Judgment 1. This is plaintiffs second appeal directed against the dismissal of their suit on the basis of a compromise which has been upheld by both the Courts below. 2. The agricultural land owned by plaintiffs-appellants (for brevity, the plaintiffs) comprised in Khasra No. 541/3-1 measuring 15 biswas, 565/1 measuring two bighas and 3 biswas, Khewat No. 1531 and Khasra No. 540/2 measuring 8 biswas was acquired by Improvement Trust, Rohtak along with other land for execution of Scheme No. 13. The acquisition of the land and the Scheme was duly notified and sanctioned culminating in the issuance of notification under Sec. 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 vide notification dated 28-6-1974 published in Haryana Government Gazette dated 20-8-1974. The plaintiffs claimed that the acquisition of their land for Scheme No. 13 was with a mala fide intention as the Chairman of the Improvement Trust was inimical towards them. 3. The case of the defendant-respondents (for brevity, the defendants) is that the land was low lying and after acquisition, earth filling had also been done and the land was levelled after spending huge amount. It is also claimed that notices under Sections 36 and 38 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 were duly published and served on the plaintiffs and the scheme was finally published in Gazette notification dated 20-8-1974. 4. After framing of issues and recording of plaintiffs evidence an application dated 23-7-1979 for dismissal of the suit on the basis of a proposed compromise was moved by the defendants stating that the Chairman of the Improvement Trust had allotted plot Nos. 38, 39, 40 and 41 to the plaintiffs at the rate of Rs. 40/- per square yard. The area of each plot is 165 square yard. The rate of the land on which it was allotted to the general public was Rs. 80/- per square yard. In support of the application AW-1 Shri H.R. Gupta, Assistant Engineer was examined who testified these facts. During the course of his deposition, he made reference to Ex. A1, wherein four of the plaintiffs requested the defendant-Improvement Trust to compensate them for the loss suffered on account of acquisition of their land. The plaintiffs have also mentioned that if they were given plot in the scheme area at a reasonable price, they were ready to effect a compromise. The Improvement Trust vide resolution dated 23-5-1978 Ex. A1, wherein four of the plaintiffs requested the defendant-Improvement Trust to compensate them for the loss suffered on account of acquisition of their land. The plaintiffs have also mentioned that if they were given plot in the scheme area at a reasonable price, they were ready to effect a compromise. The Improvement Trust vide resolution dated 23-5-1978 Ex. A2 resolved that the plaintiffs may be allotted plots at reasonable rates by private negotiation and the right to make such allotment was given to the Chairman. In pursuance to the resolution, four plots at the rate of Rs. 40/- per square yard measuring 165 square yards were allotted to the plaintiffs. This allotment has been made vide office note dated 10-7-1978 Ex. A3 and the plots allotted to the plaintiffs are indicated in Ex. A4 by red ink, which is the site plan of development Scheme No. 13. After discussing the statement of AW1 and Exs. A1 to A4, the learned trial Court concluded that the suit has been comprised as witnessed in the compromise Ex. A3. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, wherein the plaintiffs raised two objections, namely; that the provisions of Order XXXII, Rule 7 CPC have not been complied with and that all the plaintiffs were not party to the compromise and, therefore, all of them were not bound by it. Both the objections raised by the plaintiffs which failed to persuade the trial Court, were also rejected by the learned Additional District Judge in his judgment, which reads as under :- "To begin with,I may mention here that u/S. 96(3) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 , the Chairman subject to the control of the Trust could admit compromise or withdraw any claim made under the Act. Further as observed in Sarup Chand V/s. State of Haryana, (1976) 78 Pun LR 297, it is evident from the reading of S. 42 that the Legislature wanted to give finality to the Scheme sanctioned by the Government so that thereafter objections regarding the non-fulfilment of certain formalities may not be raised. The purpose was that if the land owners etc. go on filing objections even after notification, the Trust may not be able to carry out the Schemes which were finally sanctioned by the Government. The purpose was that if the land owners etc. go on filing objections even after notification, the Trust may not be able to carry out the Schemes which were finally sanctioned by the Government. Thus in view of Sec. 42(2) of the Act, such objections cannot be raised after the scheme had been sanctioned and notified under the said Act. As regards the first objection of the appellant is concerned, R. 7 of O. 32 mandates that no next friend or guardian of the minor plaintiff or defendant can without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings enter into any agreement or compromise on his/her behalf with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. The application has to be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or guardian for the suit as the case may be and also by the certificate of the pleader of the minor to the effect that the agreement or compromise is in his opinion for the benefit of the minor. Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court and recorded is voidable against all parties other than the minor. It was held in Sat Narain V/s. Kanti Lal AIR 1943 Lahore 313 that the provisions of Order 32, R. 7 are mandatory and if a compromise is arrived at on behalf of the minor without the express permission of the Court, it is voidable against all parties other than the minor. Again in Gurdial Singh V/s. Harbans Singh, AIR 1954 Pepsu 25 it was held that a compromise made on behalf of minor without express permission of the Court has no effect and the Court cannot enter into it without examining its terms before actually it is agreed upon. There can be no quarrel with this proposition of law which is well settled. The terminology of the Section speaks for itself. However, in this case, these rulings wont apply as the compromise was arrived at outside the Court. On this point, I find myself in complete agreement with the learned trial Court and reject it. There can be no quarrel with this proposition of law which is well settled. The terminology of the Section speaks for itself. However, in this case, these rulings wont apply as the compromise was arrived at outside the Court. On this point, I find myself in complete agreement with the learned trial Court and reject it. The second objection of the appellants counsel based on Vir Singh V/s. Kharak Singh, AIR 1925 Lahore 280, that a compromise which is not assented to by all the parties is contrary to law and the Court should refuse to enforce, it remains to be discussed. In the instant case it has come in evidence that Ram Sarup plaintiff-1 was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs in the suit. He alone has come up on appeal. He was a party to the compromise. Eleven other plaintiffs were also represented in person or through their attorneys whose power of attorney is on the file. The four plaintiffs who were allegedly unrepresented in the compromise-petition have not come up in appeal. Another weighty consideration is that the plaintiffs have since received Rs. 26,000/- as compensation of their acquired land which fact came in for candid mention in the statement of Ram Sarup plaintiff-1 examined as PW-2 in the suit on 19 Feb., 77. I, therefore, hold that the second point raised by the appellants counsel is equally devoid of force which also meets rejection.¨ 5. I have heard Shri Alok Jain, learned counsel for the plaintiffs and Shri Suivneet Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents and have gone through the record with their assistance. 6. Shri Alok Jain, learned counsel for the plaintiffs made an half-hearted attempt to assail the compromise as recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. He argued that the document Ex. A3 cannot be treated as compromise as it does not fulfil the requirements of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that even documents Exs. A2 to A4 collectively would not satisfy the legal requirement of a compromise. He further submitted that all the plaintiffs did not expressly consent to the aforementioned compromise and, therefore, the allotment of four plots in pursuance to the offer of Improvement Trust cannot be considered binding on the plaintiffs. 7. A2 to A4 collectively would not satisfy the legal requirement of a compromise. He further submitted that all the plaintiffs did not expressly consent to the aforementioned compromise and, therefore, the allotment of four plots in pursuance to the offer of Improvement Trust cannot be considered binding on the plaintiffs. 7. I repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the plaintiffs as to the right of the plaintiffs for allotment of plot from Scheme No. 13 because their land was acquired in accordance with law and they were paid compensation for the same. The learned counsel was unable to give any satisfactory reply to the question concerning the rights of the plaintiffs for allotment of the plots. In my opinion, the allotment of four plots was a good will gesture shown by the Improvement Trust to settle the dispute and there was no legal obligation on the Improvement Trust to allot the plots. I am further of the view that neither there is any policy nor any provision of law which may entitle the plaintiffs to claim the allotment of plots as a matter of right. If Exhs. A1 to A4 do not constitute compromise, then the suit is bound to be dismissed even otherwise. Conceding that there is no right with the plaintiffs, their learned counsel was not able to make any further submission to assail the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. 8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that no interference is called for in the decrees passed by both the Courts below while accepting the application and treating the suit as compromised in terms of Exhs. A1 to A4. There is no evidence to the contrary on record which may impel me to take a view contrary to the one taken by the Courts below reversing the concurrent findings of fact. Even otherwise, the High Court under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure could interfere only on a question of law at the stage of second appeal. No question of law has been raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and in my considered opinion, nor one arises. Even otherwise, the High Court under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure could interfere only on a question of law at the stage of second appeal. No question of law has been raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and in my considered opinion, nor one arises. The above mentioned principle is well settled by a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams V/s. K. M. Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331 , Satya Gupta V/s. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423; Chandrabhagabai V/s. Ramakrishna, (1998) 6 SCC 207 ; Ram Prasad Rajak V/s. Nand Kumar and Bros, (1998) 6 SCC 748 ; M. G. Hegde V/s. Vasudev, (2000) 2 SCC 213; State of Rajasthan V/s. Harphool Singh (dead) through L.Rs., (2000) 5 SCC 652; M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar V/s. Narayanan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000) 10 SCC 244; Baidyanath Bhattacharya V/s. S. Karmakar, (2000) 9 SCC 505; Manorama Thampuratti V/s. C.K. Sujatha Thampuratti, (2000) 9 SCC 233 ; Chandragouda V/s. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar, (2000) 10 SCC 617; Thimmaiah V/s. Ningamma, (2000) 7 SCC 409 Mohd. Abdul Muqtedar V/s. Sk. Fakruddin, (2000) 9 SCC 384; G. Thankamma Amma V/s. N. Raqhava Kurup, (2000) 9 SCC 517 ; Ananta Kalappa Jaratakhane V/s. Krishtappa, (2000) 9 SCC 735; Kempaiah V/s. Doddanaraiah, (2000) 9 SCC 60 Mohd. Hadi Hussain V/s. Abdul Hamid Choudhary, (2000) 10 SCC 248 and Ajit Chopra V/s. Sadhu Ram, (2000) 1 SCC 114 9. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is dismissed. The decree passed by the lower appellate Court is affirmed. Appeal dismissed.