S. B. SINHA, CJ. ( 1 ) THESE writ appeals involving common questions of fact and law were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE writ appeals by Manjira grameena Bank, Sangareddy are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge in W. P. Nos. 12543, 15988 and 16891 of 1991 respectively. ( 3 ) ONE Sri Ashok Kumar, the respondent herein, has filed the aforesaid writ petitions. He was appointed as Scale-1 officer in 1984 in the appellant Bank. On 11. 7. 1987 he was issued a charge-sheet containing five charges. He was placed under suspension pending enquiry with effect from 31-7-1987. The enquiry officer who conducted an enquiry against the respondent submitted report holding that charges l (b) and 4 (b) are proved. Upon consideration of the report of the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority by orders dated 1. 2. 1991 imposed the penalty of reduction to a lower stage in incremental scale from the stage as on the date of suspension i. e. , from Rs. 1,620/- to the first stage i. e. , rs. 1,550/ -. The period of suspension was treated as not spent on duty. The appellate authority rejected the appeal preferred by the respondent by order-dated 7. 9. 1991. Assailing the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, the respondent filed W. P. No. 13784 of 1991 inter alia, urging that he was not furnished with the report of the enquiry officer alongwith the show-cause notice for the proposed punishment and thus principle of natural justice were violated. ( 4 ) WHILE the said W. P. was pending, seniority list of officers Scale-I was issued on 15. 11. 1993 in which he was shown at s. No. 61 mentioning his date of joining as 1. 2. 1991 instead of 23. 1. 1984. He submitted objections to the same on 25. 11. 1993 to place him at S. No. 6. According to the petitioner, as per Regulation No. 13 (1) (a), seniority shall be reckoned with reference to the date of the appointment of an officer in his Grade and, therefore, his seniority has to be reckoned from 23. 1. 1984 only. The period of suspension cannot be ignored for the purpose of reckoning the seniority of an employee. According to the petitioner, as per Regulation No. 13 (1) (a), seniority shall be reckoned with reference to the date of the appointment of an officer in his Grade and, therefore, his seniority has to be reckoned from 23. 1. 1984 only. The period of suspension cannot be ignored for the purpose of reckoning the seniority of an employee. He is entitled to be shown at s. No. 6 instead of 61. Therefore, the respondent filed W. P. No. 16891 of 1995 for a direction to the appellant-bank to place him at S. No. 6 in the seniority list by taking into account his service from 23. 1. 1984 to 1. 9. 1993 as uninterrupted and to direct the bank to consider his case for promotion to the Manager Scale-II. ( 5 ) WHILE the matter stood thus, when vacancies arose for promotion to the category of Officers Scale-II which was on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, he was not called for interview and pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in w. P. No. 16891 of 1995, he was called for interview, but he was not promoted and persons who were junior to him were promoted. In 1996 also though he was called for interview he was not selected and respondents 2 to 13 were promoted. In the counter filed by the respondents in w. P. No. 16891 of 1995, it was admitted that petitioner was entitled to be shown at s. No. 15. According to the petitioner, since 12 persons were promoted in 1996, he is entitled to be shown at S. No. 3. Therefore, he filed W. P. No. 12543 of 1997 for a declaration that the action of the respondents in promoting his juniors 2 to 13 as arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, in 1998 16 vacancies in the category of Scale-II Officers arose. In the seniority list he was shown at 54 instead of S. No. 1. Though he was called for interview, he was not considered for promotion. Me, therefore, filed the third writ petition being W. P. No. 15988 of 1998 for a direction to the Bank to promote him to the post of Officer Scale-II as per the office circular dated 4. 5. 1998 reckoning his seniority at S. No. l5 of the seniority list dated 20. 7. 1995. Me, therefore, filed the third writ petition being W. P. No. 15988 of 1998 for a direction to the Bank to promote him to the post of Officer Scale-II as per the office circular dated 4. 5. 1998 reckoning his seniority at S. No. l5 of the seniority list dated 20. 7. 1995. ( 7 ) THE above three writ petitions were heard along with W. P. No. 13784 of 1991 and the learned-single Judge allowed all the writ petitions by the common order under challenge. The learned single Judge held that the respondent has been prejudiced by non-supply of the report of the enquiry officer and accordingly set aside the order of punishment as also the order of the appellate authority. ( 8 ) AGAINST the said order, the Bank preferred Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2000 and this Bench by order dated 11-10-2001 set aside the order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter back to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh on merits in conformity with the requirement of Regulation 31 (2) of the regulations after affording an opportunity of hearing to the respondent. Though the disciplinary proceedings have not been held to be vitiated in law, however, a copy of the enquiry report was directed to be supplied to him. ( 9 ) THE learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the period of suspension cannot be treated as a break in service so as to reduce the petitioner in the seniority list. Therefore, it was held that the services of respondent have to be treated as continuous for all the purposes except for the purpose of wages from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement and the order treating the period as not on duty shall not have the effect of change in the seniority of the employee. Accordingly, it was held that the petitioner should be treated as having continuous service right from his appointment. ( 10 ) THE question, which arises for consideration in these appeals, is as to what would be the position of the petitioner in the seniority list. ( 11 ) THE respondent claims that as per the date of his appointment, he is entitled to be placed in the category of Officer scale-I at S. No. 6. ( 10 ) THE question, which arises for consideration in these appeals, is as to what would be the position of the petitioner in the seniority list. ( 11 ) THE respondent claims that as per the date of his appointment, he is entitled to be placed in the category of Officer scale-I at S. No. 6. However, he was brought down to S. No. 61 inter alia on the ground that his probation has been extended and he had been under suspension for the period from 1987 to 1991. In the seniority list issued in the year 1995 he was shown at s. No. 61 and subsequently he was placed at S. No. 53. ( 12 ) REGULATION 13 (1)of Manjira Grameena bank Staff Service Regulations, 1983, provides that seniority of an officer or employee of the Bank in a grade or scale shall be reckoned with reference to the date of his appointment in that grade or scale. However regulation 13 (3) reads as under: ( 13 ) IN the case of an employee whose probation has been extended, his seniority shall be reckoned just below all the officers or employees, if any, recruited or promoted in the same batch along with him. ( 14 ) THERE cannot be any dispute that seniority of an employee would normally be counted from the date of his appointment in the post. Regulation 13 (3) however prescribes that seniority of an employee whose probation has been extended shall be reckoned just below all the officers or employees, if any recruited or promoted in the same batch along with him. ( 15 ) MR. Srinivas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently contended that Rule 13 (3} is ultra vires inasmuch as it has taken away the right of the employee to count bis seniority from the date of his appointment, on mere extension of probation, Extension has nothing to do with the seniority of the employee and the date of appointment will govern the seniority of the employee. He relied upon the decision of this Court in Chaitanya Grameena Bank v. S. V. L. Narayana, 1999 (1) ALD 627 - 1999 (1) ALT 550 , wherein exactly a similar regulation came up for consideration before this Court. He relied upon the decision of this Court in Chaitanya Grameena Bank v. S. V. L. Narayana, 1999 (1) ALD 627 - 1999 (1) ALT 550 , wherein exactly a similar regulation came up for consideration before this Court. A learned single Judge following the decisions of the Supreme Court in chairman, Porigramyak Bank v. Ananda chandra Das, (1994) 6 SCC 301 , M. P. Chandoria v. State of M. P. , (1996) 11 SCC 173 , Sree Narayana Dharmasangham Trust v. Swami Prakasananda, (1999) 7 SCC 78 and Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers association v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 1607 , held thus: in other words, ranking given at the time of selection process shall determine the seniority of an Officer. However, under rule 13 (3), it is open to the employer to alter the seniority on the ground that an officer s probation has been extended and place him below the seniority of all those officers recruited in the same batch. I am of the view that Rule 13 (3) confers a power inconsistent with the rule of seniority. The normal principle of seniority is the length of service on the ranking obtained at the time of selection. In other words, the length of service of an employee determines his seniority in a particular grade or scale. The length of service cannot be altered on the ground that the probation of the Officer has been extended. There is no nexus between the length of the service and the extension of probation. If the probation of an Officer is extended, that means he is inefficient in service. The fact that an officer is inefficient does not automatically result in reduction of the length of service. He continues to work from the date of his first appointment though inefficiently. The inefficiency determines his fitness for further promotion, but, does not reduce the length of service. Therefore, in the case of an Officer whose probation is extended, his seniority cannot be reduced by placing him below the Officers who were recruited in the same batch. The same reasoning applies to the determination of seniority on the basis of ranking. The inefficiency determines his fitness for further promotion, but, does not reduce the length of service. Therefore, in the case of an Officer whose probation is extended, his seniority cannot be reduced by placing him below the Officers who were recruited in the same batch. The same reasoning applies to the determination of seniority on the basis of ranking. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in chairman, Porigramyak Bank s case (supra), if once the merit list on the basis of the ranking secured at the time of the selection is prepared, it cannot be altered on the ground that the probation of an Officer is extended. Extension of probation of an officer has no relevance as the said extension cannot alter the ranking. ( 16 ) THE above decision, in our view, squarely applies to the facts of the present case. We may also add that seniority of an employee cannot be reduced unless otherwise by way of punishment as such reduction in the seniority would amount to punishment and as the individual would be deprived of the chances of his future promotion particularly where promotion is based on seniority-cum-merit. Therefore, the extension of the probation of the respondent cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of reduction of his seniority. ( 17 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner has been under suspension from 1987 to 1991. Although such a period cannot be treated as break in service, the determination of such period would, however, depend upon the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. But, in the event the petitioner is exonerated of the charges, the period of suspension cannot be treated to be a break in service so as to be reduced his position in the seniority list. The decision of the learned single Judge, in our opinion, to the above extent is correct. ( 18 ) THE respondent had been over looked for promotion for the years 1995 to 1998. It is true that where promotion is to be eonsidered on the principle of seniority- cum-merit, seniority has a greater role to play. The decision of the learned single Judge, in our opinion, to the above extent is correct. ( 18 ) THE respondent had been over looked for promotion for the years 1995 to 1998. It is true that where promotion is to be eonsidered on the principle of seniority- cum-merit, seniority has a greater role to play. ( 19 ) IN B. V. Sivuiah v. K. Addanki Bahu, (1998) 6 SCC 720 , the Apex Court referring to the decision in State of Mysore v. Syed mahmood, AIR 1968 SC 1113 , held that where the promotion is based on seniority- cum-merit, the officer cannot claim promotion as a matter of right by virtue of his seniority alone and if he is found unfit to discharge the duties of the higher post, he may be passed over and an officer junior to him may be promoted. It, therefore, cannot be said that merit has absolutely no say in the matter. ( 20 ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge to the extent indicated above is correct. The writ appeals are disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.