site-plan Ex. P4, prepared seizure memo Ex. P5 of blood stained and simple soil, seized the cloths of injured Vinod Kumar and Hanuman having blood stains vide seizure memo Ex. P6 and arrested the accused appellant on 12.8.1996 vide arrest memo Ex. P11. Police also recovered a blood stained knife vide memo Ex. P7 at the instance and on the information, Ex. P16 of accused, prepared a site plan of the place of recovery of knife vide memo Ex. P18 and prepared seizure memo Ex. P10 of the cloths of accused. Injured Kalu died on the same day of the incident. P11. Police also recovered a blood stained knife vide memo Ex. P7 at the instance and on the information, Ex. P16 of accused, prepared a site plan of the place of recovery of knife vide memo Ex. P18 and prepared seizure memo Ex. P10 of the cloths of accused. Injured Kalu died on the same day of the incident. The police got conducted the post-mortem on the dead body of deceased. The doctor who conducted post-mortem found the following injury on the person of deceased: "Penetrating wound 3/4" x 1/2" x 1/2" over right hypochordrium, small intestine protruding through the wound, lechymosis around inner opening of wound." 5. The doctor opined that the cause of death would be subject to the expert to opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory. PW 17 Dr. S.K. Singhal in his statement in Court has opined that the cause of death was traumatic coma due to injury caused on the person of deceased and the injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 6. After completion of investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against the accused appellant for offence under Sections 452, 302, 307, 323 and 324, IPC in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Lalsot, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions. 7. The learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Dausa, who tried the case, having heard the Counsel for the accused appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor and having considered the material on record, framed charges against the accused appellant under Sections 452, 302, 307, 324 and 323, IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 8. During trial, the prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 17 witnesses and also Exhibited 19 documents. The accused was then examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. The accused in his defence examined DW 1 Dr. Balmukund Sharma and exhibited, documents Exs. D1 to D13. 9. On completion of trial, hearing arguments of learned Counsel for the accused appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor and after perusing the evidence and material available on record, the learned Trial Court found the accused guilty of having committed offence under Sections 452, 323, 324 and 302, IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as indicated above. Hence the present appeal. 10. We have heard Mr. S.C. Gupta, learned Counsel for the accused appellant, Mr. Hence the present appeal. 10. We have heard Mr. S.C. Gupta, learned Counsel for the accused appellant, Mr. Rajendra Yadav, learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. Vishal Barisal appearing for the complainant and carefully gone through the entire evidence and material on record as also the judgment impugned. 11. In assailing the conviction, the first argument raised by Mr. S.C. Gupta, learned Counsel for the accused appellant was that the Trial Court has erred in believing the statements of the prosecution witnesses. According to the learned Counsel PW 2 Rajendra and PW 4 Vinod Kumar are chance witnesses and not the eye- witnesses of the incident and that the statements of other witnesses also do not corroborate each other. Hence the very genesis of the occurrence becomes doubtful. 12. We have considered the aforesaid argument. Suffice it to say that PW 2 Rajendra and PW 4 Vinod Kumar are the persons who have sustained injuries at the hands of accused appellant as would be clear from their injury reports. Ex. P1 is the injury report of Rajendra Prasad, which shows that he has sustained as many as 7 injuries including one incised wound over posterior aspect of right arm 3" above elbow joint. Similarly PW 4 has also sustained incised wound as is evident from his injury report Ex. P13. PW 2 Rajendra Prasad has deposed that accused Bhagwan Sahay inflicted a knife blow on the stomach of Kalu and when he and Vinod tried to catch hold of him, the accused inflicted knife blow on them and they also sustained injuries. Similarly, PW 4 Vinod Kumar has categorically deposed that accused Bhagwan Sahav inflicted knife blow on the stomach of Kalu in his presence and also caused injuries to him and PW 2 Rajendra when they tried to catch hold of accused. PW 1 Hanuman Prasad, at whose shop the incident took place, was first given knife blow on his left hand by accused Bhagwan Sahav. He has deposed that while he was sitting at his shop, accused Bhagwan Sahav came there with a knife and struck a knife blow on his left hand. When Kalu who had come to his shop for purchasing some items and when he tried to intervene, Bhagwan Sahay inflicted knife blow on his stomach, as a result of which his intestines protruded out. When Kalu who had come to his shop for purchasing some items and when he tried to intervene, Bhagwan Sahay inflicted knife blow on his stomach, as a result of which his intestines protruded out. Thereafter, accused also inflicted knife blows on PW 2 Ralendra Prasad and PW 4 Vinod Kumar. PW 6 Tunda Ram has also deposed similar to what has been deposed by PW 1 Hanuman Prasad, PW 2 Rajendra Prasad and PW 4 Vinod Kumar and PW 12 Dr. Om Prakash Barisal has certified the injuries of all the three injured persons. 13. Thus, in view of the above discussion we see no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the injured witnesses. In our view, the Trial Court while believing their presence at the scene of occurrence when the incident took place has rightly relied upon their testimony. 14. We have also scrutrinized the evidence of PW 5 Badri Prasad. Merely because PW 1 Hanuman Prasad and PW 5 Badri Prasad happens to be brothers, their testimony cannot be discarded. It is a settled proposition of law that where the evidence of an eye-witness is supported by medical evidence, his evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground of his being a relation. Thus the argument of the learned Counsel that PW 5 being an interested witness, his testimony cannot be relied upon, stands rejected. 15. The next ground of challenge is that the incident has not taken place as alleged by the prosecution. According to the learned Counsel, referring to the site plan, the incident d id not take place at the shop of PW 1 Hanuman Prasad. On the contrary, the incident happened at the house of accused appellant and that the members of the accused party have sustained injuries, which have been certified by DW 1 Dr. Bal Mukund Sharma and that a report from the side of accused party was also lodged against the numbers of the complainant party. According to the learned Counsel, the Trial Court has erred in not appreciating this important aspect of the case and on this count alone, the accused appellant deserves to be acquitted. 16. Firstly, we shall consider the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant as regards the place of incident. A glance at the site map, Ex. According to the learned Counsel, the Trial Court has erred in not appreciating this important aspect of the case and on this count alone, the accused appellant deserves to be acquitted. 16. Firstly, we shall consider the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant as regards the place of incident. A glance at the site map, Ex. P4 shows that place 'F' is the shop of injured Hanuman Prasad, PW 1 and the place marked B' is the residential house of accused Bhagwan Sahay. The description of the site plan shows that portion 'A' is the place where incident took place. Portion 'C ' is the place where the members of the complainant party were sitting. As regards the blood found in front of the house of the accused, which is marked as 'B', it has been stated that while injured were taken to the hospital, the blood from their wounds fell on the earth. PW 14 Prabhu Lal who carried out the entire investigation has deposed that he had prepared the site plan Ex. P4. He had collected the blood stained soil from the place marked 'F' and that this place is at a distance of about 68 from the place marked 'A'. Thus from the site plan and the statement of PW 14 Prabhu Lal, Investigating Officer it is crystal clear that the incident took place in the mariner as alleged by the prosecution. 17. So far as the argument of the learned Counsel for the accused appellant that the prosecution has not been able to explain the injuries on the person of accused is concerned, we have seen the injury report of accused and have scanned the evidence of DW 1 Dr. Bal Mukund Sharma. There are as many as 10 injuries on the person of accused. As per the statement of DW 1 Dr. Bal Mukund Sharma, all injuries sustained by accused Bhagwan Sahay were superficial and simple in nature and were caused by blunt object. That apart, having seen the arrest memo of the accused, we do not find mention of even single injury on the person of accused. What we find from the arrest memo of accused is that there were blood stains at various places on his shirt and trouser. In the light of these facts, the injury report Ex. That apart, having seen the arrest memo of the accused, we do not find mention of even single injury on the person of accused. What we find from the arrest memo of accused is that there were blood stains at various places on his shirt and trouser. In the light of these facts, the injury report Ex. D9 becomes suspicious and is of no help to the accused and it was,not necessary for the prosecution to have explained the injuries of the accused. It appears that injury report Ex. D9 is a cooked up document having been got prepared by the accused solely with a view to create evidence in his defence. Otherwise also, even for the sake of argument, if this injury report, Ex. D9 is taken to be genuine and the accused might have sustained injuries at the hands of members of the complainant side, still the prosecution was not obliged to explain the injuries of the accused since all injuries were superficial and simple in nature. It is settled proposition of law that non-explanation of injuries, if superficial and simple in nature, is not fatal to the prosecution case. 18. In Rajendra Singh v. State of Bihar, II (2000) CCR 67 (SC)=III (2000) SLT 569= (2000) 4 SCC 298 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held : "There is no infirmity with the conclusion of the High Court. Ordinarily the prosecution is not obliged to explain each injury on an accused even though the injuries might have been caused in the course of the occurrence, if the injuries are minor in nature but at the same time if the prosecution fails to explain grievous injury on one of the accused persons which is established to have been caused in the course of the same occurrence then certainly the Court looks at the prosecution case with a little suspicion on the ground that the prosecution has suppressed the true version of the incident. However, if the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy then non- explanation of the injury on the accused ipso facto cannot be a basis to discard the entire prosecution case." 19. However, if the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy then non- explanation of the injury on the accused ipso facto cannot be a basis to discard the entire prosecution case." 19. As discussed above, we find that the prosecution evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy and that being so the injuries on the person of accused, which were superficial and simple in nature were not at all required to be explained by the prosecution. In our view, the Trial Court has correctly recorded a finding that the fact as regards injuries on the body of accused is doubtful and that it was not necessary for the prosecution to have explained the injuries of accused. 20. The argument of the learned Counsel for the accused appellant that it was the members of complainant side, who entered the house of accused and caused injuries to him and his associates is of no help to the defence in view of the evidence of PW 14 Prabhu Lal, Investigating Officer, who has categorically deposed in his cross-examination that after investigation in regard to the First Information Report lodged from the side of accused party, he had submitted 'final report. We, therefore, conclude that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused appellant Bhagwan Sahay who was responsible for causing injuries to Hanuman Prasad PW 1, Rajendra Prasad PW 2 and Vinod Kumar PW 4 and inflicting solitary blow on the abdomen of Kalu Sharma, which proved fatal and his budding life came to an unfortunate premature end. 21. As per the prosecution case, there are six witnesses, namely, PW 1 Hanuman Prasad, PW 2 Rajendra Sharma, PW 3 Ramnath, PW 4 Vinod Kumar, PW 5 Badri Prasad and PW 6 Tunda Ram who have witnessed the incident. Out of these six eye-witnesses, PW 1 Hanuman Prasad, PW 2 Rajendra and PW 4 Vinod Kumar have sustained injuries at the hands of accused appellant. PW 1 Hanuman Prasad has stated that while he was sitting at his shop, accused appellant having a knife with him came there, caught hold of his hand and took him to a Chabutara and inflicted a knife blow, which hit on his hand. Kalu Sharma, since deceased, who happened to be at his shop when tried to intervene, accused Bhagwan Sahay stabbed knife into his stomach, resulting in protruding 'his intestines. Kalu Sharma, since deceased, who happened to be at his shop when tried to intervene, accused Bhagwan Sahay stabbed knife into his stomach, resulting in protruding 'his intestines. Accused also inflicted knife blows on PW 2 Rajendra and PW 4 Vinod Kumar who were present there. These two injured eye-witnesses have given same narration of the incident as that of PW 1 Hanuman Prasad. 22. Having scanned the evidence on record we have no hesitation in confirming the findings recorded by the Trial Court in holding the accused appellant guilty under Sections 452, 323 and 324, IPC after proper appreciation of evidence on record, inasmuch as there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW 1 Hanuman Prasad, PW 2 Rajendra and PW 4 Vinod Kumar, who have sustained injuries including incised wounds as is clear from the injury reports Ex. P1, Ex. P12 and Ex. P13. 23. Lastly, learned Counsel for the accused appellant argued that neither there was enmity between the deceased and the accused appellant nor it was the case of the prosecution that there existed enmity between the two. He contended that if for the sake of argument it is believed that the incident happened in the manner stated by the prosecution, then also the appellant cannot be attributed with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury which could be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or that his act would so imminently be dangerous that it must in all probabilities cause death. According to the learned Counsel, the appellant inflicted single knife below and did not repeat further blows. In support of his argument, learned Counsel has placed reliance on Ramesh Kumar @ Ramesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 39 and K. Ramkrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, II (1999) CCR 41 (SC)=III (1999) SLT 99=1999 Cr.L.R. (SC) 206. 24. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor has supported the judgment of the Trial Court and submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the prosecution has been able to establish that the accused has acted in a cruel or unusual manner, inasmuch as he inflicted a knife blow on the abdomen of deceased, which resulted in protruding his intestines and, ultimately, he succumbed to this single injury. According to him, in these circumstances, the accused appellant had an intention to kill the deceased and, therefore, Section 302, IPC is well attracted thought it is a case of solitary blow. He has placed reliance on Mahesh Balmiki @ Munna v. State of M.P., III (2000) CCR 229 (SC)=VII (1999) SLT 397= 2000 (1) SCC 319 . 25. Undisputedly, deceased Kalu Sharma's presence at the place of occurrence was merely by chance as he had gone to the shop of PW 1 Hanuman Prasad for purchasing some items and that when he tried to save Hanuman Prasad, accused struck knife blow in his stomach, which proved fatal and he succumbed to that injury. The undisputed fact is that deceased Kalu was an intervenor and that he succumbed to the only injury on his abdomen, which cannot be attributed to any person other than the present appellant. The only question that falls to our consideration is, as to whether giving a solitary blow on a vital part of the body of deceased Kalu resulting in death must always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC. 26. It is a settled proposition of law that in a single injury case also accused can be convicted under Section 302, IPC, if from the prosecution evidence it is proved that the intention is to cause death or to cause a particular injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. On this point, we deem it appropriate to refer some of the decisions of the Apex Court. 27. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case of single injury in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) SCC (Cr.) 768 , have observed that there is no justification for the assertion that giving of a solitary blow on a vital part of the body resulting in death must always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 302 Part II of the Code. If a man deliberately strikes another on the head with a heavy log of wood or an iron rod or even a Lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he must, in the absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption, be deemed to have intended to cause death of the victim or such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. Their Lordships held that the whole thing depends upon the intention to cause death, and the case may be covered by either Clause Firstly or Clause Thirdly. The nature of intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant upon the death. 28. In State of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam, IV (1994) CCR 845 (SC)=1995 Cr.L.R. (SC) 69 , their Lordships in a single injury case have observed that it is fallacious to contend that wherever there is a single injury only a case of culpable homicide is made out irrespective of other circumstances. 29. In the case in hand, the proved facts are that when accused appellant came to the shop of PW 1 Hanuman and inflicted a knife blow on his hand, deceased Kalu Sharma was sitting at his shop simply as a customer and when he tried to save Hanuman, the accused inflicted a knife blow on his stomach, as a result of which his intestines came out. It is also an undisputed fact that, accused did not repeat the blow. True it is that there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow, Section 302, IPC is not attracted. Single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302, IPC and in some cases, under Section 304, IPC. The question as to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. In the present case, whether or not there was enmity between the accused or the complainant, but from the evidence and material on record, we do not see any thing to infer that there was enmity between the accused and the deceased and the fact is that the presence of deceased Kalu at the shop of Hanuman Prasad when this unfortunate incident happened in which this innocent young lad lost his life, was per chance. The three injured witnesses named above have categorically deposed that when Kalu tried to intervene, accused Bhagwan Sahay inflicted a knife blow on the abdomen of Kalu, resulting in protruding his intestines. Admittedly the accused appellant did not repeat the blow. The blow, no doubt, was so severe that the intestines of the deceased protruded out. 30. Thus from the above discussion, it cannot be inferred that accused Bhagwan Sahay inflicted knife blow with an intention to cause death or that he was knowing that this blow is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death for the reason that incident took place all of a sudden, the accused inflicted ore blow and did not repeat further blow, for which the accused appellant, for which he had an ample opportunity. 31. In K. Rama Krishnan Unnithan's case (supra), while dealing with a case of single injury, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the conviction under Section 302 and instead convicted the accused under Section 304 Part-II. The facts in that case were similar to the facts of the present case. In that case also there was no previous enmity between the accused and the deceased and after some altercation with the deceased, the accused inflicted a single blow on the abdomen of the deceased, which proved fatal and the deceased died of a solitary blow. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case observed: "Thus it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had given one blow but the blow no doubt was quite severe, as a result of which the intestines had protruded out. It is however crystal clear that the appellant had no animosity against the deceased and he was involved because of altercations with PW 1. The scenario in which the appellant has been stated by the eye-witnesses to have given one blow on the deceased, it is difficult for us to hold that he gave the blow in question either with the intention of causing murder of the deceased or he can have said to have requisite knowledge that the death would otherwise be the inevitable result. In such a situation, even on accepting the prosecution case we hold that the accused did not commit the offence under- Section 302 but under Part II of the Section 304, IPC." 32. In such a situation, even on accepting the prosecution case we hold that the accused did not commit the offence under- Section 302 but under Part II of the Section 304, IPC." 32. The Division Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumar @ Ramesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (supra), while dealing with a case of single injury inflicted at the spur of moment, and after considering the evidence on record observed as under: "In these circumstances, we are unable to infer an intention on the part of the accused to cause death of wife or even intention to such injury as likely to cause death and, therefore, in our opinion, conviction under Section 302, IPC is not proper". 33. The facts of the aforesaid case and the present case are similar except that the weapon used by the accused in the aforesaid case was Lathi and the blow was on head of the wife of accused, whereas, in the present case the weapon used was knife and its infliction by accused was on the abdomen of Kalu, who was simply an intervenor. In both the cases, the incident took place at a spur of moment and only one blow was inflicted and there was no repetition of further blows. 34. In Mahesh Balmiki's case (supra), relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed in the case of single injury observed: "In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely be attributed the knowledge that the knife blow given by him was not imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death." 35. We have respectfully perused the case cited above. In the case before the Apex Court, the appellant and 3 others had snatched the wrist watch of a boy known to deceased and at the request of boy, the deceased and one Hari Kishan asked the appellant to return the watch. We have respectfully perused the case cited above. In the case before the Apex Court, the appellant and 3 others had snatched the wrist watch of a boy known to deceased and at the request of boy, the deceased and one Hari Kishan asked the appellant to return the watch. The appellant asked deceased and Hari Kishan to come to some specified place. On reaching there, they had exchange of hot words and, thereafter, the associates of the appellant caught hold of deceased and the appellant gave a knife blow on the chest of deceased and also inflicted injuries to Hari Kishan who rushed to save the deceased. Therefore, in our respectful view, the aforesaid case is of no help to the prosecution as the facts of the case in hand are totally distinguished with the. facts in Mahesh Balmiki's case. 36. In view of what has been discussed above, in the facts and circumstances of the case and on consideration of the case laws, we are of the opinion that the accused appellant neither intended to cause death of deceased nor had the knowledge that the injury he has inflicted on the deceased is such that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, though it has factually so resulted in death of deceased Kalu Sharma. 37. The scenario in which the appellant has been stated by the eye-witnesses of the occurrence to have given one knife blow on the abdomen of deceased, it is difficult for us to hold that he gave the blow in question either with the intention of causing murder of deceased or with requisite knowledge that the death would otherwise be the inevitable result. In such a situation, while accepting the prosecution case, we hold that the accused did not commit the offence under Section 302, IPC, but under Section 304 Part-II, IPC. 38. We have heard the Counsel for the accused appellant on the question of sentence. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the accused is in jail since 12.8.1996 and he has already undergone the sentence of about 5 years. 38. We have heard the Counsel for the accused appellant on the question of sentence. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the accused is in jail since 12.8.1996 and he has already undergone the sentence of about 5 years. Referring to some decisions of this Court, learned Counsel submitted that looking to the young age of about 20 years at the time of the commission of offence and in the facts and circumstance of the case, lenient view may be taken and the accused be sentenced to the term already undergone. 39. In Rameshwar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1988 WLN (UC) 32 , this Court maintained the conviction under Section 304 Part-II but sentenced the accused to the term already undergone i.e. 10' months. 40. In Gurucharan Singh and Others v. State of Rajasthan, 1992 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 680 , the Trial Court had convicted accused Gurucharan Singh for offence under Section 302, IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. On appeal by the accused, the Division Bench of this Court altered the conviction from 302, IPC to Section 304 Part-II, IPC and sentenced him to term of imprisonment already undergone i.e. 15 months. Again in Balunath v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 771 , the Division Bench of this Court convicting the accused appellant under Section 304 Part-I, sentenced him to the term already under gone i.e. 3 years. 41. In Kesher Dev v. State of Rajasthan, 1992 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 663 , the Division Bench of this Court while convicting the accused under Section 304 Part-II, IPC, sentenced him to the period already undergone i.e. 4 years. 42. In a case of single blow involving more or less the facts similar to the facts of the present case, referring the aforesaid cases on the question of sentence, this Court recently in Mohd @ Sazid Sazid v. State of Rajasthan, III (2000) CCR 291 (DB) , altered the conviction from Section 302, IPC to Section 304 Part--II, IPC sentenced the accused to the term already undergone i.e. 6 years and 9 months. 43. 43. In the present case, the accused appellant is in jail for last about 5 years Keeping in view the young age of accused Bhagwan Sahay, the circumstances in which the incident happened and in the light of the decisions referred to above, we deem it proper that the ends of justice would be met, if the accused is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. 44. As a result of the above discussion, we allow the appeal in part. While maintaining the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused appellant under Sections 323, 324 and 452, IPC, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC and instead convict him under Section 304 Part-II, IPC and sentence him to the period already undergone. The accused appellant is in jail and he be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.Appeal Partly allowed. *******