( 1 ) HEARD Sri R. M. K. Kishore, the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner and sri T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel representing the respondent. ( 2 ) THE Revision Petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R. C. C. No. 31/90 on the file of Rent Controller-Principal District munsif, Eluru and the respondent in c. M. A. No. 4/98 on the file of appellate authority-Senior Civil Judge, Eluru and the present Civil Revision Petition is filed as against a reversing order, the appellate authority allowing the appeal on the ground that the Revision Petitioner-tenant secured alternative accommodation under section 10 (2) (v) of the A. F. Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, in short referred to as "act" hereinafter. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to hereinafter as landlord-petitioner and tenant-respondent as arrayed in the R. C. C. ( 4 ) THE averments made by the landlord- petitioner in the R. C. C. are as follows: the petitioner in the R. C. C. i. e. , respondent in the C. R. P. is the landlord and the respondent i. e. , the Revision Petitioner is the tenant in respect of schedule property consisting of two shops. The respondent- tenant took the schedule shops on lease from the petitioner on a monthly rent of rs. 700/ -. The petitioner who is a resident of Vijayawada has been collecting rents from the respondent by making trips to eluru from time to time. The petitioner has got two sons and one daughter and the sons are grown up children who are eager to do business. The petitioner is working as clerk in a business shop at Vijayawada and that he is intending to get his sons to do business in plastic and general goods in which they are training, for which the petitioner expressed his desire to do business to the respondent. The respondent however expressed to shift his business to some other place and requested for time, but he has been taking time without keeping his promise, mat the petitioner bona fidely requires the schedule premises for their personal occupation. The respondent eversince he was requested to vacate the premises, has been paying the rents irregularly and he paid rents once in two months as can be seen from the receipt book maintained by him. The respondent eversince he was requested to vacate the premises, has been paying the rents irregularly and he paid rents once in two months as can be seen from the receipt book maintained by him. The respondent paid rents for the month of July, 1990 on 6-8-90 under receipt No. 21 and thereafter committed wilful default in payment of rents. The petitioner came to Eluru on 7-9-1990 and 13-9-1990 to collect the rents but the respondent did not pay rents due for the month of August 1990. The petitioner again came to Eluru on 15-10-1990 to collect the rent but the respondent did not pay the rent for the month of September 1990. Again the petitioner came to Eluru on 15-11-1990, but the respondent did not pay the rent for the month of October 1990. When the petitioner came down on 3-12-1990 the respondent was absent from the shop and the petitioner came to know through his inmates at vijayawada that some money order came but the same was returned as petitioner was not available by then. Therefore, the petitioner committed default in payment of rents for the months of August, September, october and November totalling to rs. 2,800/- and hence the petitioner got a legal notice issued to the respondent, but there is no reply for the same. The petitioner submits that the respondent purchased a shop which is opposite to the schedule premises for a valuable consideration cf rs. 1,20,000/- from A. Kusuma Rani under a registered sale deed dated 16-5-1991 in the name of his wife. The respondent has secured alternative accommodation and thus the respondent is liable to be evicted from the schedule premises on that ground also. The Revision Petitioner-respondent in the R. C. C. i. e. , the tenant filed his counter denying the allegations and he had admitted that he had taken the petition schedule premises on lease from the petitioner on 1-1-1979 on a monthly rent of rs. 350/- and carrying on iron and hardware business and that he has been paying rents regularly. The Revision Petitioner-respondent in the R. C. C. i. e. , the tenant filed his counter denying the allegations and he had admitted that he had taken the petition schedule premises on lease from the petitioner on 1-1-1979 on a monthly rent of rs. 350/- and carrying on iron and hardware business and that he has been paying rents regularly. The respondent paid the rents as under: ( 5 ) SRI R. M. K. Kishore, the learned counsel appearing for the Revision petitioner-tenant had contended that the wife and husband under Indian Law cannot be treated as one entity and the mere fact that the property was purchased by the wife with her own funds cannot be taken advantage by the landlord to evict the tenant on such ground. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to the respective pleadings and also the evidence and the evidence recorded in this regard by the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority. The learned Counsel had also drawn my attention to the relevant provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. ( 6 ) SRI T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned counsel representing the respondent- landlord had contended that the order of the appellate authority in ordering eviction on the ground of alternative accommodation is perfectly justified and valid in law. The learned Counsel also had contended that though the Rent Controller had not framed any specific point relating to this aspect there was some discussion and ultimately this ground also was negatived, but the appellate authority after recording the reasons had arrived at a conclusion that the landlord is entitled to the relief of eviction. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the provisions of Section 10 (3) and the. language employed in Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act. The learned Counsel also had stressed the absence of the words "of his own" in the relevant provisions Section 10 (2) (v) of the act. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on K. V. S. S. Prasada Rao v. Godavari bat and also V. K. Malhotra and another v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur in support of his contentions. The learned Counsel also had stressed the absence of the words "of his own" in the relevant provisions Section 10 (2) (v) of the act. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on K. V. S. S. Prasada Rao v. Godavari bat and also V. K. Malhotra and another v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur in support of his contentions. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing both the Counsel, as far as ground under Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act is concerned, the provision specifies as follows:"that the tenant has secured alternative building or ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause,"the provision contains two limbs. The first limb is "that the tenant has secured alternative building" and the second limb is"or ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause". Though both these grounds are incorporated under section 10 (2) (v) of the Act itself, a close reading of the provision makes it clear that the word employed is "or" and hence these grounds are to be treated as independent grounds. Hence the ingredient covered by the first limb of Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act is that the tenant has secured alternative building. Now, the question is what is the meaning of the words "tenant has secured alternative building". It is no doubt true that the words "of his own" are not specifically employed in this provision though in certain of the grounds under section 10 (3), these words "of his own" have been specifically employed. It is no doubt true that the wife and husband under indian Law do not form one entity, but for the purposes of the Act, when the wife had purchased the property, a suitable alternative accommodation, can it be made a ground to evict the husband/tenant on the ground that the tenant has secured alternative building within the meaning of section 10 (2) (v) of the Act? In the decision referred (1 supra) while dealing with this question it was held that by reading section 10 (2) (v) of the Act it is evident that the Legislatures have not used the word in the section that the tenant has secured alternative building in his own name and in the absence of the words "in his own name" it can be interpreted that the tenant must secure alternative building where he will have a legal right to stay that is the requirement of law and if the tenant had secured alternative building though it was purchased in the name of his wife, the tenant has a right to stay along with his wife as the relationship between them is cordial and hence the tenant is liable to be evicted. In the decision referred (2 supra) while dealing with a similar provision under delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 it was held that even where the wife of a tenant had built or acquired vacant possession of premises, the tenant is liable to be evicted. The learned Counsel representing the tenant had drawn my attention to the relevant portion of the deposition of R. W. 1, which reads as follows:- "it is not true to suggest that on 16-5-19911 purchased a shop on the name of my wife from one smt. Kusuma Kumari under Ex. A-1 sale deed. Being as elder of my family, i am looking after one (own ?) family affairs. My wife is not an income-tax assessee. My wife got some amount from her mother and purchased the shop under Ex. A-1 sale deed, on her name. It is true that the said shop is convenient for carrying on business. It is true that this situate in the main bazaar. It is true that towards the south of my shop there is another shop of Konakalla Kotawararao and Co. and doing business in Iron and steel. At the same manner there is also another shop situated on the western side of my wife shop. It is true that there are some more iron and steel shops in the vicinity where the shop stands on the name of my wife is situated. It is true that the shop stands on the name of my wife is located in a business area dealing with iron and steel. It is true that there are some more iron and steel shops in the vicinity where the shop stands on the name of my wife is situated. It is true that the shop stands on the name of my wife is located in a business area dealing with iron and steel. It is not true to suggest that the said shop as a godown to my shop. All of our family members are residing jointly. I own my house in eastern street, Eluru. We are residing in the upstair portion. The ground floor portion is being used as Godown for keeping out hardware material. It is not true to suggest that I am doing business in iron and hardware in the ground floor of my building. It is true that I am having a building-cum-shop in Kaikaloor road. It is not true to suggest that we are doing business in iron and hardware and cement in that building-cum-shop. Since the other shop stands on the name of my wife I did not try to occupy the same in place of the present schedule property". The learned Counsel on the strength of this evidence had contended that the approach of the appellate authority in ordering eviction on this ground is totally erroneous since the ingredients of the said ground are not all satisfied. The learned Counsel also had stressed on the aspect that if such an interpretation is given to the provision referred to supra, then if accommodation is secured by any other member of the family of the tenant in any other form, automatically the tenant is liable to be evicted and this interpretation of the provision will land tenants into serious trouble. I am not inclined to go into hypothetical questions and just I confine myself to the question involved in the present case, suffice for me to say that in view of Ex. A-1 coupled with the admissions made by R. W. 1 it is clear that alternative accommodation is available to the Revision Petitioner-tenant and accordingly the appellate authority in a well-considered order, as far as this ground is concerned, had rightly ordered eviction and hence as a final fact finding authority, the appellate authority had recorded convincing reasons for arriving at a conclusion that the landlord is entitled to the relief of eviction on the said ground. Hence, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order and the Civil revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. But however, the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises. No order as to costs.