S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) IN these writ petitions, the petitioners challenge the orders passed by the learned State Administrative Tribunal in the Original Applications inter alia directing the petitioners herein to consider the cases of the applicants for promotion to the post of Secretary, Grade-III facts: ( 2 ) THE facts stated in Writ Petition No. 1762 of 2000 are taken for the purpose of deciding the question involved in this batch of writ petitions. ( 3 ) THE unofficial respondent herein, who is working as Supervisor in the Agricultural Market Committee, Darsi, Prakasam District, had approached the learned Tribunal by filing RP No. 3786 of 1987 wherein directions were issued on 23-7-1987 to consider the case of the respondent for promotion to the post of Secretary, Grade-III on par with one B. Seshaiah. When the petitioners herein sought to cancel the promotion given to B. Seshaiah, he approached the Tribunal by way of RP and the said RP was allowed. The Government issued G. O. Ms. No. 1283, dated 1-10-1992 regularising the services of B. Seshaiah as Secretary Grade-Ill. The grievance of the unofficial respondent herein is that he being senior to B. Seshaiah in the category of Supervisor, is entitled for promotion to the post of" Secretary, Grade-III. The unofficial respondent has filed the original application seeking direction to the respondents to consider his case for promotion to the post of Secretary, Grade-III. Question: ( 4 ) THE question that arises for consideration in these writ petitions is as to whether the directions of the learned Tribunal are contrary to the rules governing the field. Contentions ( 5 ) MR. Prakash Reddy, learned Additional Advocate-General would submit that only because a mistake has been committed in respect of one Mr. B. Seshaiah and the same having been repeated in one or two cases, by itself would not be a ground for allowing the illegality to be perpetuated. The learned Counsel would submit that no writ could be issued by the Tribunal or the Court, which would be violative of the statutory rule. B. Seshaiah and the same having been repeated in one or two cases, by itself would not be a ground for allowing the illegality to be perpetuated. The learned Counsel would submit that no writ could be issued by the Tribunal or the Court, which would be violative of the statutory rule. Strong reliance, in this connection, has been placed on the decisions of the Apex Court Chandigarh Administration v. Jag/it Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745 , Chief CIT v. V. K. Gururaj, (1996) 7 SCC 275 , Gurmharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1996) 2 SCC 459 , Union of India (Railway Board) v. J. V. Subhaiah, (1996) 2 SCC 258 , Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D. B. Health Services, 1997 (95) ELT 161 (SC), Fenner (India) Ltdv. Punjab and Sind Bank, (1997) 7 SCC 89 and Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Dr. Ajay Kumar Jain, (2000) 4 SCC 186 . ( 6 ) MR. Pratap Naryan Sanghi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that having regard to the facts that the State had not been filling up the posts of Assistant Secretaries for a long time, a representation was made pursuant whereto the in-service candidates were allowed to be appointed against the said vacancies. ( 7 ) OUR attention has been drawn to the fact that stagnation had occurred also in the matter of promotion and despite the fact that on two other occasions notifications had been issued for filling up the posts by direct recruitment and a large number of applications were received, but the vacancies had not been filled up. It was submitted that most of the respondents have been working for two decades without obtaining a single promotion leading to filing of some writ petitions. Writ Petition No. 1966 of 1999 was filed by the petitioner who had the qualification and was awaiting his promotion for two decades. ( 8 ) THEREAFTER, a representation was made pursuant to and in furtherance whereof several orders were passed. In such a situation, the Tribunal by reason of the impugned judgment merely directed the respondents to consider their cases in the light of Seshaiah s case. ( 9 ) MR. ( 8 ) THEREAFTER, a representation was made pursuant to and in furtherance whereof several orders were passed. In such a situation, the Tribunal by reason of the impugned judgment merely directed the respondents to consider their cases in the light of Seshaiah s case. ( 9 ) MR. Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, has submitted that his client was appointed on promotion but had been reverted back after a period of two years whereupon only the writ petition had been filed. In the representation, he has sought for relaxation of qualification. Only in terms of the said representation, notification in G. O. Ms. No. 242, dated 22-9-1983 was issued. The concession given in terms of the aforementioned notification dated 22-9-1983 had been extended by G. O. Ms. No. 36, dated 11-1-1985. On 18-6-1985 another Government Order in G. O. Ms. No. 319 was issued. Following the aforementioned g. O. Ms. No. 319, dated 18-6-1985 only, relaxation was granted to Seshaiah. Relevant Provisions: ( 10 ) THE Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh has enacted the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (for short "the Act") to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and the establishment of markets in connection therewith. Section 33 of the Act empowers the Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 33 of the Act the Government has framed the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Rules, 1969 (for short "the Rules" ). Method of appointment to the post of Secretary Grade-III as contained in Rule 158 of the Rules reads thus: " (3) (a) by direct recruitment through the Employment Exchange; or; provided that the temporary employees working in the Agricultural Market Committees shall be allowed to register their names in the Employment Exchange as employed persons by producing no objection certificates from the appointing authorities concerned and seek direct recruitment to this post in the same Agricultural Market Committee or any other Agricultural Market Committee within the Zone concerned. Their names shall be sponsored by the Employment Exchanges subject to the rules governing such sponsoring. Their names shall be sponsored by the Employment Exchanges subject to the rules governing such sponsoring. (b) by promotion from among the Assistant Secretaries and or the Accountants with a minimum service of three years as Assistant Secretary and or Accountants. (c) by transfer from the category of Upper Division Clerks, Price Reporters, Grade-II, Grading Supervisors (Pre-revised scale of Rs. 125-200) of the Marketing Department and the employees of the Market Committee presently working as Assistant Secretaries in the pre-revised scale of 180-375. Note I: For every four vacancies, one post shall be filled up by direct recruitment. Note II: The Accountants who opt for promotion to the post of Office Superintendents shall not be eligible for promotion to the post of Secretary Grade III". Findings: ( 11 ) IT is not in dispute that the matter relating to filling up of posts of Assistant Secretaries is governed by the rules. In terms, of the said rules, the posts of Assistant Secretaries, Grade-III were to be filled up by way of direct recruitment and by way of promotion in the ratio of 1:3. ( 12 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the Tribunal, in our opinion, has proceeded entirely on a wrong premise. As noticed hereinbefore, G. O. Ms. No. 319 dated 18-6-1985 in terms whereof B. Seshaiah was appointed as Secretary Grade-III was superseded by G. O. Ms. No. 181, dated 14-3-1988. Questioning the said order, B. Seshaiah filed RP Nos. 1223 of 1988 and 1732 of 1988 before the learned Tribunal. ( 13 ) THE order of the Tribunal in the case of Mr. B. Seshaiah was justified inasmuch as he fulfils the conditions of the aforementioned G. O. Ms. No. 319, dated 18-6-1985 and in that view of the matter his appointment could not have been directed to be cancelled by reason of G. O. Ms. No. 181, dated 14-3-1988. However, it is now a well-settled principle of law that a policy decision taken by the State can also be amended, modified or withdrawn (See K. P. Perumal v, Aandn Administration. , 2000 (1) CHN 866 ). Relaxation granted by the State had later on been withdrawn. By reason of the order of the Tribunal passed in Seshaiah s case, no right could be claimed by the other petitioners. All OAs had been filed pursuant to or in furtherance of directions issued by the Tribunal only in Seshaiah s case. , 2000 (1) CHN 866 ). Relaxation granted by the State had later on been withdrawn. By reason of the order of the Tribunal passed in Seshaiah s case, no right could be claimed by the other petitioners. All OAs had been filed pursuant to or in furtherance of directions issued by the Tribunal only in Seshaiah s case. The judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal in OA No. 1223 was confined to the peculiar fact of the case of Sri Seshaiah alone. The said decision was not applicable and could not have been made applicable in relation to other employees particularly when G. O. Ms. No. 319, dated was withdrawn. The original applicants in their representations even had not asked that they be promoted to the post of Assistant Secretary pursuant to or in furtherance of any policy decision. They purported to have sought refuge to the order of the Tribunal in the said OA, ( 14 ) ARTICLE 14 is a positive concept. Equality before law and equal protection of law is applicable when an order is passed which is legal. In a case where an illegality has been committed or a mistake has been committed, no person derives any legal right therefrom so as to enable him to obtain a writ or order in the nature of mandamus. It is also well settled that a writ or order in the nature of mandamus can be issued only for the purpose of enforcement of legal right arising out of a statute or statutory rule and not contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith. ( 15 ) IN Jagjit Singh (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court as under: "generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/ unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner s case is similar to the other person s case. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner s case is similar to the other person s case. But then why examine another person s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief, is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person s case, which other person is not before the case nor in his case. In our considered opinion, such a course barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world". ( 16 ) IN V. K. Gururaj (supra), the Apex Court held that the Upper Division Clerks, who are not discharging special duties, though being seniors, are not entitled to special pay payable to certain percentage of the posts of Upper Division Clerks in the Secretariat and non-Secretariat administrative offices specified for discharging special duties and the principle of equal pay for equal work is not applicable in their case. ( 17 ) YET again, in J. V. Subbaiah (supra), it has been held: "the principle of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution, as contended for the respondents, does not apply since we have already held that the order of the CAT, Madras Bench is clearly unsustainable in law and IIIegal which can never form basis to hold that the other employees are invidiously discriminated offending Article 14. The employees covered by the order of the Madras Bench may be dealt with by the Railway Administration appropriately but that could not form foundation to plead discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution". ( 18 ) IN Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory Chandigarh, (1999) 7 SCC 89 , the Apex Court observed: "it is not the case of the appellants that the favour done to those whose rent has not been enhanced is legal or valid. Such an omission is also not referable to any lawful action of the respondents. The question of discrimination would arise only if it is found that the order in favour of the left over was legal and valid and that the case of the writ petitioners was similar in material respects to the case of such persons. No such allegation has been made or arguments addressed. There is, therefore, no basis for the appellants to urge the violation of Article 14, alleging discrimination against them". ( 19 ) RECENTLY, the Supreme Court in Dr. Ajay Kumar Jain (supra) reiterated the aforementioned principle stating: "employment under the Quick Hire Scheme was on contract basis. The respondent was not governed by CSIR Service Rules, 1994 for recruitment of Scientific, Technical and Support Staff as he would not be appointed under those rules. An appointment under the Quick Hire Scheme cannot be equated with regular appointment as per the relevant recruitment rules of CSIR against a sanctioned post. To be eligible for regularisation, the respondent had to come within the relevant rules, it is difficult to appreciate the directions issued by the CAT in the circumstances of the case. A Pool Officer or a Scientist Fellow under the Quick Hire Scheme cannot continue to hold on to the job till superannuation. The respondent has referred to certain instances where scientists were appointed on permanent contractual post by CSIR without following the selection procedure. A Pool Officer or a Scientist Fellow under the Quick Hire Scheme cannot continue to hold on to the job till superannuation. The respondent has referred to certain instances where scientists were appointed on permanent contractual post by CSIR without following the selection procedure. If something wrong has been done in violation of the rules, we cannot use that as an example to perpetuate an illegality. In any case those cases are not before us and it is difficult for us to comment if there was violation of any rules regarding those scientists. Respondent, however, cannot take advantage of an illegality, if there is any. Appointment as Scientist Fellow under the Quick Hire Scheme cannot be understood to mean regular appointment under the relevant recruitment rules applicable to CSIR or to bodies under its control. The term appointment has been only loosely used. It is mere placement as Scientist Fellow and not appointment in the sense in which this term is used in service law. As noted above, a scheme has been framed for absorption in the Pool effective from May 2, 1997. If the respondent case is covered by that scheme, he will certainly be entitled to be considered thereunder". ( 20 ) THIS aspect of the matter has been considered recently by a Division Bench of this Court in Director of Sericulture v. K. Narasaiah, 2001 (2) ALT 324 (DB), wherein it has been held: "it is a well settled principle of law that even if an irregularity had been committed by the department on misinterpretation and misconstruction of the relevant Government Orders, the same cannot be permitted to be continued, as by reason of such mistaken order the respondents do not derive any legal right to obtain the relief sought for by them. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Apex Court in Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [ (1996) 2 SCC 459 ]". ( 21 ) IN State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh Kumar Sharma, 1994 AIR SCW 218, the Apex Court held that if a mistake was committed in an earlier case, that cannot be a ground for directing the State to perpetuate the error for all times to come. In D. Wren International Ltd v. Engineers India Ltd. , AIR 1996 Cal. In D. Wren International Ltd v. Engineers India Ltd. , AIR 1996 Cal. 424 , it has been held: "in the instant case, it is not disputed that the impugned action was taken by the respondents without complying with the minimal requirements of the principles of natural justice. It is now a trite law that natural justice has to be viewed in circumstantial flexibility. It is also well known in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in The Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 = 1976 Lab. IC 1146, that one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusion in two cases when the same principle are applied in each case to similar facts. The aforementioned decision has been followed by this Court in Siben Kumar Mondal v. Hindustan Petroleum reported in AIR 1995 Cal 327 at paragraph 51". ( 22 ) IT is also well settled that the Court cannot direct filling up of the posts by direct recruitment. It is for the employer to take a decision in this regard. The directions of the learned Tribunal, which are impugned in these writ petitions, if implemented would force the petitioner herein appoint persons although they may not be willing to do so. Furthermore, the posts which are meant for the direct recruitees must be fiiied up in terms of recruitment rules wherefor compliance of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India is absolutely mandatory. ( 23 ) HOWEVER, it appears that the first respondent in WP. No. 1762 of 2000, who was found to be senior to Sri B. Seshaiah, was promoted as Secretary Grade-III with effect from 18-6-1985 under direct recruitment quota and notionally as Secretary Grade-II and Grade-I by proceedings dated 22-3-1999. By an order dated 26-2-2000 he was reverted to post of Supervisor. The equity lies in his favour and that therefore Writ Petition No, 1762 of 2000 is dismissed. All other writ petitions are allowed. No order as to costs.