JUDGMENT R. K. PATRA, J. — This is a petition filed by the petitioner for issue of a writ of habeas corpus and for quashing and setting aside his detention under the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The District Magistrate, Sundargarh in exercise of power conferred upon him under Sec. 3 (1)(a)(b)(i)(ii) read with Sub-sec. 2 (a) of the Act passed an order on 13.9.2000 at Annexure-1 directing that the petitioner be detained as it was necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. The order was served on him on 16.9.2000 and he was detained on the same day in the Special Jail, Bonaigarh. 2. The order of detention is founded on the following grounds : (i) The petitioner as the Secretary of Fuljhar Grama Panchayat sold rice meant for poor B. P. L. card-holders (controlled com¬modities) in blackmarket. (ii) On verification of the B. P. L. ration cards of the consum¬ers of Fuljhar, Badajala, Dhanijam, Falginia, Upperginia etc. villages of Fuljhar Grama Panchayat and villages of Mahulpada, Rengali, Lunga, Dalsisora of Mahulpada Grama Panchayat, it was found that he has black-marketed 243 quintals of B. P. L. rice lifted on 25.2.1999 for Fuljhar and Badjal Centres. The above stock was lifted against the allotment of February, 1999. (iii) He has lifted 112 quintals of B. P. L. rice on 11.11.1999 for Badjal Center and 118 quintals of B. P. L. rice on 14.11.1999 for Fuljhar Center against the allotment of November, 1999 and blackmarketed the entire 230 quintals of B. P. L. rice thereby poor mostly tribal consumers were deprived of getting the B. P. L. rice in November, 1999 in Fuljhar Grama Panchayat. (iv) Mahulpada Grama Panchayat was tagged with Fuljhar Grama Panchayat since May, 1999 for distribution of B. P. L. rice. A stock of 107 quintals of B. P. L. rice of Mahulpada and Rengali Centers against the allotment of November, 1999 which was lifted by him on 10.12.1999 also was blackmarketed by him. (v) He has manipulated the MR No. A/206 by way of using two separate money receipts of Sri. A stock of 107 quintals of B. P. L. rice of Mahulpada and Rengali Centers against the allotment of November, 1999 which was lifted by him on 10.12.1999 also was blackmarketed by him. (v) He has manipulated the MR No. A/206 by way of using two separate money receipts of Sri. R. K. Agrawal putting same MR Number in different dates i.e. on 11.11.1999 for 112 quintals of B. P. L. rice for Badjala Center and 112 quintals of B. P. L. rice on 16.11.1999 for Mahulpada Center. But during verification he has not shown the original money receipt dated 11.11.1999 issued by Sri N. K. Agrawal for 234. (vi) Thus the total stock of 580 quintals of B. P. L. rice was black-marketed and misappropriated by him for his personal gain, although the stock was meant for public distribution of the B. P. L. card-holders. 3. Shri Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions in support of the writ petition: (1) There was no ground existing on 13.9.2000 when the order of detention was made; (2) The transactions allegedly took place in February, 1999 and November, 1999 and the order of detention was made ten months thereafter. In absence of any fresh complaint in the interregnum, the conclusion of the detaining authority that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, has no rationality; (3) The detaining authority acted in excess of his jurisdiction in detaining the petitioner under the preventive law when he can be prosecuted for alleged black-marketing of the essential commod¬ities; (4) The petitioner was denied the opportunity of being repre¬sented through a friend before the Advisory Board; and (5) There has been delay in disposal of his representation by the Central Government. 4. Contention No. (1) : It is contended by Shri Mohanty that the District Magis¬trate sent the grounds of detention to the State Government on 17.9.2000, i.e., four days after the order of detention was made. This indicates that the ground for detention of the petitioner were non-existent when the order of detention was made on 13.9.2000. This contention is based on over-statement of facts. This indicates that the ground for detention of the petitioner were non-existent when the order of detention was made on 13.9.2000. This contention is based on over-statement of facts. In order to satisfy ourselves in the matter, we directed the learned Additional Government Advocate to produce the relevant file from the District Magistrate which he has duly done. On perusal of the file, we find that the Sub-Collector, Bonai and the Civil Supplies Officer, Sundargarh submitted a joint report dated 1.9.2000 to the District Magistrate indicating the irregu¬larities committed by the petitioner in supply of B. P. L. rice in Fuljhar and Mahulpada Grama Panchayats. On 13.9.2000, the District Magistrate passed orders which read as follows : “Perused the report of the Sub-Collector, Bonai and CS0, Sundargarh submitted jointly regarding misappropriation of 580 quintals of BPL rice by one Kalandi Charan Dash, S/o. late Daya¬nidhi Das, Village-Dhudi, P. O. Khuntagaon, P. 8. Lahunipada, Dist. Sundargarh. It is necessary to detain Sri. Kalandi Ch. Dash under the provisions of PBMS of EC Act, 1980 from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community.” On the basis of the said order in the files, Order No. 1984/C. dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure-1) was issued, Sub-sec. (1) read with Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the Act empowers the District Magistrate to make an order directing a person to be detained if he is satisfied with respect to that person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the communi¬ty, it is necessary to do so. The satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is his subjec¬tive satisfaction. From the file produced before us, we find that there was basic material, i.e. joint report of the Sub-Collector and the Civil Supplies Officer before the District Magistrate to form the requisite opinion. It is, therefore, not a case where there was no basis for the subjective satisfaction of the Dis¬trict Magistrate. The contention of the learned counsel in this regard is obviously based on his misconception with regard to the connotation of ‘materials’ and ‘grounds of detention’ which expression finds place in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel in this regard is obviously based on his misconception with regard to the connotation of ‘materials’ and ‘grounds of detention’ which expression finds place in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. 'Grounds' means the conclusions arrived at by the detaining authority from the ‘materials’ which persuaded it to pass the detention order. It may be seen that the District Magistrate although passed order of detention on 13.9.2000, the order was executed on the petitioner on 16.9.2000. So, it is only after his physical detention, the question of complying with the formalities like reporting the fact of his detention together with the grounds to the State Government and communication of the grounds of detention to him arose. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 re¬quires the detaining authority to forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made along with other particulars having bearing on the matter. From the file produced before us, we find that on the date (16.9.2000) the petitioner was detained, the District Magis¬trate sent a fax message to the State Government in the Food Supplies and Consumer Welfare Department intimating about the detention. On the next day in letter No. 2038/C dated 17.9.2000 the District Magistrate sent the order of detention, grounds of detention, joint inquiry report of the Sub-Collector and Civil Supplies Officer to the State Government. After consideration, the Government by its order dated 21.9.2000 approved the deten¬tion order. As stated above, there was ‘basic material’ available before the District Magistrate to pass the order of detention on 13.9.2000. Therefore, merely because on 17.9.2000 the District Magistrate reported to the State Government about the detention together with the grounds of detention, it cannot be held that on 13.9.2000 when the order of detention was passed, there was no material to form the requisite opinion. 5. Contention Nos. (2) and (3) : Both the contentions being interlinked are taken together for consideration. It has been stated above that the Sub-Collector and the Civil Supplies Officer in their joint report dated 1.9.2000 indicated lot of irregularities and misappropria¬tion committed by the petitioner as Secretary of Grama Panchayat in supply (non-supply) of B. P. L. rice to the consumers. (2) and (3) : Both the contentions being interlinked are taken together for consideration. It has been stated above that the Sub-Collector and the Civil Supplies Officer in their joint report dated 1.9.2000 indicated lot of irregularities and misappropria¬tion committed by the petitioner as Secretary of Grama Panchayat in supply (non-supply) of B. P. L. rice to the consumers. On the basis of the said joint report, the District Magistrate on being subjectively satisfied passed the order of detention on13.9.2000. The past is predictor of the future. The District Magistrate by applying this commonsense canon thought that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies of commodities essential to the community, it is neces¬sary to detain him under the Act. In the counter affidavit the District Magistrate has asserted that the petitioner as the Grama Panchayat Secretary enjoys considerable influence in the area and can manipulate entries of ration cards of the consumers and in view of his part conduct, there is every possibility of indulging himself in such a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of sup¬plies of commodities essential to the community. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Shri Shiv Ratan Mokim v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 610 that there can be no hard and fast rule as to what is the length of time which should be regarded sufficient to snap the nexus between the incident and the order of detention. On the facts and circumstances, the detention cannot be invalidated merely because the transaction had taken place about ten months after. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection by referring to a Bench decision of this Court in Sesadab Das v. District Magistrate, Sundargarh, 1990 Cri.L.J. 2261 submitted that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the aspect whether the petitioner would indulge in future in prejudicial activities. In that case, the detenu was an Inspector of Co-operative Societies and by virtue of his office he held on deputa¬tion the post of Secretary, Regional Co-operative Marketing Society. In course of inspection, huge shortage of stock of essential commodities was detected which led the detaining au¬thority to detain him under the Act. In that case, the detenu was an Inspector of Co-operative Societies and by virtue of his office he held on deputa¬tion the post of Secretary, Regional Co-operative Marketing Society. In course of inspection, huge shortage of stock of essential commodities was detected which led the detaining au¬thority to detain him under the Act. By the time the order of detention was made the detenu had been placed under suspension as Inspector of Co-operative Societies and he was divested of the post of Secretary of the Regional Co-operative Marketing Society. He had thus no scope to deal with essential commodities and in the circumstances there was no possibility of his indulgence in black-marketing of essential commodities in future. This aspect having not been taken into consideration by the detaining author¬ity, this Court invalidated the detention order. The facts of that case are quite different from the facts and circumstances of the present one. Therefore, the said case is of little assistance to the petitioner. Equally untenable is the contention that merely because criminal prosecution has been launched against the petitioner, he cannot be detained under the Act. The purpose of preventive detention is different from conviction and punishment and, therefore, the order of detention cannot be declared bad merely because criminal prosecution can be instituted and/or is instituted. 6. Contention No. (4); It has been stated in paragraph 21 of the writ petition that on 24.10.2000 the petitioner was produced before the Advisory Board and since he was not well versed with the provisions of law, he made a written prayer for allowing his friend to appear and make an effective representation but the prayer was rejected by the Advisory Board. To our query, Shri Mohanty admitted that the said ‘friend’ of the petitioner is an advocate. The question whether a legal practitioner and such legal practitioner as a friend can appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenu came up for consideration before the Consti¬tution Bench of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 , In paragraph-39 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as follows : “To read the right of legal representation in Article 22 (5) is straining the language of that article. Clause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of deten¬tion and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be effective, but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board merely because by S. 10 of the National Security Act, the representation made by the detenu is required to be forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration. If any¬thing, the effect of Sec. 11 (4) of the Act, which conforms to Art. 2 (3) (b), is that the detenu cannot appear before the Advi¬sory Board through a legal practitioner. The written representa¬tion of the detenu does not have to be expatiated upon by a legal practitioner.” In paragraph-94, their Lordships observed as follows : "We must, therefore, hold regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceeding before the Advisory Board ........" In paragraph-95 their Lordships held that the detenu is entitled to be assisted by a friend before the Advisory Board if that ‘friend’ is in truth and substance is not a legal practi¬tioner (emphasis supplied). The same question whether the detenu’s friend who happens to be a legal practitioner can represent the detenu before the Advisory Board came up for examination before a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v. The Adminis¬trator of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1982 SC 1029 . After taking note of the above mentioned observation in A. K. Roy’s case (supra), in concluding sub-para 1 of para-11, the question was answered as follows : “In other words, a 'friend' who, in truth and substance is a friend of the detenu may appear for the detenu but if such a ‘friend’ also happens to be a legal practitioner, he cannot, as of right, appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenu.” This being the legal position, the Advisory Board rightly reject¬ed the prayer of the petitioner to be represented by an advocate qua friend before it. 7. 7. Contention No. (5) : It is now well settled that the question whether the repre¬sentation of a detenu has been dealt with all reasonable prompt¬ness and diligence is to be decided not by application of any rigid or inflexible rule or strict formulae nor by mere arith¬metical counting of dates. It has to be decided by careful scru¬tiny of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Chin¬nappa Reddy, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Mst. L. H. S. Umma Saleema v. B. B. Gujral, AIR 1981 SC 1191 (vide para 7 of the judgment) observed : “.... We do not doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as observed by one of us in Francis Capolie Mullin v. W. C. Khambra, (1980) 8 SCR 1095 : ( AIR 1980 SC 849 ), “The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive”. The occasional observation made by this Court that each day’s delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasize the expedition with which the representa¬tion must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. Law deals with the facts of life. In view, as in life, there are invariable absolutes. Neither life nor law can be reduced to mere but despotic formulae....” The ratio of the aforesaid case was followed by the Supreme Court in many cases including Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 176 . At this stage, we may profitably refer to anoth¬er decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Shri Manilal Singhania, AIR 1976 SC 456 . In that case, the representa¬tion of the detenu was made on 21.10.1974 and the State Govern¬ment rejected it on 12.11.1974. The Court found that during this intervening period, the Secretariat was closed for Puja holidays and the Chief Minister was absent from headquarters between 7.11.1974 and 12.11.1974 and she attended to the representation immediately on her return to the headquarters. The explanation submitted on behalf of the Government with regard to delay in disposal of the representation was accepted. The Court found that during this intervening period, the Secretariat was closed for Puja holidays and the Chief Minister was absent from headquarters between 7.11.1974 and 12.11.1974 and she attended to the representation immediately on her return to the headquarters. The explanation submitted on behalf of the Government with regard to delay in disposal of the representation was accepted. Their Lordships observed that Court would have to consider judicially in each case on the available material whether the gap between the re¬ceipt of the representation and its consideration by the Govern¬ment is so unreasonably long and the explanation offered by the Government for the delay so unsatisfactory as to render the detention order thereafter illegal. Keeping the aforesaid legal position in view, let us turn to the facts of the case. The Under Secretary in the Department of Consumer Affairs, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government of India has filed counter affidavit stating that the petitioner’s representation dated 18.10.2000 was received by the Central Government on 23.10.2000 and the concerned section on 24.10.2000. As the representation was in Oriya, the State Government was requested to furnish the English version thereof by telegram dated 24.10.2000 to enable it to consider the same. On our direc¬tion the Additional Government Advocate also produced before us the file of the State Government (Food Supplies and Consumer Welfare Department). On perusal of the said file, we find that the aforesaid telegram of the Central Government was received in the concerned department of the State Government on 27.10.2000. It was diarised on 30.10.2000. Order was taken from the Under Secretary to prepare the English version of the representation on 1.11.2000. On 2.11.2000 the English version was prepared and on the same day (2.11.2000), it was sent to the Central Government in letter No. 30039 dated 2.11.2000. It may be noted that in the meanwhile on 1.11.2000, the Central Government had sent a remind¬er to the State Government to send the English version of the representation. From the counter affidavit of the Central Govern¬ment, we find that the English version of the representation was received by them on 6.11.2000. After considering the representa¬tion along with other relevant records, order was made by the competent authority on 7.11.2000 rejecting the representation. The said order was conveyed to the Superintendent of Special Sub-Jail Bonaigarh by telegram dated 7.11.2000. From the counter affidavit of the Central Govern¬ment, we find that the English version of the representation was received by them on 6.11.2000. After considering the representa¬tion along with other relevant records, order was made by the competent authority on 7.11.2000 rejecting the representation. The said order was conveyed to the Superintendent of Special Sub-Jail Bonaigarh by telegram dated 7.11.2000. From the facts stated above, we have no hesitation to hold that the representation of the petitioner was duly considered by the Central Government with promptitude and diligence and there was no remissness on its part in the matter. 8. No other point was urged by Shri Mohanty in support of the writ petition. 9. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. Hence, it is dismissed. CH. P. K. MISRA, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.