Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the decision in Succession Case No. 12 of 1990 which was handed down by Sri Sohailur Rahman, 1st Additional District Judge, Darbhanga. 2. The respondents of this appeal had filed the aforesaid succession case for grant of Succession Certificate in their names upon the death of Sri Sardar Vidya Singh, their brother, who was working as peon in the Health Department of Dalsingsarai Block. The deceased had died on 25th April, 1988, at Mohalla Kathalbar P.S. Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga. The respondents claimed succession on the basis of their relationship with the deceased as full brothers. This Succession Certificate was contested by appellant Raj Kumar on the ground that the deceased was unmarried and he had adopted the appellant as his son. The Additional Judge, however, disbelieved the story of adoption and granted Succession Certificate in the names of the respondents. 3. The decision of the trial Court was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that the learned Additional Judge committed illegally in granting the Succession Certificate, without a proceeding apportioning the stores of the respective certificate-holders, it was submitted that the Succession Certificate should have been granted in the name of one person and shares of other claimants should have been mentioned in the certificate. This having not been done, the Succession Certificate was defective. The decision of the trial Court was further assailed on the ground that the evidence led on behalf of the appellant was misinterpreted and, hence, the trial Court committed an error in arriving at a just decision and so also the grant of certificate was an erroneous decision of the case. 4. So far as the first objection to the grant of Succession Certificate is concerned, I am of the opinion that it is for the respondents to raise any technical objection in this regard. It is the respondents who will suffer, if there is any technical defect in the certificate granted to them. Neither the respondents have raised any objection in this connection nor they have filed this appeal. So, I am of the considered opinion that the objection to the grant of certificate taken by the appellant is not sustainable. It is the respondents who will suffer, if there is any technical defect in the certificate granted to them. Neither the respondents have raised any objection in this connection nor they have filed this appeal. So, I am of the considered opinion that the objection to the grant of certificate taken by the appellant is not sustainable. Moreover, I am further of the opinion that the grant of Succession Certificate in the names of both the respondents who were admittedly brothers, will not, in any way, affect their interest and they will have the shares as per the law applicable to them. So I dismiss the plea of the appellant in this connection. 5. So far, the question whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the appellant was the adopted son of the deceased, that question only remains to be considered. In this connection, the respondents lawyer pointed out that Section 9(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (in short, the Act), lays down that it is the father alone who is entitled to give his son in adoption to anybody else with the consent of mother, if the father is alive. In the instant case, it was the mother who allegedly gave the appellant in adoption to the deceased Vidya Singh. So the alleged adoption was invalid. I find that this technical objection is very much sustainable. Admittedly, father and mother of the appellant Raj Kumar Ram were alive, when the alleged adoption was made, as per the case of the appellant. It was submitted before me by the appellants lawyer that the father was present when the ceremony of adoption took place. I am of the opinion that mere presence of father could not be sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of Sec. 9(2) of the Act. I find that, P.W. 1 was examined to support the fact of the ceremony relating to the adoption. This, P.W. 1 has clearly said that it was the mother of appellant Raj Kumar Ram, namely, Urmila Devi who had given the appellant in adoption to the deceased. This P.W. No. 1 failed to say in his chief that the father of the boy was also present when this ceremony took place in the temple. The learned trial Court also on the basis of the evidence of other P.Ws., held that adoption was not proved. This P.W. No. 1 failed to say in his chief that the father of the boy was also present when this ceremony took place in the temple. The learned trial Court also on the basis of the evidence of other P.Ws., held that adoption was not proved. The learned trial Court considered Ext-B which was the certificate granted by P.W. 1. The Court held that in Ext-B, there is no reference to presence of boys father at the time of ceremony relating to the adoption. The Court further held that in view of admission of C.P.W. 4, the deceased was at his native place in the district of Darbhanga when he died. The Court further held on the basis of admission of P.W. 4 and other witnesses that appellant Raj Kumar Ram. did not have any income of his own to perform the shradh of the deceased and, therefore, any claim of performing shradh by this followers unreliable. I find that these findings of the trial Court are very much based on the evidence and they do not suffer from any error of record or infirmity. The Court further held that there was no evidence that the deceased had difference with his brothers or his mother who was alive as per his evidence and, therefore, there was no question of his being neglected by his family members and the Shradh being performed by the appellant. Hence, also the Court did not commit any illegality or irregularity and his findings are very much based on the evidence adduced by the appellant as O.P. in the lower Court. A particular affidavit (Ext-D) sworn by the deceased was also used as a place of evidence in support of claim of adoption by the appellant. The learned trial Court held that this affidavit bore L.T.I., of the deceased, even though he was admittedly a literate person. Here, he dubbed this affidavit to be of suspicious character. The learned trial Court held that documents to be suspect also in view of the fact that the photograph attached to this affidavit purportedly that of the appellant, was of boy of the age much more than 8-10 years, when the alleged adoption took place. The appellant has also blanked on the certificate granted by the President of so-called sub-divisional Harijan Adibasi Cell (Ext-C) to the effect that the appellant was adopted son of the deceased Vidya Singh. The appellant has also blanked on the certificate granted by the President of so-called sub-divisional Harijan Adibasi Cell (Ext-C) to the effect that the appellant was adopted son of the deceased Vidya Singh. The president of the Cell aforesaid was examined as P.W. 2. The lower Court has also held this witness to be unreliable because admittedly, the father of Ram Kumar Ram, the appellant was the Secretary of the Cell and so the Certificate granted by this witness was also of doubtful character. I find that this finding of the trial Court was also perfectly justified in the circumstances of the case. The father of the boy who was also examined had also admitted that his wife Urmila Devi was also working in the same Health Centre where the deceased was working. In view of this fact, there was chance of intimacy of deceased with Urmila and so the attempt of the appellant to obtain got-up paper was probable. In this connection, a particular admission of Ram Karan Mochi, one of the applicants was also referred to (Ext-A). In this connection, the lower Court held that Ram Karan Mochi alleged that his signature was obtained on a plain paper which was covered into an application admitting the alleged adoption. This finding of the learned trial Court was, perhaps, also justified in the circumstances of the case, I find that the body of this document is in a different handwriting and so called endorsement (Ext-A) of Ram Karan Mochi is in a different handwriting. 6. I need not refer to other aspects of discussions upon the evidence adduced by both the parties. I have simply referred to the salient features of the discussion of the trial Court relating to the alleged adoption. I find that the learned trial Court, on the basis of the evidence adduced by both the parties came to a definite conclusion that the appellant has failed to prove the adoption by positive and unimpeachable evidence. In this connection, it was pointed out by the appellants lawyer that the trial Court has held the adoption to be invalid only because there was no corporeal transfer of the boy from one lap to the other. However, I find that this objection of the learned appellants lawyer is not born out by the judgment of the trial Court. In this connection, it was pointed out by the appellants lawyer that the trial Court has held the adoption to be invalid only because there was no corporeal transfer of the boy from one lap to the other. However, I find that this objection of the learned appellants lawyer is not born out by the judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court has discussed and examined the evidence of both the parties, there thread bare and has come to a positive conclusion that the adoption, as alleged, was not proved. The discussion which I have had upon the salient features of the evidence will also lead to the same conclusion. Seeking compassionate appointment on the ground of mentioning of the appellant in some papers prepared at his instance cannot amount to giving him the status of an adopted son of the deceased. The papers prepared at disclosures made by the affected persons cannot, in itself, lead to the conclusion that he is adopted son of a particular person. The respondents were admittedly the full brothers of the deceased and hence, they were entitled to succession. 7. In the result, I am of the opinion that the impugned order passed in the succession case does not deserve any reversal by this Court. This Miscellaneous case is, accordingly, dismissed. 8. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.