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2001 DIGILAW 1306 (MAD)

Mary Mathew. v. State of Kerala

2001-11-05

J.B.KOSHY, K.PADMANABHAN NAIR

body2001
J.B. Koshy, J.: The first accused in S.C.No.28 of 1997 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court, Pathanamthitta is the appellant herein.. Originally there were three accused in this case. A-1 is the sister of A-2. Their mother is P.W.2. A-3 is the wife of P.W.3 who is the paternal uncle of A-1. The case of the prosecution was that: First accused was working in Delhi. She fell in love with one Reghu and married him. Out of that relationship a son was born. The relationship between them became strained and for the last three and a half years she is residing with P.W.2. In the night of 26.8 1996 there was Tiruvonam programme in the Courtyard of a house at about 200 metres away from the house of P.W.2. P.W.2 along with A-2 left the house for attending the programme. At that time, A-1 was having advanced pregnancy and therefore, A-1 and her son did not go to attend the programme. P.W.2 and A-2 came back at 2 am in the early morning. They saw A-1 in unconscious condition and her eldest son was seen crying. They took A-1 to Menathottam Hospital at Rani. P.W.13, the Gynecologist of that hospital at about 5 a.m. on 27.8.1996 examined A-1 and issued Ex.P-13 certificate. A-1 came to the hospital after delivering a child. As the child was not seen with her, P.W.13 enquired her where the child was. She said that she put a cloth on the face of the baby and she kept the baby under a coconut tree near her house. A-1 also told that she delivered a child at 11 p.m. on 26.8.1996. Even though A-1 approached the hospital telling the story of abortion, on examination, P.W.13 found that A-1 delivered a baby and there was no abortion. Then only she disclosed about the delivery. On the basis of this, P.W.13 intimated the mater to the police and the dead body was exhumed. 2. P.W. 10, the Assistant Police Surgeon of Medical College Hospital, Kottayam conducted autopsy on the deadbody and issued Ex.P-9 postmortem certificate. Then only she disclosed about the delivery. On the basis of this, P.W.13 intimated the mater to the police and the dead body was exhumed. 2. P.W. 10, the Assistant Police Surgeon of Medical College Hospital, Kottayam conducted autopsy on the deadbody and issued Ex.P-9 postmortem certificate. In Ex.P-19 post-mortem certificate the following injuries were noted by P.W.10: "(1) Pressure abrasion 16 cm long nearly horizontal completely encircling the neck below the legal of thyroid cartilage being 3.5 cm below the behind the chin (1.5 cm broad) 2.5 cm below right ear lobule (1.2 cm broad) 7 cm below occiput (1 cm broad) and 2.5 cm below left year lobule (1 cm broad). The subcutaneous tissue underneath the injury showed infiltration of blood at several sites. Deep seated contusions were noticed in the thyroid gland. (2) Contusion of scalp 3 x 2 cm involving its whole thickness on the back of middle of head overlying the occiput. Brain was found to be intact." P.W. 10 opined that the death was due to ligature strangulation and nonligation of the umbilical cord. The doctor also opined that the baby was full term and was live born. 3. A-2 and A-3 were charged only for offences punishable under Sec. 201 read with Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge found that there was no evidence against them and they were acquitted. The first accused was found guilty under Secs. 302 and 318, Indian Penal Code. The first accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Sec. 302, Indian Penal Code and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months for offence under Sec. 318, Indian Penal Code. Against the order of conviction and sentence, first accused filed this appeal. She had already undergone imprisonment for more than three years. 4. The defence statement under Sec. 313 was that she delivered a child, there was nobody to attend her and she became unconscious, she was taken to the hospital by her brother and she was totally ignorant about the death of her child as she was unconscious. Deposition of P.W.1 also shows that A-1 was unconscious when they returned after attending Thiruvonam programme. There was no eye witness in this case and A-1 was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Deposition of P.W.1 also shows that A-1 was unconscious when they returned after attending Thiruvonam programme. There was no eye witness in this case and A-1 was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The main point of circumstantial evidence was the extra judicial confession made before P.W.13, which was recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate and mentioned in the case sheet, Ex.XI. The sole basis on which the Sessions Judge convicted the accused is the extrajudicial confession. Extra judicial confession is treated as a very weak piece of evidence: The State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and others, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 258. It is true that though there is only one extrajudicial confession, if that confession is made to a trustworthy person who is not even remotely inimical to the accused, and if it evokes confidence of the Court, the Court can rely on such extrajudicial confession. See: State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 48, Normally extrajudicial confession made to an unbiased doctor is treated as a very important piece of evidence. Conviction can be based on extrajudicial confession if it is made voluntarily and truthfully to a trustworthy unbiased person. The question here is whether there is any extrajudicial confession at all. What is said to have been stated by A-1 before P.W. 13 is only that she had delivered a child at 11 p.m. on 26.8.1996, she put some clothes on the face of the baby and kept the body under a coconut tree near her house. She has not confessed that she killed the child or strangulated the child or buried the child. Extrajudicial confession to be relied on as against an accused must be clear, unambiguous and unmistakably conveyed that accused had committed the crime. As held by the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 47, a confession must either admit in terms of the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. See: Veera Ibrahim v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1167. We have already seen that as per Ex.P-9 certificate, the baby died due to strangulation. There is no admission in the alleged extrajudicial confession that she killed the baby or she strangulated the child or buried it for secret disposal of the dead body. Therefore, statement recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate cannot be treated as a confession at all. 5. We have already seen that as per Ex.P-9 certificate, the baby died due to strangulation. There is no admission in the alleged extrajudicial confession that she killed the baby or she strangulated the child or buried it for secret disposal of the dead body. Therefore, statement recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate cannot be treated as a confession at all. 5. Even though P.W.1 gave Ex.P-1 first information statement, she as well as P.Ws.2 and 3 turned hostile. It cannot be ruled out that there is possibility of her brother killing the child because his sister delivered a child while her husband was living in Delhi for the past 3 1/2 years. Whatever may be that, there is no evidence to show that A-1, mother of the child, killed the baby. She was in a perplex mood when she was examined by P.W.13 and herself admitted that 3. A-2 and A-3 were charged only for offences punishable under Sec. 201 read with Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge found that there was no evidence against them and they were acquitted. The first accused was found guilty under Secs. 302 and 318, Indian Penal Code. The first accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Sec. 302, Indian Penal Code and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months for offence under Sec. 318, Indian Penal Code. Against the order of conviction and sentence, first accused filed this appeal. She had already undergone imprisonment for more than three years. 4. The defence statement under Sec. 313 was that she delivered a child, there was nobody to attend her and she became unconscious, she was taken to the hospital by her brother and she was totally ignorant about the death of her child as she was unconscious. Deposition of P.W.1 also shows that A-1 was unconscious when they returned after attending Thiruvonam programme. There was no eye witness in this case and A-1 was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The main point of circumstantial evidence was the extra judicial confession made before P.W.13, which was recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate and mentioned in the case sheet, Ex.XI. The sole basis on which the Sessions Judge convicted the accused is the extrajudicial confession. There was no eye witness in this case and A-1 was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The main point of circumstantial evidence was the extra judicial confession made before P.W.13, which was recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate and mentioned in the case sheet, Ex.XI. The sole basis on which the Sessions Judge convicted the accused is the extrajudicial confession. Extra judicial confession is treated as a very weak piece of evidence: The State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and others, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 258. It is true that though there is only one extrajudicial confession, if that confession is made to a trustworthy person who is not even remotely inimical to the accused, and if it evokes confidence of the Court, the Court can rely on such extrajudicial confession. See: State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 48, Normally extrajudicial confession made to an unbiased doctor is treated as a very important piece of evidence. Conviction can be based on extrajudicial confession if it is made voluntarily and truthfully to a trustworthy unbiased person. The question here is whether there is any extrajudicial confession at all. What is said to have been stated by A-1 before P.W. 13 is only that she had delivered a child at 11 p.m. on 26.8.1996, she put some clothes on the face of the baby and kept the body under a coconut tree near her house. She has not confessed that she killed the child or strangulated the child or buried the child. Extrajudicial confession to be relied on as against an accused must be clear, unambiguous and unmistakably conveyed that accused had committed the crime. As held by the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 47, a confession must either admit in terms of the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. See: Veera Ibrahim v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1167. We have already seen that as per Ex.P-9 certificate, the baby died due to strangulation. There is no admission in the alleged extrajudicial confession that she killed the baby or she strangulated the child or buried it for secret disposal of the dead body. Therefore, statement recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate cannot be treated as a confession at all. 5. We have already seen that as per Ex.P-9 certificate, the baby died due to strangulation. There is no admission in the alleged extrajudicial confession that she killed the baby or she strangulated the child or buried it for secret disposal of the dead body. Therefore, statement recorded in Ex.P-13 certificate cannot be treated as a confession at all. 5. Even though P.W.1 gave Ex.P-1 first information statement, she as well as P.Ws.2 and 3 turned hostile. It cannot be ruled out that there is possibility of her brother killing the child because his sister delivered a child while her husband was living in Delhi for the past 3 1/2 years. Whatever may be that, there is no evidence to show that A-1, mother of the child, killed the baby. She was in a perplex mood when she was examined by P.W.13 and herself admitted that she was in a perplex mood and the statement made may not be correct. Ex.XI case sheet shows that several bottles of blood were given to her. When she was attended by the doctor at the untimely hour of 5 a.m. because of emergency she was not in normal sense. If she heard the news that her child was buried beneath the coconut tree in a subconscious state, there is possibility of making such statements out of hallucination and imagination. The story that she became unconscious immediately after the delivery also cannot be ruled out as it was an unattended delivery and there was bleeding. It is also difficult to believe that she immediately after delivery made a pit beneath the coconut tree and buried the child. Medical evidence shows that she was profusely bleeding as umbilical cord was not tied. An emergency operation was also done. Even though doctor deposed that she was conscious, Ex.XI case record and Ex.P-3 certificate shows that her B.P. was 80/40mm/Hg. Pulse rate was much low. There was excessive bleeding. Quick loss of blood may reduce the memory of a person and weaken or confuse the intellectual power. In any event, the prosecution was not able to prove that the first accused murdered her child in the manner as narrated in the charge sheet solely on the alleged uncorroborated and retracted extra judicial confession, recorded in Ex.P-13, (if at all, it can be called a ‘confession’) made in an unfit state of mind. In any event, the prosecution was not able to prove that the first accused murdered her child in the manner as narrated in the charge sheet solely on the alleged uncorroborated and retracted extra judicial confession, recorded in Ex.P-13, (if at all, it can be called a ‘confession’) made in an unfit state of mind. There is no evidence to show that she strangulated the child as mentioned in the post-mortem certificate. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the case beyond any shadow of doubt. Therefore, we give the benefit of doubt and set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Court against A-1 for offence under Secs.302 and 318, Indian Penal Code. In the result, we give the benefit of doubt and acquit the first accused/appellant. The first accused/appellant should be released from jail forthwith, if she is not required in any other case. The criminal appeal is allowed.