JUDGMENT 1. The judgment of the Court was as follows : The petitioner was employed as a security guard in the Security Section of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, which shall be referred in short as the 'Institute' in this judgment. The Institute contemplated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and by an order dated October 26, 1995, the petitioner had been suspended from work. The petitioner had been intimated accordingly. By a memo dated October 30, 1995, the Institute further intimated the petitioner that it had proposed to take action against him under the statutory provisions, and that he was charged with, involving "himself in serious fraudulent activities of forging appointment letters" and harbouring outsiders in his residential quarters to indulge in fraudulent activities. The petitioner was given ten days' time to submit his representation, from the date of receipt of the memo. An undated representation made by the petitioner has been annexed to the petition. It would appear from the representation that the petitioner had admitted, that his nephew one Rajkishore Singh sometimes visited his quarters, "and, lastly, on 12.10.1995 came to my quarter and on 20.10.1995, he has been arrested" The petitioner had denied any knowledge of forging or the criminal activities of Rajkishore. The Institute by its office order dated November 23, 1995 intimated the petitioner that an enquiry would be held in the matter under Rule 15(g) of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, Statute of 1962. The enquiry officer by a letter dated January 11, 1996 requested the petitioner to appear before him at a specified venue, date and time in connection with another enquiry proceedings. By a letter dated January 27, 1996, the petitioner made diverse allegations against the enquiry officer and refused to appear, contending that he had nothing to do in the case and had nothing to say in the matter. The petitioner was, thereafter, intimated by the same enquiry officer, that he would bold enquiry proceedings at a specified venue, date and time. The petitioner by a letter dated February 9, 1996 alleged that the charges were vague, indefinite and not at all specific, and asked for being supplied with diverse evidence, list of witnesses and documents, to be relied on by the Institute. The petitioner was supplied with the list of witnesses and documents on February 14, 1996. The petitioner by a letter dated February 9, 1996 alleged that the charges were vague, indefinite and not at all specific, and asked for being supplied with diverse evidence, list of witnesses and documents, to be relied on by the Institute. The petitioner was supplied with the list of witnesses and documents on February 14, 1996. In spite of several opportunities afforded to the petitioner, thereafter, the petitioner refused and failed and neglected to appear before the enquiry officer. 2. The petitioner instead chose to come to Court, by way of a writ petition which had been disposed of by an order dated March 29, 1996. The Hon'ble Judge in his order recorded that he had heard the Advocates for the parties and went through the facts and circumstances of the case and that he was, "not inclined to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage." No observations were made as regards the merits of the case and the Hon'ble Judge questions open, and the petitioner was given the "liberty to take the points as taken in the writ application before the enquiry officer". The enquiry officer was directed to dispose of the proceedings peremptorily, within two months from the date of communication of the order. 3. The allegations as also some of the prayers in the earlier writ petition which included an allegation of bias against the enquiry officer were similar to those contained in the present writ petition. It was significant that earlier writ petition was disposed of after hearing the Advocates for the parties, and going through the facts and circumstances of the case, obviously, meaning the pleadings in the petition. His Lordship, however, was not inclined to interfere, and as would appear from the order none of the reliefs claimed in the petition was granted. In fact, the only positive direction in clear terms was, that the enquiry officer was to dispose of the enquiry proceedings. The petitioner did not chose to prefer an appeal from that order. It could, therefore, be said without fear of contradiction, that the allegations in the earlier writ petition had in fact been adjudicated. In fact, the only positive direction in clear terms was, that the enquiry officer was to dispose of the enquiry proceedings. The petitioner did not chose to prefer an appeal from that order. It could, therefore, be said without fear of contradiction, that the allegations in the earlier writ petition had in fact been adjudicated. That the Court did not go into the merits of the case and that all questions were left open, merely, indicated shat since the respondents did not file any affidavit nothing was recorded as to the rights and wrongs of the case. The liberty given to the writ petitioner, was to urge before the enquiry officer those points which he had taken in the writ petition. There was no direction by the Court that the enquiry officer should hold further meetings or give a hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner at the time when the order was made was quite aware, that the last date which the enquiry officer had fixed was March 20, 1996. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it was unlikely that this fact had not been brought to the notice of the Court during the course of the hearing of the earlier writ petition. The petitioner had chosen not take advantage of the liberty, the Court had granted him. Since the enquiry officer was directed to dispose of the enquiry proceedings within two months, he submitted his enquiry on April 1996 report after almost a month from the date of the order. 4. The Institute agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and by a memo dated April 16, 1996 intimated the petitioner that the Director had "provisionally come to the conclusion that any of the penalties as set out under (iv) to (vii) of Statute 15(9), as in the Annexure, be imposed on Sri Singh". The petitioner was given the opportunity to make representation on the proposed penalty, within ten days from the date of the issue of the memo. In his representation there was not a whisper that the petitioner had been deprived of the liberty of taking all the points before the enquiry officer which he had taken in the earlier writ petition. The petitioner was given the opportunity to make representation on the proposed penalty, within ten days from the date of the issue of the memo. In his representation there was not a whisper that the petitioner had been deprived of the liberty of taking all the points before the enquiry officer which he had taken in the earlier writ petition. In the representation, it had been stated, that "In many cases, the Institute has granted 15 days time in such circumstances," and prayed that 20 days time may be granted to him to make his representation. It was alleged in the representation that there was non-application of mind by the Director, and that he was mala fide and malicious in his decision, and that he should be specific as to the punishment proposed. Finally, it had also been alleged in the representation of the petitioner that the documents annexed to the enquiry report were not legible and that xerox of such documents sent to him, along with the enquiry report, had been "intentionally reduced from' its original shape while making its Xerox". 5. Admittedly, the petitioner had received the memo dated April 16, 1996 on April 18, 1996. Surely, he could have made his allegations within ten days' as required by the respondents, instead of on May 2, 1996. Why did the petitioner not allege in his representation that he had been deprived of a hearing by the enquiry officer in compliance with the order of the Court? Why did the petitioner not make an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, for the alleged violation of an order of the Court? No answer of any sort. The petitioner was quite aware of the purport of the order of the Court. He was also aware that in his numerous representations he had exhausted his points, and asking the enquiry officer for further hearing would not enure to his interest. All he wanted was to delay and drag the process as long as it was possible, and he had been advised accordingly. 6. An interim order had been obtained by the petitioner in this petition, allowing the petitioner to continue to remain in his quarters. He is still in Possession. I find his conduct reprehensible and quite unbefetting a person to be employed in any work involving trust and confidence. 6. An interim order had been obtained by the petitioner in this petition, allowing the petitioner to continue to remain in his quarters. He is still in Possession. I find his conduct reprehensible and quite unbefetting a person to be employed in any work involving trust and confidence. His refusal to appear before the enquiry officer, his refusal to await the finding of the disciplinary authority, and his refusal to appear before the appellant authority, all indicate that the petitioner was arrogant and with scant respect for authority or the rule of law. 7. For those reasons, this application is dismissed. The respondent authorities shall be at liberty to take such disciplinary action against the petitioner as they may decide in accordance with law and the rules of the Statute. The petitioner shall pay costs of this application assessed at 100 GM. Costs shall be paid by the petitioner to the Advocates for the respondents within a week from the date of obtaining a Xerox of this order. Parties shall be at liberty to obtain Xerox of this judgment, counter signed by the Assistant Court Officer of this Court, on the undertaking of their respective Advocates to obtain certified Xerox of this judgment on the usual terms.