ORDER: Frederick Gnanaraj and Franklin Jebaraj, the petitioners herein have filed this application under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. seeking for quashing of the proceedings out of a private complaint filed by one Kumarakannan, the respondent herein for the offences under Secs.420 and 211, I.P.C. 2. The gist of the private complaint filed against the petitioners is as follows: "The second petitioner is the father of the first petitioner. The complainant is the Correspondent of a School situate at Chennai-89 and the Managing Trustee of Loyal Educational and Charitable Foundation at Chennai-92. The petitioners approached the complainant stating that one Technical Training Institute at Adambakkam, is coming for sale and the owner of the said Institute is known to them and they could get the said Institute for a reasonable price to the complainant. The petitioners further represented that in the said Institute 30 students were studying. Accordingly, the second petitioner took the complainant to Kodaikanal and introduced the owner. Sale agreement was entered into between the complainant and the owner. Out of the full sale price, a sum of Rs.50,000 was paid as advance to the owner of the Institute. When the second petitioner and the complainant were coming back to Chennai, the complainant was compelled by the second petitioner to issue a cheque for Rs.1,20,000 in the name of the first petitioner towards the future service charges which was earlier agreed to be paid to the second petitioner. Though he was not willing to give the cheque, only under compulsion of the second petitioner, the complainant issued the cheque for Rs.1,20,000 in the name of the first petitioner. The complainant specifically instructed the second petitioner not to present the cheque before the sale process is over. Thereafter, when the complainant went along with the second petitioner to the Institute, there were only 6 students studying. Further, the standard of the said Institute was also found to be very poor. Therefore, the complainant dropped the proposal for purchasing the said Institute and directed the second petitioner to return the cheque. Despite this, the petitioners presented the cheque, but the same was returned with endorsement “payment stopped by drawer”, since the complainant informed the Bank to countermand the cheque. Thereafter, the petitioners/accused sent statutory notice on 6.2.1999 demanding the cheque amount. Therefore, the complainant dropped the proposal for purchasing the said Institute and directed the second petitioner to return the cheque. Despite this, the petitioners presented the cheque, but the same was returned with endorsement “payment stopped by drawer”, since the complainant informed the Bank to countermand the cheque. Thereafter, the petitioners/accused sent statutory notice on 6.2.1999 demanding the cheque amount. Subsequently, the first petitioner filed a false case against the complainant under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the same was taken on file in C.C.No.2030 of 1999 by the XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, which is still pending. Thus, both the petitioners cheated the complainant by dishonestly obtaining a cheque for Rs.1,20,000 from the complainant and after dishonoured, they filed the false complaint against the complainant herein and thus, they committed the offence under Secs.420 and 211, I.P.C.” 3. The case of the petitioners as projected by the counsel for the petitioners is as follows: “Kumarakannan is running a school in Chennai. He is already known to Franklin Jebaraj, the second petitioner, while he was employed as Deputy Director of Training, Directorate of Employment and Training, Chepauk, Chennai. The said Kumarakannan represented to the first petitioner that he would be able to get a job in USA on an attractive remuneration. He demanded Rs.1,20,000 from the first petitioner to get an Engineer’s job for him at USA. In May, 1998, the petitioners paid the amount of Rs.1,20,000 by way of cash to Kumarakannan. But subsequently, they came to know that Kumarakannan made a false representation and got the amount. On coming to know of this, they told Kumarakannan that they would take action against him through proper forum. Under these circumstances, the said Kumarakannan issued a cheque to the first petitioner for the said amount towards the discharge of the amount obtained by him. The cheque was presented as per the advice of Kumarakannan for payment. But, the cheque was returned with endorsement as “funds insufficient” on 4.9.1998. On being informed, Kumarakannan requested the first petitioner to re-present the cheque again on 31.10.1998. When the first petitioner re-presented the same, it was bounced again on 2.11.1998 with the same endorsement. He was again requested to represent the cheque on 27.1.1999. Accordingly, it was re-presented. This time, it was returned with the endorsement “payment stopped by drawer”. Then, statutory notice was sent on 9.2.1999. When the first petitioner re-presented the same, it was bounced again on 2.11.1998 with the same endorsement. He was again requested to represent the cheque on 27.1.1999. Accordingly, it was re-presented. This time, it was returned with the endorsement “payment stopped by drawer”. Then, statutory notice was sent on 9.2.1999. Despite the receipt of the notice, there was no reply nor any payment. Therefore, the first petitioner filed a complaint within the stipulated time and the same was taken on file in C.C.No.2030 of 1999 and the summons was issued to Kumarakannan and another accused. When the matter was posted on 10.4.1999, the accused Kumarakannan did not appear. However, he appeared on 1.6.1999. Thereafter, as a counterblast to the complaint for the offence under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, he filed a private complaint on 28.6.1999 alleging that the cheque dated 3.8.1998 was fraudulently obtained by the petitioners and thereafter, the false complaint has been filed against him for the offence under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and thereby they committed the offences under Secs.420 and 211, I.P.C." 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeking for the quashing of the proceedings initiated by the respondent through the private complaint for the offences under Secs.420 and 211, I.P.C. would raise the following three points: (1) The allegations contained in the private complaint filed by Kumarakannan against the petitioners even assuming that they are true, would not constitute the offences alleged; (2) As this private complaint is with the allegation that the petitioners filed a false case against the complainant and thereby the petitioners are liable to be punished for the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C., the same cannot be entertained by the Court, in view of the embargo as contained in Sec.195, Crl.P.C. Under the said Section, only the Court in which the alleged false complaint was filed can file a complaint after coming to such a conclusion by conducting enquiry under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. Therefore, the cognizance taken in respect of the offence under Sec.211, Crl.P.C., on the complaint of the respondent is illegal. (3) This private complaint has been filed in order to wreak vengeance against the petitioners as a counterblast to the complaint filed by the first petitioner against the respondent for the offence under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and as such, the same is mala fide. 5. (3) This private complaint has been filed in order to wreak vengeance against the petitioners as a counterblast to the complaint filed by the first petitioner against the respondent for the offence under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and as such, the same is mala fide. 5. These contentions have been stoutly refuted by the counsel for the respondent. 6. In order to substantiate their respective pleas, both the counsels would cite several authorities. 7. This Court as well as the A sex Court, time and again would give the guidelines as to when and under what circumstances the inherent power under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. could be invoked to quash the proceedings. With reference to this aspect, both the counsels would cite the following authorities: (1) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 604; (2) Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S.Gill, 1996 Crl.L.J. 381 (3) G.N.Hegde v. S.Bangarappa, 1995 Crl.L.J. 2935; (4) A.E.Rani v. V.S.R.Sarma, (1995)1 S.C.C. 627 ; (5) Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar and others, 1990 U.J. (S.C.) 129. 8. The main principles in regard to invoking the inherent powers to quash the proceedings as laid down in the above decisions which are relevant to solve the issue raised in this case, are as follows: (1) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (2) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act to the institution and continuance of the proceedings. (3) Where a criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with mala fide or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 9. However, the Apex Court emphatically would observe in these decisions that the complaint has to be read as a whole and if it appears on a consideration on the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is a mala fide, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. 10. 10. These principles have necessarily to be borne in mind, while considering the points urged by the counsel for the petitioners seeking for the quashing of the private complaint proceedings. 11. Though it is stated by the counsel for the petitioners that this complaint not being bona fide has been filed against the petitioners as a counterblast to the private complaint under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed by the first petitioner, that too, after some delay, I am not inclined to go into the question whether the private complaint is mala fide or not, as it would involve the appreciation of the respective contentions with reference to the factual matters. Therefore, in regard to the aspect of mala fide, the third point, I am unable countenance the contention of the counsel for the petitioners. However, I find some force in regard to the other two points. 12. Before considering the first point with reference to the absence of ingredients of Sec.420, I.P.C., it would be appropriate to consider the second point relating to the want of jurisdiction as contained in Sec.195, Crl.P.C. 13. It is the specific case of the complainant in the present complaint that the first petitioner filed a false complaint against him under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the trial Court is pending and thereby he committed the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C. 14. The averments in the private complaint with references to the said allegation as follows: "Subsequently a false case for the offence of ‘DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE’ under Secs.138 and 142 of N.I.Act has been filed against the complainant before XXIII M.M. at Saidapet, which is pending disposal as C.C.No.2030 of 1999. The averments stated in the said complaint are falsely made with intent to cause injury and wrongful loss to the complainant." As per these averments, the complainant would state that the petitioners have committed the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C. 15. Sec.211, I.P.C. would provide thus: "211. The averments stated in the said complaint are falsely made with intent to cause injury and wrongful loss to the complainant." As per these averments, the complainant would state that the petitioners have committed the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C. 15. Sec.211, I.P.C. would provide thus: "211. False charge of offence made with intent to injure: Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding is instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." 16. The reading of the above Section would reveal that the institution of the false criminal complaint against any person knowing it to be false with intent to cause injury to that person is liable to be punished. 17. As indicated above, the allegations mentioned in the complaint clearly indicate the ingredients of Sec.211, I.P.C. However, under Sec.195, Crl.P.C., there is a special procedure provided for trial of the cases involving the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C. 18. Sec.195(1), Crl.P.C. would provide thus: "No Court shall take cognizance- (a)(i).... (ii).... (iii).... (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following Sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, Secs.193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii).... (iii) .... except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate." 19. It is obvious from the reading of the above Section, the criminal proceedings in respect of he offence under Sec.211, I.P.C., when the proceedings have already been initiated in the criminal Court, that criminal Court alone can file a complaint, or else no cognizance could be taken on the complaint of others. 20. It is obvious from the reading of the above Section, the criminal proceedings in respect of he offence under Sec.211, I.P.C., when the proceedings have already been initiated in the criminal Court, that criminal Court alone can file a complaint, or else no cognizance could be taken on the complaint of others. 20. This Court, while dealing with the similar case relating to the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C. is Ponnuchamy, Inspector of Police v. Suyambanandam, 1989 L.W. (Crl.) 411, would hold that the cognizance on the complaint filed under Sec.211, I.P.C. not by the Court concerned is invalid and as such, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 21. The very same view has been given in Adaikkalam, K. and five others v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Pallavaram, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 650, G.S.R.Krishnamurthi v. M.Govindaswamy, Income-tax Officer, 1992 L.W. (Crl.) 84 and M.Devasenapathi and another v. K.Rajamani, 1984 Crl.L.J. (Noc) 34 (Mad.). 22. Admittedly, in this case, the private complaint in respect of the offence under Sec.211, I.P.C. has not been filed by the Court. Therefore, in my view, the cognizance taken by the trial Court is illegal. 23. It is contended by the counsel for the respondent that even if it is illegal in respect of offence under Sec.211, I.P.C., the cognizance taken in respect of the offence under Sec.420, I.P.C. is sustainable. 24. This contention has to be rejected on two grounds: (1) The allegation contained in the complaint with reference to Sec.420, I.P.C. would not satisfy the requirements of the said Section. Therefore, the complaint under Sec.420, I.P.C. is not maintainable. (2) Sec.420, I.P.C. has been added along with Sec.211, I.P.C. in order to circumvent the bar contained in Sec.195, Crl.P.C. and therefore, the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. 25. According to the complainant, the respondent herein, the cheque was fraudulently obtained from the complainant towards the future service charges because of the help rendered by the petitioners in the process of sale of the Institute. The said cheque was presented and the same was dishonoured. So, the act of obtaining the cheque and presenting the same and getting it dishonoured was in order to file a false complaint. 26. These allegations, in my view, would not constitute the offence under Sec.420, I.P.C. The definition of ‘Cheating’ is given in Sec.415, I.P.C., which is as follows: "415. So, the act of obtaining the cheque and presenting the same and getting it dishonoured was in order to file a false complaint. 26. These allegations, in my view, would not constitute the offence under Sec.420, I.P.C. The definition of ‘Cheating’ is given in Sec.415, I.P.C., which is as follows: "415. Cheating: Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induce the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any properly, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat"." 27. To constitute cheating under this Section, there must be- (1) deception of any person and thereby, (2) (a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person- (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property, or (2) (b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. Firstly, there has to be practice of deception by the offender. Then on account of the deception there must be fraudulent or dishonest inducement so as to make the person deceived to deliver any property or to do something or omit to do something etc. Lastly, by reason of delivery of the property or the doing of a thing or the omission to do a thing, there must be the causing of or the likelihood of the causing of damage or harm to the person deceived in body, mind, reputation or property. Thus, as a result of the dishonest inducement of a person, there can be either wrongful loss to the person deceived or wrongful gain to another including the person practising the deception. Whenever any one of these results follows on account of the deception practised by a person, then the offence of cheating would be complete. 28. In this case, none of the ingredients is present. Whenever any one of these results follows on account of the deception practised by a person, then the offence of cheating would be complete. 28. In this case, none of the ingredients is present. Even according to the complainant/ respondent, the cheque was given out of compulsion and not on the basis of any representation which is found to be false. Even according to the complainant, the cheque was given to the petitioners only towards the future service charges for effecting the sale of the Institute. Admittedly, the sale did not materialise. 29. Furthermore, even before the presentation of the cheque, the complainant/ respondent asked the Bank not to honour the cheque by giving instruction to stop the payment. From this, it is clear that there is neither any wrongful loss to the complainant nor wrongful gain to the petitioners. Under those circumstances, the allegations even assuming them to be true would not constitute the offence under Sec.420, I.P.C. 30. In regard to the second reason mentioned above, it would be worthwhile to refer to the observation of the Supreme Court as followed by this Court in the decision reported in G.S.R.Krishnamurthi v. M.Govindaswamy, Income-tax Officer, 1992 L.W. (Crl.) 84, which is as follows: “Though, in our judgment Sec.195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that Section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that Section cannot be evaded by reasoning to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the Section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of public servant is required. The test whether there is evasion of the Section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the Section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence of which that Section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other Section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of Sections mentioned in Sec.195, Crl.P.C. merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Sec.195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” This observation in that case,in my opinion, would apply to this case also. 31. When the allegations contained in the private complaint would involve both the offences, namely, Secs.420 and 211, I.P.C., then the bar engrafted under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. would apply to both the offences, since the allegations constituting these offences are inseparable. 32. Furthermore, the attitude of the complainant to circumvent Sec.195, Crl.P.C., by resorting to prosecute for the offence under Sec.420, I.P.C. also without attempting to move the Court for taking action under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. cannot be allowed to stand. Once it is patent that circumvention of the provisions of Sec.195, Crl.P.C. has been admitted by the respondent/ complainant, the entire proceedings will have to be quashed. 33. In the light of the above said reasonings, the proceedings in C.C.No.4219 of 1999 on the file of the XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, are quashed. Thus, the petition is allowed. Consequently, Crl.M.P.No.7054 of 1999 is closed.