ORDER: The respondent filed R.C.O.P. No.535 of 1982 for eviction on the ground of Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The facts that have led to this civil revision petition shall be briefly narrated. The respondent sought eviction of one K.R.Jayasingh on the ground that he along with his father and brothers were doing business as partners in the manufacture and sale of “appalam”; they were occupying a rented premises and the landlord of that building obtained an order of eviction; this was confirmed by the Supreme Court; since it was no longer possible to continue in the rented premises, eviction was sought for on the ground of owner’s use and occupation; Eviction was ordered. 3. The petitioner herein challenged the order on the ground that the requirement was only for partnership business but certain events had transpired after the filing of the petition, which resulted in dissolution of the partnership and therefore, the need of the respondent on his own behalf would not be the same as the need of the partnership. But the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction on the ground that whether the requirement is for the partnership or for the individual it was immaterial. The petitioner also challenged the bona fides of the need and this was also negatived by the Appellate Authority. But, however, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal on the ground that the establishment of the respondent on his own business resulted in a change of cause of action. Against this a revision was filed. This was C.R.P. No.650 of 1988. 4. On a perusal of the materials on record, this Court found hat after evidence was closed before the Rent Controller, on application by the petitioner, the respondent was recalled and evidence was recorded on the changed circumstance. Therefore, this Court felt that having recorded the entire evidence even in respect of the changed circumstance, it was not proper for the Appellate Authority to drive the respondent to a fresh petition on the changed circumstance. This Court also held that even if originally the business was partnership business it was also the respondent’s own business. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority was set aside and the matter was remitted to consider, whether the respondent’s requirement was bona fide on the available evidence. This Court also held that even if originally the business was partnership business it was also the respondent’s own business. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority was set aside and the matter was remitted to consider, whether the respondent’s requirement was bona fide on the available evidence. This Court made it clear that the parties were not entitled to adduce further evidence after the order of remand. This order was passed on 19.6.1996. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority reconsidered the matter with regard to the bona fides. It was found that the need of the respondent was bona fide and eviction was ordered. Against this, the present petition has been filed. C.M.P.No.11546 of 1997 was also filed to take note of the subsequent events which were relevant to consider the bona fide requirement. 5. Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case of the respondent was that when the landlord of No.60, Usman Road, T.Nagar, obtained the order of eviction against the respondent he had obtained some of the articles of the business from his father and had commenced “appalam” business in A100, Anna Nagar, Madras and that he needed the petition premises now. Though originally, the petitioner had questioned this claim of the respondent of doing business in A100, Anna Nagar, Madras on the ground that there is no such door number, subsequently, on 2.8.1997 with much difficulty the petitioner had located the property and the correct address is A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar, Madras. He pointed out to the affidavit filed in support of the C.M.P., wherein it was stated that no shops exists in the name of Kannan Stores as alleged in A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that this would show that the respondent is not carrying on business in A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar and therefore, the requirement does not exist. 6. According to the learned counsel, when the landlord had come to Court stating that he needed the premises because he was carrying on business in an other address, which was a tenanted premises and this address had been found to be false, then the requirement itself cannot be held to be proved. He submitted that this subsequent event which had taken place after the petition must be taken note of by this Court. He submitted that this subsequent event which had taken place after the petition must be taken note of by this Court. The requirement must continue to exist until the proceedings acquire a finality. The learned counsel also pointed out to the counter and submitted that in the counter filed to C.M.P. No.11546 of 1997, the respondent has nowhere stated that he is still carrying on the “Appalam” business either at A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar or elsewhere. Several decisions were relied on by the learned counsel. (1) B.Shaik Ameer Ali v. Dr.B.K.C.Mohandas Prasad, 1986 T.N.L.J. 337; (2) Murugan Finance, Arni v. Senthilnathan, (2000)2 M.L.J. 339 ; (3) Fakir Mohideen v. Habibunissa (died), (1997)2 M.L.J. 278 ; (4) M.M.Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1113. 7. Mr.Prabhakaran, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the issue whether the respondent was carrying on business or intended to carry on business had all been accepted by this Court before the order of remand. The only question that had to be considered after remand by this Court was whether the need was bona fide. The Appellate Authority had found that the need was bona fide. To interfere in revision it had to be established that the impugned order was either illegal or improper. The Court cannot sit in appeal and sift the entire evidence once again in the absence of any illegality or impropriety. He also submitted that the conduct of the petitioner leaves much to be desired. Before the Rent Controller all that the petitioner had said was there was no such address, A100, Anna Nagar. This objection was rejected by the Appellate Authority and on facts it was found that the respondent bona fide required the premises for his use and occupation. It is now the petitioner’s case that there is such an address, but the respondent is not carrying on business in that address. This according to the respondent was not a subsequent event, but a new case and this cannot be countenanced by this Court. The learned counsel referred to M/s.Boston and others v. S.A.Akbar and others, (1998)1 M.L.J. 270 . 8. The petition for eviction has been filed under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, which gives a right to the landlord to apply for eviction of the tenant from the building, “in case it is ...... The learned counsel referred to M/s.Boston and others v. S.A.Akbar and others, (1998)1 M.L.J. 270 . 8. The petition for eviction has been filed under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, which gives a right to the landlord to apply for eviction of the tenant from the building, “in case it is ...... non-residential building, if the landlord or [any member of his family] is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or (any member of his family) is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own.” Therefore, to obtain possession of a non-residential building on this ground. (a) the building should be non-residential in character, (b) The landlord should be carrying on business on the date or his applying for eviction, (c) The landlord should not be occupying for the purpose of his business in other non-residential building which is his own, (d) The landlord’s claim must be bona fide and for his business needs and not based on oblique motives like trying to harass the tenants. In this case, the first three requirements were held to have been satisfied by the order of this Court in the earlier civil revision petition. If condition (d) is also found in favour of the landlord then the order of eviction must necessarily follow. The Appellate Authority found on the materials before it, that the need was bona fide. The question is whether the allegation made in C.M.P.No.11546 of 1997 if proved disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. It is the case of the petitioner that the fact that the respondent’s business was not found located in A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar is a subsequent event that must be taken note of. 9. In M.M.Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1113, it was held thus: “Where a person claiming to be a landlord seeks to evict the tenant on ground of bona fide requirement but loses his interest in entirety in the demised premises during the pendency of appeal, he would not still be entitled to maintain or continue the action after cessation or extinguishment of his interest in the building.” 10. In Fakir Mohideen v. Habibunissa (died), (1997)2 M.L.J. 278 , this Court held as follows: “It is settled law that a claim for eviction, on the ground of bona fide own occupation, that requirement must be available to the landlord not only on the date of petition but it should continue to be there on the date of final adjudication of rights. If, in between the periods, there is a change of circumstances due to subsequent events, that is also a matter which should be taken into consideration by this Court.” The subsequent event in that case was the landlord came into possession of a building of his own, which disqualify him from obtaining eviction on the ground of owner’s occupation. 11. In Murugan Finance, Arni v. Senthilnathan, (2000)2 M.L.J. 339 , it was held thus, “Merely because, the tenant is in occupation of other premises, the landlord is not entitled to take possession unless he satisfies the ground under the Rent Control Act while considering the grounds for eviction. While considering the requirement, the law is settled that the requirement must continue till the final disposal of the eviction petition. That means, the subsequent events also will have to be taken into consideration by Court.” In that case, the subsequent event so that the landlord had, sold two shop rooms out of the shop rooms belonging to him and therefore, the claim cannot be bona fide and also since eviction was for the purpose of putting up staircase for the entire building that requirement also ceases to exist when the landlord had put up a staircase in the portion occupied by him. Therefore, this was a subsequent event that was held to disentitle the landlord form obtaining an order of eviction. 12. In B.Shaik Ameer Ali v. Dr.B.K.C.Mohandas Prasad, 1986 T.N.L.J. 337, this Court held that the need for additional accommodation ceased to exist because subsequent to the Rent Controller’s order there was an addition of second and third floors. Therefore, the requirement was held to be not bona fide. These judgments have no application to the facts of the case. Even in the affidavit that was filed in support of C.M.P.No.11546 of 1997, all that the petitioner has alleged is that no shop belonging to the respondent/ landlord is in the said premises. Therefore, the requirement was held to be not bona fide. These judgments have no application to the facts of the case. Even in the affidavit that was filed in support of C.M.P.No.11546 of 1997, all that the petitioner has alleged is that no shop belonging to the respondent/ landlord is in the said premises. In the first place, it was never the respondent’s case that he was carrying on business in another shop belonging to him. He could not have obtained an order of eviction. It was the respondent’s case that he was carrying on business in a premises in which he was a tenant. Para No.7 of the affidavit is relevant. “I further submit that even presuming that the said Kannan Stores did exist at sometime in the said premises, it is not there as on date and as such I am advised to state this fact should be taken into consideration in moulding the relief prayed for by the respondent/ landlord.” The petitioner has carefully avoided stating that Kannan Stores had never existed in the said premises. Nowhere in the affidavit has the petitioner stated that the respondent is not carrying on “Appalam” business that the respondent does not need the building for carrying on business or that the respondent’s need is not bona fide. It is also not alleged in this affidavit, that subsequent to the R.C.O.P., the respondent had vacated the place where he was carrying on “Appalam” business in A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar and that he had ceased to carry on business at A100, 3rd Avenue, Anna Nagar or elsewhere and therefore, the requirement does not exist. 13. In the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent M/s.Boston v. S.A.Akbar, (1998)1 M.L.J. 270 , this Court had considered the scope of Sec.25 of the Act and it was held that the need of a landlord honestly desiring to do business in his own premises was a bona fide need. 14. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava, A.I.R. 2001 S.C.W. 598, it was held that, “The crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. 14. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava, A.I.R. 2001 S.C.W. 598, it was held that, “The crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. It is pernicious, and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.” In that case, a person approached the Court for accommodation for his son to start a clinic who had then became a medical graduate. The case took twenty three years for culmination and by that time, the son had joined the provincial medical service twelve years after the institution of the case. The Supreme Court noted with pain what is called the “judicial tardiness”. The Supreme Court questioned whether the landlord and his son were expected to remain idle without doing any work for fear of forfeiting their requirement on the ground of subsequent developments. It is in those circumstances the Supreme Court held that “cautious cognizance” should be taken of subsequent developments referring to Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409, wherein a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court while pointing to the need for remoulding the relief on the basis of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, warned that the cognizance of such subsequent events must be done very cautiously. 15. In this case, the petition for eviction for was filed in 1982 and it has taken about 19 years to reach this stage. 15. In this case, the petition for eviction for was filed in 1982 and it has taken about 19 years to reach this stage. The landlord/ respondent was a young man of 25 years on that day desiring to start his business, in his own building. Though it has been proved to the hilt that he is carrying on business and that his need is bona fide and that the premises is non-residential and also that he has no non-residential building of his own, the petitioner has successfully kept him at bay, raising one objection after another. The first objection was that the requirement for partnership business is not the same as requirement for the individual’s business. This was negated. Then the objection was that the address where the respondent claims to be carrying on business does not exist. This was rejected. Now the petitioner wants this Court to accept that there is such an address but the respondent is not carrying on business there. The counter was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that the respondent had not stated that he is carrying on business elsewhere. When the petitioner has not even made out a case of a subsequent event it is not necessary for the respondent to furnish any more details than are necessary for deciding the matter on hand. As in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava, A.I.R. 2001 S.C.W. 598, the requirement of the landlord existed and it was a bona fide one on the date of his application for eviction. The finding of fact is he is carrying on business. It is not the case of the petitioner that he never carried on business in tenanted premises. That being so no subsequent event has been made out for this Court to intervene in revision. The Appellate Authority’s order suffers from neither illegality nor impropriety. The petitioner has not made out the existence of any subsequent event which has to be taken note of. The civil revision petition is therefore, dismissed with costs of Rs.2,000. The connected C.M.Ps. are closed.