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2001 DIGILAW 1293 (MAD)

V. Krishnakumari v. Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) now re-designated as Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms) Tirunelveli

2001-11-01

MALAI SUBRAMANIAN, V.S.SIRPURKAR

body2001
Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Petitioner herein challenges the order passed by the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) dated 28.6.1998 in Spl. Revision Petition No. 12 of 1998. The facts are rather peculiar. 2. Petitioner claimed to be belonging to the family of one T.K. Eswara pillai of Kere lapuram, Kanyakumari District. The said Eswara Pillai had expired on 6.6.1990, leave behind him his wife Prasannakumari and sons Kumarapillai and Vasanthakumar and daughters Soruparani and Krishnakumari (petitioner herein) as his heirs. The family of late Eswara Pillai was managing the lands of one Iravipurathu Sri Krishnasami Koil, Keralapuram, Thuckalay, which was a private trust. The said trust owned extensive lands a nd needless to say that Eswara Pillai being the Trustee and head of the family was managing the said lands. After the advent of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The said Eswara Pillai filed the returns under the Act as the total extent of the lands owned by the Trust and which were managed by the members of the family exceeded 15 Standard acres, which was the ceiling limit under Sec. 5 of the Act. The enquiry ensued on the return s and the authorised officer by his order dated 17-9-1984 held that the private trust represented by the family held surplus stands to the extent of 10.26 standard acres. An appeal came to be filed against this order by the owners. That appeal was dismissed on 29-5-1987. Thereafter, a writ petition came to be filed vide W.P. No. 8539 of 1997 before the Madras High Court, questioning the proceedings of the authorised officer and the Tribunal, but, that writ petition was also transferred to the Special Appellate Tribunal, which was renumbered as Tr.P No. 91 of 1994 and by order dated 4-4-1995, the Tribunal dismissed the said petition. In pursuance of that a notification declaring 10.26 standard acres of lands as surplus lands has also been issued. It must be menentioned at this juncture that before all this happened, the petitioner was happily married and she had ceased to be the family-member of Eswara Pillai. She had no concern whatsoever with the lands. In pursuance of that a notification declaring 10.26 standard acres of lands as surplus lands has also been issued. It must be menentioned at this juncture that before all this happened, the petitioner was happily married and she had ceased to be the family-member of Eswara Pillai. She had no concern whatsoever with the lands. She did not own or possess even a cent of the above mentioned lands which originally belonged to the private trust and were being managed by her father and brothers. It is for the first time in the year 1998, after the notification under Sec. 18(1) of the Act was published that the petitioner woke-up and filed a revision under Sec. 83 of the Act before the Tribunal. It is interesting to note that there she contended on the basis of Sec. 5(3-A) of the Act that the lands belonging to private trust would be deemed to be the lands owned by the beneficiaries under the private trust and the beneficiaries would be deemed to be the owners of the lands to the extent of their shares and, therefore, the earlier proceedings which had ignored the beneficiaries and more particularly the beneficiary like her were all illegal. By way of prayer, she sought for writ of Certiorari(?) calling for the records of the impugned proceedings of the authorised officer and sought a relief to quash the orders. This revision has been dismissed by the learned Member of the Tribunal which has resulted in the present writ petition. 3. Mr. C. Selvaraju, learned counsel for the petitioner tried to urge that the Tribunal has not properly interpreted the provisions of Sec5(3-A) of the Act. According to him, the lands belonging to the trust became the lands belonging to the beneficiaries and, therefore, the proceedings were bound to be taken against the beneficiaries also. However, the learned counsel very fairly admits that it is for the first time that the petitioner came up by way of a revision under Sec. 83 of the Act without in any manner taking part in the earlier proceedings either before the authorised officer or before the Tribunal. In fact, the learned counsel suggests that the enquiries on the lands suggested in the revision were necessary for proper appreciation. In fact, the learned counsel suggests that the enquiries on the lands suggested in the revision were necessary for proper appreciation. The learned counsel, therefore, assailed the order that the Tribunal has failed to correctly interpret the provisions of Sec. 5(3-A) of the Act as also Sec..3(36-A) 4. Learned counsel firstly relies on the provisions of Sec3(36-A) which defines the private trust and contends that a private trust includes the beneficiaries under it and, therefore, by reading Sec. 5(3-A) along with Sec. 3 (36-A) of the Act, all the lands should have been held to have been owned by all the beneficiaries thereby the land s could not have been held to be surplus lands. 5. The argument, though attractive, is without any substance. The fiction, which is created by Sec. 5 (a-A) of the Act, is only in order to see that the beneficiaries do not defeat the provisions of the Act and its main objectives. Sec. 5(3-A) of the Act reads as follows: 5. Ceiling area: — “(3-A) (i) For the purposes of this Act, the land owned by a private trust shall be deemed to be land owned by the beneficiaries under the private trust and each such beneficiary shall be deemed to be the owner of the land to the extent of the share of his beneficial interest in the said trust. (II) In calculating the extent of land held by such beneficiary for the purposes of this Act, such extent of the share of the land as is mentioned in clause(i) shall be taken into account. Explanation: — For the purposes of this subsection, the trustee of a private trust shall be deemed to be a beneficiary under such private trust, if any income or part thereof from such private trust is enjoyed by him or his heirs, or by his family or the family of his heirs. III (a) The land held by the public trust referred to in the Explanation to clause(36A) of section 3 shall be deemed to be held by the founder of the trust or his heirs or the family of the founder or of his heirs:(b) In calculating the extent of land held by such founder or his heirs or such family, the extent of the land held by the public trust shall be taken into account. Iv (a) Where any of the institutions mentioned in clause(c) of sub-section (1) is a beneficiary under a public trust, the land owned by such public trust, the land owned by such public trust shall be deemed to be land owned by such institution and each institution shall be deemed to be the owner of the land for the purposes of this Act to the extent of the share of the beneficial interest in such public interest. (b) In calculating the extent of land held by such institution, such extent of the share of the land as is mentioned in sub-clause (a) shall be taken into account”. Under this section, if the lands are owned by a private trust and are being enjoyed by the beneficiaries, then fictionally it is deemed that the lands are owned by those beneficiaries, thereby the beneficiaries are made liable to file the returns. After all, if the lands are owned by a deity, the deity is not supposed to file the return. The provisions of the Act could have been defeated if such deeming fiction had not been created. It is for this reason that the deeming fiction is created so that the beneficiaries do not take undue advantage by dividing the whole lands of the deity into small pockets and thereby claim the lands to be under the ceiling limit. The scheme of the section is that if the lands are actually owned by the private trust, even then, it will be deemed to be lands of the beneficiaries, thereby the beneficiaries and such other persons who are enjoying the usufructs of the lands would be under a legal duty to go before the authorities, file their returns and face the proceedings. That is the correct interpretation. If that is so, obviously, what is contended by the petitioner could not be the correct contention and has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal. In this case, when the enquiry took place, the persons who were in possession of the lands and managing the same did appear and ultimately some lands to the extent of 10.26 standard acres of lands were found to be surplus lands, Now, the whole proceedings cannot be ordered to be reopened, much less once the notification under Sec. 18(1) of the Act has been issued. One wonders as to what the writ petitioner was doing when the proceedings were going on. Surely, she must be presumed to have the notice because under the provisions of the Act the public notice as also been published. Under the circumstances, in our view, the petitioner was a total stranger, having no locus standi to file the revision under Sec 83 of the Act and the revision was bound to be rejected on this ground alone. 6. Be that as it may. We find no reason to differ from the reasons given by the Tribunal. In short, the writ petition has no merits. It is dismissed, but without any orders as to the costs.