JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. (Oral) - The second petitioner filed a complaint against respondent No. 4, alleging that he had cut and sold 5 or 6 eucalyptus trees at a price of Rs. 10, 000/-. On receipt of this complaint, the fourth respondent, who was working as Sarpanch of the village Panchayat, was placed under suspension. However, after inquiring into the complaint, the competent authority vide its order dated September 11, 2001 held that the land vests in the Wakf Board. The mutation had been sanctioned in favour of the Board on September 19, 1994. Respondent Sita Ram was elected as Sarpanch in 1998. There was no evidence "regarding the sale of the trees". Thus, the charge of cutting and selling trees from the Panchayat land was not proved. Resultantly, respondent No. 4 was reinstated. Aggrieved by the order, the second petitioner as well as the Panchayat filed an appeal before the Special Secretary. It was dismissed with the observation that "the complainant has got no right to prefer the appeal against the order of reinstatement under the provisions of the Act". Copies of the orders passed by the Deputy Director (exercising the powers of the Director) (Panchayats) and the Special Secretary to the Government have been produced on record as Annexures P-9 and P-10. 2. The petitioners allege that the Appellate Authority had erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of locus-standi. The trees vested in the Panchayat. Thus, they pray that the orders be quashed. 3. The case was posted for hearing before this Bench on November 21, 2001. It was adjourned at the request of the counsel for the petitioners to enable him to produce evidence to show that even though the land had been transferred in favour of the Wakf Board, the trees still vested in the Panchayat. In pursuance to this order, the petitioners have produced a copy of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 297 of 1994. 4. Mr. Sihota, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the plaint, it had been specifically alleged that the trees vested in the Panchayat and that the land was being used for the Government Primary School. On this basis, the counsel contends that the Authorities had erred in ordering the reinstatement of the respondent/Sarpanch. 4. Mr. Sihota, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the plaint, it had been specifically alleged that the trees vested in the Panchayat and that the land was being used for the Government Primary School. On this basis, the counsel contends that the Authorities had erred in ordering the reinstatement of the respondent/Sarpanch. He further contends that the Appellate Authority should not have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the complainant had no cause to complain. 5. On a perusal of the judgment delivered by the Civil Court, we find that the Gram Panchayat had filed the suit "for declaration to the effect that the mutation No. 2555 which has been entered in favour of defendant (Wakf Board) of the land bearing Khewat No. 283, khatauni Nos. 327, 331 and 332, Khasra Nos. 91(2-4), 43 min (22-5), 43 min (3-10), as entered in the jamabandi for the year 1992-93, situated in village Dosanjh Khurd, tehsil Phillaur is illegal, null and void and is not binding upon the rights of the plaintiff with the consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from getting sanctioned the mutation in its favour through Halqa Patwari, illegally and forcibly except in due course of law, till the decision of the suit". 6. The suit was tried. It was found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the Gram Panchayat was owner in possession of the suit property. It was consequently dismissed with costs. The suit having been dismissed, it is established that the Panchayat had no right in the land. That having happened, the basic ingredient of the complaint that the fourth respondent had sold the trees standing on the Panchayat land, could not have been sustained. In this situation, it is not surprising that the competent authority had found that the land had been transferred in favour of the Board in the year 1994. Thus, the complainant had no cause for grievance against the Sarpanch, who had been elected in the year 1998. 7. The findings by the Authority, exercising the powers of the Director, are not shown to be wrong in any manner whatsoever. 8. Mr. Sihota contends that even the fourth respondent had admitted during the course of inquiry that the trees were standing on the Panchayat land. 9. We have perused the statement. It bears no date. 7. The findings by the Authority, exercising the powers of the Director, are not shown to be wrong in any manner whatsoever. 8. Mr. Sihota contends that even the fourth respondent had admitted during the course of inquiry that the trees were standing on the Panchayat land. 9. We have perused the statement. It bears no date. Irrespective of that, the petitioners have to show that despite the land having been transferred in favour of the Board, the ownership of the trees vested in the Gram Panchayat. There is nothing on record to support this assertion. In fact, the suit filed by the Gram Panchayat having been dismissed and no further attempt to salvage the land having been made, it is clear that the Panchayat had accepted the decree of the Civil Court, which had been passed as far back as August 10, 1995. In the circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the petitioners are only trying to harass respondent No. 4 and that neither the Panchayat nor the second petitioner had any cause to complain. 10. Mr. Sihota contends that the second petitioner had the right to file an appeal. The Appellate Authority had erred in dismissing the same on the ground of locus-standi. 11. Under Section 20(6) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, it is only a person "aggrieved by an order of removal or suspension" can file an appeal. Thus, a complainant does not have the right to do so. There is no infirmity in the view taken by the Appellate Authority. 12. Mr. Sihota refers to the decision of the Full Bench in Ram Phal v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government Haryana, Development and Panchayat Department, Chandigarh, 1996(1) PLR 233 to contend that the appeal was maintainable. 13. We have perused this judgment. Their Lordships were examining the provisions of Section 102(5) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. The phraseology of the provisions was materially different inasmuch as the right of appeal was available to any person aggrieved "by an order". The crucial words "by an order of removal or suspension" were not there. Thus, the counsel can derive no benefit from this decision. 14. The phraseology of the provisions was materially different inasmuch as the right of appeal was available to any person aggrieved "by an order". The crucial words "by an order of removal or suspension" were not there. Thus, the counsel can derive no benefit from this decision. 14. Irrespective of the above, we find that there is not even an iota of evidence to show that the Panchayat was the owner of the land or the trees in the year 1998 when the fourth respondent had assumed the office of the Sarpanch. Still further, nothing has been produced on record to show that the fourth respondent had got the trees cut or was responsible for their sale. 15. No other point has been raised. 16. In view of the above, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is consequently dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.