P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) JUDGMENT r. M. K. KISHORE, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel representing the respondent. ( 2 ) THE revision petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R. C. C. No. 31/90 on the file of Rent Controller-Principal District Munsif, Eluru and the respondent in C. M. A. No. 4/98 on the file of appellate authority-Senior Civil Judge, Eluru and the present Civil Revision Petition is filed as against a reversing order, the appellate authority allowing the appeal on the ground that the Revision Petitioner-tenant secured alternative accommodation under Section 10 (2) (v) of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960, in short referred to as "act" hereinafter. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to hereinafter as landlord-petitioner and tenant-respondent as arrayed in the R. C. C. ( 4 ) THE averments made by the landlord-petitioner in the R. C. C. are as follows: ( 5 ) THE petitioner in the R. C. C. i. e. , respondent in the C. R. P. is the landlord and the respondent i. e. , the Revision Petitioner is the tenant in respect of schedule property consisting of two shops. The respondent tenant took the schedule shops on lease from the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 700/ -. The petitioner who is a resident of Vijayawada has been collecting rents from the respondent by making trips to Eluru from time to time. The petitioner has got two sons and one daughter and the sons are grown up children who are eager to do business. The petitioner is working as clerk in a business shop at Vijayawada and that he is intending to get his sons to do business in plastic and general goods in which they are training, for which the petitioner expressed his desire to do business to the respondent. The respondent however expressed to shift his business to some other place and requested for time, but he has been taking time without keeping his promise, that the petitioner bona fidely requires the schedule premises for their personal occupation. The respondent eversince he was requested to vacate the premises, has been paying the rents irregularly and he paid rents once in two months as can be seen from the receipt book maintained by him. The respondent eversince he was requested to vacate the premises, has been paying the rents irregularly and he paid rents once in two months as can be seen from the receipt book maintained by him. The respondent paid rents for the month of July, 1990 on 6-8-90 under receipt No. 21 and thereafter committed wilful default in payment of rents. The petitioner came to Eluru on 7-9-1990 and 13-9-1990 to collect the rents but the respondent did not pay rents due for the month of August 1990. The petitioner again came to Eluru on 15-10-1990 to collect the rent but the respondent did not pay the rent for the month of September 1990. Again the petitioner came to Eluru on 15-11-1990, but the respondent did not pay the rent for the month of October 1990. When the petitioner came down on 3-12-1990 the respondent was absent from the shop and the petitioner came to know through his inmates at Vijayawada that some money order came but the same was returned as petitioner was not available by then. Therefore, the petitioner committed default in payment of rents for the months of August, September, October and November totaling to Rs. 2,800/- and hence the petitioner got a legal notice issued to the respondent, but there is no reply for the same. The petitioner submits that the respondent purchased a shop which is opposite to the schedule premises for a valuable consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/- from A. Kuswna Rani under a registered sale deed dated 16-5-1991 in the name of his wife. The respondent has secured alternative accommodation and thus the respondent is liable to be evicted for the schedule premises on that ground also. The Revision Petitioner-respondent in the R. C. C. i. e. , the tenant filed his counter denying the allegations and he had admitted that he had taken the petition schedule premises on lease from the petitioner on 1-1-1979 on a monthly rent of Rs. 350/- and carrying on iron and hardware business and that he has been paying rents regularly. The respondent paid the rents as under: from 1-1-1979 to 31-12-1981 Rs. 350/- per month from 1-1-1982 to 31-12-1984 Rs. 425/- per month from 1-1-1985 to 30-6-1987 Rs. 550/- per month from 1-1-1987 onwards Rs. 7001- per month since the petitioner informed the respondent to enhance rent from Rs. 700/- to Rs. The respondent paid the rents as under: from 1-1-1979 to 31-12-1981 Rs. 350/- per month from 1-1-1982 to 31-12-1984 Rs. 425/- per month from 1-1-1985 to 30-6-1987 Rs. 550/- per month from 1-1-1987 onwards Rs. 7001- per month since the petitioner informed the respondent to enhance rent from Rs. 700/- to Rs. 1200/-at a stretch, he filed R. C. C. No. 309/90 to permit him to deposit the rents into Court and the same is pending. From 16-7-88, the petition schedule premises fell to the share of the petitioner and he has been collecting the rents at Rs. 700/- per month from the respondent. The petitioner is collecting the rents from other tenants also by coming from Vijayawada from time to time. While so, the petitioner refused to receive rent when tendered on 3-9-1990, as the respondent did not agree to the petitioner s unjust demand to enhance the rent from Rs. 700/- to Rs. 1200/- and later the respondent remitted the same by way of money order on 1-10-90 for two months i. e. , Rs. 1400/- for the months of August and September, 1990. But as it was refused again he remitted three months rent i. e. , rs. 2100/- for August, September and October 1990, but it was also refused by the petitioner. As the matter stood thus, the petitioner sent a letter on 21-11-1990 to the respondent and requesting him to vacate. The allegations in the said letter are not true and correct. The petition schedule shop is only one shop but not two shops and the premises let out to the respondent is behind the Bazar road and is not a busy center. The sons of the petitioner are studying in Vijayawada Saidu Appalaswamy College, B. A. and Intermediate respectively and the petitioner is residing at Vijayawada since last several years. He denied the request made by the petitioner to him for shifting of the premises. The petitioner is a resident of Vijayawada and he used to visit Eluru and collecting the rents and that he never committed default in payment of rents. The respondent-tenant denied the petitioner coming to Eluru on 7-9-1990, 13-9-1990, 15-10-1990 and 5-11-1990 for collecting rents from him. He never committed default in payment of rents for the months of August, September, October and November, totaling Rs. 2800/ -. The respondent-tenant denied the petitioner coming to Eluru on 7-9-1990, 13-9-1990, 15-10-1990 and 5-11-1990 for collecting rents from him. He never committed default in payment of rents for the months of August, September, October and November, totaling Rs. 2800/ -. As the petitioner refused to receive the rents, he deposited the same into Court in R. C. C. No. 30/91 regularly. The Door No. 7a-8-18/2 only is let out to this respondent and the Door No. 7a-8-18/3 shop is let out to one Bandisetti Sambasivarao and the extent of the schedule land is 70 square yards but not 60 square yards and it is only one shop and not two shops. The respondent never committed default in payment of rent but this respondent was always ready to pay the rent immediately whenever the petitioner came from Vijayawada to Eluru to collect rent and this practice is going on since last several years. The respondent-tenant denied the alleged personal occupation of the petitioner for his sons business. The petitioner has got five other shops of his own and he let out the same to other tenants, and that the petitioner does not belong to trading family and that recently one upstair portion is kept vacant and the petitioner let out the same to a Tailor recently i. e. , in February, 1991. On the strength of the pleadings, the learned Rent Controller had recorded the evidence of PW-1 and his son PW-2 and Exs. A-1 to A-9 were marked and on behalf of the respondent, RW-1 was examined and Exs. Bl to B-13 were marked. The learned Rent Controller had framed the following points for consideration:- 1. Whether the respondent/tenant committed any wilful default in payment of monthly rent ? 2. Whether the petitioner/landlord bona fide requires the schedule premises for his personal occupation ? 3. To what relief ? the learned Rent Controller after discussing the said points on appreciation of evidence of PW-1, PW-2, RW-1 and also Exs. A-1 to A-9 and B-1 to B-13 had arrived at a conclusion that the landlord is not entitled to the relief and had dismissed the eviction petition. It is pertinent to note that on tenant securing alternative accommodation under Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act by virtue of the purchase of property under Ex. A-1 to A-9 and B-1 to B-13 had arrived at a conclusion that the landlord is not entitled to the relief and had dismissed the eviction petition. It is pertinent to note that on tenant securing alternative accommodation under Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act by virtue of the purchase of property under Ex. A-1 sale deed dated 16-5-1991, the learned Rent Controller had not specifically and separately framed any point for consideration on this aspect, but however had discussed the said aspect also under Point No. 2 at paragraph-14. The landlord aggrieved by the order of the Court of first instance had preferred C. M. A. No. 4/98 and the appellate authority had framed the following points for consideration :- whether the order and decree of the lower Court is contrary to law and liable to be set-aside on the ground of wilful default, bona fide requirement and also on the ground that the tenant secured alternative accommodation ? the appellate authority at paragraphs 8 to 13 had discussed about the aspect of wilful default and had arrived at the conclusion that the order of the Rent Controller need not be interfered with as far as this ground is concerned. The learned appellate authority at paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 had discussed even the ground of bona fide requirement and had concurred with the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the said point. Since these are concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, on facts, this Court as a revisional Court is not inclined to interfere with the said findings and both the Counsel even had not stressed their arguments relating to these grounds. However, the appellate authority at paragraphs 17 to 22 after discussing the ground of the tenant securing alternative accommodation under Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act had ordered eviction giving the tenant two months time to vacate the premises from the date of the order and the tenant aggrieved by this portion of the order had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition. ( 6 ) SRI R. M. K. Kishore, the learned Counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner-tenant had contended that the wife and husband under Indian Law cannot be treated as one entity and the mere fact that the property was purchased by the wife with her own funds cannot be taken advantage by the landlord to evict the tenant on such ground. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the respective pleadings and also the evidence and the evidence recorded in this regard by the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority. The learned Counsel had also drawn my attention to the relevant provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. ( 7 ) SRI T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel representing the respondent landlord had contended that the order of the appellate authority in ordering eviction on the ground of alternative accommodation is perfectly justified and valid in law. The learned Counsel also had contended that though the Rent Controller had not framed any specific point relating to this aspect there was some discussion and ultimately this ground also was negatived, but the appellate authority after recording the reasons had arrived at a conclusion that the landlord is entitled to the relief of eviction. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the provisions of Section 10 (3) and the language employed in Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act. The learned Counsel also had stressed the absence of the words "of his own" in the relevant provision Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on K. V. S. S. Prasada Rao v. Godavari Bai, 1998 (2) ALD 222, and also V. K, Malhotra and another v. Smt. Ranjitkaur, 1985 (1) AIRCJ 250, in support of his contentions. ( 8 ) AFTER hearing both the Counsel, as far as ground under Section 10 (2xv) of the Act is concerned, the provision specifies as follows: "that the tenant has secured alternative building or ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause," the provision contains two limbs. The first limb is "that the tenant has secured alternative building" and the second limb is "or ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause". The first limb is "that the tenant has secured alternative building" and the second limb is "or ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause". Though both these grounds are incorporated under Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act itself, a close reading of the provision makes it clear that the word employed is "or" and hence these grounds are to be treated as independent grounds. Hence the ingredient covered by the first limb of Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act is that the tenant has secured alternative building. Now, the question is what is the meaning of the words "tenant has secured alternative building". It is no doubt true that the words "of his own" are not specifically employed in this provision though in certain of the grounds under Section 10 (3), these words "of his own" have been specifically employed. It is no doubt true that the wife and husband under Indian Law do not form one entity, but for the purposes of the Act, when the wife had purchased the property, a suitable alternative accommodation, can it be made a ground to evict the husband/ tenant on the ground that the tenant has secured alternative building within the meaning of Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act ? In the decision referred (1) supra while dealing with this question it was held that by reading Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act it is evident that the Legislatures have not used the word in the section that the tenant has secured alternative building in his own name and in the absence of the words "in his own name" it can be interpreted that the tenant must secure alternative building where he will have a legal right to stay that is the requirement of law and if the tenant had secured alternative building though it was purchased in the name of his wife, the tenant has a right to stay along with his wife as the relationship between them is cordial and hence the tenant is liable to be evicted. In the decision referred (supra) while dealing with a similar provision under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 it was held that even where the wife of a tenant had built or acquired vacant possession of premises, the tenant is liable to be evicted. In the decision referred (supra) while dealing with a similar provision under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 it was held that even where the wife of a tenant had built or acquired vacant possession of premises, the tenant is liable to be evicted. The learned Counsel representing the tenant had drawn my attention to the relevant portion of the deposition of RW-1, which reads as follows:- "it is not true to suggest that on 16-5-1991 I purchased a shop on the name of my wife from one Smt. Kusuma Kumari under Ex. Al sale deed. Being as elder of my family, I am looking after one family affairs. My wife is not an income tax assessee. My wife got some amount from her mother and purchased the shop under Ex. A. l sale deed, on her name. It is true that the said shop is convenient for carrying on business. It is true that this situate in the main bazaar. It is true that towards the south of my shop there is another shop of Konakalla Kotawararao and Co. and doing business in Iron and steel. At the same manner there is also another shop situated on the western side of my wife shop. It is true that there are some more iron and steel shops in the vicinity where the shop stands on the name of my wife is situated. It is true that the shop stands on the name of my wife is located in a business area dealing with iron and steel. It is not true to suggest that the said shop as a godown to my shop. All of our family members are residing jointly. I own my house in eastern street, Eluru. We are residing in the upstair portion. The ground floor portion is being used as Godown for keeping our hardware material. It is not true to suggest that I am doing business in iron and hardware in the ground floor of my building. It is true that I am having a building cum shop in Kaikaloor road. It is not true to suggest that we are doing business in iron and hardware and cement in that building-cum-shop. Since the other shop stands on the name of my wife I did not try to occupy the same in place of the present schedule property". It is true that I am having a building cum shop in Kaikaloor road. It is not true to suggest that we are doing business in iron and hardware and cement in that building-cum-shop. Since the other shop stands on the name of my wife I did not try to occupy the same in place of the present schedule property". The learned Counsel on the strength of this evidence had contended that the approach of the appellate authority in ordering eviction on this ground is totally erroneous since the ingredients of the said ground are not all satisfied. The learned Counsel also had stressed on the aspect that if such an interpretation is given to the provision referred to supra, then if accommodation is secured by any other member of the family of the tenant in any other form, automatically the tenant is liable to be evicted and this interpretation of the provision will land tenants into serious trouble. I am not inclined to go into hypothetical questions and just I confine myself to the question involved in the present case, suffice for me to say that in view of Ex. A-1 coupled with the admissions made by RW 1 it is clear that alternative accommodation is available to the Revision Petitioner-tenant and accordingly the appellate authority in a well-considered order, as far as this ground is concerned, had rightly ordered eviction and hence as a final fact finding authority, the appellate authority had recorded convincing reasons for arriving at a conclusion that the landlord is entitled to the relief of eviction on the said ground. Hence, 1 do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order and the Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. But however, the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises. No order as to costs.