JUDGMENT: The Insurance company has challenged the award passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Tirunelveli on the ground that it has no liability to indemnify the insured, for the accident to 1st respondent. 2. The 1st respondent was engaged as a loadman to transfer crushed stones into the lorry belonging to the 3rd respondent from the crusher unit belonging to the 4th respondent. The lorry was driven by the 2nd respondent and insured by the appellant. At the time of loading the crushed stones, a wall standing in the quarry fell down resulting in an injury to the 1st respondent's right leg and so, a claim was filed and an award of Rs.54,191 was passed. Aggrieved by this, the Insurance Company has filed the appeal. 3. The following questions were raised by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of arguments. “(1) Whether the Insurance company is liable when the policy does not cover injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act (2) Whether the Insurance Company is liable under the Motor Vehicles Act, when the lorry was nowhere near the spot where the accident occurred (3) Whether the injury caused by the wall toppling down would be an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle and finally, (4) Whether a quarry would be a” public place “to bring in the operation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act” 4. The matter was argued over several dates and this Court records its appreciation of the matter in which both the counsel for the appellant and the 1st respondent performed their duty as true officers of Court in arriving at the solution. The learned counsel for the appellant narrated the following facts so that the questions could be decided easily. On 6.12.1995, the 1st respondent and three others, at the request of the 3rd respondent, boarded his lorry bearing Regn. No.T.N. 69-0568 to collect the crushed stones from the 4th respondent's crusher. The lorry was parked at the entrance to the quarry about 250 ft. from where the accident occurred. When the 1st respondent was loading the crushed stones, a wall fell down and the accident occurred. No.T.N. 69-0568 to collect the crushed stones from the 4th respondent's crusher. The lorry was parked at the entrance to the quarry about 250 ft. from where the accident occurred. When the 1st respondent was loading the crushed stones, a wall fell down and the accident occurred. The 1st respondent having approached the forum constituted under the Workmen's Compensation Act, cannot expect to receive compensation from the appellant who is only liable to indemnify the insured in respect of accidents that come within the purview of Motor Vehicles Act. He further submitted that when the accident occurred because the wall fell down, it cannot be held to be an accident that happened on account of the use of a motor vehicle. Finally, he submitted that there is oral evidence to show that no one can enter the crushing quarry as a matter of right and therefore, the accident did not occur in “a public place” and hence the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act are not attracted. He relied on the judgment reported in Mangalam v. Express Newspapers Ltd. 1982 A.C.J. (Supp.) 203 where the Division Bench of this Court held that the Express Newspaper Estate which is a place where entry of public is regulated is not a public place and the Insurance Company is not liable. It was also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the policy is an Act only policy and it covers compensation due to road traffic accident only and that is why originally, the appellant was not made a party to the claim and was impleaded only thereafter. 5. Mr. Rajan, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, on the other hand submitted that both Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act are welfare legislation and should be construed liberally. He submitted that the words “arising out of the use of Motor vehicle” would also be given a wider interpretation and when the accident occurred because the 1st respondent was engaged in loading stones into the motor vehicle, it would be covered by the words “arising out of the use of motor vehicle”. He also submitted that the factual finding is that the 3rd respondent had engaged the 1st respondent as a loadman. The policy is in the name of the 3rd respondent and that is not in dispute. He also submitted that the factual finding is that the 3rd respondent had engaged the 1st respondent as a loadman. The policy is in the name of the 3rd respondent and that is not in dispute. Therefore, when the accident occurred both out of the use of the motor vehicle and in the course of employment, the insurer of the 3rd respondent must definitely be made liable. As regards the words “public place”, he would submit that the Full Bench of this Court has held that the words “public place” should receive a broader construction to take within its ambit, places where public can enter, whether the entry is uncontrolled, restricted or regulated. He relied on the following judgments: (i) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajoy Medhi 1996 A.C.J 727; (ii) New India Assurance Company Limited v. Dalibai and others New India Assurance Company Limited v. Dalibai and others 2000 A.C.C. 154; (iii) Babu v. Remesan 1996 A.C.J. 988; (iv) Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Vasantha Pitambar 1998 A.C.J. 179; (v) Chief Secretary, State of Kerala v. Ramaniamma 1999 A.C.J. 1226 (vi) United India Insurance Company Limited v. Paravathi Devi 1999 A.C.J. 1520 (F.B.) (vii) G. Bhuvaneswari v. M. Sornakumar G. Bhuvaneswari v. M. Sornakumar 2000 A.C.J. 1343 (D.B.). 6. The distinction that was sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the choice of forums for obtaining a decision on the claim for compensation had received the attention of the Supreme Court in Smt. Rita Devi and others v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another Smt. Rita Devi and others v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another 2000 T.N.L.J. 28 In that case, the claim for compensation was made for the death of the driver of an auto-rickshaw which was the insured vehicle. The driver was murdered. A claim petition was filed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Supreme Court considered the legal import of the words “accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles” and held that the murder was due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. The driver was murdered. A claim petition was filed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Supreme Court considered the legal import of the words “accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles” and held that the murder was due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court held thus: “We do not see how the object of the two Acts, namely the Motor Vehicles act and the Workmen's Compensation Act are in anyway different in our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts are to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under the Act while the relief provided under Chapters X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours we are supported by Sec.167 of the Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field hence judicially accepted interpretation of the word” death “in Workmen's Compensation Act is, in our opinion applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also.” In this case, instead of death, the compensation was claimed on account of the injuries. It is no doubt true that the 1st respondent chose the forum constituted under the Workmen's Compensation Act. That his injury occurred during the course of employment is established beyond doubt; that his employee was insured by the appellant is also not in dispute. In these circumstances, if it is established that the accident occurred “in a public place” and arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, then Sec.167 permits the choice of claiming compensation under either of the two Acts as per the decision cited above. 7. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajoy Medhi 1996 A.C.J 727 the driver of a car was dragged by the police personnel and assaulted. He claimed compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act. 7. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajoy Medhi 1996 A.C.J 727 the driver of a car was dragged by the police personnel and assaulted. He claimed compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act. The Insurance Company challenged his liability on the ground that the injuries were not sustained in an accident. The learned Judge of the Assam High Court held that the Insurance Company was liable. 8. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Dalibai 2000 A.C.C. 154 the driver was given a blow while he had parked his truck, as a result of which, he had died. The Insurance Company challenged the award on the ground that the accident did not occur in the course of employment. This will not apply to this case. 9. The decision reported in Babu v. Remesan 1996 A.C.J. 988 was a case where the claimants were engaged in loading a goods vehicle. When the rope was thrown to the other side together the goods, it came in contact with some live wire resulting in burn injuries. Claim was made under the Motor Vehicles Act. The question was raised whether this was an accident that arose from the use of the motor vehicle. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court (which included Justice K.T. Thomas as he then was) held thus: “The expression use of a motor vehicle covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationery. The word ‘use’ has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationery and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. Such use need not necessarily be so intimate and closely direct as to make it a motor accident’ in the sense in which the expression is used in common parlance. The expression employed by the legislature is ‘accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle’. Evidently the legislature wanted to enlarge the scope of the word ‘use’ and not to restrict it for denying compensation in deserving cases. The test should be whether the accident was reasonably proximate to the use of a motor vehicle, whether or not the motor vehicle was immoution then.” 10. Evidently the legislature wanted to enlarge the scope of the word ‘use’ and not to restrict it for denying compensation in deserving cases. The test should be whether the accident was reasonably proximate to the use of a motor vehicle, whether or not the motor vehicle was immoution then.” 10. In Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Vasantha Pitambar 1998 A.C.J. 179 the driver took the vehicle for oiling and greasing and put the vehicle on jack. The vehicle slipped. The question was raised whether the accident arose in the cause of an employment. It was held in favour of the claimant. This decision also may not strictly apply to this case. 11. The decision reported in Chief Secretary, State of Kerala v. Ramaniamma 1999 A.C.J. 1226, was a case where the workman suffered chest pain and died of heart-attack. This also may not apply to this case. 12. In United India Insurance Company Limited v. Paravathi Devi 1999 A.C.J. 1520 (F.B.) the Full Bench of this Court, while considering what a “public place” is for the purpose of understanding Sec.2(24) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 followed the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and held thus: “The definition of ‘public place’ is very wide. A perusal of the same reveals that the public at large has a right to access though that right is regulated or restricted. It is also seen that this act is beneficial legislation, so also the law of interpretation has to be construed in the benefit of public. In the overall legal position and that fact that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it has to be construed in the benefit of the public, we are of the view that the word ‘public place’, wherever used as a right or controlled in any manner whatsoever, would attract in any manner whatsoever, would attract Sec.2(24) of the Act. In view of this, as stated, the private place used with permission or without permission would amount to be a ‘public place’”. An extract of the photograph from the Bombay High Court judgment may be useful to decide the question: “….It is also necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the expression ‘right of access’ and ‘access as of light’. An extract of the photograph from the Bombay High Court judgment may be useful to decide the question: “….It is also necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the expression ‘right of access’ and ‘access as of light’. The latter expression denotes a place where the members of public have a right of its use as members of public and as a matter of right, whether regulated, restricted or not. They cannot, however, be denied the said right except on legal grounds. On the other hand, where there is only a right of access, the owner of the place, if he happens to be a private owner, may deny the access to any members of the public on any ground which he chooses. In other words, in the former case, the right of the members of the public to use the place is restricted compared to their right to use in the latter case. The definition under the act uses the expression ‘right of access’ as pointed out earlier. What is, therefore, significant to note is that under the present definition even a place the right to use of which is restricted is a public place. Once this is borne in mind much of the controversy raised before us around the correct meaning of the expression ‘public place’ loses its edge.” In this case, the Division Bench judgment reported in Mangalam v. Express Newspapers Ltd. 1982 A.C.J. (Supp.) 203 cited by the learned counsel for the appellant was also relied on. But yet, the Full Bench held that “public place” for the purpose of Chapter 8 of the Motor Vehicles Act will cover all the places even those which are privately owned where public have access, whether free or controlled. 13. The decision reported in G. Bhuvaneswari v. M. Sornakumar G. Bhuvaneswari v. M. Sornakumar 2000 A.C.J. 1343 (D.B.) is one where the Division Bench of this Court, following the above Full Bench decision, held that the accident which occurs in a factory premises is one which occurred in a public place. 14. In Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More (1991)3 S.C.C. 530 a petrol tanker overturned as a result of collison with a truck and after few hours, it exploded causing death. 14. In Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More (1991)3 S.C.C. 530 a petrol tanker overturned as a result of collison with a truck and after few hours, it exploded causing death. The Supreme Court held that the word “use” has a wider connotation and the use of a vehicle does not cease merely because the vehicle had been rendered immobile for various reasons. The Supreme Court also considered the effect of the expression “caused by” and “arising out” with reference to motor accidents and held that latter had a wider connotation than the former and it held thus: “In Sec.92-A Parliament, however, chose to use the expression “arising out of” which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Sec.92-A, the casual relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This construction of the expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” in Sec.92-A enlarges the filed of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment.” 15. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thimmawwa 1989 A.C.J. 149 coolies employed for loading and unloading of the trailer attached to a tractor met with an accident resulting in death of some and injuries to others. The Insurance Company challenged its liability. The Division Bench of the Karnataka Court held thus: “A motor policy a document pertaining to a contract, it is needless to point out, cannot be interpreted so as to restrict its operation as would defeat the very purpose for which it had been taken. We are, therefore, not left in doubt that the policy under consideration has been rightly interpreted by the Claims Tribunal so as to make the insurer liable to indemnity the insured against the latter's legal liability to coolies employed in connection with loading and/or unloading the tractor-trailer while they were carried in tractor-trailer for the purpose of its loading and/or unloading.” 16. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Balawwa 1993 A.C.J. 815 the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court again held in favour of the claimant, who died after loading stones on a tractor trailer when he went to answer the call of nature, due to heart failure. 17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Balawwa 1993 A.C.J. 815 the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court again held in favour of the claimant, who died after loading stones on a tractor trailer when he went to answer the call of nature, due to heart failure. 17. The case of the appellant is that the claimants are liable to indemnify the insurer only when accident has occurred out of the use of motor vehicle in a public place. In view of the Full Bench judgment, the inescapable conclusion is that the crushing quarry is a public place. One particular phrase in the decision reported in G.Bhuvaneswari v. M.Sornakumar G.Bhuvaneswari v. M.Sornakumar 2000 A.C.J. 1343 (D.B.) is relevant. The Division Bench held that the factory premises which is accessible to and available for the use of public who have dealings with the factory is a public place. In this case, the public who have dealings with the stone crushing spot have access to the quarry, and, if at all, entry is only regulated. Hence the spot of occurrence is definitely a public place within the meaning of Sec.2(24) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. As held by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, this was a place where the public had a right of access though not a legal right of access and the place was accessible to the members of public for their use, enjoyment, avocation or other purposes. In this case, the place was accessible for the persons who quarried the stone and transported it for their use. As stated earlier, the accident also occurred in the course of employment. 18. The various judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent also come to his aid. The use of the vehicle need not be inextricably connected with the accident. As referred to above the words “arising out of” also give a much wider scope for advancing the beneficial purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. The paragraph cited above from the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Company Limited Smt. Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Company Limited 2000 T.N.L.J. 28 would also show how the relevant object of both the Acts are to provide compensation for the victims of accident. The paragraph cited above from the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Company Limited Smt. Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Company Limited 2000 T.N.L.J. 28 would also show how the relevant object of both the Acts are to provide compensation for the victims of accident. It would indeed be unjust to hold that falling down of the wall was an incident and not an accident. The 1st respondent went to the quarry to load the motor vehicle and at that time, met with the accident. Therefore, the nexus between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident cannot be said to be remote. The fact that the lorry was parked 250 feet away from the quarry is irrelevant. The connection between the spot where the accident occurred and the activity of loading provides the close link between the accident and the use of motor vehicle. 19. Further, Sec. 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act requires compulsory coverage in respect of death/injury to driver and employees carried in a goods vehicle to the extent of liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The counsel for the appellant produced a sample policy in which the Insurer covers the liabilities under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the true certified copy of the policy in this case to show that such a cover was not extended by the Insurer. It is true that the two policies are different. But the policy on hand shows that the policy does not cover use for carrying passengers in the vehicle except employees (other than the driver) not exceeding six in number coming under the purview of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The 1st respondent is an employee and there is nothing to show that there were more than 6 persons in the vehicle. So this limitation also does not exclude the 1st respondent. In these circumstances, all the questions raised by the appellant are answered in favour of the 1st respondent. The quantum is purely an issue of fact and was not seriously challenged and therefore, that is not interfered with. C.M.A. is therefore dismissed. No costs. C.M.P.Nos.17965 of 1999 and 4214 of 2001 are closed. Appeal dismissed.