Judgment Bakhshish Kaur, J. 1. This is a petition under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondents for wilful disobedience and violation of the order dated April 09, 1999 passed by Shri Naval Kumar, Rent Controller, Chandigarh and the order dated 19th May, 1999 passed by this Court. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that Shri Pawan Kumar, father of the petitioner was owner of House No. 7, Sector 21-A, Chandigarh. Amarjit Singh was inducted as a tenant on 1.2.1974 in one room on the ground floor towards the right side of House No. 7, Sector 21-A, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the demised premises) by the previous owner. It was let out for residential purposes vide rent note dated January 31, 1974. Shri Pawan Kumar and Smt. Kanta Devi, the present petitioners purchased this property from Ms. Ahluwalia wife of Shri M.K. Ahluwalia, her husband and General Attorney vide registered sale deed dated August 19, 1980. 3. Shri Pawan Kumar, who was under-secretary with the Government of Punjab, filed ejectment application under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act). The respondent was granted leave to contest the petition under Section 18-A(5) of the Rent Act as per order dated December 02, 1998 passed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh. Shri Pawan Kumar then challenged this order in the Civil Revision No. 5937 of 1998. During the pendency of the revision petition, compromise the effected between the parties on 7th April, 1999 and the respondent gave an undertaking to vacate the demised premises and hand over the vacant possession or before December 30, 1999 and that he will not misuse the demised premises for commercial use. Copy of the compromise is Annexure P-1. The statements of the parties were recorded by the Rent Controller on 8.4.1999 and the compromise deed was admitted into evidence as Exhibit C-1. 4. The respondent did not abide by the undertaking given by him as he did not vacate the demises premises. This petition has, therefore, been filed for initiating contempt proceedings against him for disobeying the order passed by the Rent Controller on 9.4.1994 (Annexure P-3) and the order of this Court dated 9.5.1999 (Annexure P-5). 5.
4. The respondent did not abide by the undertaking given by him as he did not vacate the demises premises. This petition has, therefore, been filed for initiating contempt proceedings against him for disobeying the order passed by the Rent Controller on 9.4.1994 (Annexure P-3) and the order of this Court dated 9.5.1999 (Annexure P-5). 5. In addition to the above, the petitioner has filed another ejectment application under Section 13 of the Rent Act against the respondent on the ground of change of user as the respondent had used the demised premises as an office of driving school (commercial purpose) under the name and style of M/s. Zamindara Driving School. However, this application was dismissed as withdrawn as the application for ejectment under Section 13-A of the Rent Act was allowed. 6. Since Pawan Kumar had died, therefore, his legal representatives had filed execution application for the execution of the order dated 9.4.1999. Therein, the respondent got filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure from his brother Jagjit Singh, a partner of M/s. Zamindara Driving School. 7. The respondent in his written reply has raised the preliminary objection that the contempt petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had already filed execution application before the Rent Controller. Objection petition has also been filed in the execution proceedings and that this contempt petition has been filed as a counter-blast. Since the order is executable under law, therefore, the petition for contempt is not maintainable. The same has been filed to be used as a weapon to coerce the respondent to comply with the ejectment order illegally when the respondent is not in possession of the demised premises. It is pleaded, inter alia, that his brother Jagjit Singh, who is a partner in the Zamindara Driving School, has physically dispossessed him from the demised premises and he does not permit him to enter the demises premises. Therefore, on this ground also, the petition is not maintainable. 8. On merits, it is averred that the premises were taken on rent from Shri Ahluwalia, the previous owner and landlord of the house in question for commercial purposes. It is, however, admitted that the house had been purchased by the father of the petitioner. 9. I have heard Shri C.P. Sapra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri U.K. Agnihotri, learned counsel for the respondent. 10.
It is, however, admitted that the house had been purchased by the father of the petitioner. 9. I have heard Shri C.P. Sapra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri U.K. Agnihotri, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Civil Contempt as defined under Section 2 of the Act means wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. In contempt proceedings, unlike the trial for a criminal offence, no oral evidence is recorded and the facts are to be gathered and believed on the basis of the affidavits furnished by the parties. Thus, though the procedure of trial for contempt is summary in nature, but its consequences are serious. Where a person suffers a statement being aware of the consequences of making such a statement, whether he can be allowed to retract from his statement made before the Court ? Isnt he required to abide by the terms of the undertaking given by him in a proceeding before the Court ? 11. It is well-settled that every fraction (infraction ?) of the Courts order does not amount to contempt of Court. It is only wilful and deliberate violation of Courts order, a contemptuous conduct on the part of the contemnor which is to be condemned in contempt proceedings. 12. It is, therefore, to be seen as to whether there has been wilful disobedience or the orders or direction of the Courts attracting the provisions of Section 2(P) of the Act ? Has the petitioner been able to establish wilful disregard of the orders dated 19.4.1999 (Annexure P-3) and 19.5.1999 (Annexure P-5) ? 13. The Revision Petition No. 5937 of 1998 was disposed of on 19.5.1999 as the parties had effected compromise, therefore, the following order was passed :- "Learned counsel for the petitioner states that matter as such has been settled and, therefore, he does not press for the revision petition. He has appended the compromise. Revision petition is dismissed, as withdrawn." 14. The compromise deed is Annexure P-1 signed by the landlord and the tenant, that is, Pawan Kumar and Amarjit Singh-respondent respectively. The relevant terms and conditions incorporated therein are reproduced as under :- "The parties have compromised their dispute on the following terms and conditions :- i) That the respondent/tenant admits the requirement of the petitioner/landlord.
The compromise deed is Annexure P-1 signed by the landlord and the tenant, that is, Pawan Kumar and Amarjit Singh-respondent respectively. The relevant terms and conditions incorporated therein are reproduced as under :- "The parties have compromised their dispute on the following terms and conditions :- i) That the respondent/tenant admits the requirement of the petitioner/landlord. He also admits that the petitioner/landlord is retiring on 31.5.1999 from Punjab Government Service. ii) That the respondent/tenant has no objection if an order of eviction is passed against him from the tenancy premises on the ground of personal requirement of the petitioner. iii) That the respondent/tenant undertakes to vacate the tenancy premises on or before 30.12.1999 and will hand over the vacant possession thereof to the landlord. He will also not misuse the tenancy premises for commercial use. The petitioner/landlord has no objection to the grant of time to vacate the premises up to 30.12.1999. iv) That the tenant/respondent will pay regularly rent, electricity and water charges to the petitioner/landlord till 30.12.1999." 15. On the basis of the aforesaid compromise deed, Amarjit Singh-respondent made a statement before the Rent Controller on 8.4.1999, copy of which is Annexure P-2. It reads as under :- "Statement of Sh. Amarjit Singh respondent : I submit that the petitioner is retiring on 31.5.1999 and requires the demises premises for his bona fide use and occupation. Eviction order may be passed against me but time may be granted to me to vacate the same up to 30.12.1999. The landlord has no objection to grant this time. I have signed compromise deed Ex. CI which bears my signatures. I will abide by the terms and conditions of Ex. CI. Sd/-Respondent, Sd/- (Tejwinder Singh, PCS) Amarjit Singh RC 8.4.99." 16. Pawan Kumar, the landlord made the following statement :- "The above statement of the respondent is correct. I have executed Ex CI. I have no objection to the grant of time to the respondent up to 30.12.99. The parties may be left to bear their own cost. RO & AC Sd/- (Tejwinder Singh PCS) Sd/- RC/8.4.99." Pawan Kumar Verma 17. On the basis of their statements, the compromise deed was admitted into evidence as Exhibit C-1. The learned Rent Controller had passed the order of eviction on 9.4.1999, copy whereof is Annexure P-3. The relevant portion thereof reads as under :- "The statements of petitioner and respondent was recorded.
On the basis of their statements, the compromise deed was admitted into evidence as Exhibit C-1. The learned Rent Controller had passed the order of eviction on 9.4.1999, copy whereof is Annexure P-3. The relevant portion thereof reads as under :- "The statements of petitioner and respondent was recorded. Keeping in view the statement of the parties, this case is disposed of in terms of compromised deed C-1. The parties shall remain bound by their statements given in the Court, and the respondent shall be bound to vacate the demised premises on or before 30.12.1999 as per their undertaking given in the court in this respect. Memo. of costs be prepared. File be consigned to the record room." 18. Thus when the respondent had given an undertaking that he would vacate the demised premises on or before 30th December, 1999, would it be proper for him to raise the objection that he was forcibly dispossessed by his brother and that he is not in possession of the premise and therefore because of non- impleadment of his brother Jagjit Singh as a party to the ejectment petition, he cannot be made liable to abide by the undertaking given by him before the Court and that he cannot comply with the ejectment order. By taking these pleas in reply, he in fact, is again committing contempt of Court by misleading the Court on misrepresentation of facts. In fact, he had already admitted in his statement that the petitioners father Pawan Kumar required the demises premises for his personal use and occupation, therefore, the order of eviction may be passed against him. In the compromise deed Annexure P-1, under Clause 3 he had specifically mentioned that he will also not miscue the tenancy premises for commercial use, meaning thereby that at the time of making statement the driving school was not in existence nor the demised premises were being used by the Zamindara driving school. It is not his defence that the misuse has been done by his brother after physically or forcibly dispossessing him from the demised premises. It is his calculated move to obstruct and avoid the eviction order, which has been passed on the basis of undertaking given by him.
It is not his defence that the misuse has been done by his brother after physically or forcibly dispossessing him from the demised premises. It is his calculated move to obstruct and avoid the eviction order, which has been passed on the basis of undertaking given by him. In wilful disregard of the compromise, undertaking and the eviction order, the contemnor has again committed contempt by asserting that he was been physically dispossessed by his brother from the demised premises. It is totally a white lie because it is defence that the office of Zamindara Driving School is being run in the demised premises, of which he and his brother are the partners. 19. For constituting civil contempt, essential ingredients is "wilful disobedience" and wilful connotes "purposeful" and clear intention to flout. It is well-settled that the act of contemnor must be calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of law. In this regard, reference is made to Digvijay Narayan Singh v. A.K. Sen, ILR 1971 (Delhi) 14 (FB). It can be safely concluded that the respondent is guilty of wilful disobedience of the order of ejectment passed against him. 20. Contempt jurisdiction is exercised for the purpose of upholding the majesty of law and dignity of judicial system as also of the Court and Tribunals entrusted with the task of administering/delivery of justice as held by the Apex Court in T. Sudhalkar Prasad etc. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2001(1) SLR 596. It is also held that the proceedings for contempt of Court cannot be used merely for executing the decree of the Court. 21. In Murray and Co. v. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000(2) RSJ 22, Honble Mr. Justice Umesh C. Banerjee of the Apex Court observed that though judicial hyper-sensitiveness is not warranted but angelic silence on the part of a Judge is also not expected vis-a-vis infraction of majesty of law. The Contempt of Court Act, 1971 has been engrafted in the Statute Book for the purpose of bringing in a feeling of confidence of the people in general for due and proper administration of justice in the county. It is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the Courts and as such, it must be exercised with due care and caution and in cases of larger interest for due administration of justice.
It is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the Courts and as such, it must be exercised with due care and caution and in cases of larger interest for due administration of justice. In para 10, it has been further observed as under :- "...The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by the Courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the juridicary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which even can remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the people in general." 22. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case discussed as above, I am of the view that the contemnor had scant regard for the order passed by Court. He totally put a blind curtain on the undertaking given by him before the Court which the Court had accepted as correct. He has attempted to obstruct the administration of justice. Thus, for this wilful disobedience on his part, he cannot escape the liability. He is, therefore, held guilty for committing contempt of court. The contemnor is punished to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and pay fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for one month. This order will become operational after the expiry of three months, during which period the respondent may avail appropriate legal remedy available to him and/or purge the contempt.