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2001 DIGILAW 1272 (PNJ)

Sham Singh v. State of Haryana

2001-11-09

R.C.KATHURIA

body2001
JUDGMENT R.C. Kathuria, J. - Sham Singh, petitioner, seeks quashing of First Information Report No. 379 dated 24.11.1992 registered under Sections 467, 468, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code with Police Station, Nissing and the subsequent proceedings taken thereon. 2. In order of get a clear picture of the controversy involved in this petition, a few facts have to be noticed. First Information Report was lodged by Lachhman Singh son of Cheta resident of village Gonder, Tehsil and District Karnal. It was stated therein that he owned 123 Kanals 15 Marlas of land comprising 2479/8624th share of land of Khewat No. 175/170, Khatauni Nos. 434, 435, 436 and 437 situated in Village Gonder. Out of this land Lachhamn Das had sold 10 Kanals of land to his brother, Baru Ram, and 24 Kanals to the sons of his brother, namely, Darshan Singh, Kaltar Singh, Patawar Singh, Bhim Singh, Janak Singh and Ilam Singh. In this manner, he was left with 89 Kanals and 15 Marlas of land out of the above mentioned land. It is further stated in the report that Pritam Singh, accused No. 2 in connivance with Mohinder Singh- accused No. 1, who is son of the complainant and is a simple minded person had got a suit for partition filed by Mohinder Singh against him in order to get his share in the property separated. That suit for partition was resisted by the complainant-Lachhman Singh. Said Mohinder Singh, in the mean time, filed another Civil Suit No. 451 of 1991 titled as Mohinder Singh v. Lachhman Singh against Lachhman Singh in connivance with Pritam Singh praying for decree for declaration to the effect that Mohinder Singh was the owner in possession of the land to the extent of 103 share out of 2475 shares of Lachhman Singh out of the total land measuring 431 Kanals 4 Marlas situated in Village Gonder, Tehsil and District Karnal as per jamabandi for the year 1986-87. That suit was decreed in favour of Mohinder Singh on the basis of admission in written statement and the statement recorded in the Court admitting the claim of Mohinder Singh by the Senior Sub Judge, Karnal on 18.9.1991. That suit was decreed in favour of Mohinder Singh on the basis of admission in written statement and the statement recorded in the Court admitting the claim of Mohinder Singh by the Senior Sub Judge, Karnal on 18.9.1991. When Lachhman Singh came to know about this decree, he made enquiries and found that Sham Singh, petitioner-accused had impersonated him in the Court and made a statement and put his thumb impression on it and the Court accepted his statement and passed the decree in favour of Mohinder Singh. On the basis of these allegations, the case was registered under Sections 467, 468, 420 and 120-B Indian Penal Code 3. When the Police took up the investigation of the matter, the petitioner secured anticipatory bail as per order dated 9.1.1993 from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal. Thereafter, he filed the present petition seeking quashing of the aforesaid FIR. 4. I have heard counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made two-fold submissions before me which according to him fully justify quashing of FIR No. 379 dated 24.11.1992 registered against the petitioner-accused. Firstly, that the alleged statement of Mohinder Singh, for whom, the petitioner is stated to have impersonated on 18.9.1991, was recorded by the Court and there being no complaint made by the Court for the registration of a case, criminal proceedings in the form of registration of the FIR could not be initiated in view of the complete bar contained in Sections 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). Reliance was placed in this regard on the case Sardul Singh v. The State of Haryana, 1992 Criminal Law Journal 354. Secondly, it was submitted that a civil suit has already been filed by Lachhman Singh, wherein decree passed in Civil Suit dated 18.9.1991 has been challenged being a fraudulent decree and for that reason during the pendency of civil suit, no parallel criminal proceedings could be launched or taken against the petitioner-accused. Secondly, it was submitted that a civil suit has already been filed by Lachhman Singh, wherein decree passed in Civil Suit dated 18.9.1991 has been challenged being a fraudulent decree and for that reason during the pendency of civil suit, no parallel criminal proceedings could be launched or taken against the petitioner-accused. In support of this contention reference was made to the cases Ajmer Singh and others v. The State of Punjab, 1988 Chandigarh Criminal Cases 496; Surat Singh and another v. Dalwinder Singh and others, 1989 Chandigarh Criminal Cases 532; Tek Chand and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1990(1) Chandigarh Criminal Cases 386; Bal Kishan Das v. P.C. Nayar, 1991(3) Recent Criminal Reports 374 (SC) and M/s Karam Chand Ganga Parshad and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1244. 5. Both the averments have been controverted from the side of the prosecution. A preliminary objection has been taken from the side of the prosecution on the ground that so far challan has not been filed because further proceedings of the case have been stayed by this Court as per order dated 31.3.1993 and the bar of provisions of Section 195 of the Code will apply only at the stage of taking cognizance but not to the investigation of the case by the Police. Regarding the other stand taken, it was stated by the State counsel that in this case written statement has been filed which contained the signatures of Sham Singh, petitioner and thus fictitious written statement impersonating Lachhman Singh signed by Sham Singh was procured outside the Court and subsequently filed in the Court and for that reason even the protection available to him under Section 195 of the Code would not be attracted. 6. After considering the respective stands of the parties, the petition deserves to be rejected for the simple reason that the petitioner has no right to seek the quashing of the FIR and stall the investigation of the case. It is well settled that statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by the provisions of Section 195 of the Code. It is well settled that statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by the provisions of Section 195 of the Code. Investigation by the Police cannot be equated with the cognizance taken by a Magistrate because the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 of the Code would arise when a police report or a complaint is made in respect of the offences committed. Therefore, after the registration of the case, the Police is not precluded from investigating the allegations made and collecting evidence or material in support thereof. The question came up for consideration in case State of Punjab v. Raj Singh, 1998(1) RCR(Criminal) 576. The relevant observation reads as under :- "We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the F.I.R. lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 Indian Penal Code by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Code prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the Court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) Criminal Procedure Code, and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an F.I.R. which discloses a cognisable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in Court. In other words, the statutory power of the Police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the Court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195 (1)(b) Criminal Procedure Code, but nothing therein deters the Court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the F.I.R. (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided if forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code The judgment of this Court in Gopal Krishan Menon and Another v. D. Raja Reddy, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1053, on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the Civil Court and not hence it was held that the Court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code" 7. The dictum of the law laid down in the above case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case and for that reason the petition has to be dismissed on this ground alone. 8. Under the circumstances of the case there is no need to go into the other questions raised because that would necessarily depend upon the nature of the evidence which is collected and produced in Court and it is only thereafter the Court would be in a position to examine the question whether under the circumstances of the case bar of Section 195 of the Code would apply in respect of the offence for which the accused would be sought to be prosecuted by the Police. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, there is not merit in the petition and the same is consequently dismissed. Petition dismissed.