JUDGMENT V. Gopala Gowda, J.— This Miscellaneous Second Appeal is filed by the Second Defendant in the trial Court challenging the judgment passed in Regular Appeal No. 65 of 1990, dated 19.10.1998 in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 19.6.1990 in O.S. No. 100 of 1981 and remitting back the matter to the trial Court with a direction to it to give opportunity to both the parties for adducing evidence and dispose of the same in accordance with law on merits urging various legal contentions. 2. The rank of the parties in this judgment is referred as described in the plaint for the sake of convenience. 3. Plaintiff filed Original Suit No. 100 of 1981 before the Principal Munsiff and First Additional JMFC, Ranebennur for grant of judgment and decree to declare that they have got the hereditary right of performing Pooja Viniyoga and all religious ceremonies etc., to Shri Kotrabasaveshwar God in the temple situated on the bank of river Tungabhadra and sought for declaration that the Plaintiffs and third Defendant have acquired hereditary right to succeed to trusteeship after the death of the first Defendant who was making wahivat of the trust properties of the said deity belong to joint family means Plaintiffs and third Defendant have got right to succeed to the trusteeship and further sought for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 1 and 2 not to interfere with their rights contending that the Plaintiffs and the third Defendant are legally entitled for the relief sought for by them as their right is religious in nature. The custom and the practice confer right upon them to succeed to the hereditary trusteeship of the above said trust. The custom and the practice confer right upon them to succeed to the hereditary trusteeship of the above said trust. The Defendants 1 and 2 have filed written statement disputing the claim of the Plaintiffs and further stated that the Plaintiffs 1 to 6 have no hereditary right for performing the pooja of the deity and further stated that the property and the deity is a public trust property, it is not belonging to any community and further contended that trustee can appoint a person of another caste and it is not a hereditary peeta and there is no custom or practice prevailing for appointment of successor to the office of the trust as hereditary right at any point of time and further stated that the mode of succession to the office was mentioned in the application filed at the time of registration of public trust. Same was registered under the BOMBAY PUBLIC TRUST ACT, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "BPT Act, 1950") and further at para 16 of the written statement it is pleaded that suit filed by the Plaintiffs is not maintainable in view of the provision under Section 80 read with Sections 18, 19 and 21 of the BPT Act, 1950 and also further pleaded that suit is also not maintainable for another reason that the Plaintiffs have not obtained prior permission of the Charity Commissioner as required under Sections 50 and 51 of the BPT Act, 1950 and further it is pleaded that the Charity Commissioner who is a necessary party to the original suit proceedings as the subject matter of the suit affecting the public religious or the charitable purpose the right of the public trust will be affected. Therefore suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed additional issues as framed at para 4 with regard to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 oust the Civil Court jurisdiction under Section 9 Civil Procedure Code and the original suit instituted by the Plaintiffs without obtaining prior permission as required under Sections 50 and 51 from the Charity Commissioner original suit is not maintainable and further non-joinder of a necessary party namely the Charity Commissioner the suit is bad in law. The said issues were tried as preliminary issues and passed the judgment and decree answering in favour of the Defendants 1 and 2 by recording its reasons at paras 6 and 7 by the trial Court. Referring to the rival contentions urged by the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of parties placing reliance upon the full bench judgment of this Court reported in Gurupadayya Charantayya Adavimath etc. Vs. Chikkayya etc., AIR 1979 Kant 202 and considering the relevant provision under Section 80 regarding the bar on jurisdiction of Civil Court and Section 51 of the BPT Act, 1950 and the judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in Dinanath Ajabrao Ingole and Anr. Vs. Shetkari Shikshan Prasarak Mandal and Others, AIR 1983 Bom 404 , recorded the finding with reference to the rival contentions of the parties and considering the provisions of Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Act and also the contentions urged on behalf of the Plaintiffs that they have got the right of hereditary to succeed to the first Defendant's office, the trial Court has held against them regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Placing reliance upon the Hindu Law by Mayne's at page 639 and elaborately considered the full bench judgment of this Court and held that the original suit instituted by the Plaintiffs is not maintainable for the reason that under Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and further the trial Court has accepted the case of the Defendants 1 and 2 and it has held that suit is also not maintainable for the reason that the prior permission as required under Sections 50 and 51 of the BPT Act, 1950 not obtained. Therefore on that ground also the suit is held to be not maintainable and further held that the subject matter involved in the suit is in relation to public trust. Charity Commissioner is a necessary party to the suit. He has not been impleaded therefore, suit is held to be bad in law for non- joinder of necessary party being Charity Commissioner. 4. The Plaintiffs aggrieved by the above said judgment and decree filed a regular appeal before the Civil Court under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code urging various legal contentions. He has not been impleaded therefore, suit is held to be bad in law for non- joinder of necessary party being Charity Commissioner. 4. The Plaintiffs aggrieved by the above said judgment and decree filed a regular appeal before the Civil Court under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code urging various legal contentions. On the basis of rival contentions of the parties, the First Appellate Court with reference to the findings recorded to the preliminary issues 1 to 4 has formulated the points for his determination at para 21 and has answered the same from paras 22 to 37 in the impugned judgment. It is also necessary to make reference that during pendency of the appeal, appellants 3 to 5 on 13.8.1998 filed an application in IA 5 under Order 32, Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code praying for discharging their guardianship on the ground that they attained the majority and also sought permission to proceed in the suit in their personal capacity. IA 2 under Order 41, Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code was also filed for producing certified copy of the judgment in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 1230 of 1985 connected with Writ Petition No. 7780 of 1985 disposed on 7.12.1994 as additional evidence in support of their case. The same was allowed. IA-4 filed under Order 6, Rule 17 was dismissed as not pressed. IA 6 filed by the second Defendant seeking permission of the First Appellate Court to produce the additional evidence namely the certified copy of extract khatha of the lands and also the certified copy of Form-7 and Nagaravani daily newspaper, Davangere dated 29.1.1997. The learned First Appellate Judge has answered the points formulated by him in favour of the Plaintiffs placing reliance upon the full bench judgment of this Court referred to supra and also the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Shree Gollaleshwar Dev and Others Vs. Gangawwa Kom Shantayya Math and Others, AIR 1986 SC 231 and the judgments of Taraben Baldevdas Parikh Vs. Charity Commissioner, Greater Bombay Region and Others, AIR 1957 Bom 42 , Maganbhai Madhabhai Vs. Ambalal Bhikhabhai Patel, AIR 1982 Guj 129 . Gangawwa Kom Shantayya Math and Others, AIR 1986 SC 231 and the judgments of Taraben Baldevdas Parikh Vs. Charity Commissioner, Greater Bombay Region and Others, AIR 1957 Bom 42 , Maganbhai Madhabhai Vs. Ambalal Bhikhabhai Patel, AIR 1982 Guj 129 . The legal submissions made on behalf of contesting second Defendant that the suit is not maintainable and for the reasons stated in the written statement and also the same has been considered by the First Appellate Judge and considered the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 read with Sections 50, 51 and 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 and also judgment of this Court rendered in Miscellaneous First Appeal and Writ Petition has recorded a finding applying the ratio laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Gurupadayya's, it has recorded a finding that the matter involving religious practices and principles governing succession to a matadhipathi cannot be equated to an ordinary question of mode of succession to the office of a trust as contemplated under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950 and the same falls outside the scope of the said provision and further placing reliance on aforesaid full bench judgment of this Court referred to supra at para 34 it has recorded a finding holding that in view of the law laid down by the full bench of this Court, it has held that the findings of the Principal Munsiff, Ranebennur holding that Civil Court has no jurisdiction is held to be wrong for the reasons recorded by him at para 35 of the impugned judgment stating that the Learned Trial Judge has not bestowed his attention to the reliefs claimed in the suit by the Plaintiffs and he had earnestly expressed his opinion holding that the subject matter of the suit falls under the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 read with Sections 50 and 51 of the BPT Act, 1950 and further Learned Trial Judge taking into consideration of certain provisions of the Hindu Law has earnestly observed that the first Defendant deceased is a Sanyasi without any basis in support of the pleadings and further made an observation that the observations of the trial Court holding that the Defendant was a Sanyasi and he cannot be a joint family member are all extraneous considerations as the same are not based on the pleading under proof. Therefore the Learned First Appellate Judge has held that the observations of the trial Court in the judgment while answering the preliminary issues are erroneous in law and further he has held that the Plaintiffs have claimed their hereditary right to succeed to the math in question on the basis of their hereditary right. Therefore the findings recorded on issues 1, 2 and 4 are held to be illegal and unsustainable in law and further at pages 36 and 37, the Learned First Appellate Judge without reference to the legal submission made on behalf of the second Defendant has held that the law laid down in the said cases are not applicable to the facts of the case for the reason that the question of succession to the headship of a math can be agitated in the civil suit before the competent Civil Court and the matter does not fall under the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 read with Sections 50 and 51 of the BPT Act, 1950 and therefore he had held that Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 is not attracted to the facts of the present case. He had further held that the question of seeking permission from the Charity Commissioner as contended by the second Defendant is untenable in law and further held that the Commissioner is not a proper and necessary party and thereby he has set-aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remitted back the matter to the trial Court with a direction to give opportunity to parties to determine the rights of the parties on merits. The correctness of the judgment of the First Appellate Court is challenged in this appeal contending that the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court suffers from error in law for having set-aside the legal and valid findings recorded by the trial Court holding that they are erroneous in law without assigning valid and cogent reasons, which findings are in contravention of the provisions of BPT Act, 1950 and the law laid down by the full bench of this Court in Gurupadayya's case. Therefore, Learned Counsel Mr. Deshpande submits that the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set-aside. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Therefore, Learned Counsel Mr. Deshpande submits that the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set-aside. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Tarakaram, appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Respondents has placed strong reliance upon the full bench judgment of this Court particularly para 11 wherein this Court after consideration of the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20 read with Sections 79 and 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 placing reliance upon the full bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Keki Pestonji Jamadar and Anr. Vs. Kohodadad Merwan Irani and Others, AIR 1973 Bom 130 wherein the said High Court placed reliance upon the law laid down by the Apex Court reported in 1965 at page 1744 wherein the High Court of Bombay has held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted while interpreting the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act Sections 45, 52 and 81 and further the un-reported Division Bench judgment of this Court in which the parties to this appeal are parties in the said proceedings. Referring to the submissions at paras 16 and 17 of the impugned judgment placing reliance upon the full bench judgment of this Court has observed at para 20 of the judgment in the writ petition rendered by the Division Bench of this Court that on the basis of the submission made at the bar the civil suit is being pursued between the same parties and about the same dispute it is not necessary for this Court in these proceedings to go into the details with reference to the interpretation of the expression reflected in the Register of Public Trusts maintained under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950. Therefore the said matters were disposed of holding that the findings given by the authorities functioning under the provisions of the BPT Act, 1950 are subject to the final decision of the Civil Court and the Civil Court has to dispose of the suit without being influenced by the findings recorded by the authorities in exercise of their power. In view of the observations made in the aforesaid judgment of this Court, the same are binding between the parties. In view of the observations made in the aforesaid judgment of this Court, the same are binding between the parties. Therefore, it is not open for the second Defendant to turn around and contend that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the original suit filed by the Plaintiffs in view of Section 80 of BPT Act, 1950 and further learned senior Counsel submits that the full bench judgment of this Court referred to supra in Gurupadayya's case has been reiterated by further explaining the ratio laid down at para 11 in the said case by considering the provisions of Section 19 at para 12 and answered the point at issue at para 18 in Adishayya Kadayya's case reported in AIR 1983 Kar 83. Therefore, the Learned Senior Counsel submits that the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are perfectly legal and valid which need not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction and power. Further the learned Senior Counsel submits that the First Appellate Court has rightly remitted back the matter to the trial Court for determination of the merits of the case which remittal order will not affect the rights of the parties, for this reason also, the impugned judgment need not be interfered with by this Court. 5. This Court has to answer the rival contentions urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of the parties. I have been taken through the judgment of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court for the purpose of appreciating the rival contentions urged by the Learned Counsel on behalf of the parties it is necessary for this Court to extract the relevant provisions of the BPT Act, 1950 for the purpose of appreciating the case of the parties and answer the same viz., Sections 18 and 19 which read as hereunder: Section 18: Registration of Public Trusts.-1. It shall be the duty of the trustee of a public trust to which this Act has been applied to make an application for the registration of public trust. 2. Such application shall be made to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner of the region or sub-region within the limits of which the trustee has an office for the administration of the trust or the trust property or substantial portion of the trust property is situated, as the case may be. 3. 2. Such application shall be made to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner of the region or sub-region within the limits of which the trustee has an office for the administration of the trust or the trust property or substantial portion of the trust property is situated, as the case may be. 3. Such application shall be in writing, shall be in such form and accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed. 4. Such application shall a) In case of a public trust created before this Act was applied to it, be made, within three months from the date of the application of this Act, and b) In the case of a public trust created after this Act comes into force, within three months of its creation. 5. Such application shall inter alia contain the following particulars.- (ai) the designation by which the public trust is or shall be known (hereinafter referred to as the name of the public trust). i) the names and addresses of the trustees and the manager. ii) the mode of succession of the office of the trustee. iii) the list of the moveable and immovable trust property and such description and particulars as may be sufficient for the identification thereof. iv) the approximate value of the movable and immovable property. v) the gross average annual income of the trust property estimated on the income of three years immediately preceding the date on which the application is made or of the period which has elapsed since the creation of the trust, whichever period is shorter. vi) the amount of the average annual expenditure in connection with such public trust estimated on the expenditure incurred within the period to which the particulars under Clause (v) relate. vii) the address to which any communication to the trustee or manager in connection with the public trust may be sent, viii) such other particulars which may be prescribed: Provided that the rules may provide that in the case of any or all public trusts it shall not be necessary to give the particulars of the trust property of such value and such kind as may be specified therein. 6. Every application made under Sub-section (1) shall be signed and verified in the prescribed manner by the trustee or his agent specially authorised by him in this behalf. 6. Every application made under Sub-section (1) shall be signed and verified in the prescribed manner by the trustee or his agent specially authorised by him in this behalf. It shall be accompanied by a copy of an instrument of trust, if such instrument had been executed and is in existence. 7. (New) It shall also be the duty of the trustee of the public trust to send a memorandum in the prescribed form containing the particulars, including the name and description of the public trust, relating to the immovable property of such public trust, to the sub-registrar of the sub-district appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, in which such immovable property is situate for purposes of registration. Such memorandum shall be sent within three months from the date of creation of the public trust and shall be signed and verified in the prescribed manner by the trustee or his agent specially authorised by him in this behalf. Section 19: Inquiry for registration.-On the receipt of an application under Section 18, or upon an application made by any person having interest in a public trust or on his own motion, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner shall make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining. (i) whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust, (ii) whether any property is the property of such trust, (iii) whether the whole or any substantial portion of the subject matter of the trust is situate within his jurisdiction. (iv) the names and addresses of the trustees and manager of such trust, (v) the mode of succession to the office of the trustee of such trust, (vi) the origin, nature and object of such trust, (vii) the amount of gross average annual income and expenditure of such trust, and (viii) any other particulars as may be prescribed under Sub-section (5) of Section 18. 6. 6. The provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 read with Sections 79 and 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 are required to be examined to find out the intention of the legislature in ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court expressly as per Section 80 of the Act in respect of matters which are enumerated for determination of the rights of the parties by either the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner under the provision of Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950 the full bench of this Court in the case of Sri Gurupadayya Charantayya Adadvi math referred to supra, interpreting the very same provisions of the Act this Court has clearly laid down the law at para 11, the relevant portion of the said paragraph is extracted hereunder: In the language of Section 80, two categories of matters are excepted from the jurisdiction of civil Courts. The matters which the authorities under the Act have jurisdiction to decide or deal with, and the questions in respect of which the Act imparts finality to the decision of the statutory authorities, are both excluded from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. There is no difficulty to isolate the questions falling under the second category. They have been specifically provided under Sub-section (1) of Section 79, namely, the questions as to whether or not a trust exists, whether such trust is a public trust and whether a particular property is the property of such trust. These questions shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and the decision thereon unless set-aside by the Court on application or in appeal under the Act has been made final and conclusive under Sub-section (2) of Section 79. The question with which we are concerned viz., the succession to the Headship of the math and the mode thereof is obviously not one of those questions specified under Section 79. 7. By reading the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case referred to supra wherein this Court has clearly laid down the law holding that the two categories of matters are excepted under Section 80 from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. 7. By reading the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case referred to supra wherein this Court has clearly laid down the law holding that the two categories of matters are excepted under Section 80 from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. These matters are namely that the authorities under the Act have jurisdiction to decide and deal with, and the question in respect of which the Act imparts finality to the decision of the statutory authorities are both excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950. Now the question for consideration and determination of the rights of succession to the office of the trust who claims such right is vested under the provisions of Section 19(5) of the BPT Act, 1950 with the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner on an enquiry in the prescribed manner under the rules, has got the power to decide the mode of succession to the office of the trustees of such trust. Therefore the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court is applicable to the facts of this case for the reason that the mode of succession to the office of the trustees of the trust in question can be determined on an application made by the parties and conducting such enquiry by the officer upon whom power is conferred in the prescribed manner under the rules framed. Further Learned Counsel for the second Defendant has placed reliance upon the unreported judgment of this Court rendered in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 2011 of 1991 decided on 25.11.1997 at para 6, wherein this Court has held that the position of a trustee cannot be equated to that of a Mahanth of a math. In the instant case, on the basis of the application of the second Defendant in view of the power conferred upon the deceased first Defendant he was nominated to the trusteeship of the trust in question. On consideration of the application, the Assistant Charity commissioner in exercise of its power under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950 read with the relevant rules framed under the provisions of the Act has passed an order appointing the second Defendant as a trustee to succeed to the office of the deceased first Defendant of the trust in question. On consideration of the application, the Assistant Charity commissioner in exercise of its power under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950 read with the relevant rules framed under the provisions of the Act has passed an order appointing the second Defendant as a trustee to succeed to the office of the deceased first Defendant of the trust in question. It is an undisputed fact that the said order was challenged by the second Plaintiff who is the second Respondent in this appeal by filing Writ Petition No. 7780 of 1985 before this Court and also the Miscellaneous First Appeal against the order passed dated 14.5.1985 under the proceedings No. GB.RK. 284 of 1984-85. Nodoubt this Court in the said proceedings on the basis of the submissions by the Learned Counsel for the parties therein with reference to the full bench judgment of this Court referred to supra has directed the parties to get their rights determined in the civil suit on the ground that right of the Plaintiffs is religious one and their right is claimed on the basis of the custom and practice prevailing in the community. The observations made in the said unreported judgment shall not prevent the competent Civil Court to answer the legal questions raised by the parties regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Court in the original suit proceedings with reference to the provisions of the BPT Act, 1950 particularly Section 80 wherein the Civil Courts jurisdiction has been expressly taken away in respect of matters required to be determined under the provision under Section 19 of the Act for the reason that the rights claimed under the provisions of the Act upon which the authorities have been conferred with the power to determine the rights of the parties with regard to the succession of the public trust. Such matters are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is the ratio laid down by the full bench judgment. The said ratio laid down by this full bench of this Court in the case of Gurupadayya Charantayya Adavimath referred to supra is in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others, AIR 1995 SC 1715 in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant and Anr. 8. Krishna Kant and Others, AIR 1995 SC 1715 in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant and Anr. 8. Therefore the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel that the observations made in the unreported judgment of Miscellaneous First Appeal and Writ Petition referred to above which is disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court on 25.2.1994 wherein the second Plaintiff had challenged the orders passed by the authorities in the proceedings which order was affirmed by the Appellate Authority the District Judge, the observations made in the said order of this Court is binding on the parties cannot be accepted for the reason that in view of Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 and that the parties cannot confer the jurisdiction on the Civil Court as the same would amount to opposing the policy of the State by interpreting Section 80 of the Act, as it has expressly ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 9 in respect of matters which are required to be decided and determined by the competent authorities upon whom the specific powers is conferred under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950, as such power is conferred upon such authorities mentioned in the said provision only with a view to see that public trust shall be regulated by the authorities under provisions of the Act with a view to achieve the object of the trust established. Therefore the Civil Court's jurisdiction under Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 has been expressly rightly ousted in regard to the reliefs as prayed in the plaint by the Plaintiffs. In this view of the matter, the reliance placed upon unreported judgment by the Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiffs cannot bind the parties in regard to the conferment of jurisdiction upon the Civil Court, which has been expressly ousted under the provision of the Act referred to supra. Therefore the parties to the original suit, and the Learned Trial Judge was not prohibited from passing an order independently by examining the relevant provisions of the Act particularly with reference to Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 in regard to his jurisdiction to try the suit and determine the rights of the parties in respect of which the special machinery is established under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950. Further submission that the Full Bench Judgment referred to in Gurupadayya's case and which judgment has been reiterated and explained in Adishayya Kadayya's case are not applicable to the facts of this case in support of the second Defendant but not to the Plaintiffs case. The case of the second Defendant and Plaintiffs regarding the Civil Court's jurisdiction have been properly considered by the trial Judge by recording its findings by assigning valid and cogent reasons holding that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted in respect of the prayers sought for in the plaint by the Plaintiffs. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1965 page 1744 at 1746, para 10 by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs are also not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason by a close reading of the above said judgment of the Apex Court no provision similar to Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 fell for consideration for the Supreme Court in the above said case to consider and answer whether Civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly ousted under the provisions of the said enactment which was examined by the Apex Court in respect of the matters relating to the matter of the succession to the public trust. Therefore the reliance placed upon the said judgment of the Apex Court by the Full Bench of Bombay High Court upon which the learned Senior Counsel has placed strong reliance in support of the case of the Plaintiffs are misplaced for the reason that the facts of those cases have no application to the facts of the present case with regard to deciding the matter in question as to whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction or not under the provisions of the BPT Act, 1950 as I have already held that Full Bench of this Court in the case referred to supra is an answer in support of the findings of the trial Court on the preliminary issues in favour of the second Defendant as the same are based on the proper interpretation of the provisions of Sections 19, 79 and 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 keeping in view the intention and object of the Act for the reason that determination of the rights of the parties of succession to the public trust is the matter which is entrusted with the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950, that power has been rightly exercised by the Assistant Charity Commissioner on the application filed by the second Defendant for the reason that the first Defendant-trustee has nominated him to succeed to him to the office of the matadhipathi of the public trust. Therefore that order has become final and that order cannot be a subject matter of the original suit proceedings instituted by the Plaintiffs in the Civil Court, which Court's jurisdiction is expressly ousted in view of the provision under Section 80 of BPT Act, 1950. In this view of the matter, the question of determining the rights of the Plaintiffs by the Civil Court in their original suit on the ground that they have hereditary right to the office, and they have got right based on custom and practice prevailing in Hindu religion, does not arise at all for the reason that their claim is devoid of merit. Therefore the suit filed by the Plaintiffs for grant of declaratory relief and permanent injunction as prayed for by the Plaintiffs is not maintainable in law for the reason that the matter pertaining to the office Matadhipathi of the public trust is already concluded by the competent authority under the provisions of Section 19 of the BPT Act, 1950 on the application filed by the second Defendant holding that he is entitled to succeed to the office of the public trust in question as he was nominated by the first Defendant. In my considered view the findings recorded by the trial Court and the conclusions arrived at by him assigning valid and cogent reasons are perfectly legal and valid which findings should not have been interfered with by the First Appellate Authority in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction holding that the findings recorded by the trial Court are erroneous in law cannot be accepted for the reason that the findings of the First Appellate Court are not only erroneous in law but also suffers from error in law in view of the law declared by the Full Bench of this Court which has been followed by the Division Bench in Adishayya Kadayya's case, holding that Civil Court has no jurisdiction in view of Section 80 of the BPT Act, 1950 in respect of the matters enumerated under Section 19 of the Act and to determine the rights of the parties, power is conferred upon the authorities mentioned in the said provision. For the reasons stated supra, the appellant-second Defendant must succeed. Hence I pass the following order: 9. Appeal is allowed. The impugned order/judgment and decree is set-aside. The order of the trial Court is restored. 10. After dictating the judgment allowing the appeal, Learned Senior Counsel Sri Tarakaram made an oral application for grant of stay order, staying the operation of this judgment for a period of 8 weeks, contending that Plaintiffs/Respondents have got right to challenge this judgment before the Apex Court. Learned Counsel S.A. Deshpande on behalf of the Defendant/appellant opposes the application on the ground that the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court challenged in this appeal as the case was remanded by it. The said judgment and decree was stayed by this Court in this appeal. Learned Counsel S.A. Deshpande on behalf of the Defendant/appellant opposes the application on the ground that the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court challenged in this appeal as the case was remanded by it. The said judgment and decree was stayed by this Court in this appeal. Therefore he submits that there is no executing decree or order passed against the Plaintiffs as their suit is dismissed by the trial Court which judgment is affirmed by this Court after setting aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court and therefore there is no need for grant of stay order, staying the judgment of this Court. The second Defendant is already functioning as a trustee of the public trust in question in pursuant to the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner. In view of the submission made on behalf of the second Defendant/appellant, though the judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored in this appeal by passing this judgment which is not an executable decree/order and therefore the question of grant of stay of this judgment as prayed by the Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiffs/Respondents does not arise. Hence the oral application of the Plaintiffs seeking for stay of this judgment is rejected.