S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THE applicant before the Tribunal is the writ petitioner. Facts: ( 2 ) THE petitioner was working as a group D employee in Kendriya Vidyalaya sangatan, Gooty. When a charge memo alleging misconduct was served upon him, he submitted his explanation on 7-7-1999 and on the same day he had also submitted a letter of resignation which was accepted. Even the two representations dated 10-7-1999 and 21-7-1999 seeking to withdraw the said letter of resignation were refused, he filed the Original Application no. 1625 of 1999 before the Central administrative Tribunal inter alia also making allegations against the 3rd respondent. ( 3 ) THE learned Tribunal by reason of the impugned order inter alia held: from the material on record it is clear that respondent No. 2 has taken not of the allegations made by the applicant against the principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangatan, respondent No. 3. He has also taken note of the rule position as also the withdrawal of the resignation requested by the applicant. ( 4 ) MS. T. Bala Jayasree, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, raised various contentions in support of this writ petition. The learned counsel would submit that having regard to the fact that the resignation was accepted without waiting for the expiry of the notice period is clearly indicative of the fact that the resignation was not a voluntary one. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on P. Kasilingam v. P. S. G. College of Technology, 1981 (1) SLR 307 (SC ). It was further submitted that even in relation to the temporary employees 30 days notice is mandatory in nature and as the requirement of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 had not been complied with, the impugned order cannot be sustained. It was urged that the order of termination was passed mala fide at the instance of the 3rd respondent herein. ( 5 ) ADVERTING to the question raised in this petition we may notice that before the learned Tribunal the Commissioner, Assistant commissioner and the Principal of the kendriya Vidyalaya in their official capacities were impleaded as parties. In the writ petition, however, the Principal has not been impleaded in his offical capacity but in his personal capacity. The 3rd respondent before the Tribunal, therefore, is not before us. In the writ petition, however, the Principal has not been impleaded in his offical capacity but in his personal capacity. The 3rd respondent before the Tribunal, therefore, is not before us. On that ground alone this writ petition is not maintainable. We may further deprecate the practice of impleading the respondent in his personal capacity for the first in the writ petition only with a view that the allegation of mala fide can be pressed although he had not been impleaded as such in the original application. The allegation of personal malice, it is trite, cannot be permitted to be raised in absence of the person against whom it is attributed. An allegation of malice on fact can be gone into and determined only in the presence of the person against whom such malice is attributed and not otherwise. It is now well settled that malice has to be pleaded and proved by cogent material evidence. (See vijayawada Municipality v. A. P. S. E. Board, air 1977 SC 87, Kedar Nath v. State of punjab, AIR 1979 SC 220 , Keshab Roy v. State of W. B. , (1973) 3 SCC 216 ). It is also interesting to note that in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334 = AIR 1976 SC 1766 = 1976 Lab IC 1146, the Apex Court has held that normally question of malice may not be gone into in a writ proceeding. If malice in law is urged the matter may be different. ( 6 ) IN Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab State electricity Board, (2000) 5 SCC 630 , the apex Court held: incidentally, be it noted that the expression "mala fide" is not meaningless jargon and it has its proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be appreciated from the records of the case in the facts of each case. There cannot possibly be any set guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts and circumstances. We ourselves feel it expedient to record that the petitioner has become more of a liability than an asset and in the event of there being such a situation vis-a-vis an employee, the employer will be within his liberty to take appropriate steps including the cessation of relationship between the employer and the employee. We ourselves feel it expedient to record that the petitioner has become more of a liability than an asset and in the event of there being such a situation vis-a-vis an employee, the employer will be within his liberty to take appropriate steps including the cessation of relationship between the employer and the employee. The service conditions of the board s employees also provide for voluntary (sic compulsory) retirement, a person of the nature of the petitioner, as more fully detailed hereinbefore, cannot possibly be given any redress against the order of the board for voluntary retirement. There must be factual support pertaining to the allegations of mala fides, unfortunately there is none. Mere user of the word "mala fide" by the petitioner would not by itself make the petition entertainable. The Court must scan the factual aspect and come to its own conclusion i. e. , exactly what the High Court has done and that is the reason why the narration has been noted in this judgment extenso. Tampering of the annual confidential rolls has been alleged but there is no evidence in regard thereto or even to link up the two private respondents therewith. While it is true that the earlier relationship between an employer and employee or between the employees was that of mutual trust, confidence or welfare, presently the situation in general stands polluted and may be even one degree higher than the pollution of the environment, but that does not however clothe the Court to come to a conclusion of mala fide without there being any basic evidence being made available to the Court. ( 7 ) THE petitioner herein entered into a contract of service. His service was governed by the conditions laid down in the offer of appointment. However, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the period of notice referred to in the offer of appointment as also Rule 5 of the rules would govern the matter relating to resignation which thus could not have been accepted before expiry of the said period, but the same is stated to be rejected. It is one thing to say that a contract of service can be terminated upon giving a notice, period for which may itself be a subject- matter of agreement. It is one thing to say that a contract of service can be terminated upon giving a notice, period for which may itself be a subject- matter of agreement. But it is another thing to say that a person may resign and such resignation may be accepted forthwith. In the instant case the question that the resignation was accepted before the expiry of the prescribed period was not raised before the learned Tribunal nor having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case could be raised. ( 8 ) FURTHERMORE, it is one thing to say that the resignation is to take effect from a future date and before the said date expires it is withdrawn. But it is another thing to say that resignation is tendered without specifying a future date from which it shall come into force and the same is accepted in token whereof the petitioner has signed, in which event, in the considered opinion of this Court, acceptance of such a resignation cannot be said to be bad in law. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that only because subsequently the resignation was withdrawn would itself be a ground for directing reinstatement of the petitioner in service as was urged by the learned Counsel. In P. Kasilingam s case (supra) the facts of the case are different. Therein the appellant, while he was on probation as a Lecturer, was subjected to a departmental enquiry by the Principal for dereliction of duty and irresponsible conduct and a charge memo was issued. Pursuant to the explanation submitted by the appellant refuting the charges, an enquiry officer was appointed. On the day when enquiry was to begin, the appellant accompanied by the Principal of the College submitted to the Correspondent at his residence a letter tendering apology and also a letter of resignation. In that case a plea that the resignation had been obtained forcibly was found to be correct by the appellate authority as has been noticed by the Apex Court in the following words : there is no manner of doubt that the circumstances attendant upon the submission of the letter of resignation and the letter of apology on 19-3-1976 are somewhat strange. The manner in which the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant on that day at 8. 30. The manner in which the letter of resignation was obtained from the appellant on that day at 8. 30. a. m. , together with his letter of apology, just before the departmental enquiry was to commence at 9. 00. a. m. , clearly suggests that they were integral parts of the same transaction. It was somewhat unusual for a delinquent officer to be called to the residence of the Correspondent of the College along with the Principal and to have the two documents signed by him, as a condition for dropping the enquiry. It appears that the submission of letter of apology, which virtually amounted to an admission of guilt, along with the unconditional letter of resignation, was part of a deal between the management and the appellant. It was meant to act as an inducement for the enquiry not to be proceeded with. One is left with the unfortunate impression that the management wanted to dispense with the services of the appellant. The Government was, therefore, justified in holding that if the appellant placed in such circumstances submitted his resignation, it would not necessarily give rise to an inference that his act in dong so was voluntary. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, however, the appellate authority has arrived at a finding of fact that the offer of resignation was a voluntary act on the part of the petitioner. It is now a well settled principle of law that applicability of a decision would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. A little variation in fact or additional fact, makes a lot of difference in arriving at a conclusion. In Pawan Kumar Dubey (supra) it has been held: it is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. ( 10 ) "in C. I. T. v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. , (1992) 4 SCC 363 at 385 Dr. A. S. Anand, J. , (as the learned Judge then was) stated the law in the following terms:. . . . . ( 10 ) "in C. I. T. v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. , (1992) 4 SCC 363 at 385 Dr. A. S. Anand, J. , (as the learned Judge then was) stated the law in the following terms:. . . . . It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete law declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this court". ( 11 ) IN Jay a Sen v. Sujit Kr. Sarkar, 2000 (1) ILR Aandn 145, it was held:-"it is now well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well known that even that a slight distinction in fact or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in decision making process (See Quinn v. Lealhain, (1990-1903) AER (Rep.) 1, Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, ( 1990 (4) SCC 207 ), commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun engineering Co. , Ltd, ( AIR 1993 SC 43 ), regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, ( AIR 1976 SC 1766 ) and Municipal corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1988 (1) SCC 101)". ( 12 ) IT is also a settled law that a decision is not an authority on a point which was not argued (see Mittal Engineering works (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 1 SCC 203 ). ( 13 ) FURTHERMORE, conditions contained in a contract of service can be waived. The period of notice or pay in lieu thereof being a matter of contract, in absence of statutory rules governing the field, the period can be waived. In Sitaram Jivyabhai Gavali v. Ramjibhai P. Mahala, (1987) 2 SCC 262 the Apex Court was concerned with termination of a temporary employee who had resigned by tendering one month s salary in lieu of notice and handing over office records in due compliance with the conditions contained in the appointment order, with a view to contest election from the Dadra and Nagar Haveli Parliamentary constituency. In the said case the order of appointment contained the following conditions:1. In the said case the order of appointment contained the following conditions:1. He will be governed by the Central Civil services Rules. 2. The appointment is purely on temporary basis and is liable to be terminated at one month s notice. 3. Before resigning the post, he shall have to give one month s notice to the administration failing which he shall have to remit one month s notice pay before he could be relieved from service. ( 14 ) THE third ground urged before us viz. , the question of mala fide on the part of the respondent No. 3, for the reasons stated hereinbefore cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in the writ petition. ( 15 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.