JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ.—A short but interesting question of law arises for consideration before me in the present revision petition filed by the petitioner-judgment-debtor. 2. Necessary facts for resolving the controversy in the present revision may now be stated; One Surinder Kumar son of Brahma Nand resident of village Ani, Tehsil Ani District Kullu filed a suit against Partap Chand, son of Brahma Nand, resident of village Ani and against Baran Dass, son of Thaplu in the Court of Sub Judge, Rampur Bushehr being Case No. 30-1 of 1980 for declaration and possession of land admeasuring 10 biswas comprised in Khasra No. 3752/859 Khewat Khatauni 479/701 min situated in Phati Pranali Kothi Sirigarh, District Kullu and also for mandatory injunction directing the defendant No. 1 to remove super structure and flour mill constructed by him on the suit land and to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the land to the plaintiff. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 inter alia contending that there was collusion between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 (who admitted the claim of the plaintiff) and, hence, the suit was not maintainable. It was also contended by him that defendant No. 2 agreed to sell suit land to him and defendant No. 1 in pursuance of the said. agreement, paid Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1 was put in possession by defendant No. 2. He was, therefore protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant No. 2, thereafter, had no right to sell suit property to the plaintiff. Alternatively defendant No.1 contended that if the plaintiff is held entitled to decree for possession, he may be awarded Rs. 29,000 from the plaintiff. 3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed necessary issues. By a judgment and decree, dated March 12, 1984, the trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled.to possession of suit property. The contention of defendant No. 1 that he was protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was negatived. The Court, however, held that the defendant No. 1 was entitled to Rs. 29,000 and the plaintiff was directed to pay the said amount to defendant No.1. 4. In paragraph 28 of the judgment, the trial Court stated : "Suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed subject to payment of Rs. The Court, however, held that the defendant No. 1 was entitled to Rs. 29,000 and the plaintiff was directed to pay the said amount to defendant No.1. 4. In paragraph 28 of the judgment, the trial Court stated : "Suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed subject to payment of Rs. 29,000 the compensation for the constructions and machine and flour mill, which has been installed by defendant No. 1 over the suit land. After the payment of Rs. 29,000, the plaintiff shall be entitled to get the same. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly and file after completion be consigned to record room." 5. In accordance with the operative part of the judgment, decree was passed. 6. It is not in dispute by and between the parties that defendant No. 1 had accepted the judgment and decree and did not prefer appeal against that part of the decree under which the possession of the suit property was to be delivered to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, who was asked to pay Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1, did not accept the said direction and preferred an appeal before the District Court, Shimla which came to be decided by the Additional District Judge (II), Shimla on July 7, 1986. The Additional District Judge allowed the appeal, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff for possession and set aside the decree of the trial Court. Consequently, the appeal was also dismissed. 7. Obviously, the plaintiff felt aggrieved by the decree of the first appellate Court and approached this Court by filing Regular Second Appeal No. 321 of 1986. The learned Single Judge of this Court by a judgment dated July 31, 1996, allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and remanded the case for fresh decision on merits in accordance with law, keeping in mind the observations made in the judgment. It is also not in dispute that on December 6, 1996, three appellant withdrew his appeal which he had filed against that part of the decree under which he was ordered to pay Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1. Meanwhile, however, on July 15, 1998, the plaintiff filed a petition for execution of decree for possession, which was passed by the trial Court on March 12,1984 against the defendants. It is also undisputed that an amount of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1. Meanwhile, however, on July 15, 1998, the plaintiff filed a petition for execution of decree for possession, which was passed by the trial Court on March 12,1984 against the defendants. It is also undisputed that an amount of Rs. 29,000 was deposited by the plaintiff on December 15, 1998. 8. In execution petition No. 29-10 of 1997/1996, which was filed by the plaintiff-decree holder on July 15, 1998, notice was issued to the defendant-judgment debtor. Three objections were raised on behalf of the present petitioner. Firstly, the execution application filed by the decree holder was beyond, the period of limitation. Secondly, the judgment-debtor was protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and no decree for possession could have been passed against him and he could not be directed to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the property to the plaintiff decree holder. Thirdly, the amount of Rs. 29,000 which was ordered to be deposited by the plaintiff was not deposited by him and, hence, decree could not be executed. 9. The executing Court rejected all the three contentions advanced by the petitioner-judgment debtor and by an order dated September 11, 1998 impugned in the present revision, dismissed the objection-petition. It is that order, which is challenged by the judgment debtor in the present revision petition. 10. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. All the three objections raised before the executing Court were reiterated before me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-judgment-debtor. 11. So far as applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, the learned Counsel for the judgment debtor fairly conceded that when the said objection was not upheld by the trial Court in the suit and defendant No. 1 judgment debtor had not challenged that part of the decree, it was not open to him to challenge that finding now in the execution proceedings. It, therefore, cannot be said that the executing Court had committed an error of law or of jurisdiction in rejecting the said contention. The first contention, therefore, has no force and cannot be upheld. 12. Regarding payment of Rs. It, therefore, cannot be said that the executing Court had committed an error of law or of jurisdiction in rejecting the said contention. The first contention, therefore, has no force and cannot be upheld. 12. Regarding payment of Rs. 29,000, though the Executing Court rejected the objection raised on behalf of the judgment debtor, as on today, the contention has become more or less academic inasmuch as after the order passed by the Executing Court on September 11, 1998, the decree-holder had already made payment of Rs. 29,000. In my opinion, therefore, no grievance can now be made by the judgment debtor so far as that direction is concerned. 13. The contention which was vehemently pressed in service before this Court is whether the execution application instituted by the decree holder on July 15, 1998 could be said to be within the period of limitation. 14. The learned Counsel for the judgment debtor contended that the decree was passed on March 12, 1984. By the said decree, the plaintiff was held entitled to possession. He could, therefore, have executed that part of the decree. It was submitted that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), such execution application ought to have been filed within a period of twelve years from the date the decree became executable. Article 136 of the under : Act reads as "136. For the execution of any decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court Twelve years When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment of delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place : Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation." 15. The counsel submitted that an execution petition was filed in July, 1998 but by that time, twelve years were over. It was, therefore, bared by the law of limitation and ought to have been dismissed only on that ground without entering into the merits of the matter. The counsel submitted that an execution petition was filed in July, 1998 but by that time, twelve years were over. It was, therefore, bared by the law of limitation and ought to have been dismissed only on that ground without entering into the merits of the matter. As it was not done, the executing Court committed jurisdictional error, which deserves to be interfered with and corrected by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 115 of the Code. 16. The contention of the learned Counsel for the decree holder, on the other hand, was that the time would start to run only after the appeal filed by the decree holder before the first appellate court was withdrawn on December 6, 1996 and as the execution petition was filed within less than two years, it was not hit by Article 136 of the Limitation Act and the executing Court was right in treating the execution petition within limitation. 17. A moot question which arises for consideration of this Court is as to when the period of limitation started; from the date of decree passed by the trial Court on March 12,1984 as contended by the judgment-debtor, or from the date of withdrawal of appeal before the first appellate Court on December 6, 1996 as submitted by the decree-holder. 18. According to the judgment debtor, when the decree was passed by the trial Court on March 12, 1984, it was full, complete and executable. No doubt, the plaintiff decree holder was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 29,000, to defendant No. 1 but the decree could not be said to be incomplete or conditional. It was therefore, obligatory for the decree holder to execute the decree within the period of limitation even if he was aggrieved by a part of the decree by which he was asked to pay some amount. 19. In this connection, my attention was invited by the learned Counsel to a decision of the Supreme Court in Yashwant Devorao v. Walchand Ramchand, AIR 1951 SC 16. In that case, suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the Court and the defendant was ordered to pay Rs. 1,12,215 to the plaintiff. In the decree, however, it was mentioned that since the plaintiff had not paid the requisite amount of Court fees, he should pay the deficit amount of Court fees. In that case, suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the Court and the defendant was ordered to pay Rs. 1,12,215 to the plaintiff. In the decree, however, it was mentioned that since the plaintiff had not paid the requisite amount of Court fees, he should pay the deficit amount of Court fees. The decree holder filed an execution application after twelve years from the date of decree but within twelve years from the payment of deficit Court fees. It was contended on behalf of the judgment debtor that the execution petition was time barred. On behalf of decree holder it was submitted that the execution petition was within the period of limitation relying on the fact that the deficit amount of Court fees was paid on December 5, 1935 and from that date, the limitation would start running. Negativing the contention and holding execution, petition to be barred by time, the Apex Court observed: "That the decree was not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen on the fulfilment of which alone, it could be executed. The payment of Court fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of Decree holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it now and then and, therefore, it was capable of execution from the very date it was passed." (Emphasis supplied) 20. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the judgment debtor that the ratio in Yashwant Deorao, applies to instant case also. In their Lordships opinion, a decree can be said to be conditional one if "some extraneous event is to happen on fulfilment of which alone, it could be executed." The counsel submitted that no such extraneous event has been contemplated by the decree in the present case, on the fulfilment of which alone, the decree was to become executable. It could be executed there and then only. Only thing required to be done by the decree holder was to deposit an amount of Rs. 29,000. In other words, the decree was not conditional decree. Payment of Rs. 29,000 by the decree holder was merely an enabling provision in the direction of execution of decree. It was for the decree holder to get the decree executed by paying/depositing Rs. 29,000. When he failed to comply with that direction, he could not contend that the decree was not executable. Payment of Rs. 29,000 by the decree holder was merely an enabling provision in the direction of execution of decree. It was for the decree holder to get the decree executed by paying/depositing Rs. 29,000. When he failed to comply with that direction, he could not contend that the decree was not executable. A decree, which was otherwise executable but no proceedings were initiated by the decree holder within the period prescribed by law, would fall within the mischief of Article 136 of the Act and the executing Court ought to have upheld the preliminary objection raised by the judgment debtor. 21. Alternatively, it was argued that the decree holder was not entitled to exclusion of period under Section 15 of the Act. 22. On behalf of the decree holder, it was contended that the execution petition was within time and was not hit by Article 136 of the Act. It was submitted that the time started running from the date the plaintiff-decree holder withdrew his appeal in 1996. 23. So far as exclusion is concerned, the learned Counsel for the decree holder conceded that case of the decree holder was not of exclusion. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss the said point and the judgment cited at the Bar on that point. 24. In my opinion, the learned Counsel for the decree holder is right in submitting that the execution application was not barred by limitation. From the record, it is clear that the decree was one and the same. No doubt, the trial Court decreed the suit for possession filed by the plaintiff but with the same pen and ink, it directed the plaintiff to pay an amount of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1. When the petitioner had a grievance against that part of the decree and he was of the view that no such direction could have been issued and the plaintiff could not have been directed to pay Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1, it was open to him to challenge that part of the decree, which he did. 25. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff-decree holder could have executed the decree by making payment of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1 judgment-debtor as per the direction in the decree. 29,000 to defendant No. 1, it was open to him to challenge that part of the decree, which he did. 25. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff-decree holder could have executed the decree by making payment of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1 judgment-debtor as per the direction in the decree. The question, in my opinion, is not whether the decree holder could have taken execution proceedings or not, but if he has challenged the other part of the decree by preferring an appeal and the proceedings were pending, can it be said that execution petition was barred by limitation even if it was filed by the decree holder within twelve years from the disposal (in the instant case withdrawal) of the appeal? In my judgment, the answer must be in the negative. 26. It is not in dispute that against a decree directing the plaintiff to pay an amount of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1, the former filed an appeal in the District Court and then against the decree of the District Court, he approached this Court. Second appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the first appellate Court. Ultimately, on December 6, 1996, the decree holder (original plaintiff) withdrew his appeal. The submission made on behalf of the decree holder, therefore, in my opinion, deserves to be accepted that the time started to run from December 6, 1996, when he withdrew appeal from the first appellate Court. It is, therefore, not necessary to express final opinion as to whether a decree, by which a party is held entitled to possession and directed to pay some amount can be said to be conditional or not. It may, however, be noted that in Yashwant Deorao, the plaintiff had no grievance against any part of the decree. The decree was wholly in his favour and he had not challenged any part of the decree. He was directed to pay deficit court fees, but he failed to pay court fees and the decree could not be executed. 27. It may also be profitable to refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant Custodian General of Evacuee Property and another v. Lila Devi and another, AIR 1980 SC 2080. He was directed to pay deficit court fees, but he failed to pay court fees and the decree could not be executed. 27. It may also be profitable to refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant Custodian General of Evacuee Property and another v. Lila Devi and another, AIR 1980 SC 2080. In that case, a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant, which was in the following terms: "It is hereby decreed that the defendant do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 11,53,600 with interest thereon at 3 per cent per annum to the date of realisation on account of mesne profits which have been accrued since the institution of the suit subject to payment of court fees on the entire amount after deduction the court fees already paid." 28. The amount of Court fees was not paid. Execution proceedings were initiated for payment of mesne profits for which a decree was passed. It was contended by the decree holder that he was entitled to mesne profits decreed in the suit notwithstanding the payment of Court fees. The contra submission was that the decree was not executable unless the deficiency in the Court fee was made good. The question before the Court was whether the payment of Court fees was a condition of decree and decree could be said to be conditional. The Apex Court stated: "In our opinion, reference to Section 48 can be of no assistant to the appellant. The decree for payment of mesne profits cannot be said to have come into operation. It is a conditional decree. The sum decreed as mesne profits is payable to the decree holder only if the full amount of Court fees is paid to him. The decree itself embodies that stipulation. The obligation on the part of the judgment-debtor to pay the mesne profits accrues only on the satisfaction of that condition.” (Emphasis supplied) 29. In the instant case, obviously, direction was in the decree itself. The defendant No. 1 was directed to hand over possession of property to the plaintiff and the plaintiff was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1. Since the plaintiff was aggrieved by the second part of the decree and challenged that direction by filing an appeal, he could have waited till disposal of such appeal. The defendant No. 1 was directed to hand over possession of property to the plaintiff and the plaintiff was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 29,000 to defendant No. 1. Since the plaintiff was aggrieved by the second part of the decree and challenged that direction by filing an appeal, he could have waited till disposal of such appeal. He could not have got the decree executed without payment of Rs. 29,000. In such a case, in my view, time would not start to run unless the appeal was finally disposed of. 30. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor that the doctrine of merger would not apply in the instant case as decree passed by the trial Court never merged in appeal. It was submitted that an appeal filed against the second part of the decree was decided by the first appellate Court as well as by this Court but in second appeal and a remand order was passed. Such order, according to the learned Counsel for the judgment debtor, cannot be termed as "decree" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code and the doctrine of merger cannot be attracted. Moreover, after remand, the appeal was not decided on merits by the first appellate Court as the appellant withdrew it. It was, therefore, contended that considering even that eventuality, the execution application was time-barred. 31. In my opinion, the contention his no force. As the plaintiff decree holder had grievance against a part of the decree and proceedings had been initiated by him against that part, limitation would start to run only from the final outcome of the proceedings i.e. from December 6, 1996 when appeal came to be withdrawn. Admittedly, the execution petition was filed in July, 1998 i.e. within a period of twelve years from withdrawal of appeal. The execution petition was, therefore, within time and the executing Court did not commit any error in treating the execution petition within time and in deciding it in accordance with law. 32. For the foregoing reasons, the revision deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.