COMMON JUDGMENT: Both appeals arise out of a single suit O.S.No.44 of 1982, on the file of the Sub Court, Ramanathapuram at Madurai. 2. In A.S.No.824 of 1984, defendants 1 to 4 and 6 to 10 are the appellants. In A.S.No.565 of 1985, defendants 7 to 9 are the appellants. The appeals are disposed of by the following common judgment: The suit was filed by the first respondent in both the appeals. He died pending the appeals and his Legal Representatives have been brought on record as respondents 6 to 12. In A.S.No.565 of 1985, defendants 7 to 9 are the appellants. The appeals are disposed of by the following common judgment: The suit was filed by the first respondent in both the appeals. He died pending the appeals and his Legal Representatives have been brought on record as respondents 6 to 12. The case was as follows: Arulmigu Thirubuvaneswarar Temple and Arulmigu Ayyanar Temple at Kumalendal Village, Thirvadanai Taluk, Ramanathapuram District, are ancient temples established for the villagers with the help of Rajas of Ramnad, and the ancestors of the plaintiff were the persons in management of the temples for over a century; the village mentioned was an inam village and a Mohammedan was the inamdar before the abolition of the inam rights; though the village was an inam by character, it was classified as a Dharmasanam with grant as to several service holders (Public and Religious) and to the suit temples also; an extent of 4 acres, 21 cents was the grant for the temples by the Rajas of Ramnad for maintenance of the deity and the grant was not affected by the inam nature of the Will in favour of the said Mohammedan; originally the inamdar of the Dharmasanam grant was one Iyengar and subsequently one Mohammedan purchased the shares in the inam grants from the said Iyengar; an inamdar of the dharmasanam, Iyengar was said to have had overall control of the said grants including the grant to the deity and consequently the person managing the temple had a duty to satisfy the inamdar in those days pertaining to maintenance of the temple; the plaintiff’s grandfather one Periyar Thevar was managing the temples as a hereditary trustee; the inamdars never interfered in the management as they were satisfied that the temples were maintained properly; when Iyengar inamdar sold the property to one Mohammedan, there was some interference in the management of the temples; the matters were taken to the Rajas of Ramnad, who directed one Vellaichamy Kanakkupillai to assist the plaintiff’s grandfather when troubles were given by the said Mohammedan; the Mohammedan Inamdar was demanding rent from the temples now and then; there were 45 shares belonging to different persons; the inamdar claimed 14-4-6 share; he filed a suit O.S.No.58 of 1952 before the District Munsif, Ramanathapuram at Madurai, and the suit was decreed mentioning the rights of the respective parties, wherein it was stated that the properties mentioned in the plaint as items 7 to 10 and 16 and 17 belonged to the temples and the management thereof would be held by the plaintiff and another Chinniah Pillai alias Chinna Perumal Pillai, son of Vellaichamy Kanakkupillai already referred to, he was only a nominee of Samasthanam, the plaintiff was the person in actual management of the temple; the decree of the Court had also recognised the management of the temples by the plaintiff; before him, his father and before his father his grandfather were managing the temples; a document of lease of land belonging to Peyar Thevar in favour of one Rayar of the village described the said Peyar Thevar as the hereditary trustee of the suit temples and the document had been registered on 19.10.1905; the management had been continuously in the family of the plaintiff; in the suit in O.S.No.58 of 1952, the plaintiff was the fourth defendant along with his father Nagalinga Thevar, who was the second defendant; the judgment in O.S.No.58 of 1952 referred to one Chinniah Pillai alias Chinna Perumal Pillai, the first defendant in the said suit, to manage the temples along with the plaintiff, Chinniah Pillai alias China Perumal Pillai is the third defendant in the said suit; he had nothing to do with the actual management of the temples; he also did not have a hand in the management; Chinna Perumal himself had written to the departmental authorities reiterating the right of the plaintiff and that he was only assisting the plaintiff in the matter of management of the temples; hence, in those circumstances, the denial of such right of the plaintiff by H.R. and C.E. Department was not proper but illegal; the plaintiff had acquired a vested right of management of the temples both from the ancestors and from the decision of the Civil Court in O.S.No.58 of 1952 which was binding on all persons concerned; the plaintiff was also appointed by the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., Ramanathapuram, taking into account he was managing the temple hereditarily; the department appointed the ninth defendant as trustee of the temple in the year 1975 for the first time; the plaintiff was asked to hand over the charge to the Village Munsif; the plaintiff was obliged to move the Deputy Commissioner to establish his right to manage the temple hereditarily; the petition was taken on file as O.A.No.101 of 1976; during the pendency of the said petition, defendants 1 to 6 got themselves impleaded as respondents 1 to 6 got themselves impleaded as respondents 1 to 6 in the said O.A. and opposed the petition; in the meantime, one Muthuramalingam, the member of the family of the plaintiff, was appointed as fit person by the 7th defendant, and the charge of the temples and its properties were handed over to Muthuramalingam; during the pendency of the said O.A., the Executive Officer of Nagara Sivan Temple, Devakottai, was appointed as fit person, but, he did not exercise his office, as such the properties of the temples continued to be in the hands of the plaintiff through the said Muthuramalingam; the petition was dismissed, after an elaborate trial; there was considerable delay in passing the order for over one year; he maneuvered to dismiss the petition on materials gathered by him behind the plaintiff’s back; the plaintiff was not allowed to cross-examine the Inspector, H.R. & C.E., who was shown as C.W.1 in the order; there was no notice of date of his examination and when the plaintiff’s counsel expressed his unhappiness over the way in which the Inspector was examined by the Deputy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner promised every now and then that the materials would not be sued against plaintiff without giving an opportunity to peruse the materials as well as to cross examine the Inspector; the order of the Deputy Commissioner was ex facie bad; though in the last para of the order he stated that the plaintiff’s family was found to have been associated with the temples for long meriting a representation in the Trust Board for management of the temple, the Deputy Commissioner had failed to understand the provisions of law regarding the hereditary right of the management as defined in the H.R. and C.E. Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act); the Deputy Commissioner had observed that the plaintiff’s management for 10 years even during the life time of his father cut at the very concept of the hereditary trusteeship was fantastic and ridiculous against the position of law, as there was no bar for a son to manage a temple during the life time of his father due to his old age, etc.: against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Commissioner/ the eighth defendant in A.P.No.17 of 1981; by order dated 16.4.1982, the Commissioner dismissed the appeal by a non-speaking order; the legal concept of the hereditary trusteeship had been thrown in the air and the order had been passed by the Commissioner on being carried away by wrong notions as well as incorrect particulars; there was no discussion in the order regarding both, oral and documentary, evidence of parties; the suit had been filed to set aside the order of the Commissioner and consequently to declare that the plaintiff was holding the office of the trusteeship of the suit temples hereditarily; in the course of the trial, the plaintiff came to know that the tenth defendant had been appointed as the trustee of the suit temple; and, in order to get a binding adjudication against him he had been impleaded as a party in the suit. 3. 3. The first defendant filed a written statement to the following effect: It was false to say that Peyar Thevar was managing the temples as hereditary trustee; it was also denied that the plaintiff is the grandson of Peyar Thevar or that Peyar Thevar acted as trustee much less as hereditary trustee; the suit in O.S.No.58 of 1952 had not been properly interpreted by the plaintiff; in the course of proceedings, in the said suit, to prevent total danger and loss of properties to the temples, a tentative ad hoc compromise had been made, it was only a suggestion; Inamdar Mohammed Ishaq did not claim or purport to make any ruse of devolution of the trusteeship for the suit temples in fact he had no right to do so; the Mahajanams or the villagers were not parties to the said suit; the compromise was not binding on the defendants or their predecessors or any others; the compromise did not and could not recognize any hereditary right or trusteeship; the parties to compromise had no right to declare or deny or accept rights to the temples; the very admission by the plaintiff that one Vellaichamy Kanakkupillai and Chinniah alias Chinnaperumal Pillai functioned in the management showed that the plaintiff was not accepted as trustee muchless as hereditary trustee; the truth and validity of the lease deed mentioned in the plaint was not admitted; any self serving statement could not be furnished as a basis for claim; indeed, the third defendant was managing the temples and their properties; the third defendant never wrote to the departmental authorities reiterating the plaintiff’s right; the time, occasion, place and the particulars of the department could not be furnished by the plaintiff; the plaintiff had no vested right; this defendant was not aware of the appointment of the plaintiff in 1975 by the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. the plaintiff was not having control or management over the temples or their properties; the trial before the Deputy Commissioner/7th defendant was fair and full fledged; the plaintiff was heard in full, the order of the seventh defendant was unassailable; mere delay in delivering the judgment was no ground to invalidate the same; there being no procedural defect or any other irregularity in the order of the Deputy Commissioner and of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., the same could not be questioned; Mr.Balakrishnan had long ago been appointed as trustee and possession of the temples and properties remained with him; the plaintiff made misrepresentation and obtained an order of interim injunction without any effect; there was no cause of action for the suit; and, the suit was not maintainable and barred by limitation. 4. The fifth defendant filed a written statement disputing that the plaintiff was the hereditary trustee of the temples; though the Iyengars transferred their interest to the Mohammedan, the family of the plaintiff came in possession of the temples and their management and continued to hold the same; this defendant was not aware of the facts of the suit in O.S.No.58 of 1952 on the file of the District Munsif, Ramnad; the right of the plaintiff was a legal fiction and had to be decided according to law; there was no cause of action against this defendant; and, this defendant had to be exonerated. 5. 5. A common written statement, filed on behalf of defendants 7 to 9, was as follows: The suit was not maintainable either in law or on facts; the allegation that the plaintiff’s grandfather was managing the suit temples as hereditary trustee was false; it was equally false to allege that the plaintiff was the person in actual management of the temples and that before him, it was in the management of the plaintiff’s father and before him the plaintiff’s grandfather was managing the suit temples; originally, some Iyengars, who were Inamdars and land holders of the village, managed the suit temples; one Mohammedan purchased certain pangus in the village and he claimed division in proportion to his share of the lands set apart for the maintenance of the temples and filed a suit in O.S.No.58 of 1952; objections were raised by the villagers for the said partition and finally the matter was compromised and the said Mohammedan relinquished his claim over the temples lands; the father of the plaintiff Nagalinga Thevar had admitted himself in the said suit that the temples were being managed by Iyengars and that the said Iyengars had leased out the lands and that from and out of such income they rendered various services, paid salary to Gurukkal and did renovation work in the temples; this admission cut at the very root of the concept of the hereditary right of the trusteeship of the plaintiff; the alleged document of lease referred to in para 9 of the plaint and the judgment in O.S.No.58 of 1952 would not show that the plaintiff and his ancestors were in exclusive management of the suit temples in the capacity of hereditary trustees; the lease deed was only a self styled and self serving document; likewise the judgment in O.S.No.58 of 1952 did not confer any right of hereditary trusteeship either over the plaintiff or his ancestors; on the other hand, the said judgment disclosed that one Chinnaperumal Pillai and the plaintiff were directed to render accounts to the Inamdars (Iyengars) failing which they could be removed from the management of the temples; the judgment and decree in the said suit wreck the plaintiff’s case of hereditary trusteeship; Peyar Thevar, stated to be the grandfather of the plaintiff, was cultivating the temples lands of warm basis; when the said Iyengars gave up the management of the temples to the villagers due to infight amidst themselves, the said Peyar Thevar and other villagers stepped into the administration of the temples; the said fact had been admitted by the plaintiff in O.A.No.101 of 1976 before the seventh defendant; the plaintiff did not produce any material document to establish his case of hereditary trusteeship; the claim in the plaint that he had acquired a vested right of management over the temples both from his ancestors as well as by virtue of the judgment in O.S.No.58 of 1952 was absolutely incorrect and misleading; after the suit temples were brought under the control of the H.R. & C.E. Department, the ninth defendant published a notice calling for applications for appointment of non-hereditary trustees; the plaintiff himself sent an application on 8.12.1974 for appointing him as non-hereditary trustee; the ninth defendant appointed the plaintiff as non-hereditary trustee for three years by his order in R.Dis.No.9110/70, dated 10.7.1975; during the tenure of his office as non-hereditary trustee, the Act 24 of 1976 came into force, by virtue of the said Act, he ceased to be a non-hereditary trustee; as per provisions of the said Act, the Village Munsif was appointed as fit person to the suit temples by the ninth defendant and the plaintiff was asked to handover the charge of the temples; accordingly, he handed over the charge to the fit person; after handing over the charge of the temples, he filed an application before the seventh defendant under Sec.63(b) of the Act; during the pendency of the main application, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory application praying to appoint one Muthuramalingama family member of the plaintiff, as fit person of the suit temples, even though the said Muthuramalingam was appointed as fit person, he did not take charge of the temples from the Village Munsif; it is false to say that the charge of the temples and their properties were handed over to Muthuramalingam; as per the definition under Sec.6(11) of the Act, the office of the hereditary trusteeship should devolve either by hereditary right or it should be regulated by usage or it should be specifically provided for by the founder; one of the said ingredients was established by the plaintiff; further, there was no satisfactory proof of exclusive management of the temples by the plaintiff’s family; on the other hand, there was a lot of evidence to show that third parties had also participated in the management of the temples; the authorities under the Act had passed their orders as per land and their orders were perfectly legal and valid, the other allegations regarding non grant of permission to the plaintiff to cross-examine the Inspector, H.R. & C.E., and that the order of the eight defendant was not a speaking order, were all incorrect; sufficient opportunity was given to the plaintiff, but, it was not properly availed of by him; having failed to prove his case beyond doubt, it was not proper on the part of the plaintiff simply to blame defendants 7 and 8; the orders passed by the defendants 7 and 8 were not liable to be set aside; because of the long standing dispute between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6, the entire management of the temples was now jeopardized; any delay in appointing trustees would cause considerable hardship and prejudice to the management of the temples; the plaintiff was estopped from questioning the administrative action of the Department in appointing trustees as per Secs.47 and 49 of the Act; the suit was also barred by limitation; there was no cause of action; the suit was liable to be dismissed. 6. The tenth defendant filed a written statement denying the various allegations made in the plaint. He practically reiterated the various contentions raised in the other written statement. It is not necessary to repeat them. 7. The learned Subordinate Judge, Ramanathapuram, framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for? (2) What the relief he is entitled? The learned Subordinate Judge framed an additional issue on 10.8.198, namely- “Whether it is true that the plaintiff and his ancestors had managed the suit temples as hereditary trustees?” 8. On the side of the plaintiffs, Exs.A-1 to A-7 were marked. The plaintiff, besides examining himself as P.W.1 examined two other witnesses, P.Ws.2 and 3. On the side of the defendants, the first defendant was examined as D.W.1, the fourth defendant as D.W.2 and one Balakrishnan as D.W.3. 9. On the materials placed, the learned Subordinate Judge found, as follows:In the document Ex.A-1 of the year 1905, which is a registered lease deed, there was reference to one Peyar Thevar, son of Nagalinga Thevar, as hereditary trustee; the document had been executed at a time when there were no disputes, that it was totally unnecessary to refer to Peyar Thevar as hereditary trustee in a lease deed unless he was the hereditary trustee; it was also not shown that Peyar Thevar was hereditary trustee in respect of any other temple; it had also been admitted by the first defendant in his evidence that Peyar Thevar, mentioned in Ex.A-1 was the plaintiff’s grandfather; Ex.B-1 is a letter dated 5.8.1966 written by the plaintiff to the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Ramanathapuram, wherein it was stated that he and the third defendant were trustees of the temples and that the Department should not act of on the representations given by their enemies; and, in Ex.B-2 it had been stated that the suit temples were being run for maniyams as also for mahajanams. According to the learned Judge, this would not by itself show that the suit temples belonged to the villagers; before there was change of hands of the properties from Iyengars to the Muslims, there was no warrant for relying on Ex.B-2 it had been admitted by the first defendant that Peyar Thevar was managing the suit temples on behalf of the villagers; but, there was nothing to show that it was really so; the firth defendant admitted in para 3 of his written statement that the suit temples were in the management of the plaintiff for a long number of years; the fifth defendant was a party in O.A.No.101 of 1976 before the Deputy Commissioner; the order being Ex.A-15; the fifth defendant had admitted in the statement before the Deputy Commissioner that the Plaintiff was managing the suit temples from 1952; in Ex.B-12 report, dated 7.11.1979 it had been stated that the plaintiff was the hereditary trustee and it had also been stated that the plaintiff was helping the fit person; it is also stated in the report that there was no objection that the plaintiff was managing the temples hereditarily; Ex.B-12 was entitled to considerable weight; this report had not been properly examined by the Deputy Commissioner; the Inspector had been examined as D.W.3 in the present proceedings; after the report, Act No.26 of 1976 came to be passed and hereditary management was abolished, and village Munsif and Karnam were directed to take over the management; even when his father was alive, the plaintiff had taken over the management and this was the reason given by the Deputy Commissioner for holding that any hereditary right, the plaintiff claimed, was affected by this statement; this had clearly over looked Ex.B-8, dated 7.8.1966, wherein the third defendant had written to the Assistant Commissioner stating that the plaintiff and himself were the trustees and some enemies were trying to create problems and loss to them; S.Subramania Pillai v. Velinintra Vinayagar, Soolapidari Amman, Sudalai Madaswamy, Mudivikanku Amman, Kankayan Kandan Sastha Deity, Variyoor, Kaniyakumari Village, Agasteeswaran Taluk, Kanniyakumari District represented by its trustees, (1981)2 M.L.J. 77, clearly showed that: “When the members of a particular family alone were exercising rights of trusteeship, it would fall under the category of hereditary trustee...... the mere fact that a member of the family acted as a trustee even before his father’s elder brother, does not in any manner affect the hereditary principle governing the trusteeship....” In that view, the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. 10. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeal as follows: The evidence on record does not warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff is a hereditary trustee. The lower Court failed to note that the plaintiff was put in management of the temples along with the third defendant for the first time by virtue of the decree in O.S.No.58 of 1952 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Ramanathapuram. The very same decree declares that the plaintiff and the third defendant were liable to be removed if they did not manage properly. The learned Judge had not properly understood the scope of the suit in O.S.No.58 of 1952, and it was for partition of Samudhayam lands in the Dharmasanam village of Kuzhiendal, filed by a Muslim co-sharer and the temple lands were also included in the subject matter. The entire proceedings in that suit proved that the temples’ management was with the villagers and at the time of that suit it was with one Venkatarama Iyengar. The very fact that the plaintiff and his witnesses had admitted that the management of the temples was formerly with Iyengars, would clearly disprove his case. There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the plaintiff’s father was a trustee at any point of time. The learned Judged erred in relying upon Ex.A-1, the lease document, over looking that the recitals were self serving. Ex.A-1 purported to deal with the private properties of Peyar Thevar and there was no occasion for referring to the temples management. The non production of the patta or the inam documents, which would have thrown light on the subject, would only lead to an adverse inference against the plaintiff. The evidence on the side of the plaintiff’s witnesses ought not to have been accepted. Having accepted his appointment as trustee by the Department, the plaintiff is estopped from claiming hereditary trusteeship. The report of the Inspector, H.R. & C.E., is not conclusive to prove the plaintiff’s right as hereditary trustee. The plaintiff has not placed enough material to substantiate the hereditary trusteeship as defined under Sec.6(11) of the Act. Having accepted his appointment as trustee by the Department, the plaintiff is estopped from claiming hereditary trusteeship. The report of the Inspector, H.R. & C.E., is not conclusive to prove the plaintiff’s right as hereditary trustee. The plaintiff has not placed enough material to substantiate the hereditary trusteeship as defined under Sec.6(11) of the Act. 11.Per contra, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that Ex.A-1 had come into existence at a time when there was no dispute between the parties and it was entitled to much weight. The lower Court was well within its right to place reliance on Ex.A-1. The mere submission of an application by the plaintiff for appointment as trustee would not militate against the case that he was a hereditary trustee. In O.S.No.58 of 1952, the plaintiff’s right as hereditary trustee had been recognised and the lower Court has rightly found that there was no embargo for a junior member of the family to act as managing trustee while a senior member was there. The admission by the first defendant as D.W.1 would clearly show that the plaintiff was the hereditary trustee. 12. Ex.A-1, no doubt, shows that one Peyar Thevar was the managing trustee of the temple in the year 1905. Peyar Thevr had been admitted to be the plaintiff’s grandfather by D.W.1. Indeed, there was no reason to hold that, at the time such a recital was made in Ex.A-1, there was some motive behind it. This, however, by itself, will not conclude the question. Under Sec.6(11) of the Act, it is required that the continuity must be there. There should not be any break in the continuity. There is, absolutely, no material to show, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the plaintiff’s father acted as trustee at any point of time. There is a break in the chain. From 1905 till the plaintiff started claiming right as hereditary trustee, there was nothing to show that the hereditary trusteeship had continued in the family. The scope of the suit O.S.No.58 of 1952 had been totally misunderstood by the lower Court. That was a partition suit among the samuthayaatharm and it was a vague compromise. 13. Two of the issues framed are relevant for our purpose. The second issue, whether the properties endowed for the Ayyanar Koil and Tirupuvaneswara Swami Temple are liable to be partitioned? That was a partition suit among the samuthayaatharm and it was a vague compromise. 13. Two of the issues framed are relevant for our purpose. The second issue, whether the properties endowed for the Ayyanar Koil and Tirupuvaneswara Swami Temple are liable to be partitioned? and the fourth issue, who is to manage the properties endowed to the temple? The learned District Munsif, Ramanathapuram, held that items 7 to 10 and 16 and 17 were to be enjoyed for the benefit of Thirubuvaneswarar temple and Ayyanar temple. In issue No.4, this is what he has stated: “The plaintiff deposed that defendants 1 and 4 should manage the properties. The other defendants have not chosen to repudiate this claim or suggest any alternative means. Therefore, I hold under this issue that defendants 1 and 4 shall manage the items endowed to the temples of Tirupuvaneswara Swami and Ayyanar. They shall render accounts to the inamdars. They are also liable to be removed if they fail to discharge their duties.” 14. It is also significant to note that the present plaintiff was the fourth defendant in that suit. His father was the second defendant. The first defendant was Chinniah Pillai alias Chinnaperumal Pillai. The plaintiff’s counsel reported to instructions and he was set ex parte. Still, on the deposition of the plaintiff in that suit, the learned District Munsif directed that the first and the fourth defendants to manage the items endowed to the temples. When this was pointed out to him, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that the plaintiff’s father Nagalinga Thevar was the second defendant in the suit and that would show that the present plaintiff’s counsel reporting no instructions would not affect his right. I do not agree. The plaintiff in that suit had absolutely no locus standi to say that defendants 1 and 4 in that suit should manage the properties and it was very strange for the District Munsif to have passed an order on the basis of such a deposition by the plaintiff. No doubt, the learned District Munsif has observed that the other defendants had not chosen to repudiate this claim or suggest any alternative means. The learned District Munsif also observed that the plaintiff and the first defendant in that suit/present third defendant were liable to be removed if they have failed to discharge their duties. No doubt, the learned District Munsif has observed that the other defendants had not chosen to repudiate this claim or suggest any alternative means. The learned District Munsif also observed that the plaintiff and the first defendant in that suit/present third defendant were liable to be removed if they have failed to discharge their duties. On the basis of that decree, the plaintiff cannot set up any hereditary right. The fact remains that it has not been proved that the plaintiff’s father exercised any rights of trusteeship after Peyar Thevar. 15. Ex.B-4 is a preliminary report submitted by the Inspector, H.R. & C.E. on 29.1.1966. In column 5, it is stated that the plaintiff and the third defendant herein were managing the temples. Against column 8 it is stated that the trustees were not hereditary trustees. 16. Ex.B-1 is a letter from the plaintiff to the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Ramanathapuram at Madurai, stating that Chinna Perumal Pillai and himself were managing the temples as trustees, that their enemies had created problems by sending petitions and that on the basis of those petitions no action should be taken against them. There is no claim made in this communication that the plaintiff was the hereditary trustee. In fact in the from address he has claimed to be a trustee and hereditary trustee. On 7.8.1966, an identical letter, Ex.B-8, was sent by the third defendant to the Assistant Commissioner. 17. Ex.B-24 statements dt.30.1.1972 given by the plaintiff and the third defendant. It is stated that Sri Thirubuvaneswarar temple had been in their management for over 30 years and before them their fathers were managing the temple. Before their fathers, the temple was in the management of the villagers. It was a Dharmasanam village. The senior proprietor one Ramakrishnan Iyengar was managing the temple. Only the senior proprietor, as per the village custom, would be referred to as Mahajanam. The said Ramakrishna Iyengar did not issue and there was no brahmin family in the said village. Even during his lifetime, Ramakrishna Iyengar sold away his personal properties and left the place, and thereafter one by name Mohammedan Ishaq, who had purchased the maximum shares, filed a suit showing the temple grounds as Samudhayam lands and sought partition in O.S.No.58 of 1952. Even during his lifetime, Ramakrishna Iyengar sold away his personal properties and left the place, and thereafter one by name Mohammedan Ishaq, who had purchased the maximum shares, filed a suit showing the temple grounds as Samudhayam lands and sought partition in O.S.No.58 of 1952. The plaintiff and the third defendant had been impleaded as fourth and first defendants respectively in that suit and they filed their written statement and resisted the suit and in that suit there was a decree passed directing them to manage the temple and its properties, and as per the terms of the decree, they had been managing the temple and its properties, and since the temple management had been with them from the time of their respective fathers, they filed a petition in O.A.No.8 of 1968 under Sec.63(b) of the Act for declaration as hereditary trustees and for want of documents they withdrew the original application, and since then they had sufficient supporting documents, they were planning to file a petition once again under Sec.63(b) of the Act. This statement was recorded on 30.1.1972 before the Inspector, H.R. & C.E., Ramanathapuram. There is no reference to the plaintiff’s grandfather being in management and on the contrary the statement is based on the decree in O.S.No.58 of 1952. On 19.2.1973, under Ex.B-9, H.R. & C.E. Department (Administration) sent a communication to the Panchayat President, Kumuzhenthal Village, stating that applications were invited for the post of trustees for Sri Bhuvaneshwarar temple in Kumuzhenthal village and applications had to reach the office of the Assistant Commissioner on or before 30.3.1973. The communication also mentioned about the eligibility and qualifications, with which we are not concerned. On 10.5.1975, under Ex.B-10, an order was passed by the Assistant Commissioner, appointing the plaintiff as trustee for the temple in question for a period of three years. Thereafter, O.A.Mo.101 of 1976 came to be filed by the plaintiff. Only for the first time the plaintiff then claimed that the management was hereditarily in the hands of his family. In the enquiry before the Deputy Commissioner, Ex.A-1, dated 19.10.1905 was produced, but it was not accepted and the plaintiff’s claim was rejected. It is also stated in that order that the second defendant in O.S.No.58 of 1952 was the present plaintiff’s father Nagalinga Thevar and he himself had stated before the Court that the temple was being managed by Venkatarama Iyengar. It is also stated in that order that the second defendant in O.S.No.58 of 1952 was the present plaintiff’s father Nagalinga Thevar and he himself had stated before the Court that the temple was being managed by Venkatarama Iyengar. Chella Perumal/ third defendant in the present suit, who was aged 80, had filed an affidavit before the Deputy Commissioner stating that the present plaintiff had no hereditary right and that the management was vested in common with the villagers. Ultimately, while dismissing the petition, the Deputy Commissioner observed as follows: “However, the petitioner’s family is found to have been associated with the temple for long meriting a representation in the trust Board for the management of the temple but it is for the administrative authorities to consider”. The plaintiff filed an appeal in A.P.No.17 of 1981. The appellate authority, namely the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., found that the plaintiff and his predecessors were not in exclusive management. The very opening paragraph of his appeal under Sec.63(b) runs as follows: “Sri Thirubuvaneswarar temple and Ayyanar temple at Kumalendal village are an ancient temples established by the villagers with the help of the Rajah of Ramnad for the people of the area.” The above admission of the plaintiff in the view of the Commissioner would constitute sufficient material to reject the claim for hereditary trusteeship. The evidence of Nagalinga Thevar himself in that suit had been marked as Ex.A-3 before the H.R. & C.E. Department where he had admitted that the temple was being managed by Venkatarama Iyengar. The statement made by the plaintiff’s father would bind the plaintiff also and before the Department, Chelliah Thevar had also filed an affidavit questioning the alleged right of the plaintiff. Thus, in the absence of any satisfactory proof of exclusive management of any satisfactory proof of exclusive management of the temple by the plaintiff’s family, he was not entitled to any declaration. The learned Subordinate Judge was clearly in error in holding that the plaintiff had established that he was the hereditary trustee for the suit temple. The finding by the trial Court is based on surmises and conjectures and not based on legally acceptable evidence and is patently contrary to law. The reasons given by the lower Court are totally unsatisfactory and cannot be sustained. 18. The plaintiff has not explained the break in the chain. The finding by the trial Court is based on surmises and conjectures and not based on legally acceptable evidence and is patently contrary to law. The reasons given by the lower Court are totally unsatisfactory and cannot be sustained. 18. The plaintiff has not explained the break in the chain. No material is produced to show that his father was ever in management as hereditary trustee. The mere finding that from 1952 he had been managing the temples and their properties would not clothe him with any hereditary right. The ingredients necessary for getting declaration had not been satisfactory established. He had himself applied to the department and got himself appointed as trustee. The very many communications sent by him also do not show that he had claimed any right as hereditary trustee. He had also accepted his appointment and waived his right if any as hereditary trustee. The appeals will stand allowed. The judgment and the decree of the lower Court are set aside. The suit O.S.No.85 of 1952 is dismissed. No costs.