Judgment ( 1. ) BY this petition which is essentially under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the orders passed by the BIFR, dated April 26, 2000 (annexure P-18) and affirmed in appeal by the AAIFR, dated August 25, 2000 (annexure P-20 ). ( 2. ) IN the earlier occasion, the petitioner (referred to in the proceedings as PPL) had filed one reference (being Case No. 222 of 1998) to the BIFR under Section 15 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985, seeking a declaration that it be declared as a sick industrial company within the meaning of Section 2 (10) of the Act. This declaration was sought on the basis of the accounts in respect of the financial year ended on March 31, 1998. The BIFR by its order dated May 10, 1999 (annexure P-9), declared the petitioner (PPL) as a sick industrial company in terms of Section 3 (1) (o) of the Act (SICA ). This order was challenged by one of the leading financial institutions, i. e. , State Bank of India in appeal being Appeal No. 101 of 1999 before the AAIFR. By order dated December 7, 1999 (annexure P-ll), the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the BIFR. The effect of the appeal being allowed was -that the declaration granted by the BIFR to the petitioner (PPL) as sick industrial company no longer existed. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the appellate order of the AAIFR, filed a writ petition before this court being W. P. No. 1824 of 1999. It is pending. ( 3. ) THE petitioner then renewed their application again seeking a declaration by filing a second reference under Section 15 ibid out of which the present writ arises. This reference was filed on the strength of accounts for the financial year ended on March 31,1999. This reference was rejected on its merits by the BIFR by its order dated April 26, 2000 (annexure P-18 ). The petitioner then filed an appeal to the AAIFR. Even the appeal came to be dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated August 25, 2000 (annexure P-20 ). It is against these orders as stated supra that the present writ is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 4. ) HEARD S. C. Bagadiya, learned senior counsel for the petitioner. ( 5. Even the appeal came to be dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated August 25, 2000 (annexure P-20 ). It is against these orders as stated supra that the present writ is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 4. ) HEARD S. C. Bagadiya, learned senior counsel for the petitioner. ( 5. ) SHRI Bagadiya learned senior counsel, firstly, submitted that the impugned orders are passed essentially relying on the earlier orders of the AAIFR which is the subject-matter of W. P. No. 1824 of 1999 and hence this petition be also admitted and then finally heard along with the one that arises out of earlier proceedings. His second submission was that the approach of the two authorities in concurrently dismissing the second reference is faulty and is basically strayed away by the earlier rejection without examining independently the worth of the second reference application, which was based on the subsequent years account. Learned counsel then made an attempt to point out what mistake the authorities committed in relation to certain entries reflected in the balance-sheet on the basis of which the declaration was sought. ( 6. ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the impugned two orders, i. e. , annexures P-18 and P-20, I find no substance in any of the submissions, which were pressed into service. None of the submissions has even prima facie substance for admitting this petition much less interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 7. ) IT being a settled position of law in relation to this type of cases that every reference has to stand on its own leg and it stands on each financial year balance-sheet. In other words, the company (petitioner herein) is legally entitled to make an application (reference) every year to the BIFR, and seek a declaration that it has become a sick industrial company as contemplated under Section 2 (1) (o) ibid. An equally well settled principle is that rejection of one years reference is no bar to make an application in the next year. The BIFR has to decide the application (reference) on the strength of the balance-sheet filed in support of the application. An equally well settled principle is that rejection of one years reference is no bar to make an application in the next year. The BIFR has to decide the application (reference) on the strength of the balance-sheet filed in support of the application. It may be that an application made for one year which was rejected may be allowed in the next year by the BIFR provided a case to that effect is made out and vice versa. ( 8. ) IN view of this settled legal position, the second reference application out of which the present writ arises can be and has to be independently decided having no bearing over the earlier one. In other words, the fate of this petition, even if it goes against the petitioner, would not in any manner jeopardise the rights of petitioner while prosecuting the earlier petition and the same will be decided on its merits, whereas the present one will have to be decided on its own merits. ( 9. ) I, therefore, do not find any substance in the submissions that merely because the earlier petition is pending, this petition be also heard or decided along with the earlier one. This court will examine the correctness and legality of findings rendered by the BIFR/aaifr in the earlier petition as and when that matter comes for hearing. ( 10. ) THE other submission of learned counsel for the petitioner too has no substance. Mere perusal of two orders passed by the BIFR and the AAIFR would show that they are based on the accounts/balance-sheet of the year ending on March 31, 1999. Merely because some reference was made to earlier proceedings and the balance-sheet that does not vitiate the findings of two authorities. ( 11. ) IN my opinion, no flaw can be noticed or could be shown to this court which will result in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Both the BIFR as also the appellate authority (AAIFR) in its respective sphere and jurisdiction very correctly examined the entire issue, as to whether any case is again made out by the petitioner on the strength of balance-sheet ending on March 31, 1999, for seeking a declaration that it has become sick industrial company within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (o) ibid. After discussing the whole issue on the facts and in the light of several infirmities noted on the balance-sheet the learned member of the BIFR, and affirmed in the AAIFR had this to observe against the petitioners conduct in the entire episode : "14. The fact remains that finished goods were given to PIIL on credit and simultaneously advances were given for supply of raw material by the PIIL. This is not acceptable as a normal business transaction. Honest arms length business transactions inevitably imply that payables are adjusted against receivables when the same parties are involved in receivables and payables. When funds are parked with another company or firm in advance for the purchase of raw materials and simultaneously finished goods are given to the same company or firm on credit there is a clear picture of funds being placed with that company in order to meet its trading finance needs, and the company giving such advance for raw materials as well as finished goods on credits suffers in the long run. We totally disapprove of these dishonest and unfair practices. 15. The impugned order was passed by the BIFR, noting that the mala fides in financial year 1998 account cannot be cured or purified merely by preparing another balance-sheet for the subsequent year (in this case, as on March 31, 1999 ). We confirm the BIFRs conclusion that PPL/ promoters approached the BIFR with unclean hands. 16. The impugned order is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed. " ( 12. ) WHAT more is needed for this court except to uphold the impugned orders in its writ jurisdiction. This court is not the second appellate court for again to re-examine or reappreciate the entire accountancy factual scenario. All that was possible up to the stage of first appellate court but not thereafter. Jurisdictional error visible on the face of record alone can be corrected by this court under Article 227 but not the factual error. (Though in this case even that could not be noticed ). ( 13. ) LOOKING to the totality of the facts emerging from the record of case, I find no merit in the writ. It is accordingly dismissed in limine.