Judgment :- The petitioner is the accused in C.C. No. 3466 of 2000 on the file of XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai and he seeks to quash the records of the case. According to the petitioner, the complaint has been filed against him for the alleged offence under Ss. 500 and 504 of I.P.C. and the same is pending in C.C. No. 3466 of 2000. The allegations in the complaint are that there were disputes between the staff of Mitsui & Co. Ltd., Madras Office, with the management about promotion, increment and other benefits of the staff and no proper settlement was reached in the talks held at Chennai Office on 7-3-2000 between Dr. Veeramani, President of Bharatiya Kamagar Sena, Madras Unit and Mr. Parameswaran, representing the workers and the petitioner, representing the Management of the Company and in that meeting, the petitioner has allegedly called the workers "beggars" and representatives of the workers allegedly got very angry and agitated and went out of the room. The other staff workers also got very angry and agitated and they grabbed sticks and other objects and tried to attack the management people. The complainant and other representatives of the Union pacified the staff workers. The petitioner allegedly insulted the workers by calling "beggars" and committed defamation knowing fully the implications and thus instigated them to commit breach of peace and hence he is alleged to have committed offences punishable under Ss. 500 and 504 of I.P.C. The petitioner has further averred that the allegations that, in the meeting held at the Chennai office of the company on 7-3-2000, he called the workers "beggars" is totally false, baseless and malicious. During the discussion, when the representatives of the workers said "the staff are not beggars", the petitioner, as a joke said "they are bigger". But, unfortunately, the representatives of the workers suddenly started to say loudly "don't say as beggars" and never listened to further talks. Because of the lack of fluency in English and because of Japanese pronouncement of English, when the petitioner used the word 'bigger', the representatives of the staff workers mistook it as 'beggar' and this is a clear case of misunderstanding. The petitioner had no reason or intention to use the word 'beggars' about the staff of the company. The petitioner did not make any defamatory statement as alleged and he never insulted the workers. The petitioner had no reason or intention to use the word 'beggars' about the staff of the company. The petitioner did not make any defamatory statement as alleged and he never insulted the workers. The petitioner always treated the employees as family members with great respect. The respondent/complainant has grudge against the petitioner for warning him from sending representation directly to Mr. Kazmi Nakagawa, who is in Japan, in violation of the hierarchy. The respondent/complainant did not attend the meeting on 7-3-2000 and he has no personal knowledge of the incident. He has not signed the complaint in any representative capacity. No incident occurred as alleged in the complaint and neither Mr. Parameswaran has recorded any audio cassette of the proceedings of the meeting held on 7-3-2000 in the company. They are only figments of imagination and purposely made to harass the petitioner. The respondent has failed to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner and no offence as alleged has been made out against him. In order to attract S. 499, Explanation 2, the identity of the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations. No offence as alleged against the petitioner has been made out against him and there is no case worth going for trial. The proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. It is alleged in the complaint that in the talks held at Chennai Office of Mitsui & Co. Ltd. on 7-3-2000 between Dr. Veeramani, President of Bharatiya Kamagar Sena, Madras Unit and Mr. Parameswaran, representing the workers and the petitioner herein, representing the management of the company, regarding promotion, increment and other benefits of the staff, Mr. Parameswaran said that the workers are not beggars to get Rs. 5/- as annual increment and the petitioner herein replied as "yes they are beggars" and the remarks had brought disrepute to the workers and they feel insulted and defamed in the eyes of others. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent/complainant is not a person aggrieved by the offence and as such not competent to prosecute under S. 199 of Criminal Procedure Code. Section 199 of Cr. P.C. contains a mandatory provision and it lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under Chapter XXI of Indian Penal Code (i.e. Ss. Section 199 of Cr. P.C. contains a mandatory provision and it lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under Chapter XXI of Indian Penal Code (i.e. Ss. 499 to 502) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Section 199 of Cr. P.C. thus lays down an exception to the general rule that a complaint can be filed by anybody whether he is an aggrieved person or not and modifies that rule by permitting only an aggrieved person to move the Court in case of defamation and any violation will result in illegality and want of jurisdiction making the cognizance itself illegal. Therefore, the question is whether the respondent/complainant is an aggrieved person within the meaning of S. 199 of Cr. P.C. Under S. 499 of Indian Penal Code, making or publishing any imputation concerning any person intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that it will harm his reputation is defamation and admittedly in this case there is no imputation made concerning the respondent individually. Under Explanation 2 to the section, it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. In the present case, we are concerned with only Association or Collection of persons as such capable of being defamed. Such persons must be a definite and determinable body capable of being identified and then only the imputations can be said to relate to its individual members. If a well defined class is defamed, every person of that class can file a complaint even if the defamatory imputation does not mention him by name. Keeping in view the above principles, it has to be seen whether the association or collection of persons in respect of which defamatory word was used was a definite and an identifiable association or collection of persons, so that, the imputation can be said to relate to its individual components enabling an individual member of it to maintain a complaint. The imputation is alleged to be against the staff/workers of the Mitsui & Co. Ltd., Madras Office and the complaint was filed by the respondent, as a staff member. The imputation is alleged to be against the staff/workers of the Mitsui & Co. Ltd., Madras Office and the complaint was filed by the respondent, as a staff member. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the complaint was not lodged by the complainant as representative of staff/workers and the complainant has not specified that he is a member of a particular Union of workers and hence the identity of the association or the collection of persons is not established to attract Explanation 2 to S. 499 of I.P.C. and, therefore, the complaint is not maintainable and in this regard, he relied on the following decisions. In the decision in G. Narasimhan v. T. V. Chokkappa, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2609 , the Chairman of the Reception Committee of a conference organised by the Dravida Kazhagam was the complainant and the complaint was in respect of news item regarding a resolution passed in the meeting. The conference consisted of a large number of party sympathizers, leaders and outsiders. The Supreme Court held that applying the test that collection of people must be identifiable, definite and determinate in relation to the imputations, that the conference was not an identifiable or definite body so that all those who attended it could not be said to be its constituents who, if the conference was defamed, would, in their turn be said to be defamed. The complainant, who was the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Conference, was therefore held to be not an aggrieved person. In Narottamdas L. Sha v. Patel Maganbhai Revabhai, reported in 1984 Cri LJ 1790, the Gujarat High Court held that even according to the complainant, the editorial did not refer to him personally or to any other individual but referred to the lawyers as a class and thus the alleged defamation could not be referred to a determinate or identifiable section/class of lawyers as distinguished from the rest of the members of lawyers' fraternity and hence the complaint was not maintainable. In M. P. Narayan Pillai v. M. P. Chacko, reported in 1986 Cri LJ 2002, the Kerala High Court held that imputations alleged against Syrian Christian community as a whole, which is an unascertainable body of persons and no member of that community could say that he was individually defamed and he cannot claim to be an aggrieved person competent to file a complaint for defamation under S. 499 of I.P.C. In the decisions referred to above, imputations were alleged against unidentified and indeterminate class of persons and hence it was decided that no member of that class could say that he was individually defamed and he cannot claim to be an aggrieved person under S. 199 of Cr. P.C. The learned senior counsel for the respondent contended that talks were held at Chennai Office at Mitsui & Co. Ltd. on 7-3-2000 between the petitioner herein, representing the management of the company and Dr. Veeramani, President of Bharatiya Kamagar Sena, Madras Unit and Mr. Parameswaran, representing the workers and in that meeting, the petitioner herein called the workers "beggars" and the workers got insulted and defamed. He further contended that at the time of filing the private complaint, the complainant examined himself and also examined Dr. Veeramani, President of Bharatiya Kamagar Sena, who in his sworn statement has stated that the petitioner herein called the workers "beggars" in the meeting and they have recorded it in an audio cassette and hence the word used by the petitioner is per se defamatory and the imputation is alleged against staff/workers of Mitsui & Co. Ltd., which is a definite and determinable body and the complainant, being a member of that body, is an aggrieved person within the meaning of S. 199 of Cr. P.C. The alleged imputation is only against the staff/workers of Mitsui and Company Ltd., Madras Office and it does not refer to anybody else. The staff/workers of Mitsui and Co. Ltd., Madras Office, is a well defined class and the respondent/complainant is a member of that class and such being the case, he can file the complaint even though the imputation does not mention him by name, and he is an aggrieved person within the meaning of S. 199 of Cr. The staff/workers of Mitsui and Co. Ltd., Madras Office, is a well defined class and the respondent/complainant is a member of that class and such being the case, he can file the complaint even though the imputation does not mention him by name, and he is an aggrieved person within the meaning of S. 199 of Cr. P.C. The learned senior counsel for the respondent further contended that on the allegation made in the complaint and the sworn statements of the witnesses, the Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out, that the allegations might come within the definition of defamation and could be taken cognizance of and hence this is not a case warranting quashing of the proceedings and he relied on the pronouncements of the Apex Court in the following cases. In Satrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi, reported in 1996 (4) Crimes 27 : (1997 Cri LJ 212) (SC) it is held as follows (Para 13) : "It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under S. 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations might come within the definition of 'defamation' under S. 499, I.P.C. and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class at Nasik." In the recent decision in M. N. Damani v. S. K. Sinha, reported in 2001 SCC (Cri) 823 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2037 ), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as follows : "Head Notes. For deciding whether the criminal proceedings should be allowed to continue or the same should be quashed, two aspects are to be satisfied : (1) Whether the uncontroverted allegations, as made in the complaint, prima facie establish the offence, and (2) whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. For deciding whether the criminal proceedings should be allowed to continue or the same should be quashed, two aspects are to be satisfied : (1) Whether the uncontroverted allegations, as made in the complaint, prima facie establish the offence, and (2) whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. On a plain reading of the order of the Magistrate issuing summons to the respondents, keeping in view the allegations made in the complaint and sworn statement of the appellant, it appears that a prima facie case is made out at that stage. There are no special features in the case to say that it is not expedient and not in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. The single Judge of the High Court failed to apply this test. The High Court could not say at that stage that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction resulting in the case after a trial. Assuming that the imputations made could be covered by Exception 9 of S. 499, I.P.C., several questions still remain to be examined whether such imputations were made in good faith, in what circumstances, with what intention, etc. All these can be examined on the basis of evidence in the trial." In the present case, as already seen, the XIVth Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, on a consideration of the allegations made in the complaint and sworn statements of the complainant and witness Dr. Veeramani, prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations might come within the definition of 'defamation' and could be taken cognizance of. As already seen, the complainant is an aggrieved person under S. 199 of Cr. P.C. to maintain the complaint for defamation and the petitioner has not made out a case for quashing the criminal proceedings on this ground. As already seen, the complainant is an aggrieved person under S. 199 of Cr. P.C. to maintain the complaint for defamation and the petitioner has not made out a case for quashing the criminal proceedings on this ground. The other ground raised for quashing the proceedings is that the allegations in the complaint would not constitute an offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that mere utterance of abusive words by itself does not constitute offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. and the essential requirements that the accused must intentionally insult and that insult must give provocation to any person and further that the accused must have requisite knowledge that such provocation will result in breach of public peace or commission of any other offence have to be proved and he relied on the judgments of this Court in Mohammed Ibrahim Maracayar v. Ismail Maracayar, reported in (1949) Mad WN (Cri) 91 : (1950 (51) Cri LJ 173) and of the Supreme Court in B. R. Meena v. Mangal Das Chiman Lal Barot, reported in 1987 (Supp.) SCC 597. The Apex Court as well as this Court in the above decisions have held that mere utterance of abusive words without more does not constitute an offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. and the ingredients of the offence have to be proved. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner further contended that the imputation is alleged to have been made by the petitioner herein against the staff/workers of Mitsui & Co. Ltd. during the talks held in the office of the company with the representatives of the workers and none of the workers, including the complainant, was present in the meeting and there was nothing to show that the petitioner intentionally insulted the workers and thereby gave provocation to them intending or with knowledge that such provocation will cause them to break the public peace or commit any other offence and hence the offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. is not made out. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondent contended that on 7-3-2000, talks were held between the management and the workers' representatives in the office of Mitsui & Co. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondent contended that on 7-3-2000, talks were held between the management and the workers' representatives in the office of Mitsui & Co. Ltd. at Chennai and the complainant and other staff/workers were waiting outside the meeting room to know about the result of the meeting and when the petitioner allegedly insulted the workers calling them "beggars", the representatives got angry and agitated and came out of the room and informed the staff/workers about the imputation made by the petitioner and the staff/workers got angry and grabbed sticks and other objects and tried to enter the room and attack the management people and they were pacified and prevented from committing any offence and these allegations are sufficient to constitute an offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. and he relied on the judgment of this Court in Nagendran Servai v. Balakrishnan Servai, reported in (1996) 1 Mad LW (Cri) 18 in this regard. Arunachalam, J. In the above decision held that the offence under Ss. 500 and 504 of I.P.C. can coexist and they are distinct offences committed in the course of same transaction and the test is whether a normal person, in the position of the person insulted, would have reacted to the use of the particular insulting words, by retaliation, in a violent manner and thereby a breach of peace would have been caused. This Court in Mohammed Ibrahim Maracayar's case, referred to above, has held that the likelihood of the breach of the peace must be immediately after the provocation or so soon afterwards that it must form part of res gestate. With respect, I agree with the views expressed in the above decisions. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint disclose a prima facie case for constituting an offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. The learned XIVth Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, on the averments made in the complaint, along with the sworn statements of the complainant and witness, satisfied that there was sufficient ground for proceeding further and took cognizance of the offence under S. 504 of I.P.C. also. Hence the plea of the petitioner for quashing the criminal proceedings on this ground also cannot be accepted. The petition is devoid of merit and the same is dismissed. Connected Crl. M.P. No. 5204 of 2000 is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.