ORDER: In all the above writ petitions except in W.P.No.5152 of 2001, the petitioners who are Arts and Science Colleges have filed the above writ petitions seeking to quash the proceedings of the 1st respondent relating to the Amendment Regulations 2000 dated 16.8.2000 and declare that the 1st respondent has no jurisdiction over the existing M.C.A. Course offered by the petitioners colleges and forbearing the 1st respondent from any manner interfering with the petitioners in conducting M.C.A. course and other Post Graduate Courses in Computer Science which have been duly granted permanent which have been duly granted permanent affiliation/ approval/ recognition by the concerned University. 2. In W.P.No.5152 of 2001, the petitioner is the Association of Management of Private Colleges, both aided and unaided, in Tamil Nadu, and they have filed the writ petition to prohibit the respondents from in any way exercising their jurisdiction with reference to the courses run by them, like, M.B.A., M.C.A., B.B.A., B.B.M., B.C.S. etc. 3. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner- Association in W.P.No.5152 of 2001 has submitted that only on the verdict given in Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, by the Apex Court, the AICTE is trying to encroach upon the powers of the Universities and the State Government relating to the administration of Arts and Science Colleges. He relied on the proceedings of the AICTE, dated 22.9.2000 sent to the Secretary to Government, Government of Tamil Nadu, in which it is stated that admission should be made only in accordance with the Regulation G.S.R. 476(E), dated 20.5.1994 based on the judgment of the Apex Court in the Unnikrishnan’s case. Relying on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in The Association of Managements of Private Colleges v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997)3 C.T.C. 76 , the learned counsel has submitted that the Division bench has categorically held that Unnikrishnan’s case has no application to the Arts and Science Colleges. 4. Referring to the Regulations of 1997, the learned senior counsel submitted that even those Regulations will not apply to Arts and Science Colleges and it will apply only to the technical institutions which are going to be established afresh. 4. Referring to the Regulations of 1997, the learned senior counsel submitted that even those Regulations will not apply to Arts and Science Colleges and it will apply only to the technical institutions which are going to be established afresh. Referring to the Notification issued by the AICTE, exercising powers conferred on them, under Sec.23(1) of the AICTE Act, 1987 (hereinafter called the Act) the learned senior counsel has submitted that even the said notification will apply only to the professional/ technical education which are going to be established afresh, to start new courses. According to him, the said notification will not apply to the existing colleges and the existing courses. He has also submitted that if there is any correspondence courses with reference to the categories mentioned in the petitions, the AICTE is not having any Regulations with respect to the same. 5. The learned senior counsel, referring to Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the Act has submitted that the Arts and Science Colleges and the courses conducted by them, which are in issue do not come under the said definition, as there is no notification issued by the Central Government with reference to the same. Referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, he has stated that according to the same, the AICTE is set up only to advise with reference to technical institutions where technical education is imparted. Even referring to Secs.10 and 23 of the said Act, the learned senior counsel has submitted that the functions of the council and its power to make Regulations are only with reference to technical institutions and technical education. 6. Mr.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has submitted that the colleges are being run with the affiliation granted by the concerned University. The Arts and Science Colleges and the courses conducted by them do not come under the definition provided under Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the said Act. 6. Mr.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has submitted that the colleges are being run with the affiliation granted by the concerned University. The Arts and Science Colleges and the courses conducted by them do not come under the definition provided under Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the said Act. Referring to Sec.10 of the Act, the learned senior counsel has submitted that the functions of the council have been contemplated under the said provision only with reference to the technical education and so Universities imparting technical education and so the AICTE cannot spread its wings towards the Act, the Power of the AICTE to make Regulations, he has submitted that they can make Regulations only with reference to technical institutions and technical education as defined under Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the Act. He has also referred to the Regulation No.2 of the Regulations 1994, in support of his submission. Even with reference to Regulation No.8, the amendment of which is challenged in these writ petitions, the learned senior counsel has submitted that the said Regulation would apply only to the new technical institutions and not with reference to existing institutions. Referring to the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.19088 of 1993, dated 13.12.1993, the learned senior counsel has submitted that in the said writ petition while defending the prayer sought for to grant approval for starting new course, namely, Master of Computer Application in the Arts and Science Colleges, it is pleaded by the AICTE stated that Master of Computer Applications course was not coming under the purview of the All India Council for Technical Education and hence the AICTE was not considering the proposals submitted by the petitioner. On the basis of the said judgment, the learned senior counsel has also submitted that the AICTE, was very definite about the non-application of the Acts and Regulations to the Arts and Science College and so they cannot now come forward with the plead that the act and the science colleges and so they cannot now come forward with the plea that the Act and Regulations would apply to them. 7. 7. Mr.Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, referring to Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the Act, has submitted that computer courses and the Arts and Science courses have not been included in the said definition and so the AICTE cannot extend its jurisdiction to such courses in such colleges. Referring to various Regulations, the learned senior counsel has further submitted that the entire Regulations deal with only the degree and diploma courses, and Post Graduate course has not been dealt with. On the other hand, he has submitted that Post Graduate course has been excluded from the applicability of the Regulations. On that basis, it is his further submission that the AICTE cannot bring M.C.A. and M.B.A. courses within its wings to have a control over the same. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the definition for professional courses mentioned in the scheme in Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 cannot be substituted to the definition under Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the Act. According to him, education relating to computer Science cannot automatically be considered as Technical Education. Only if it is Technical, it can be called as Technical Education. 8. The learned Advocate General who is appearing for the respondents has submitted that computer science is a Technical Education as defined under Sec.2(g) of the Act, as it is “a Research and Training in Engineering Technology”. Referring to M.B.A. courses, he has further submitted that the “management” has been defined as Technical Education under the said provision. On that basis, he has also submitted that the institution which imparts Technical Education has to be construed as a technical institution insofar as those courses are concerned. According to him, though the Act was enacted in 1987, only after Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, the Regulations were framed in 1994 and on the basis of the said Regulations, the petitioner- institutions are brought under the wings of AICTE. Only because of introduction of Regulation No.2(2) of the Approval Regulations, 1994 the institutions which are conducting M.C.A. and M.B.A. courses are exempted from the purview of the Act. In view of the withdrawal of the same with effect from 16.8.2000, those institutions have again been brought into the clutches of the AICTE. Only because of introduction of Regulation No.2(2) of the Approval Regulations, 1994 the institutions which are conducting M.C.A. and M.B.A. courses are exempted from the purview of the Act. In view of the withdrawal of the same with effect from 16.8.2000, those institutions have again been brought into the clutches of the AICTE. Referring to M.C.A. Courses conducted in Engineering Colleges, he has submitted that when such courses in Engineering Colleges can be conducted only after the approval from the AICTE, it cannot be said that the Arts and Science Colleges need not obtain approval. In answering the arguments of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners with reference to the decision in The Association of Managements of Private Colleges v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997)3 C.T.C. 76 , in which it is held that the principles laid down in Unnikrishnan’s case won’t apply to the Arts and Science Colleges, the learned Advocate General has submitted that the said observation has to be construed as the principle laid down in Unnikrishnan’s case does not apply only to courses other than Technical Education, and, if the Arts and Science Colleges conduct Technical Education Courses, the principles laid down in Unnikrishnan’s case will squarely apply. Referring to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institutions v. State, A.I.R. 1991 Mad. 246, it is his further submission that the Act and the Regulations will apply not only to the colleges to be started, but also to the existing colleges, and thereby even the existing colleges have to get the approval from the AICTE, by complying with the requirements contemplated under the Act and the circumstances, while answering the arguments of Mr.Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the Act and Regulations do not apply to the Post Graduate Courses, the learned Advocate General has submitted that the approved Regulations will apply even to the Post Graduate Courses, as the degree includes Post Graduate also. He has further submitted that the petitioners are not challenging the unamended Regulations and they are challenging only the amendment and so the petitioners case that the Regulations are beyond the scope of the Act and so the same cannot be enforced against the petitioners cannot be accepted. 9. He has further submitted that the petitioners are not challenging the unamended Regulations and they are challenging only the amendment and so the petitioners case that the Regulations are beyond the scope of the Act and so the same cannot be enforced against the petitioners cannot be accepted. 9. Most of the Arts and Science Colleges in Tamil Nadu, have started their courses even before independence, and they had obtained affiliation from the Madras University under the provisions of the Madras University Act, 1923. Those Arts and Science Colleges were brought in within the purview of the grant-in-aid and received the grant from the State Government. Subsequently, the State Government decided not to provide with the aid to the colleges to be started and so the unaided colleges were being permitted to be established. Even with reference to the aided colleges, they have been permitted to start courses without any aid. In effect, even the aided colleges are running unaided courses. 10. Meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force with effect from 17th April, 1976. Under the said Act, distinction has been made between non-minority and minority colleges. After implementation of the University Grants Commission scales of pay, the colleges were required to follow the Regulations of Universities Grants Commission. 11. Though the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 was enacted in 1987, the All India Council for Technical Education (hereinafter called AICTE), did not take any steps to bring the Arts and Science Colleges within its fold till 1994. Only after Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, they started to interfere with the administration of Arts and Science Colleges and also with the Universities in Tamil Nadu. 12. The AICTE issued a circular on 31.5.2000 asking the concerned universities to initiate appropriate action in accordance with Clauses (v) and (vi) of AICTE notification under GSR No.476 E, dated 20.5.1994 to ensure that no examinations are conducted for such technical programmes which were not approved by AICTE and also directing to comply with the same. Challenging the said circular, a batch of writ petitions were filed before this Court. Challenging the said circular, a batch of writ petitions were filed before this Court. In the judgment in Indira Gandhi College v. All India Council for Technical Education, 2001 C.T.C. 78, this Court on the basis of the exemption granted by the AICTE in Regulation No.2(2) of the Regulations exempting the applications of Regulations to M.B.A. and M.C.A. courses during the relevant period (1999-2000), the impugned proceedings therein dated 31.5.2000 were quashed. Though in the said batch of cases, an argument was advanced about the power of AICTE to have a control over the Arts and Sciences Colleges, this Court did not go into that question in view of the said Regulation No.2(2) and found that the said argument need not be gone into to decide the issue raised. 13. Now, all these writ petitions are filed challenging the amendment Regulations 2000 dated 16.8.2000. The said amendment is called “All India Council for Technical Education (The grant of approval for starting new technical institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and approval of intake capacity of seats for the course or programmes) Amendment Regulations, 2000”. It is also stated that the said Regulation came into force from the date of publication in the Official Gazette. Under the said Amendment Regulation, Regulation No.2(2) had been withdrawn. 14. In Regulation No.8(c) “M.B.A.” and “M.C.A.” have been inserted before the words “Architecture, Hotel Management...” In Regulation 8, Sub-Registration 8 (iv) has been replaced with the following provision- “8(iv) - A furnished permanent building at least adequate for the first year on the land as specified at 8(i) shall be required within the stipulated period.” After the Schedule in Amendment Regulation 1997, a note has been introduced as follows: “Note: The Council on advice of the Executive Committee may modify the prescribed dates as mentioned in the Schedule. The decision of the council regarding the date shall be final.” By making these amendments, the AICTE has spread its wings to these courses even they are conducted by the Arts and Science Colleges. 15. In W.P.No.5152 of 2001, as stated already, the petitioner- association has challenged the jurisdiction and authority of the AICTE, to have control over its members/ institutions on the ground that the Act cannot be made applicable to the Arts and Science Colleges. In the other cases, as stated already, the petitioners have challenged the above said amendment Regulations, 2000. 16. In W.P.No.5152 of 2001, as stated already, the petitioner- association has challenged the jurisdiction and authority of the AICTE, to have control over its members/ institutions on the ground that the Act cannot be made applicable to the Arts and Science Colleges. In the other cases, as stated already, the petitioners have challenged the above said amendment Regulations, 2000. 16. According to the petitioners, the Act will apply only to the Technical Institutions, viz., Engineering Colleges and Polytechnics. Referring to Secs.2(g) and 2(h) of the Act, a submission was made by the learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P.No.5152 of 2001, to the effect that the courses being conducted by the Arts and Science Colleges could not be brought with the mischief of the definition “Technical Education”, and if it is so, the institutions which are conducting such courses cannot be called as “Technical Institutions” so as to enable the AICTE to exercise powers and authorities over those institutions. The statement of objects and reasons, enacting the Act has been relied on by the learned senior counsel in support of the above said submission. 17. In the said Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, it is stated that the purpose for which, the AICTE was set up has been mentioned, as a large number of private "Engineering Colleges and Polytechnics" were started in complete disregard of the guidelines laid down by the AICTE, and so it was thought it fit to provide statutory powers to the AICTE. On the basis of the same, the learned senior counsel tried to submit that the purpose of enactment is only to control the Engineering Colleges and Polytechnics, and not the Arts and Science Colleges. 18. The enacting words of the Act are not always to be limited by the words of the preamble, and must in many instances, go beyond it. The preamble may be a good means of finding out the meaning of the statute, as the same usually mentions the general object and Intention of the Legislature in passing the enactments, and so the preamble cannot restrict the enacting part of an Act, though it may be referred to for the purpose of solving the ambiguity. The preamble may be a good means of finding out the meaning of the statute, as the same usually mentions the general object and Intention of the Legislature in passing the enactments, and so the preamble cannot restrict the enacting part of an Act, though it may be referred to for the purpose of solving the ambiguity. So, merely because, in the preamble, the Arts and Science Colleges have not been mentioned, it cannot be said that the definition under Sec.2(h) of the Act only means Engineering colleges and Polytechnics. The said Statement of Objects and Reasons also refers to the development of Technical Education. There is no doubt that when the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, we must look into that dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute, and if that particular word is defined, then it will ordinarily have that meaning assigned to it on the definition clause. 19. Considering the importance of the definition, to appreciate the scope of the Act, the Apex Court in the decision S.K.Gupta v. K.P.Jain, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 734: (1979)3 S.C.C. 54 , has held as follows: "25. The noticeable feature of this definition is that it is inclusive definition and where in a definition clause the word "include" is used, it is so done in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such natural import, but also those things which they include (see: Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 A.C. 99 at 105). Where in a definition Section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that words is used in threat statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the content otherwise requires. But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. At any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provisions of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect (see: Jobbins v. Middlesex County Council, (1949)1 K.B. 142). At any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provisions of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect (see: Jobbins v. Middlesex County Council, (1949)1 K.B. 142). Where the definition clause is preceded by the words ‘unless the context otherwise requires, normally the definition given in the Section should be applied and given effect to but this normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied (see: Khanna, J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 S.C.C. (Supp.) 1 at 97: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299). It would thus appear that ordinarily one has to adhere to the definition and if it is an expansive definition the same should be adhered to. The frame of any definition more often than not is capable of being made flexible but the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made losses and kept tight as far as possible (see: Kalya Singh v. Genda Lal, (1976) S.C.C. 304 at 309: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1634 at 1637, 1638). 20. The same view has been taken by the Apex Court while considering the scope of opening words "unless there is anything repugnant in the object or context". in the decision in Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram, (1990)1 S.C.C. 134, holding as follows: “18. It is true when a word has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs wherever that word is used in the body of the statute unless the context requires otherwise.” The context “ as pointed out in the book Cross-Statutory Interpretation (2nd edn., p.48)” is both internal and external“. The internal context requires the interpreter to situate the disputed words within the Section of which they are part and in relation to the rest of the Act. The external context involves determining the meaning from ordinarily linguistic usage (including any special technical meanings), from the purpose for which the provision was passed, and from the place of the provisions within the general scheme of statutory and common law rules and principles. 19. The opening sentence in the definition of the Section states” unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context“. 19. The opening sentence in the definition of the Section states” unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context“. In view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to examine the context and collocation in the light of the object of the Act and the purpose for which a particular provision was made by the legislature. Reference may be made to the observations of Wanchoo, J. in Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s.Fraser and Ross, (1960)8 S.C.R. 857: A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 971: (1960)80 C.C. 18, where the learned Judge said that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the words to have a somewhat different meaning indifferent Sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context. In that case, the learned Judge examined the construction of the word” insurer “ as used in Secs.33(1) and 2-D of the Insurance Act, 1938, in the light of the definition of that word under Sec.2(9) thereof. The Insurance Act by Sec.2(9) defines an ‘insurer’ as a person carrying on the business of ‘insurance. The question arose whether Secs.33(1) and 2-D did not apply to insurer in Sec.2(9) postulates actual carrying on of the business. It was pointed out that in the context of Secs.22(1) and 2-D and taking into account the policy of the Act and the purposes for which the control was imposed on insurers, the word” insurer “ in the said Sections also refers to Insurers who were carrying on the business of insurance but have closed it.” 21. We have to now consider whether the courses in question will come under the definition of “Technical Education” as defined under Sec.2(g) of the Act. We are also not concerned with any presumed intention of the Legislature as we have to get the intention as such from the words in the statute. The definition given in the Act should be construed as not repugnant to the context and would not defeat or enable to defeat the purpose of the Act. We are also not concerned with any presumed intention of the Legislature as we have to get the intention as such from the words in the statute. The definition given in the Act should be construed as not repugnant to the context and would not defeat or enable to defeat the purpose of the Act. Sec.2(g) of the Act reads as follows: “Technical education” means programmes of education, research and training in engineering technology, architecture, town planning, management, in engineering applied arts and crafts and such other programme or areas as the Central Government may, in consultation with the Council, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare.“ The respondent- AICTE is trying to bring the courses in question under the programme” research “ and training in engineering technology”. According to AICTE, M.C.A. Course is “a research and training in engineering technology”. With reference to M.B.A. Course, the respondents are trying to bring it with reference to the programme, “Management”. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners have also submitted that the said course cannot be treated as engineering course and so it cannot be a technical education. 22. In Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, while framing the scheme, in para 170, computer science has been treated as a technical education. In the said decision, in para 170(ii), it is stated as follows: "Colleges of engineering and colleges and institutions imparting technical education including electronics, computer sciences, established and/or run by private educational institutions." 23. An attempt was made to the effect that the explanation given under the said decision cannot be imposed to the definition "technical education" as defined under the Act, as the said definition does not include computer science. From the curriculum for Master of Computer Application, given by the AICTE, would clearly establish that the said course is an engineering technology. No material is placed before me by the petitioners that computer science course cannot be construed as an engineering technology, though it is generally argued that all education imparted regarding computer cannot be taken as an engineering technology. Since the M.C.A. course has to be construed as an engineering technology, as defined in the definition for "technical education", an institution imparting such education has to be construed as technical institution, as defined under Sec.2(h) of the Act. 24. Since the M.C.A. course has to be construed as an engineering technology, as defined in the definition for "technical education", an institution imparting such education has to be construed as technical institution, as defined under Sec.2(h) of the Act. 24. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners have submitted that the petitioners institutions are Arts and Sciences colleges and the same cannot be declared as technical institutions. There cannot be any doubt about the same. If only such institutions conduct any "Technical Education", insofar as the said programmes, such part of institutions have to be called as technical institution. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate General, it cannot be accepted that if such programmes are being conducted in engineering colleges. it would be a technical education, and if the same programmes are conducted in Arts and Science Colleges, different meaning should be given, as if they are non-engineering technology. In view of the abovesaid discussion, I am not able to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the courses in question cannot be construed as technical education, and thereby their institutions cannot be construed as technical institutions even with reference to the said courses. In view of the above, the argument even with reference to Secs.10 and 23 of the Act the power is given only with reference to technical education to the AICTE and so the AICTE cannot extend their power to the petitioner- institution cannot be accepted. 25. Mr.Haridas, learned senior counsel appearing for the respective petitioner has submitted that only the basis of Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, the AICTE has made the Regulations fixing the norms and guidelines. This fact is not in dispute. On that basis the learned senior counsel has also submitted that the said Unnikrishnan’s case will not apply to Arts and Science Colleges, as held by the Division Bench decision of this Court in The Association of Managements of Private Colleges v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997)3 C.T.C. 76 . In the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the decision of the Apex Court in Unnikrishnan’s case, has no application to private arts and science colleges, which runs as follows: "54. Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 has no application to private Arts and Science Colleges. In the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the decision of the Apex Court in Unnikrishnan’s case, has no application to private arts and science colleges, which runs as follows: "54. Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 has no application to private Arts and Science Colleges. Although general questions relating to all self-financing colleges came up for consideration, the Apex Court consciously confined the scheme framed only to professional colleges as its clear from paragraph 170 of the said judgment. Even in paragraph 146 of the said judgment the Apex Court has stated, "in this judgment, however, we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for the matter other private educational institutions except professional colleges". In paragraph 170 of the said judgment, it is clearly stated that the scheme is confined only to professional colleges. The learned senior counsel for the respondents in his arguments also did not take support for the impugned order from Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178.“ 26. There cannot be any dispute about the said principle. In the decision in The Association of Managements of Private Colleges v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997)3 C.T.C. 76 , the Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the powers of the Government to prescribe the procedure for admitting the students by common selection to the Arts and Science Colleges on the basis of the principles laid down in Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 has held so, as set out supra. The said dispute is only with respect to Arts and Science courses. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate General, we are not concerned with the said courses but we are concerned with Technical Education, viz., M.C.A. etc., and insofar as the said courses are concerned, the said institutions should be treated as technical institutions. To that extent the scheme laid down in Unnikrishnan’s case, would squarely apply and the petitioners cannot rely on the said Division Bench decision of this Court to the facts of the present case. 27. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has also submitted that those Regulations may not apply to the correspondence courses where M.C.A. and M.B.A. courses are being conducted. It is not in dispute that such courses are being conducted only by the Universities and so the same cannot be compared with. 28. 27. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has also submitted that those Regulations may not apply to the correspondence courses where M.C.A. and M.B.A. courses are being conducted. It is not in dispute that such courses are being conducted only by the Universities and so the same cannot be compared with. 28. It is further argued by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that even the Amendment under which the AICTE wants to extend their wings to the institutions of the petitioners is only referring to the new technical institutions, and not to the institutions already in existence. This submission of the learned senior counsel is on the basis that Regulation No.8(C) and Sub-Registration No.8(iv) of the approval regulations. Regulation No.8 will apply only to the new institutions and any management also can be construed as it is only referable as the new institution. Even if such submission is acceptable, in view of the earlier discussions, the Act will apply even to the petitioners institutions. While dealing with the scope of the Act applicable to the existing colleges, the Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institutions v. State, A.I.R. 1991 Mad. 246 has categorically held as follows: ”39. We do not find any substance in the argument that the All India Council for Technical Education will have no jurisdiction over the existing colleges and that it can exercise its powers of recognition or derecognition only with reference to new colleges, which are established after the coming into force of the Act. Nor is there any substance in the argument that the power or recognition or withdrawal or affiliation continues to subsist in the State Government or the University respectively insofar as institutions which came into existence prior to the passing of Central Act, 52 of 1987. The argument is that as the permission was given by the State Government subject to certain conditions, it is open to the State Government to cancel the same on the ground that the conditions were not fulfilled. Similarly, it is argued that the University having granted affiliation subject to certain conditions, is entitled to withdraw the affiliation on the ground that those conditions are not fulfilled. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Central Act. Similarly, it is argued that the University having granted affiliation subject to certain conditions, is entitled to withdraw the affiliation on the ground that those conditions are not fulfilled. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Central Act. It does not make any distinction between institutions which had come into existence before the passing of the Act and those which are to be started thereafter. We have no doubt whatever that the Act applies to all technical institutions, whether they came to be before the passing of the Act or subsequent thereto. The learned Advocate General lays stress on Sec.10(k) of the Act which provides for grant of approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned. The said provision does not indicate in any manner that the powers conferred and the duties enjoined on the council are confined to such new institutions and not the existing institutions. The language of the other clauses in Sec.10 of the Act as well as the other Sections of the Act shows that the jurisdiction of the council extends over all the technical institutions, whether established before or after the Act. Hence, the State Government and the University have to act only on advice of the All India Council for Technical Education for withdrawing the permission or recognition or affiliation. Admittedly, when the Act came into force, the colleges in question had valid permission and affiliation. On the coming into force of the Act, the power to cancel the permissions withdraw the affiliation having vested in the All India Council, neither the State Government nor the University can exercise the same. Hence, the State Government had to jurisdiction to appoint a High Power Committee on its own and cancel the permission granted to the petitioner on the basis of the findings of the said High Power Committee. The only course open to the State Government was to have forwarded the findings of the High Power Committee to the All India Council for Technical Education and requested them to take appropriate action. Similarly, the University had no jurisdiction to rely straightway on the findings of the High Power Committee and withdraw the affiliation granted to the petitioner." 29. The only course open to the State Government was to have forwarded the findings of the High Power Committee to the All India Council for Technical Education and requested them to take appropriate action. Similarly, the University had no jurisdiction to rely straightway on the findings of the High Power Committee and withdraw the affiliation granted to the petitioner." 29. While dealing the applicability of the Act to the institutions commenced before the said Act, the Apex Court in the decision in P.Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, (1995)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 348, rejecting the contention that with respect to existing institutions only the provisions under the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Rules made thereunder would apply, has held that the said Act does apply only to the colleges other than technical institutions. So it is clear that even to the existing institutions, the provisions of the Act will apply and the Regulations made thereunder, if it is not exempted, such Regulations also will apply. 30. Mr.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the petitioners relying on the order of the learned Judge of this Court in W.P.No.19098 of 1993, dated 13.12.1993 has submitted that the AICTE has taken the view in the said writ petition to the effect that M.C.A. course was, not coming under the purview of the AICTE, and so they are not considering the proposal submitted by the petitioner. On the basis the learned senior counsel was further submitted that the AICTE had understood its power and jurisdiction that they are not having jurisdiction to deal with the Arts and Science Colleges which are conducting M.C.A. courses, and so now they cannot come forward with the plea that the Act will apply even to the said course being conducted by the Arts and Science Colleges. 31. Though AICTE was on the impression that the said course may not come under the purview of the Act, in view of the decision in Unnikrishnan’s case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, the Regulations were framed. The AICTE had no Regulation during the said period to bring the said courses within the purview of the Act, and so counter was filed to that extent. After the decision of Unnikrishnan’s case, Regulations were framed and so the said courses namely, M.C.A. course would come within the purview of the Act and the Regulations. The AICTE had no Regulation during the said period to bring the said courses within the purview of the Act, and so counter was filed to that extent. After the decision of Unnikrishnan’s case, Regulations were framed and so the said courses namely, M.C.A. course would come within the purview of the Act and the Regulations. The said order was passed before the Regulation was framed, and before the decision of the Apex Court in Unnikrishnan’s case. So, the said order cannot be relied on by the petitioners to submit that the respondents are estopped from contending that M.C.A. course being conducted in Arts and Science Colleges would come under the purview of the Act. Moreover, if the respondents are able to establish that the Act will apply to the said courses also, there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. 32. Mr.Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.6007 of 2001 has submitted that the petitioner- institution was started long before the Act came into force. According to him, the Approval Regulations 1994 as amended by Amendment Regulations 1997, would apply only to the decree and diploma levels, but the same will not apply to the post graduate courses. He has also submitted that though Regulation No.2(2) of the Regulations had been deleted under which exemption was given from applicability of the Regulations to the post graduate courses for M.B.A. and M.C.A. Regulation No.2(1) of the Regulations will apply only to the degree and diploma courses, and so the said Regulations cannot be made applicable to the post graduate courses. Even referring to various Regulations, the learned senior counsel has also reiterated the argument. He has also, referring to the AICTE (norms and guidelines for admission in Professional Colleges) Regulations, 1994 (GSR 476 (e) submitted that they do not apply to the post graduate course as it is specifically stated so in Regulation No.2 of that Regulations. The submission of the learned senior counsel with reference to the approval Regulations 1994 (No.E 304-4/CCF/REG/94) do not apply to the post graduate courses, cannot be countenanced. It cannot be denied that the degree includes post graduate degree. Unless any specified exclusion from applicability of the Act with reference to Post graduate course under the said Regulation is made, the submission of the learned senior counsel cannot be accepted. It cannot be denied that the degree includes post graduate degree. Unless any specified exclusion from applicability of the Act with reference to Post graduate course under the said Regulation is made, the submission of the learned senior counsel cannot be accepted. Only because of the sub Regulation (2) to Regulation No.2 of the Regulations, during the relevant period, M.C.A. and M.B.A. courses have been placed outside the scope of the Act. 33. Mr.Masilamani, learned senior counsel is absolutely correct in saying that other Regulations of 1994 (GSR 476 (E) cannot be made applicable to the Post graduate courses or programmes in any discipline other than Management. So with reference to M.C.A. course, the said Regulation does not apply. 34. The learned Advocate General has submitted that though under the said Regulations, 1994 in GSR 476 (E) post graduate courses have been excluded, the said Regulation and other Regulations are interlinked and so the same can be made applicable to the Post graduate courses. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the specific exclusion under Regulation No.2 and the norms and guidelines or any other subject, which has been specifically dealt with in the said Regulations, cannot be made applicable to the petitioners, merely because they are conducting M.C.A. courses. This conclusion is also on the basis that though the AICTE, by exercising powers conferred under Sec.23 of the Act, has no exempted the Post graduate courses from the Approval Regulations 1994. But the said exemption is given with reference to the later Regulation (GSR 476 (E)). So, the submission of the learned Advocate General that even the said Regulation would apply to the petitioners institutions on the basis that they are conducting M.C.A. courses cannot be countenanced. 35. While answering the arguments of Mr.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, regarding powers of AICTE to frame Regulations and also the Regulations in question are beyond the power given under the Act to make Regulations, the learned Advocate General has rightly submitted that the said issue has not been raised in these writ petitions, and none of the petitioners has challenged the said Regulations. In support of his submission that without challenging the said Regulations, the submission of the learned senior counsel cannot be sustained, the learned Advocate General has relied on the decision in State of Kerala v. M.K.Kunnhikannann Nambiar, (1996)1 S.C.C. 435 , in which it is held as follows: "8. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th End. (Re-issue (Vol. 1(1) in para 26.p.31, it is stated, thus: “If an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes, and it has been wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity challenged, its legality is preserved.” In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf and Jowelli, 1995 Edn., at pp.259-60 the law is stated thus. “The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between void and voidable decisions. The Courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction, to the extent that the situation today can be summarised as follows: (i) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a Court of competent jurisdiction.” Similarly, wade and Forsyth in Administrative law, seventh Ed. 1994, have stated the law thus at pp.341-343. “...every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But there is no situations the only was to recourse to the law. IN a well-known passage Lord Radoliffe said: ”An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effects for its obstensible purpose as to the most impeccable or orders. This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible, for others also the order can effectively pre-resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible, for others also the order can effectively pre-resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. The necessity of recourse to the Court had been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Private Council without distinction between patent and latent defects.‘ The above statement of the law supports our view that the order of the Board dated 28.6.1977 declining to implead Respondent’s and (which stood confirmed in revision) concludes the matter against respondents 3 and 4“. 36. Same view has been taken in the decision in Padmanabhan v. The State, (1956)1 M.L.J. 179 : I.L.R. 1956 Mad. 1272: A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 349 in which it is held as follows: ”(4) The Regional Transport Authority could thus include amongst the conditions of the permit any “prescribed” condition. “Prescribed” has been defined by Sec.2(2) of the Act mean prescribed by rules made under the Act. Sec.68 of the Act conferred authority on the state Government to make rules under the act. (1) A State Government make make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect, the provisions of this Chapter, i.e., Chapter - IV. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this Section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely.... (Then follows a l1st of items numbered ((a) to (2-a)). (5) Rule 160-B is a rule made under the provisions of Sec.68 of the Act. therefore the condition imposed by Rule 160-B is a “prescribed condition” which the meaning of Sec.48(d). (6) The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Rule 160-B was ultra vires and that it fell outside the scope of the power vested in the State Government by Sec.68 of the Act. He pointed out that carriage of mails was not cone of the enumerated items in Sec.68(2) of the Act with reference to which the state authorised to make rules. As the learned Advocate-General rightly pointed out Sec.68(2) does not exhaust the scope of Sec.68(1). Sec.68(2) itself specifically provides that the enumeration in that sub-clause is without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred on the State Government by Sec.68.(1) The items enumerated in Sec.68(2) all fall within the scope of Sec.68(1) as well. As the learned Advocate-General rightly pointed out Sec.68(2) does not exhaust the scope of Sec.68(1). Sec.68(2) itself specifically provides that the enumeration in that sub-clause is without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred on the State Government by Sec.68.(1) The items enumerated in Sec.68(2) all fall within the scope of Sec.68(1) as well. The effect of Sec.68(2) is that with reference to the items included in Sub-sec.(2) It is not necessary for the Court to examine further whether any of these items comes within the scope of the general provision in Clause (1) of Sec.68.“ 37. In the decision in S.K.Singh v. V.V.Giri, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2097, also in the Apex Court has held as follows: ”41. We do nothing that the legislature, while framing chapter IXA of the Code under contemplated such a dichotomy or intended to give such a narrow meaning to the freedom of franchise essential in a representative system of government. In our opinion the argument mentioned above is fallacious. It completely disregards the structure and the provisions of Sec.171-C. Sec.171-C is enacted in three parts. The first sub-section contains the definition of “undue influence”. This is an wide terms and renders a person voluntarily interfering or attempting to interfere with the free existence of an electrical right guilty of committing undue influence. That this is very wide is indicated by the opening sentence of Sub-sec.(2), i.e., without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Sub-sec.(1). “ It is well-settled that when this expression is used anything contained in the provisions following this expression is not intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision. This was so held by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, 1945 F.C. 195: A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156.” 38. It is so held by the Apex Court in the decision in Raghubanchmani v. Ambica Prasad, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 176, as follows: “5. It is therefore contended relying on Sub-sec.(2) that inasmuch as no fraud or false representation or concealment of any material fact has been alleged or proved in this case, the Chief Settlement Commissioner cannot exercise the revisionary power under Sec.24. This contention in our view has no validity. It is therefore contended relying on Sub-sec.(2) that inasmuch as no fraud or false representation or concealment of any material fact has been alleged or proved in this case, the Chief Settlement Commissioner cannot exercise the revisionary power under Sec.24. This contention in our view has no validity. It is a well-established proposition of law that where a specific power is conferred without prejudice to the generality of the general powers already specified the particular power is only illustrative and does not in any way restrict the general power.” 39. In view of the foregoing discussions, I find and conclude that the provisions of the AICTE Act and Regulations of the All India Council for Technical Education (grant of approval for starting new technical institutions introduction of courses or programmes and approval of intake capacity of seats for the course or programmes) Regulations, 1998 as amended by Amendment Regulations, 1994 are enforceable against the petitioners institutions insofar as they relate to technical courses, namely, M.B.A., M.C.A., etc. but the All India Council for Technical Education (norms and guidelines for fees and guidelines for admission in professional colleges) Regulations, 1994 (GSR 476 E) cannot be made applicable against those institutions in view of exemption granted under Regulation No.2 of the Regulations, and the impugned amendment Regulation No.8, dated 16.8.2000 is held valid. 40. For all the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Connected W.M.Ps. are closed.