L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Petition presents a peculiar set of facts and question of law. The petitioner herein and respondents 2 to 6 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed OS. No. 355 of 1988 against the 1st respondent and one Mr. G. Kumaraswamy in the Court of the 1st Additional subordinate Judge, Warangal, for permanent injunction. Along with the suit, they filed LA. No. 847/88 for temporary injunction. An ex parte injunction was granted on 29-12-1988. At the instance of the 1st respondent and the other defendants, the matter was advanced to 18-1-1989. In their counter, the 1st respondent stated that under the guise of the order of temporary injunction, the petitioner had undertaken construction work in the land belonging to the respondent No. 1. When the Counsel for the petitioner herein sought time, an undertaking was recorded that the petitioner shall not proceed with any construction. The matter was ultimately adjourned to 25-1-1989. Thereafter, the petitioner did not evince any interest and ultimately the suit itself was dismissed on 26-7-1994 since the Counsel reported no instructions. Accordingly, the order of ex parte injunction dated 29-12-1988 stood dissolved. ( 2 ) THE 1st respondent and mr. G. Kumaraswamy filed IA. No. 583/94 under Section 151 of CPC for grant of mandatory injunction directing the petitioner to restore status quo ante obtaining as on the date of grant of ex parte injunction. This IA was obviously filed subsequent to the dismissal of the suit. ( 3 ) THE trial Court, after hearing the parties at length and discussing the facts as well as law on the subject, passed orders on 12-9-1994 granting the relief prayed in the ia. This order was sought to be executed by filing EP. No. 21/95 and the same was resisted by the petitioner. Their objection was that once the suit was dismissed way back on 26-7-1994, the trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the I. A. No. 583/94 and any order passed in the said ia in the suit, which was no longer on the file of the Court, was a nullity. The record does not disclose that there was any dispute as to the fact that the petitioner had undertaken construction after obtaining ex parte injunction order. The reports of the commissioners appointed by the Court below speak to the said fact. The record does not disclose that there was any dispute as to the fact that the petitioner had undertaken construction after obtaining ex parte injunction order. The reports of the commissioners appointed by the Court below speak to the said fact. The Executing court repelled the contention of the petitioner and allowed the EP through order dated 5-12-1998 by directing the bailiff to remove the structures and restore status quo ante obtaining as on the date of ex parte injunction granted in I. A. No. 583/94 (sic. 847/88) in O. S. No. 355/88. This order is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition. ( 4 ) MR. Ashwani Kumar, representing sri Y. Rama Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that once the suit was no longer on the file of the trial Court, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the IA and the order that was passed in IA. No. 583/94 is a nullity and without jurisdiction in the eye of law and not capable of being executed. As to the question whether it was open to them to challenge or ignore the order in I. A. No. 583/94 without instituting necessary appeal/revisional proceedings, he submits that the executing court can go into the validity and if it finds that the order or decree which is sought to be executed is without jurisdiction, it can dismiss the Execution Petition. ( 5 ) MR. Kesava Rao, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submits that the Civil Court does not become functus officio soon after the suit is dismissed or decreed and it retains with it the power to deal with the ancillary proceedings arising out of the suit, more so, when the proceedings are tainted by fraud, misrepresentation, etc. He also contends that inasmuch as the order passed in I. A. No. 583/94, which is sought to be executed, has not been challenged by the petitioner and since it has become final, the executing court was left with no alternative except to execute the decree. Therefore, he contends that the order under revision does not suffer from any irregularity or illegality. ( 6 ) THE facts stated above are not at all in dispute and in fact they are borne out by the record. Therefore, he contends that the order under revision does not suffer from any irregularity or illegality. ( 6 ) THE facts stated above are not at all in dispute and in fact they are borne out by the record. The main question that arises for consideration in this revision is whether a civil Court becomes functus officio once it has dismissed or decreed the suit. Normally, such an eventuality will not arise inasmuch as the aggrieved parties will prosecute their remedies in appeal or revision. But in cases where the plaintiffs seek a remedy in interlocutory proceedings and having secured the object, either withdraw or do not prosecute the proceedings, thereby driving the Court to dismiss the same, the affected parties are left with no remedies. They cannot file appeal because the suit is dismissed. They cannot challenge the order in the IA in which the interim order is obtained, because it stands merged with the order of dismissal of the suit. It is in this situation that the question assumes importance. ( 7 ) IDENTICAL situation arose before this court in K. Savaramma v. G. Radhakrishna murthi. The facts were almost similar. Reviewing the case law on the subject and analyzing the facts, this Court held as under:"the question is whether such an injustice and injury meted out to the petitioner would be allowed to be perpetrated. Though it is contended that after the dismissal of the suit the court becomes functus officio, their lordships of the Supreme Court in f. A. A. Samad v. Municipal Corporation, ahmedabad (1976-11 SCWR 172), held that the Court does not become functus officio. It still has the power to undo the injustice done. Following that ratio, it must be held that the Court does not become functus officio after the dismissal of the suit. Application can be filed for passing appropriate orders. It is true that the petitioner invoked sec. 151 CPC. Wrong quotation of a provision of law does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court so long as the power is traceable. It is therefore held that restitution under Sec. 144 cpc could be ordered. Even otherwise it is eminently a fit case to exercise inherent powers. It is true that the exercise of power under Section 151 cpc is discretionary. It is therefore held that restitution under Sec. 144 cpc could be ordered. Even otherwise it is eminently a fit case to exercise inherent powers. It is true that the exercise of power under Section 151 cpc is discretionary. " ( 8 ) IT is not at all difficult to discern the reason underlying the principle enunciated in the judgment referred to above. When a party approaches the Court seeking adjudication of a dispute, he should be prepared to receive the outcome of the adjudication. If for any reason, he intends to abandon the proceedings half way, it is expected of him to remain in a position or state of affairs that was obtaining before he initiated the proceedings. Anything which he gains in the form of or through interlocutory proceedings has to be neutralized. On the other hand, if the party is permitted to retain the advantage which he secured through the very proceedings which he had abandoned, not only such proceedings but also the Court, in which they are instituted, become a tool and some times weapon in the hands of unscrupulous persons to perpetuate fraud. ( 9 ) NO principle of law, if there exists one, can be permitted to operate to strengthen the hands of such persons to advance their ignoble objects. If such things are permitted, courts, which are established for resolution of disputes through respectable means and in accordance with the enacted provisions and established principles of law, would become vulnerable to the misadventures. Corresponding legal proceedings, which are normally intended to expose and eliminate fraud, get transformed into the one to abet and perpetuate it. One just and cannot find any support for such manoeuvers in custom or conventions, much less, in law. I respectfully follow the ratio in the precedent. The question, therefore stands squarely answered in favour of the 1st respondent herein. ( 10 ) A subsidiary question also arises as to whether the petitioner can challenge the order passed in EP. No. 21 of 1995 without challenging the order passed in IA. No. 583/94. I respectfully follow the ratio in the precedent. The question, therefore stands squarely answered in favour of the 1st respondent herein. ( 10 ) A subsidiary question also arises as to whether the petitioner can challenge the order passed in EP. No. 21 of 1995 without challenging the order passed in IA. No. 583/94. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Koran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, wherein it was held:"it is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. " ( 12 ) THE proposition referred to above is well settled and well established and it does not call for any further discussion. The executing Court can refuse to execute any decree which is passed by a Court without jurisdiction and the lack of jurisdiction can be on many grounds. The question, however, is whether the said order can be said to be without jurisdiction. It is only if the petitioner is able to establish that the Court that passed the order in IA. No. 583/94 lacked jurisdiction since it became functus officio, the suit having been dismissed much prior to the filing of the IA. Since it is already held that the trial Court does not become functus officio, and it does have the jurisdiction to entertain the IA to undo the mischief played by the petitioner, any further discussion on this question becomes superfluous. ( 13 ) BEFORE parting, I would like to place on record the able and dispassionate assistance rendered by Mr. Ashwani Kumar and Mr. Kesava Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the respondent respectively. ( 14 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the order under revision does not suffer from any irregularity or lack of jurisdiction. Ashwani Kumar and Mr. Kesava Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the respondent respectively. ( 14 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the order under revision does not suffer from any irregularity or lack of jurisdiction. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.