P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE civil revision petition is filed by the unsuccessful landlady and her son as against a reversing Judgment in RA. No. 32/94 dated 23-7-1999 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad. The petitioners filed RC No. 263/ 86 on the file of Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent for the months of January and February, 1986 as per the terms of the lease deed dated 1-1-1983 and also on the ground of bona fide personal requirement and subsequently IA No. 780/90 the eviction petition was amended by adding paragraphs 5 (a) and 5 (b) seeking the eviction of tenant on two more grounds i. e. , sub-letting and acquiring alternative accommodation. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are as follows:- the revision petitioners-petitioners in RC No. 263/86 on the file of Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad are the owners of the property bearing Municipal No. 4-4-72 at Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad and the respondent is their tenant. The tenancy is monthly tenancy borne out by a lease deed executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioners dated 1-1-1983. The said lease deed is for a period of eleven months. The rent agreed is to be paid by the respondent to the petitioners is Rs. 650/- inclusive of Municipal taxes, rent for amenities such as electrical fittings and other facilities, as agreed to between the parties. The split up value of the rent payable per month is given in Schedule i! to the said lease deed. A Xerox copy of the lease deed is filed herewith. The rent is payable in advance every month on or before 5th of every month by cheque or DD regularly. The said terms and conditions of the lease deed are binding on the respondent. The respondent is irregular in payment of rents and failed to pay the rents for the months of January and February 1986 though he was directed to pay the same by the petitioners. Thus the respondent has failed to observe the terms and conditions of the lease deed of paying the rents in advance for the month and thus becoming a wilful defaulter of rents. Thus the respondent has failed to observe the terms and conditions of the lease deed of paying the rents in advance for the month and thus becoming a wilful defaulter of rents. The respondent is, therefore, liable to be evicted as a wilful defaulter having failed to pay the rents in terms of the rental agreement, in advance, on or before 5th ofthe month. The petitioner No. 2 who is the son of the petitioner No. 1 requires the said premises to carry on his own business and for that purpose, called upon the respondent to handover vacant possession of the premises by 1-3-1986. The respondent received the said notice of demand issued on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal occupation to carry on their own business, but the respondent has failed to comply with the demand made therein. The respondent has neither acknowledged receipt of the notice nor has handed over vacant possession of the premises despite the fact that the respondent is not entitled to be in occupation of the premises after the expiry of the lease by 31-12-1986. The petitioners seek eviction of the respondent on the ground of personal requirement also and pray that this Hon ble Court may be pleased to allow this petition for the same. The personal requirement of the petitioner No. 2 is bona fide, genuine and the petitioner No. 2 has no other vocation or business of his and therefore the premises is required bona fide for personal occupation. The respondent is in occupation of the demised premises as a tenant thereof. However, it is noticed since last more than six months that the respondent is never available in the shop. The third person by name Sri Balram is sitting in the shop and is carrying on the day to day business. On enquiries, the petitioners have reliably learnt the respondent has parted with the possession of the premises in favour of the said Sri Balram and has in effect sub-let the same. The respondent is receiving huge premium from the said Sri Balram. Thus the respondent is liable to be evicted on this ground also. The respondent has not obtained any permission from the petitioners to sublet the premises or any portion thereof. The respondent is receiving huge premium from the said Sri Balram. Thus the respondent is liable to be evicted on this ground also. The respondent has not obtained any permission from the petitioners to sublet the premises or any portion thereof. On enquires made by the petitioners, they have learnt that the respondent has stopped carrying on the business in the demised premises in view of he having obtained alternative accommodation. To the knowledge of the petitioners, the respondent is carrying on business in the same line elsewhere under the name and style of (1) M/s. Shandar Footwear at Abids Circle, Hyderabad and (2) M/s. Sangam Footwear at M. G. Road, Secunderabad. Thus the respondent having obtained alternative accommodation is not entitled to continue in possession of the demised premises. The respondent is hereby called upon to produce the original documents in respect of the business carried in the said premises. It is therefore submitted that the respondent is liable to be evicted on this ground also. ( 3 ) THE respondent had filed a counter denying all the allegations. It was pleaded that the demised premises has been in his occupation since 1967 and he has been carrying on business of foot wear which is the sole source of income for him and his family members and he had tendered the rents for the months of January and February, 1986 at the rate to Rs. 650/- per month, but Padma Bai, the landlady, demanded him to enhance the rent of Rs. 2,000/- per month and that he had refused to enhance the rent and the landlady also refused to receive the rent and thereafter he remitted the rents by money order for three months i. e. , January, February and March, 1986 amounting to Rs. 1,950/-, but the money order was refused and thereafter a demand draft dated 10-3-1986 for Rs. 1,950/- was also refused. It was also pleaded that time and again the rents were enhanced from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 650/- in between 1967 and 1987 and the eviction petition is thought of only with a view to enhance the rent further. The bona fide personal requirement also was specifically denied. ( 4 ) THE respondent also filed additional counter to the amended paras to the following effect. 300/- to Rs. 650/- in between 1967 and 1987 and the eviction petition is thought of only with a view to enhance the rent further. The bona fide personal requirement also was specifically denied. ( 4 ) THE respondent also filed additional counter to the amended paras to the following effect. The respondent submits that the petitioner has to succeed or fail on the strength of the case putforth originally in the year 1986 and that too on the alleged cause of action claiming the relief. The amendment sought and allowed to add paras 5 (a) and 5 (b) are contrary to the letter and spirit of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. Therefore, both the paras deserve to be ignored and relief claimed on the basis of the said paras has to be rejected. It is hit by the bar of the principles of Order II (2) CPC. The alleged amendments are not subsequent events at all giving rise to the cause of action. As regards paras 5 (a) of the petition, the petitioner has rightly pleaded that this respondent is in occupation of the demised premises as a tenant. The rest of the allegations are devoid of any merit. There is no truth whatsoever in the said averments and on their own admission they are hearsay and therefore legally untenable besides being factually incorrect. It is denied that since the last more than six months or at any time prior to that, or thereafter, until now the respondent is found to be not available in the shop. The very fact that the petitioners have categorically and correctly admitted that this respondent is in occupation of the demised premises falsify the claim and the ground now put forward for seeking eviction. It is false to contend that there is any stranger or a third person sitting in the shop and carrying on day to day business. The petitioners have told a lie to the Court. Sri Bahrain is not a third person. He has been in the employment under the respondent since a very long time prior to the filing of the eviction petition and continued to be an employee even thereafter. The petitioners have told a lie to the Court. Sri Bahrain is not a third person. He has been in the employment under the respondent since a very long time prior to the filing of the eviction petition and continued to be an employee even thereafter. As an employee, he has been doing the work entrusted to him and he has no independent existence either as an alleged sub-tenant or in any other capacity except being an employee under the respondent. The petitioners contention that on enquires they have reliably learnt that this respondent has parted with possession of the premises in favour of said Sri Balaram and has in effect sub-let the same being false, baseless without any foundation, is hereby emphatically denied. It is false to contend that this respondent is receiving huge premium or any other like sum or any part of it from the said Sri Balaram. The petitioners have narrated Cock and Bull story of their imagination. There is no truth whatsoever in their allegations. As there is no sub-tenancy, created at any time, there arises no question of obtaining permission from the petitioners. The alleged ground in para 5 (a) is after thought, falsely putforth when the petitioners after completion of their evidence and closing their side were themselves satisfied that they having failed to make out a case for eviction on any of the grounds originally pleaded. There is no likelihood of success in the case and getting the reliefs as prayed for against the respondent in the eviction case. As regards para 5 (b), the respondent submits that he is a very old tenant continuously occupying the suit premises since 1967 and that the footwear business established is his main business and the source of income. The allegations made in the para under reply as they stand are hearsay, false and devoid of any merit. It is false to contend that the respondent has stopped carrying on the business in the demised premises and that he has obtained alternative accommodation. The premises alleged to have been obtained are not alternative accommodation for the business being carried on by the respondent in the suit building. It is false to contend that the respondent has stopped carrying on the business in the demised premises and that he has obtained alternative accommodation. The premises alleged to have been obtained are not alternative accommodation for the business being carried on by the respondent in the suit building. The premises where Sangam Footwear business, M. G. Road, Secunderabad is being carried on since 1973 is not alternative accommodation nor the premises where the business Shandar Footwear at Abids Circle is being carried on since 1979 can be termed to be an alternative accommodation. The claim is also barred by lapse of time. The respondent has a large family to maintain. If a tenant opens branch offices and sister concerns while carrying on the business in the premises where originally established the business, it is idle on the part of the petitioners to contend that the tenant has secured alternative accommodation. The petitioners are put to strict proof of the allegations that the respondent has obtained alternative accommodation and that the alleged accommodation is the alternative to the suit premises. This apart, the petitioners have no cause of action to claim eviction on the alleged ground. The petitioners have been increasing the rent from time to time and the last of such increase and fresh agreement of tenancy on 1-1-1983 has been at the rate of Rs. 650/- per month inclusive of Municipal Taxes etc. The alleged cause of action if any stands waived and the petitioners have no entitlement to claim eviction on the alleged ground pleaded in the para under reply. The family circumstances compelled the respondent to expand business from time to time in order to have more income to meet the growing requirement of the family by expanding business. ( 5 ) BEFORE the learned Rent Controller, PW1 and RW1 and RW2 were examined. Exs. P1 to P3 and Exs. Rl to respondent-168 were marked and the learned Rent Controller had framed the following points for considcration:- 1. Whether the present eviction petition is not maintainable? 2. Whether the respondent had acquired alternative accommodation? 3. ( 5 ) BEFORE the learned Rent Controller, PW1 and RW1 and RW2 were examined. Exs. P1 to P3 and Exs. Rl to respondent-168 were marked and the learned Rent Controller had framed the following points for considcration:- 1. Whether the present eviction petition is not maintainable? 2. Whether the respondent had acquired alternative accommodation? 3. Whether the respondent sublet the premises to Balaram the Court of first instance on the strength of the oral and documentary evidence, had allowed the eviction petition directing the respondent to put the petitioners in possession of the demised premises within three months and the respondent aggrieved by the said order had preferred RA No. 32/ 94 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court at Hyderabad which was allowed by an order dated 23-7-1999 and aggrieved by the same, the petitioners in RC had preferred the present civil revision petition. ( 6 ) IN the appeal, the appellate authority had further examined PW] and Exs. R169 to R198 were marked and also Exs. P4 and P5, the sale deeds dated 28-8-1995 were marked. ( 7 ) HEARD both the Counsel, Sri Vilas V, Afzulpurkar, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners had mainly contended that the appellate authority had confused and had mixed up the points for consideration and had made certain observations and the findings of the appellate authority that there was waiver of statutory rights by the petitioners relating to the ground of securing alternative accommodation is totally opposed to the settled legal position and the learned Counsel also had contended that inasmuch as Balaram was an employee of the respondent-tenant it was for him to prove the same by examining the said Balaram to the effect that he was only an employee and there was no subletting and pointing out that non-examination of Balaram is fatal to the case of the petitioners, is an unsustainable finding. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on Manepalli Ankaiah Gupta v. Chunduru Venkata Anjaneya Guruprasad, 1989 (3) ALT 248 , Pendyala Venkatakrishna Rao v. Dr. B. Scetharam, 1989 (2) APLJ 269, Motamatri Surya Kameswara Rao v. Namburu Satyanarayanamma, 1997 (3) ALD 462 . The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on Manepalli Ankaiah Gupta v. Chunduru Venkata Anjaneya Guruprasad, 1989 (3) ALT 248 , Pendyala Venkatakrishna Rao v. Dr. B. Scetharam, 1989 (2) APLJ 269, Motamatri Surya Kameswara Rao v. Namburu Satyanarayanamma, 1997 (3) ALD 462 . ( 8 ) SRI Subba Rao, the learned Counsel representing the respondent-tenant had vehemently contended that the appellate authority had reversed the Judgment of the Court of first instance recording detailed reasons, especially at paragraphs 8 and 9 and also 10 to 18 of the impugned order and hence the Revisional Court need not interfere with such well-considered order. ( 9 ) THE appellate authority at paragraph-7 had observed:- "the Point to be considered in this case is whether the appellant has sublet the premises after securing alternative building to the said Balaram and whether the tenant/ appellant would be comparatively harassed in view of the passing of the order of eviction by the lower Court and if there was any legal error committed by the lower Court in not taking into account that the said Balaram was only an employee and the premises was not sublet to him during the year 1991". Again at paragraph 10, the appellate authority observed:- "the points to be considered in this case are whether there is waiver of right and so much as the landlady could not approach the Court of law for eviction earlier and there was long lapse of 17 years in preferring (he eviction case allegedly knowing about the fact of subletting of the demised premises by the tenant after the tenant acquired alternative accommodation". It is pertinent to note that there is repeated discussion about the alleged sub-tenant Balaram and his status. It is the contention of the respondent-tenant that Balaram was his employee. When the Court felt that the said Balaram is a material witness and inasmuch as neither of the parties were able to examine the said Balaram, in the fitness of things, the Court might have summoned such a material witness as a Court witness instead of making observations relating to burden of proof by misplacing such burden. No doubt this procedure of summoning a material witness as a Court witness is adopted by the Courts very rarely. However, in the present case, the appellate authority had further examined RW1 and Exs. R169 to R198 and Exs. No doubt this procedure of summoning a material witness as a Court witness is adopted by the Courts very rarely. However, in the present case, the appellate authority had further examined RW1 and Exs. R169 to R198 and Exs. P4 and P5 were also marked. It is also settled position of law that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, if they are in conflict with any of the provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 and the Rules framed thereunder, normally are made applicable even to Rent Control proceedings. Order 41, Rule 28 CPC dealing with the mode of taking additional evidence reads as follows ; "wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the Appellate Court may either take such evidence, or direct the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate Court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the Appellate Court. Order 41, Rule 29 CPC dealing with points to be defined and recorded specifics as follows: "where additional evidence is directed or allowed to be taken, the Appellate Court shall specify the points to which the evidence is to be confined, and record on its proceedings the points so specified". Where the appellate authority had permitted the further oral and documentary evidence, in the fitness of things, the appellate authority should have followed the procedure contemplated under Order 41, Rules 28 and 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Padmanabha v. Ouseph, AIR 1967 Ker. 83 , it was held that where the appellant who was examined as DW1 in the trial was recalled for examination by the appellate Court as a Court witness without recording reasons for his examination and without specifying in the proceedings the points on which the evidence should be confined it was held that the appellate Court acted in violation of Order 41, Rules 27 and 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the procedure followed by the Court was highly irregular. Order 41, Rule 29 CPC ensures that the appellate Court considers exactly on what points there is lacuna and also that an opportunity will be given to both sides to adduce additional evidence on such points. ( AIR 1938 Mad. 372 = 1938 (1) MLJ 50 ). Order 41, Rule 29 CPC ensures that the appellate Court considers exactly on what points there is lacuna and also that an opportunity will be given to both sides to adduce additional evidence on such points. ( AIR 1938 Mad. 372 = 1938 (1) MLJ 50 ). As already observed supra, if the examination or non-examination of Balaram was felt to be so crucial, the appellate authority in all probability could have thought of examining such a witness as a Court witness and no doubt it is within the discretion of the Court. Apart from it, even on the aspect of bona fide personal requirement and other grounds, except the evidence of PW1, the 2nd petitioner in the eviction petition, there is no other material placed. ( 10 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the matter has to be remitted back to the appellate authority to follow the necessary procedure as contemplated by Order 41, Rules 28 and 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also to give further opportunity to both the parties if they want to let in any further evidence relating to their respective contentions and record proper reasons and dispose of the matter in accordance with law within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. The civil revision petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.