ORDER: The petitioners are accused in S.C.No.41 of 1997 pending before the II Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry. They filed a petition in Crl.M.P.No.604 of 1997 for discharge under Sec.227, Crl.P.C. and the learned Sessions Judge rejected their plea. Therefore, the petitioners have come by way of Crl.R.C. to set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge and to discharge them from the case registered for offences under Secs.364, 302, 367 and 201 read with 149, I.P.C. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that there are certain allegations appearing in the materials relied on by the prosecution against the petitioners 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 13 but insofar as the other petitioners are concerned, the petition may be allowed and they may be discharged from the case as there are no materials against them. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor, Pondicherry submitted that this petition is not maintainable, because according to him, the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge refusing to discharge these petitioners amounts to only an interlocutory order and therefore the revision is barred by virtue of Sec.397(2), Crl.P.C. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is not an interlocutory order, but it is an order affecting the rights of the parties, therefore, it is revisable. Sec.397, Clause 2 curtails the use of the revisional powers in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. Therefore, the main question involved in this case is to decide whether the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge refusing to discharge these petitioners from the case, amounts to an interlocutory order so as to attract the mischief of Sec.397(2) of Crl.P.C. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor relied on a ruling of this Court rendered in the case of Mohammed Asif v. State by Additional Superintendent of Police, CB. CID. Chennai, (1999)2 L.W. (Crl.) 640, wherein the learned Judge Thiru B.Akbar Basha Khadiri, J. held that an order of dismissal of discharge, because by dismissal of discharge petition, no finality is reached. He would further held that when a discharge petition is allowed, the accused stands discharged and the proceedings would get terminated, but the other side of the picture is that if the petition is dismissed, no finality is reached and therefore, the order cannot be said to be an intermediate, quasi-final order. He would further held that when a discharge petition is allowed, the accused stands discharged and the proceedings would get terminated, but the other side of the picture is that if the petition is dismissed, no finality is reached and therefore, the order cannot be said to be an intermediate, quasi-final order. This ruling was rendered by the learned Judge basing on the ruling given by the Apex Court in V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962, wherein their Lordships have observed as follows: "The order of framing the charges is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is true that if the Special Court would have refused to frame charges and discharged the accused, the proceedings would have terminated but that is only one side of the picture. The other side of the picture is that if the Special Court refused to discharge the accused and framed charges against him, then the order would be interlocutory because the trial would still be alive.” 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners took me to the various observations made by the Apex Court in V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962 and contended that their Lordships have distinguished the provisions under Sec.397(2), Crl.P.C. from Sec.11, Clause (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and held that only with reference to Sec.11(1) of the said Act, an order framing charge is an interlocutory order. Their Lordships in that case have referred to the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1978)1 S.C.R. 222 , wherein it has been observed as follows: “It seems to us that the term interlocutory order in Sec.397(2) of restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Sec.397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Sec.397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” 6. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, (1978)1 S.C.R. 749 , it has been held by the Apex Court that an order framing charges is not an interlocutory order and therefore a revision against such an order is competent before the Sessions Judge or the High Court. The Apex Court referred to this ruling also in deciding V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962 and held as follows: “Even so, the ratio decided in the aforesaid case was, in our opinion absolutely correct and we are entirely in agreement with the learned Judges constituting the Bench that the order of the Sessions Judge framing charges, in the circumstances of the case, was not merely an interlocutory order but partook of the nature of a final order or, at any rate, an intermediate order so as to be taken out of the bar contained in Sec.397(2) of the Code.” 7. Para 8 of the judgment in V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962, reads as follows: “It follows therefore that an order framing a charge was clearly revisable by the High Court under Secs.435 and 439 of the Code of 1898. We may, however, point out that we are in complete agreement with the principle, involved in the cases discussed above, that an order framing charges against an accused undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial and it is the duty of the Court to apply its judicial mind to the materials and come to a clear conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out or the basis of which it would be justified in framing charges. The question, however, with which we are concerned in the present appeal is essentially different. The question, however, with which we are concerned in the present appeal is essentially different. The order of the Special Judge framing the charge is a reasoned order and not a mechanical or a casual order so as to vitiate the order of the Special Judge. In the instant case, we are concerned with a much larger question, viz., whether or not the term ‘interlocutory order’ used in Sec.11(1) of the Act should be given the same meaning as this very term appearing in Sec.397(2) of the Code. In other words, the question is whether Sec.11(1) of the Act tightens or widens the scope of the term ‘interlocutory order’ as contained in Sec.397(2) of the Code as interpreted by this Court in the decisions, referred to above.” 8. Keeping in mind, the reasons and object of the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act for the speedy judicial termination of prosecution, without permitting them to unduly protract the litigation, their Lordships have distinguished the term“interlocutory order“appearing in Sec.11(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act from that of the term appearing in Sec.397(2) and held by giving a wider meaning to the term as fund in Sec.11(1) of the Act, that an order framing of charges is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings, but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. But so far as the term interlocutory order as found in Sec.397 (2) is concerned, their Lordships of the Apex Court in V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962, held that an order of framing of charges is not an interlocutory order, but it is an intermediate order, which is revisable and their Lordships were in full agreement with the dictum given in Madhu Limaye’s case, (1978)1 S.C.R. 749 , para 44 of the judgment rendered in V.C.Shukla’s case, clarifies the position as follows: “On a true construction of S.11(1) of the Act and taking into consideration the natural meaning of the expression ‘interlocutory order’, there can be no doubt that the order framing charges against the appellant under the Act was merely an interlocutory order which neither terminated the proceedings nor finally decided the rights of the parties. According to the test laid down in Kuppuswami’s case, the order impugned was undoubtedly an interlocutory order. According to the test laid down in Kuppuswami’s case, the order impugned was undoubtedly an interlocutory order. Taking into consideration, therefore, the natural meaning of interlocutory order and applying the non-obstante clause, the position is that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are expressly excluded by the non obstante clause and therefore Sec.397(2) of the Code cannot be called into aid in order to hold that the order. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye (supra) and Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1978)1 S.C.R. 222 , were given with respect to the provisions of the Code, particularly Sec.397(2), they were correctly decided would have no application to the interpretation of Sec.11(1) of the Act, which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non-obstante Clause.” 9. Thus, their Lordships have clearly distinguished between the “interlocutory order” occurring in Sec.397(2) and the same occurring in Sec.11(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. From all the above rulings, it is very clear that an order of framing charges is not an interlocutory order, because it substantially affects the right of the concerned person. Learned Judge Thiru M.Karpagavinayagam, J. in the case of V.R.Nedunchezhian v. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB CID (Headquarters), Government Estate, Chennai-2, (1999)1 L.W. (Crl.) 358, after discussing the various rulings of the Apex Court held that an order framing charge under the Criminal Procedure Code affecting the rights of the parties would be revisable in the revisional jurisdiction and therefore it cannot be called to be an interlocutory order as interpreted by the Apex Court, but it could be termed as an intermediate order, since it affects the liberty and rights of the parties. 10. The Apex Court in the case of Amarnath v. State of Haryana, (1978)1 S.C.R. 222 , has held as follows: “The term “interlocutory order” is a term of well-known legal significance which has been used in various statutes. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. The term "interlocutory order" in Sec.397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad and artistic sense. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. The term "interlocutory order" in Sec.397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad and artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. Any other which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis of insertion of this provision in Sec.397 of the Code. For instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Sec.397(2) of the Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory orders so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." There can be no doubt that an order framing a charge against an accused or an order refusing to discharge an accused is an order affecting the right of a person concerned, because in case, the Court refuses to discharge him, he has to face the trial unnecessarily and in case, the Court discharges the accused from the case, the finality is reached. Therefore, it is a stage where the right of the party is at stake. Therefore, it cannot be said that either framing of charges or refusing to discharge the accused from the case, amounts to an interlocutory order. 11. Learned Public Prosecutor contends that an order of framing charges is different from the refusal of the Court to discharge the accused from the case and both of them were covered by two different provisions namely, Secs.227 and 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Secs.227 and 228 of the Code should not be separately read. 11. Learned Public Prosecutor contends that an order of framing charges is different from the refusal of the Court to discharge the accused from the case and both of them were covered by two different provisions namely, Secs.227 and 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Secs.227 and 228 of the Code should not be separately read. The harmonious construction of both these provisions indicate that they are inseparable, because according to Sec.227, Crl.P.C. upon consideration of the records of the case and documents therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and prosecution, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground, for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing, whereas under Sec.228 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if upon such a consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he shall frame charges. Therefore, the paramount duty of the Court is to consider the records of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submission of both sides to decide whether there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. This decision is taken by the Court at a single stage and in either way the Court decides and therefore Sec.227 cannot be separated from Sec.228 and whether the Court refuses to discharge the accused under Sec.227 ,or frames charges under Sec.288, both the orders are one and the same, since both the orders affect the right of the party and therefore they are revisable. 12. The learned Judge Thiru B.Akbar Basha Khadiri, J. has held that an order of discharge cannot be equated with an order of dismissal of discharge petition, because by dismissal of discharge petition, no finality is reached. He has also noted that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could not cite any direct authority to show that the order dismissing the discharge petition is not an interlocutory order. The finality according to the learned Judge is the termination of the proceedings resulting either in acquittal or conviction as quoted by the Apex Court in V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962, while considering the effect of the term "interlocutory order" under Sec.11(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The finality according to the learned Judge is the termination of the proceedings resulting either in acquittal or conviction as quoted by the Apex Court in V.C.Shukla’s case, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962, while considering the effect of the term "interlocutory order" under Sec.11(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. But according to me, the finality in such circumstances is not the termination of the trial, but the particular proceedings where the Court decides to either frame charge against the accused or discharge the accused as held in Madhu Limaye’s case, (1978)1 S.C.R. 749 , that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec.397(2). Though, there is no direct ruling to show that the order dismissing the discharge petition is either an interlocutory order of not an interlocutory order, so long as it is established that the order of framing charges against an accused does not amount to an interlocutory order under Sec.397(2), Crl.P.C., an order to refuse to discharge the accused also cannot be an interlocutory order, because in both circumstances, the Court has to decide whether to frame charges or to discharge the accused, it is at one stroke, the Court is expected to act after perusing the records of a particular case and upon hearing both sides. Therefore, merely because there is no precedent to show that the order dismissing the discharge petition is not an interlocutory order, it cannot be held that it is an interlocutory order, inasmuch as, it affects the right of the party from getting discharged from the case. Once, he is discharged from the case, the trial insofar as he is concerned, reaches finality. No doubt, as held by the learned Judge Thiru B.Akbar Basha Khadiri, J. in the abovesaid ruling, by dismissal of discharge petition, no finality is reached, insofar as trial is concerned. But insofar as the right of the party to get himself discharged from the case is concerned, the finality is reached and he is forced to undergo the ordeal of trial. But insofar as the right of the party to get himself discharged from the case is concerned, the finality is reached and he is forced to undergo the ordeal of trial. Therefore, it is not the termination of the trial, which is a decisive factor to decide whether an order passed is an interlocutory order or the final order, but whether the order substantially affects the rights of the parties is the relevant aspect that has to be taken into consideration while deciding whether an order is an interlocutory order or a final order. 13. In Madhu Limaye’s case, (1978)1 S.C.R. 749 , the State Government prosecuted the appellant for an offence under Sec.500, I.P.C. after according necessary sanction and the Public Prosecutor filed the complaint before the Court of Session. The appellant filed a petition under Sec.203, Crl.P.C. to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. This was negatived by the learned Sessions Judge and he framed charges against the accused. Then the accused went on revision before the High Court. The High Court held that the revision petition was not maintainable under Sec.397(2), Crl.P.C. since the order of the Sessions Judge was only an interlocutory order. But the Supreme Court allowed the appeal holding that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec.397(2), Crl.P.C. The Apex Court has also posed a question in Madhu Limaye’s case as follows: “If a complaint is dismissed under Sec.203 or under Sec.204(4), or the Court holds the proceeding to be void or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of the complainant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise it will make Sec.398 of the new Code otiose. Does it stand to reason, then, than an accused will have no remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a complainant or otherwise and which is fit to be quashed on the face of it.” 14. Does it stand to reason, then, than an accused will have no remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a complainant or otherwise and which is fit to be quashed on the face of it.” 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam and another, 1999 S.C.C. (Crl.) 393, after discussing the import of the expression “interlocutory order” as found in Sec.397(2) of Crl.P.C., as interpreted in Amarnath v. State of Haryana, (1978)1 S.C.R. 22, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1978)1 S.C.R. 749 and in V.C. hukla v. State, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962, held that an order directing issuance of process is not interlocutory and Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.397 does not apply to such an order and it is only an intermediate and quasi final order and therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Sec.397 could be exercised against the same, if an order of issuance of process cannot be held to be an interlocutory order, the order refusing to discharge the accused from the case by no stretch of imagination can be held to be an interlocutory order. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in this case refusing to discharge the accused is not an interlocutory order, inasmuch as it affects the valuable right of the accused and Sec.397(2) is not a bar for entertaining the revision. 15. Coming to the facts of the case, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners conceded that there are materials to frame charges against the petitioners 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 13 and therefore on facts, there is no question of discharge of these accused, but insofar as the petitioners 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14 are concerned, there is absolutely no material to show that they were involved in the commission of the offence. Learned Public Prosecutor also could not show any material as against these accused. Under such circumstances, interest of justice requires that the above petitioners have to be discharged from the case. In the absence of any allegation of facts, constituting any offence against these accused, they cannot be made to undergo the or deal of trial. 16. Learned Public Prosecutor also could not show any material as against these accused. Under such circumstances, interest of justice requires that the above petitioners have to be discharged from the case. In the absence of any allegation of facts, constituting any offence against these accused, they cannot be made to undergo the or deal of trial. 16. In the result, the revision petition stands dismissed insofar as the petitioners 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 13 are concerned and with regard to the other petitioners, the revision petition is allowed. Thus the revision petition is partly allowed. Consequently, connected Crl.M.Ps. are closed.