Judgment Rajesh Balia, J.-These nine (sic ten?) appeals arise out of the proceedings which have a chequered history. All the respondents in these appeals claim to be admitted as tenants on the agricultural land situated in the erstwhile Jagir of Chhatargarh in the erstwhile State of Bikaner, now in the Bikaner district. The lands-fall within the area irrigated by the Rajasthan Canal (now known as Indira Gandhi Canal). The Jagir of Chhatargarh was resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, on 23rd of August, 1954. It was the case of the respondents that they were regularly paying the rent to the erstwhile Jagirdars and, thereafter, they have paid the rent to the State Government. According to them, after the resumption of Chhatargarh Jagir, they became tenants of the State Government by operation of the provisions of Section 9 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1952’) and consequently the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for Short, ‘the Act, 1955’) came into force from 15th October, 1955 and they became Khatedar tenants under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. It was further the case of the respondents that prior the the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, they were governed by the Tenenacy Act of the Bikaner State concerning the tenancy rights in the land in question and which according to them, were heritable and transferable. In 1958, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was amended and Section 15-A was inserted envisaging that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 13 or Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, 1955 or any other law for the time being in force, or in any lease, patta or other document, land in the Rajasthan Canal area leased out on any terms whatsoever shall be deemed to have been let out temporarily within the meaning of the proviso to the said sub-section of Section 15 of the Act and no Khatedari rights shall accrue or shall be deemed ever to have accrued in any such land leased out as aforesaid. 2. In the first instance, on challenge to validity of Section 15-A by a number of persons, it was held to be ultra vires by this Court in (1) Jassuram & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1963 Raj 72. 2. In the first instance, on challenge to validity of Section 15-A by a number of persons, it was held to be ultra vires by this Court in (1) Jassuram & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1963 Raj 72. Thereafter the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was included in Schedule IX of the Constitution and the Revenue Authorities refused to recognise the Khatedari rights of the persons in land or the area falling within the territory of Rajasthan Canal and treated those occupants as trespassers, as a result of which proceedings under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 or Section 22 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act were initiated against some of the persons and standing crops of some of the tenants were attached. 3. In theback-drop, 492 writ petitions were filed before this Court between 1969 and 1972 which included the petitions fifed by the respondents in these appeals respectively, challenging the validity of Section 15-A of the Act of 1955 on various grounds and for quashing the proceedings taken for their eviction as unauthorised occupants under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act/Rajasthan Colonisation Act, by holding them to be Khatedar tenants under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. These petitions, in the first instance, came to be decided by a learned Single Judge (Hon’ble V.F Tyagi. J.) by a common order dated 18th April, 1972. The learned Single Judge upheld the validity of Section 1 5A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The learned Single judge further directed all the petitioners to hand over the land to the State Government, soon after the then standing crop is harvested by them and left the State Government free to take action in respect of those lands in accordance with the provisions of the law, for that purpose. These directions were issued on the premise that the petitioners, while obtaining the interim orders, who were in possession of the land in question had given a definite undertaking that if their petitions were dismissed by this Court, they will hand over the lands to the State Government with the standing crops. 4. Aggrieved with this order, as many as 285 appeals were preferred before the Division Bench which came to be decided on 20th January, 1973. Said Judgment is reported in (2) Jugal Kishore & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1973 RLW 250). 4. Aggrieved with this order, as many as 285 appeals were preferred before the Division Bench which came to be decided on 20th January, 1973. Said Judgment is reported in (2) Jugal Kishore & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1973 RLW 250). While affirming the Judgment of the learned Single Judge about the validity of Section 15A, that part of the order by which the petitioners were directed to hand over the possession to the State Government on dismissal of the writ petitions, after harvesting the standing crops, was modified by directing that that part of the learned Single Judge which proceeds on the basis of the assumed undertaking given by the appellants is set aside, because there appears to be some factual error. At no point of time, the appellants gave any undertaking to hand over the possession of the land’. Along with that the Court also ordered that the proceedings under Section 22 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act in the 14 appeals detailed in Schedule ‘B’ of the Judgment be set aside and quashed and allowed the appeals, in part, by further directing that if the appellants are to be evicted from the land in question, they shall be evicted in accordance with law. No interference was made in proceedings pending under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act by holding that it requires number of questions of fact including of nature of rights and continued possession which may be decided in appropriate proceedings under law for determining such issues. Total number of cases in which proceedings under Section 22 of Colonisation Act were pending were 14 and in which proceedings under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act were pending were 13. Thus, out of 285 appeals, proceedings for eviction were only in respect of 27 cases. Aggrieved with the Judgment passed by the Division Bench, the appellants preferred appeals before Supreme Court. 5. During the pendency of the appeals and special leave petitions, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was further amended and Section 15-AAA was enacted with effect from 29th December, 1979, making the provision for conferring Khatedari rights in cases covered by Section 15-A of the Act. In view of changed circumstances, the appeals and special appeals pending before the Supreme Court were dismissed as having become infructuous on 31st July, 1986. In view of changed circumstances, the appeals and special appeals pending before the Supreme Court were dismissed as having become infructuous on 31st July, 1986. The Court observed that - “we do not think and valid reason exists for differing from the reasoning and conclusion reached by the High Court in upholding the constitutional validity of Section iSA of the Act.” The Court further observed that -“the appellants and petitioners shall, however, be at liberty to move the Prescribed Authority under the Act for grant of such relief under Section 15AAA of the Act to which they may be entitled within four weeks from today.” 6. Pursuant to these observations, the application under Section 15AAA of the Act of 1955 were filed by a number of persons including the respondents non-petitioners in respect of the area situated in Chhattargarh (erstwhile Jagir of Chhattargarh and Sattasar). 7. The case of the applicants was that they were tenants of erstwhile Jagirdar and paying rent to him. In support of their claim, they have produced a photocopy of certified copy of Dhalbach and ‘Khatauni Darmiyani’ for the relevant period. It was also urged that in the proceedings to which reference has been made hereinabove, this Court has recorded a categorical finding that the applicants are to be treated as ‘Ghair Khatedars’ and not trespassers. These findings bind the State and Revenue Authorities as a finding recorded between the parties. It was also claimed that the right of applicants are transferable and heritable and that they are in continuous possession of the land in question since the commencement of Act of 1955 until making of the applications. A certificate of Gram Panchayat was also produced in support of the applicants’ claim as tenant and continuous possession of the said land. 8. TheState denied all the claim. It was stated that records relied on by the applicants were prepared falsely by the erstwhile Jagirdar and cannot be relied on to sustain their claims. It was urged that most of the applicants were trespassers and have encroached upon the land later on during the pendency of petitions challenging the validity of Section iSA to said (sic?) along with those petitioners who had come to the Court on the basis of their entire possession. It was urged that most of the applicants were trespassers and have encroached upon the land later on during the pendency of petitions challenging the validity of Section iSA to said (sic?) along with those petitioners who had come to the Court on the basis of their entire possession. The State also urged that no such issue as for existence of rights of the applicants at the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was raised and determined by the High Court in earlier proceedings. Therefore, no benefit can be derived there from by the applicants, to claim their status as tenant of erstwhile Jagirdar at the commencement of Act of 1955. One fact also needs to be noticed here that it is the case of the State from beginning that an investigation is going with the alleged fabrication or interpolation in the record of erstwhile Jagirdar by C.I.D./C.B.I. It is also not in dispute that no result of such investigation has been placed on record despite requests made in this behalf or that whether any conclusion has been reached by the investigating agency against the genuineness or otherwise of the originals in question, which is alleged to have been seized from the custody of the Colonisation Department. 9. These applications were disposed of by the Assistant Collector through different set of orders. Some applications were dismissed by order dated 12.87, which was affirmed by the Board of Revenue by its order dated 17.96. Out of the said order, one writ petition, filed by Basant Kumar as Writ Petition No. 2535/96, has been admitted and is pending consideration before this Court. The present group of petitions does not fall in that category. Another set of applications were dismissed by order dated 18.1.88 by the Assistant Collector. That order of the Assistant Collector was affirmed by the Board of Revenue by its order dated 29.89. No challenge was made to that order. The third set of applications were rejected by the Assistant Collector vide his order dated 11.86, with which we are concerned. 10. That order of the Assistant Collector was affirmed by the Board of Revenue by its order dated 29.89. No challenge was made to that order. The third set of applications were rejected by the Assistant Collector vide his order dated 11.86, with which we are concerned. 10. TheAssistant Collector, after recording the contentions raised by the respective parties, rejected the claim of the applicants to be treated as Gair Khatedars at the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, on the basis of the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge of this Court in (3) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1474/69 and 491 other connected matters, on 18th April, 1972, as approved by the Division Bench in Jugal Kishore’s case, referred to above, on the ground that the finding has been recorded by the High Court about the Gair Khatedari status of the applicants without considering the merits of their claim and it is, therefore, not binding. On the basis of the report submitted by the Tehsildar he refused the request of the applicants to call for the original Tehsildar’s report, there is no need to summon the original record. While refusing to summon original record of which the documents filed by the applicant purported to be copies, he also refused to admit the copies in evidence about their status as tenant vis-a-vis Jagirdar on the basis of that record. However, it may be noticed here that as a fact, it has never been disputed that these entries so exist in those records. What has been the case of the present appellants is that the records in which the entries exist appear to be fabricated and tampered with and, therefore, documents emanating therefrom cannot be relied on. He also found that continuous possession of the applicants since the commencement of the Act has not been established and the possession of the applicants under interim orders passed by the Courts cannot be considered to be in juridical possession which can be taken note of That erstwhile Jagirdar has manipulated and constructed unwarranted and irrelevant record in order to secure better compensation of the land situated in Rajasthan Canal area. He also held against heritable and transferable nature of rights claimed by the applicant. With these conclusions, he rejected all the applications. 11. He also held against heritable and transferable nature of rights claimed by the applicant. With these conclusions, he rejected all the applications. 11. Appeals against this order was preferred before the Revenue Appellate Authority, who by his order dated 8.89, accepted the appeals by upholding the claim of the applicants that they were tenants of the erstwhile Jagirdar at the time of commencement of the Act of 1955 within the meaning of Section 15AAA of the Act and were entitled to be conferred with the Khatedari rights. For coming to this conclusion, reliance was placed on certain findings recorded by this Court in its Judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as Judgment given by the Division Bench refereed to above. .12. Aggrieved with the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, revisions were preferred by the State before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue by its Judgment dated 12th June, 1998, upheld the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority. For reaching its finding that the applicants were tenants or the erstwhile .Jagirdar of Chhattargarh at the commencement of the Act of 1955 and fulfil other conditions as envisaged therein, it heavily relied on the Judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench, referred to above, to which we shall presently refer to. The Board of Revenue, while considering the question whether the documents filed by the applicants in support of their claim could be admitted in evidence, categorically recorded that the Assistant Collector was not justified in refusing to call the record on the ground that the report of the Tehsildar has been received and noticed that the State Government was repeatedly asked whether any report has been submitted about the result of investigation in question of fabrication or falsity of the record in question or any report has been submitted by the investigating agency of the State Government. However, this was not responded. No such report or material was produced before the Board of Revenue to suggest that the original record has been found to be of suspicious character. The Board also required specifically from the learned counsel for the State that they produce the seizure memo of the record and Supurdgi memo of return of the record. However, this was not responded. No such report or material was produced before the Board of Revenue to suggest that the original record has been found to be of suspicious character. The Board also required specifically from the learned counsel for the State that they produce the seizure memo of the record and Supurdgi memo of return of the record. It was stated by the State counsel that the C.B.I. has seized the record from the custody of the Colonisation Department and the seizure memo shall be produced after obtaining the same from the Colonisation Department, but the same was not produced before the Board until the decision was rendered. It was also noticed by the Board that certified copies of the record, photostat copies of which have been produced in these proceedings, it is in custody of the C.B.I. and that in spite of repeated requests for issuing certified copies, the same are not issued to the applicants. In these circumstances, the Board held the photostat copies produced by the present respondents are admissible in evidence as secondary evidence, and refused to draw any inference that the original record is of suspicious character, for want of any evidence disagreeing with the finding recorded by the Assistant Collector in that regard. 13. Aggrieved with the orders passed by the Board of Revenue, affirming the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, the State has preferred the writ petitions which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge [Judgment dated 8.99 reported in 2000(1) RLR 300]. Hence, these appeals. 14. A great deal of controversy is centered around as to what finding has been recorded in the earlier proceedings between the parties by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1747/69 (sic 1474/69 ?), along with 491 other similar writ petitions and the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeals arising therefrom, referred to above. 15. The Assistant Collector has refused to look into the finding recorded by the High Court on the ground that finding does not appear to have been recorded, after considering the matter on merit. 10.16. Such comments, in our opinion, were inaptly expressed, to say the least. It conveys that though such finding exists but does not bind him. 15. The Assistant Collector has refused to look into the finding recorded by the High Court on the ground that finding does not appear to have been recorded, after considering the matter on merit. 10.16. Such comments, in our opinion, were inaptly expressed, to say the least. It conveys that though such finding exists but does not bind him. It is not open for any Authority, except the Authority reviewing such order having jurisdiction to do so in appropriate proceedings, to sit over the Judgment s of the judicial Courts by side-lining it on the ground that the Court has not given its finding, after considering the same on merit. Whether the Court has arrived at the finding rightly or wrongly, if it has attained the finality, it is binding on the parties, and the parties cannot resile from it; and in the subsequent proceedings, the authorities before whom any proceedings take place have also to treat those findings as binding on the parties and give effect to it. It is not for the Court/Tribunal, in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties to deviate from it and reach its own conclusion differently by holding earlier decision to be erroneous. Permitting that would be negating the rule of law. 117. However, that would not detract from considering what finding actually has been recorded by the Court on earlier occasion which can be held binding. .18. The Revenue Appellate Authority as well as the Board of Revenue has primarily based their findings about the rights of the applicants as tenants at the time of commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, because it is the foundation for proceeding further in the enquiry in the application under Section 15-AAA for recognising the applicant as Khatedar tenant that applicant must be a tenant under the relevant law at the time of commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, along with other conditions, which we shall refer to at the appropriate stage. The findings on which the core of contention rests was recorded by the learned Single Judge of this Court in his Judgment , which reads as under :-- .“That the Khatedari rights which the petitioners claim to have acquired after 1955 were extinguished and the petitioners held the land by virtue of the provisions of Section iSA as temporary lessee in the capacity of the Ghair Khatedar tenants.” 119. Itis on the aforesaid finding the applicants have claimed that since their claim as Gair Khatedar tenants under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 has been accepted by the High Court, they are entitled to be declared as holding Khatedari rights under Section 15-AAA as they were in continuous possession of the land in question since the commencement of the Act of 1955. According to the applicants, this finding has been affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in the following terms as under:-The learned Single Judge has treated the petitioners as persons to whom the lands had been leased out temporarily. In our opinion, that conclusion is correct because that precisely is the language of Section iSA or any other law for the time being in force or any lease, patta or other document, land in Rajasthan Canal area leased out on any terms whatsoever shall be deemed to have been let out temporarily within the meaning of the proviso to the said sub-section of the said Section 15 of the Tenancy Act”. 20. Then the Division Bench further stated that the question is whether the appellants could be treated as trespassers. The petitioners claim to have been admitted to tenancy by the former Jagirdars and in many cases land revenue was collected by the State from them. The learned Single Judge has given them the label of Ghair Khatedar tenants. We are unable to call the appellants as trespassers nor did the learned Single Judge considered them to be so. The law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. The possession of the trespasser is never judicial and never protected by law while the possession of the erstwhile tenant is judicial and he can only be ejected in accordance with the process of law.” 21. The law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant. The possession of the trespasser is never judicial and never protected by law while the possession of the erstwhile tenant is judicial and he can only be ejected in accordance with the process of law.” 21. Thelearned Advocate General has contended that these findings cannot be read out of context and nowhere either the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench has decided the controversy raised on facts by the present petitioners appellants before us, that the petitioners in the earlier litigation, as well as the respondents in the present litigation were tenants with transferable and heritable rights at the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, necessary precondition for recognising or declaring the petitioners as having acquired Khatedari rights in the land in question in Rajasthan Canal by operation of Section 15-AAA of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 22. This is apart from the controversy raised about the admissibility of the documents produced by the applicants along with their applications before the Assistant Collector to support their claim to the existing Tenancy Act on the date the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force. 23. On the other hand, Mr. L.R. Mehta and Mr. B.L. Purohit has contended that after considering the entire material and context in the earlier petitions, in which precisely the same issue was raised whether the petitioners were Khatedar tenants and entitled to hold Khatedari rights in the land in question even after insertion of Section 15-A in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act by an amending Act in 1958. The learned Single Judge has categorically held all the petitioners before the Court to be Ghair Khatedar tenants and, therefore, the status of the respondents applicants as Ghair Khatedar tenants at the commencement of the Act of 1955 must be taken to be binding between the parties and not liable to be investigated by the Revenue Appellate Authorities. 24. Asstated earlier, there will be need to look into the question raised and decided in those proceedings. However, before we do that, it will be necessary to look into the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act for the present purposes to understand the issues always in former proceedings and proceedings at hand in proper perspective. 25. 24. Asstated earlier, there will be need to look into the question raised and decided in those proceedings. However, before we do that, it will be necessary to look into the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act for the present purposes to understand the issues always in former proceedings and proceedings at hand in proper perspective. 25. When the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, was brought into force on 110.1955 as a step forward towards agrarian reform by recognising the right of tiller to cultivate the land, it was provided under Section 15 of the Act that every such person shall be a Khatedar Who at the commencement of the Act is- .(i) a tenant of land otherwise than as a sub-tenant; or .(ii) a tenant of Khudkasht; or (iii) who thereafter is admitted .(a) as a tenant otherwise than a sub-tenant, or .(b) tenant of Khudkasht or .(c) an allottee of land in accordance with Rules framed under Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 or .(d) who acquires Khatedari Rights in land according to the provisions of Act of 1955 or .(e) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 or .(1) any other law for the time being in force. 26. However, no Khatedari rights were to accrue under Section 15 to any person to whom land is or has been allotted in Gang Canal, Bhakra, Chambal or Jawai Project areas notified in this behalf by the State Governmen 27. There was no inhibition against recognising/acquiring Khatedari rights in land in Rajasthan Canal now Known as Indira Gandhi Canal area. 28. However, inhibiting the acquisition of Khatedari rights in Indira Gandhi Canal Area, special provisions were made in Tenancy Act by inserting Section 15-A vide Rajasthan Act No. 6 of 1958 as amended from time to time. Section 15A was made operative retrospectively with effect from the date of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Sub-section (1) envisaged that notwithstanding provisions of Section 13 or 15 of the Act or any other law for the time being in force of any terms in any lease Patta or other document, such lands shall be deemed to have been let out temporarily as in the case of areas of Gang Canal, Bhakra Chambal or Jawai Project notified in this behalf under proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Act. It further envisaged that no Khatedari rights to accrue in the Indira Gandhi Canal area. Said provision was in the first instance declared to be ultra vires the Constitution and void. However, the Tenancy Act was placed in IX Schedule of Constitution and it fell beyond the judicial review on the touch stone of violation of Part III of the Constitution. 29. At the same time under Sub-section (2) of Section 15A it was provided that a person who claimed to be in possession of , and in enjoyment of Khatedari rights if any/and falling in Sub-section (1) because it has been let out of his permanently before commencement could apply for declaration to that effect in accordance with Section 15 (5) of the Act. Thus, rights of permanent allottees prior to the date of commencement of Act of 1955 were excepted from the operation of Section 15A, subject to a declaration made under Section 15 (5) of the Act of 1955. However, any other rights which could have been Otherwise considered good for recognition as Khatedar tenant under Section 15(1) were relegated to position of holding temporary lease, loosing their status as Khatedar. 30. By inserting proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section iSA vide Act No. 65 of 1962 w.e.f 312.61, the acquisition of Khatedari rights accruing under Colonisation (General Colony) Conditions 1955 or in accordance with other statement of conditions or rules of allotment and sale of Government land made under Section 7 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 or in accordance with Rules for allotment of land for Khudkasht in the Indira Gandhi Canal area under the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952 were saved from the operation of Section iSA (1). 5.31. It is in the aforesaid scenario the persons claiming as tenant of erstwhile Jagirdar of Chhatargarh and Sattasar had first approached this Court under Article 226 for declaring Section iSA to be ultra vires and declaration that they are Khatedars, because they were tenants of erstwhile Jagirdar at the commencement of the Act of 1955 and became Khatedar tenant under Section 15 of the Act of 1955 on commencement of said Act, of which status they are deprived of because of impugned provisions. 6.32. 6.32. While said proceedings were pending, Section 15-AAA had been inserted w.e.f 112.79, which was a non-obstante clause to operate notwithstanding any provision contained in Section 1 5A about recognitionldeclaration of Khatedari rights in Rajasthan Canal area which were not to accrue in terms of Section iSA, though could so accrue or had accrued in terms of Sections 13 and 15 of the Act of 1955. It may here be noticed that Sub-section (2) of Section iSA had already carved out as exception to Sub-section (1) of that Section by permitting the permanent lessees prior to commencement of Act, were still permitted to make an application for declaration of their status under Section 15(5) of the Act. 7.33. Supreme Court having noted said provisions, had dismissed the claimant’s appeals as having become infructuous in view of said provision but permitted the appellants to approach appropriate authority by moving applications under Section 15-AAA for recognition of rights claimed by them. However, the Court upheld the Judgment of Rajasthan High Court declaring Section iSA to be a valid piece of Legislation. 8.34. With the above background of controversy and existing provisions under the Tenancy Act, it becomes relevant that Scheme of Section 15-AAA be examined. 9.35. At this juncture it would be appropriate to refer the provisions of Section 15AAA of the Act of 1955. It reads as under :--“15-AAA. Accrual of Khatedari Rights in Indra Gandhi Canal Area - .(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 15A, any person who, at the commencement of this Act, - .(a) wasa holder of Khudkasht or any occupany tenant or a Maurusidar or a Khatedar tenant or a tenant with transferable and heritable rights and was recorded as such in the Annual Register then current, or .(b) wasnot so recorded, but was a holder of Khudkasht or an occupancy tenant or a Maurusidar or a Khatedar tenant or a tenant with transferable and heritable rights, shall, as from the date of the commencement of this Act, be entitled to the rights, and subject to all the liabilities of a Khatedar tenant under this Act. .(2) Every person claiming that the rights mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) accrued to him shall within one year of the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1979 and on the payment of a Court fee of Fifty paise, apply to the Assistant Collector having jurisdiction, or to any other authority as may be prescribed by the State Government from time to time, for declaration that he acquired Khatedari rights under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) in the land held by him as the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 15 shall apply to such application. (2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 15-A, any person who was a holder of Khudkasht or a tenant of land otherwise than as a sub-tenant or tenant of Khudkasht within the Indira Gandhi Canal area, whether recorded as such at the commencement of this Act or subsequently in the record or rights prepared during the survey or re-survey and record operations conducted under Sections 106 and 107 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act No. 15 of 1956), shall be entitled to all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities, of a Khatedar tenant under this Act, with respect to the whole or such part of the land held as does not exceed the maximum in area of land which he is entitled to hold in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (Rajasthan Act No. 11 of 1973). .(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), any person who, at the commencement of this Act - .(a) wasa tenant of land otherwise than as a sub-tenant or tenant of Khudkasht and was recorded as such in the annual registers then current, or .(b) wasnot so recorded, but was tenant of land otherwise than as a sub-tenant or tenant of Khudkasht, and was in continuous possession of the land as such tenant upto the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, shall on an application being made in such form and in such manner as may be pres