JUDGMENT 1. - The instant application has been filed by the respondent - the returned candidate, under the provisions of O. VII R. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the Code") on the ground that the election petition is barred by Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short, "Cr.P.C.") and, thus, liable to be rejected at the threshold. 2. Petitioner has filed the election petition alleging corrupt practices adopted by the respondent in the Rajasthan State Legislative Assembly Election (Makrana Constituency No. 196), wherein respondent was declared elected on 28.11.1998. The ground of challenge is based on an Appeal published on 24.11.1998, purporting to have been made by the petitioner, asking the voters to Vote & Support the respondent - returned candidate. The appeal /pamphlets so printed were distributed by the respondent and his agents at Sadar Bazar, Makrana at about 8.00 p.m. on 24.11.1998. Petitioner has urged that corrupt practices were adopted by respondent the returned candidate has materially affected the result of the election. Petitioner's case is that under Clause (4) of Section 123 (1) of the Representation of the. People Act, 1951, publication of any statement of fact by the candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of the candidate, which is false and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true in relation to a candidature or withdrawal of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election, amounts to corrupt practice. Declaration that respondent has adopted corrupt practices and the said practice was made to pursuade Muslim community not to vote in favour of the petitioner is sought with a further direction that election of the returned candidate be declared void and he be restrained from contesting the election in future after being declared disqualified with other reliefs also. 3. This application has been filed by the respondent on the ground that petitioner had filed a complaint on 24.11.1998 at about 9.30 p.m. with the Police Station, Makrana in respect of the same incident furnishing complete details thereof, i.e. printing of appeal and its circulation. Petitioner also filed a criminal complaint against the applicant alongwith 17 other persons under sections 419, 171 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Petitioner also filed a criminal complaint against the applicant alongwith 17 other persons under sections 419, 171 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. His complaint has been dismissed by the competent criminal Court after examining his witnesses vide order dated 17.8.1999, against which his "revision has also been rejected by the Court vide judgment and order dated 21.4.2001. 4. As the election petition is based on the ground of adopting corrupt practices, proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, standard of proof is the same as is required in a criminal trial i.e. petitioner has to prove the case beyond reasonable manner of doubt and as the incident/ allegations of corrupt practice are the same which had been alleged in the criminal complaint and in the revision and the same stood dismissed, the election petition is not maintainable being barred by Clause (d) of R.11 of O. VII of the Code. In Madan Kanwar v. Surendra Kumar, 1971 RLW 133, this Court held that suit for recovery of wages was barred in view of specific provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and, therefore, the application under O. VII, R.11 of the Code ought to have been allowed by the trial Court rejecting the plaint on this ground alone. The Court also rejected the contention that in such a case, the Civil Court was under an obligation to return the plaint to file before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. 5. In Khubi Lal v. Power House Karamchari Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti, Udaipur, 1973 RLW 228, this Court held that as the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act clearly bar the institution of a suit against the Co-operative Society in respect of any act touching the Constitution, Management or Business of the society, until the expiry of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar, the suit was barred before completing the said statutory period or without giving notice as required under the Statute. Similarly, in Nagar Palika, Nathdwara v. Temple Board, Nathdwara,1981 RLW 239, the Court held that if the suit barred by any law, the Court has no power or jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with the trial of the suit. 6. Similarly, in Nagar Palika, Nathdwara v. Temple Board, Nathdwara,1981 RLW 239, the Court held that if the suit barred by any law, the Court has no power or jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with the trial of the suit. 6. In view of the above Shri Parihar, learned counsel for the applicant has urged that the election petition is not maintainable as provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. bars the trial of a person once acquitted for the same offence. Thus, his application u/O.VII R.11 of the Code deserves to be allowed. 7. Mr. Acharya, learned counsel for the Election petitioner has raised the preliminary objection urging that the application under O.VII R.11 of the Code cannot be entertained at this stage as the respondent has filed the written statement to the election petition. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that once the respondent has chosen to file reply, the Court is bound to frame the issues and proceed with the trial. Submissions made by Mr. Acharya are preposterous as a similar contention has been repelled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Samar Single v. Kedar Nath & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1926 , observing that if an election petition can be summarily rejected at the threshold of the proceedings, there could no reason as why the same cannot be rejected at any subsequent stage of proceedings. Even if it is pointed out to the Court after flaming the issues that petition suffers from the basic defect and the plaint does not reveal any cause of action, it is always open to the Court to consider the application filed by the other side under O. VII R.11 of the Code even at that stage for the reason that there is no express or implied bar to consider such application at any later stage. The Code does not provide for considering such application at any particular stage only. The Court observed as under: "In the absence of any restriction placed by the statutory provision, it is open to the Court to exercise that power at any stage. While it is true that ordinarily preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of absence of cause of action should be raised by the respondents as early as possible, but if a party raises objection after filing written statement, the preliminary objection cannot be ignored. While it is true that ordinarily preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of absence of cause of action should be raised by the respondents as early as possible, but if a party raises objection after filing written statement, the preliminary objection cannot be ignored. If the election petition does not disclose any cause of action, the respondents' right to raise objection to the maintainability of the petition, or Court's power to consider the objection is not affected adversely merely because the objection is raised after filing of the written statement or framing of the issues. The Court would be acting within its jurisdiction in exercise of its power u/ Order 7, Rule 11 in rejecting the same even after settlement of the issues." 8. Thus, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that this Court can still entertain the application and decide as to whether the petition is barred by the provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. 9. There is no dispute that the criminal complaint was based on the same facts and same allegations involving same set of persons. Moreso, the complaint stood dismissed by the competent Criminal Court after examining the witnesses produced by the petitioner but without issuing process to the respondent under section 202 Cr.P.C. The revision against the order dismissing the complaint has also been dismissed. Moreso, there can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the proceedings in the election petition where corrupt practices are imputed must be regarded as of quasi-criminal in nature and standard of proof is the same as in a criminal trial. 10. Mere allegation of corrupt practices and proving the same is not enough to dislodge a returned candidate. The election petitioner must also prove that such corrupt practices have materially affected the result of the election. (Vide : Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 1201 ; and Shivajirao B. Patil Kawekar v. Vilasrao D. Deshmukh, (2000) 1 SCC 398 . 11. In Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi, (1999) 9 SCC 386 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "Charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in character. If substantiated it leads not only to the setting aside of the election of successful candidate, but also of his being disqualified to contest an election for a certain period. In Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi, (1999) 9 SCC 386 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "Charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in character. If substantiated it leads not only to the setting aside of the election of successful candidate, but also of his being disqualified to contest an election for a certain period. It may entail extinction of a person's public life and political career. A trial of an election petition though within the realm of civil law is akin to trial on a criminal charge ......... To prove charge of corrupt practice a mere preponderance of probabilities would not be enough. There would be a presumption of innocence available to the person charged. The charge shall have to be proved to the hilt, the standard of proof being the same as in a criminal trial." 12. Same view had been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed & Ors., AIR (1975) SC 290; Ram Singh & Ors. v. Col. Rain Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3 ; Manohar Joshi v. Damodar Tatyaba & Ors., (1991) 2 SCC 342 ; Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1733 ; R.P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 481 ; and V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P Thirunavukkarasu, (2000) 2 SCC 294 . 13. In the election petition, reference has been made only to the complaint filed by the petitioner with the police station. Respondent, in his application, has submitted that this Court must take the subsequent developments also into consideration and as the said complaint has already been dismissed by the competent Criminal Court and the revision against the same has also been dismissed, the election petition is barred by Section 300 Cr.P.C. and thus liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 14. Firstly, it is difficult to assume that the plaint may include the subsequent development as urged by Mr. Parihar. Even if it is so, it is very much doubtful that election petition is not maintainable in view of the fact that petitioner's complaint has been dismissed by competent criminal Court for the reason that jurisdiction of both the forums is completely different. The criminal Court cannot declare the returned candidate disqualified for contesting the election in future nor it can declare his election to be void. The criminal Court cannot declare the returned candidate disqualified for contesting the election in future nor it can declare his election to be void. It can simply hold him guilty of the alleged offences and further impose punishment on him alongwith the co-accused, if any. While in the election petition, if the allegations of corrupt practices are established, two consequences follows : (i) his election will be declared as void; and (ii) he shall be disqualified to contest or vote at any election for a period upto six years. [Vide : Patangrao Kedam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh & Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 5941. 15. The principle of issue estoppel enshrined in Section 300 Cr.P.C. is based on well-known maxim "Nemo Debet Bis Vexari Pro Una Et Eadem Causa" (It is a rule of law that a man shall not be twixe vexed for one and the same cause). An action may be defended by showing such acts which may induce the Court, on equitable grounds, to declare certain defences admissible, the effect of which, if established, may be not, in deed, to destroy the action ipso jure, but to render it ineffectual by means of the "exception" thus specially prescribed. The class of exceptions just adverted to include the "exceptio rei judicatae" from which presuma derived the plea of judgment recovered. The res-judicata is in fact, a result of the definitive sentence or decree of the Court, and is binding upon, and in general unimpeachable by the litigating parties. 16. This principle does not rest on doctrine of estoppel but embodies the well established rule of Common Law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence. The principle that has been sought to be enacted in the Section is that no man should be vexed with several trials for the offences arise out of identical acts committed by him. Where an offence has already been the subject of judicial investigation and adjudication, and there has been an acquittal and the acquittal is conclusive, it would be very dangerous principle to adopt a judgment as of guilt as not fully establishing the innocence of the accused. 17. Where an offence has already been the subject of judicial investigation and adjudication, and there has been an acquittal and the acquittal is conclusive, it would be very dangerous principle to adopt a judgment as of guilt as not fully establishing the innocence of the accused. 17. Where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused of a different or distinct offence, but it precludes the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact, when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the provisions of Section 300(2) Cr.P.C. (Vide Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, (1950) AC 458; Pritam Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415 ; P. Channappa v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, AIR 1966 Mys. 68 & Kishan Rao v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 Mys. 241 . Such a trial is barred by the principle enshrined in Article 20(2) of the Constitution, also. 18. In Kharkan & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 83 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of doctrine of "Autrefois acquit" and held that the plea thereof can be taken only when a person is tried again for the same offence or on same facts for any other offence under conditions attracting the provisions of Section 221 Cr.P.C. (Secs. 236 and 237 of Criminal Procedure Code 1898) for the reason that earlier judgment could be admissible only if it fulfils the condition laid down in Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (Judgments of Courts of Justice-when relevant). The earlier judgment could be admissible to show the parties and the decision but it may not be admissible for the purpose of relying upon and appreciation of evidence and in such a case, the principle of issue estoppel is not applicable. Same view has been reiterated in Satbir v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 2074 . 19. The earlier judgment could be admissible to show the parties and the decision but it may not be admissible for the purpose of relying upon and appreciation of evidence and in such a case, the principle of issue estoppel is not applicable. Same view has been reiterated in Satbir v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 2074 . 19. In Masud Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 284 the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on large number of its earlier judgments, particularly in Pritam Singh (supra); and Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 SC 961 and held that principle of issue estoppel applies to true criminal proceedings and it does not apply if the second proceeding is not criminal proceeding. 20. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87 , observed that application of issue estoppel concerns "as to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to up-set a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial." 21. In V. K. Agrawal v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 1106 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that doctrine of issue estoppel is not applicable in case of acquittal of an accused charged with having committed an offence punish- able under section 111 read with Section 135 of the Customs Act for his trial subsequently under the provisions of Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act. The Court further observed that such a prohibition is also not contemplated even under the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. 22. Be that as it may, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar, AIR 1960 SC 1113 ; and Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430 , examined the nature of proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C. and held that in such proceedings the accused does not come into picture at all till process is issued that he may remain present either in person or through counsel generally with a view to be informed of what is going on but he has no right to take part in the proceedings not he can be permitted to participate therein. The object of proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person flamed therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint and another object is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. In the latter case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under "An enquiry under section 202 can in no case be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the Legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry." 23. In Dr. S.S. Khanna v. Chief Secretary Patna & Anr., AIR 1983 SC 595 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an inquiry under section 202, Cr.P.C. is not in the nature of a trial, therefore, the trial does not commence unless the process is issued to the accuse. In case the complaint is rejected without issuing process, the question of application of principle of issue estoppel does not arise. The Court observed as under : "An inquiry under section 202 of the Code is not in the nature of a trial for there can be in law only one trial in respect of any offence and that a trial can commence only after process is issued to the accused. The said proceedings are not strictly proceedings between the complainant and the accused. A person against whom a complaint is filed does not become an accused until it is decided to issue process against him. Even if he participates in the proceedings under section 202 of the Code, he does so not as an accused but as a member of the public. The object of the inquiry under section 202 is the ascertainment of the foundation calling for the issue of process to the person complained against or whether it is a baseless one on which no action need be taken. The section does not require any adjudication to be made about the guilt or otherwise of the person against whom the complaint is preferred. The section does not require any adjudication to be made about the guilt or otherwise of the person against whom the complaint is preferred. Such a person cannot even be legally called to participate in the proceedings under section 202 of the Code." 24. Thus, in view of the above, a pre-requisite condition for attracting the said principle is that there has to be a definitive judgment/decree or sentence. 25. In the instant case, admittedly, process had not been issued under section 200 Cr.P.C. against the returned candidate. The complaint filed by the Election petitioner stood dismissed only after examining him and other witnesses by the Magistrate and his revision also stood dismissed. In view of the settled legal proposition, the proceedings held in this case in the Courts below cannot be held to be a trial. Such proceedings amounts to enquiry to ascertain the truth in the allegations made in the complaint, therefore, it cannot be held that the returned candidate had already faced the trial and stood acquitted. As the proceedings before the criminal Court cannot be termed to be a trial, the doctrine of issue estoppel is not applicable in the instant case and the application is liable to be rejected. The application filed u/O. VII R. 11 to dismiss the Election Petition at the threshold as the Petition is barred by the provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.Application dismissed. *******