JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 30th May, 1995 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhilwara (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'), whereby the Tribunal awarded compensation for a sum of Rs. 56,800/- in favour of the respondent-claimant No. 1 and against the appellant and respondent No. 2 and 3. 2. The appellant is insurer of motorcycle No. RNW 9291 which was involved in the accident resulting in injuries caused to the respondent No. 1. The Tribunal after recording the evidence, reached to the conclusion that due to rash and negligent driving of the motorcycle by its driver respondent No. 3 Anil Kumar, respondent No. 1 (claimant) who was pillion rider on the said motorcycle, sustained injuries which resulted in fracture of his left leg's bone. 3. It s contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that no first information report was lodged with the police of this accident and, therefore, the claim petition as such is not maintainable. He has relied on Rule 10.2 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), wherein along with claim petition, certain documents including first information report are to be filed. There is no mandatory requirement of filing the first information report. It is only in a case where the injured person or any other person, registers a case with the police, then only first information report is to be annexed, that is also not mandatory. It is for the claimant, if he relies on first information report, he may annex the same with claim petition. Non-filing or non-registration of F.I.R. cannot be said to be an impediment to lay claim for compensation arising out of the motor vehicle accident. Moreso, the claim petition is filed under the provision of section 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). There is no such requirement in the Act. 4. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the deceased was pillion rider and therefore, Insurance Company is not liable for compensation. Admittedly, vehicle involved in accident was comprehensively insured by the appellant Insurance Company. Policy is already on record (C-19/2). 5. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Minaxi and others AIR 2000 Karnataka page 73 while deciding the case on identical facts held that 'any person. Admittedly, vehicle involved in accident was comprehensively insured by the appellant Insurance Company. Policy is already on record (C-19/2). 5. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Minaxi and others AIR 2000 Karnataka page 73 while deciding the case on identical facts held that 'any person. as envisaged under Section 147(1) of the Act also covers the pillion rider. Relying on the Tariff Advisory Committee letter dated 2nd June, 1986 wherein it was specifically mentioned as under : "It has now been decided that the Standard Motor Cycle Comprehensive Policy should cover liability to Pillion Passengers treating them as occupants in the Motor Cycle and provide indemnity to such persons who are not carried for hire and reward." 6. It was further held that the term 'any person' used under Section 147(1) of the Act also covers the pillion rider. In 1998(1) TAC page 187 Rajasthan this Court held that any person other than the party to contract is a third party. In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Faqir Chand and others 1996 ACJ 111 a similar view was taken by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. Madhya Pradesh High Court in New India Assurance Company ltd. v. Riaz Mohammed and others 1996 ACJ 655 and in Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rayashree Rath and others 1998(1) TAC page 653 (Ori.) held that the insurer is the first party and the insured is the second party, other than two every person is a third party. 7. Chapter XI of the Act of 1988 deals with the Insurance of Motor Vehicles against third party risks. The expression 'Third Party' has not been defined in the Act of 1988. Section 145(g) of the Act defines the word 'Third Party' includes the Government Generally, the word 'includes' is used, in the statute to give wider meaning of words or phrase occurring in the body of the statute. In Stroud's judicial dictionary, 3rd Ed. Vol. 4 page 3019- 3020, the expression 'Third party risks' has been given meaning as under : "Third party risks connotes that the insurer is one party to the contract, that the policy holder insured is another party, and that claim made by others in respect of the negligent use of the care, may be naturally described as claims by third parties." 8. Thus, it is clear that any person other than the insurer and insured is third party and the insurance policy covers liabilities for death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The expression 'any person' would include an occupant of car/motor cycle who is gratuitously travelling in the car/motor cycle (vide 1998 ACJ 531) In New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh and others 2000 WLC (SC) Civil 40 : (2000) 1 SCC 237 Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "The result is that under the new Act an insurance policy covering third-party risk is not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle Is of any type or class. Hence the decisions rendered under the old Act vis-a-vis gratuitous passengers are of no avail while considering the liability of the insurance company in respect of any accident which occurred or would occur after the new Act came into force." 9. In Ashok v. Narmada, 2000 ACJ 553 Madhya Pradesh High Court while dealing with similar matter held that pillion rider is covered by the expression 'any person' mentioned under Section 147 and in the policy. It was held that the Insurance Company is liable for the death of pillion rider. 10. It was next contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive. It is settled law that the Insurance Company can defend the cause only on the grounds envisaged under Section 149(2) of the Act. The grounds raised in the appeal are not available to the Insurance Company as it is beyond the scope of the Section 149(2) of the Act. Under Section 149 of the Act, it is the duty of the insurer to satisfy the Award against any person insured in respect of third party risks. "Section 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks : (1) ......... Under Section 149 of the Act, it is the duty of the insurer to satisfy the Award against any person insured in respect of third party risks. "Section 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks : (1) ......... (2) No sum shall be payable by an 'insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice though the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely : (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely : (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being on e of the following conditions, namely : (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. 11. 11. Admittedly, none of the grounds as given in sub- section (2) of Section 149 exist in this appeal. The insurer cannot defend the claim petition on the grounds/defences other than those provided under sub- section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. 12. The grounds raised in this appeal by the appellant is directly and substantially involved the challenge to the quantum of compensation which is beyond the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act as noticed above. 13. In British India General Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Captain Itbar Singh and others, AIR 1959 SC page 1331 while considering the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act, 1939 corresponding section 149(2) of MV Act, 1988, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "Now the language of sub-section (2) seems to us to be perfectly plain and to admit of no doubt or confusion. It is that an insurer to whom the requisite notice of the action has been given "shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely", after which comes an enumeration of the grounds. It would follow that an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated and no others. If it were not so, then of course no grounds need have been enumerated. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute." 14. In Narender Kumar and another v. Yarenissa and others 1998 ACJ 244 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that : "It is, therefore, obvious on a plain reading of the aforesaid three sub-sections of section 96 that before any insurer can be saddled with the liability to answer judgment he must have notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend on all or any of the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (2) of section 96, if the same, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is or are available to the insurer. Once that opportunity is made available, sub-section (6) of section 96 says that the insurer shall not be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment otherwise than in the manner provided by sub-section (2). Once that opportunity is made available, sub-section (6) of section 96 says that the insurer shall not be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment otherwise than in the manner provided by sub-section (2). We may next notice section 110-C (2-A) which outlines the procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act. Sub-section (2-A) provides that where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom it is made, or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claims, it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer, who may be liable in respect of such claim, be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds available to the person against whom the claim was made, this sub-section shows that the initial requirement is merely to issue a notice to the insurer to inform him of the filing of the claim application and it is then left to the insurer whether or not it would seek impleadment to defend action on any of the grounds available under sub- section (2) of section 96 of the Act. In the situation envisaged by sub-section (2-A) of section 110-C, the Claims Tribunal, if it finds that the claimants and the person against whom the claim is made have colluded or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may direct the impleadment of the insurer and permit him to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that would have been available to the person against whom the claim was made. In the present case, such a situation has not arisen but it is essential to take notice of the said sub-section." 15. In Shankarayya and another v. United India Insurance Co. In the present case, such a situation has not arisen but it is essential to take notice of the said sub-section." 15. In Shankarayya and another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and another 1998 ACJ 513 (SC) held that : "the insurance company when impleaded as party by the court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in the Section 170 are found to be specified and for that purpose the insurance company has to obtain order in writing from the Tribunal and which should be reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the insurance company cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory defence. That is envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section 149". 16. In Chinnama George others v. N.K. Raju and another 2000 ACJ 777 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no ground given in Section 149(2) exists for the insurer to defend the claim petition. Appeal challenging the quantum of compensation filed jointly by the owner and insurer is not maintainable, if defence on any of the grounds under Section 149(2) of the Act is not available to it. 17. Admittedly, in the instant case the present appeal is beyond the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. Indisputably, in the instant case the petitioner insurer neither sought permission to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the insured nor such permission was granted by the Tribunal. Thus, the condition precedent mentioned in Section 170 of the Act are not found to be satisfied. The Insurance Company cannot hold wider defence on merits then what is available to do by way of statutory defence envisaged under Section 149(2) of the Act. 18. Under these circumstances, the appeal filed by the Insurance Company challenging the factum of accident and quantum of compensation is incompetent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that the Insurance Company cannot maintain the appeal on the grounds other than the grounds/defences provided to them under section 149(2) of the Act. None of the grounds raised in this appeal falls within the ambit of section 149(2) of the Act and, therefore, this appeal itself is incompetent. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this appeal. None of the grounds raised in this appeal falls within the ambit of section 149(2) of the Act and, therefore, this appeal itself is incompetent. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******