P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE revision petitioners are the respondents 1 to 8 in RC No. 50 of 1993 and respondents 4 to 9 in the CRP are respondents 2 to in the said RC No. 50 of 1993 on the file of Principal Rent Controller, secunderabad. Respondents 1 and 2 in the present CRP are petitioners 1 and 2 in rc No. 50 of 1993 and 3rd respondent in rc No. 50 of 1993 is no more. ( 2 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the petitioners in the Revision Petition are referred to as "tenants" and respondents 1 and 2 are referred to as "landlords" and the a. P. Buildings (lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960 will be referred to as "act". ( 3 ) THE landlords filed RC No. 50 of 1993 on the file of Principal Rent Controller, secunderabad on the ground of bona fide personal requirement with the following averments made in the eviction petition. The petitioners are the owners and landlords of the premises of the mulgi bearing No. 2-1-77, situate at Tobacco Bazar, secunderabad and the respondents are the tenants occupying the said premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 225/ -. The respondents have been using the said premises for non- residential premises. The petitioner was carrying on the business of wholesale cloth merchants along with his father, uncle and other brothers in the name and style of gujjar Gopal Rao and Sons and subsequently after his father s death in the name and style of G. Venkat Rao, and brothers . Thereafter the 1st petitioner discontinued his business in the suit mulgi and let out the same to the respondents. The 2nd and 3rd petitioners are the grown up sons of the 1st petitioner having finished their studies and are on the look out for starting a business of their own. They have not been able to secure any job inspite of all efforts. The petitioners 2 and 3 with the help of 1st petitioner, who has rich experience in the business of wholesale clothes, intend to commence a wholesale cloth business of their own in the suit mulgi. The petitioners are not in possession of any mulgi in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The petitioners require the suit mulgi for their own self occupation for the purpose of commencing a business. The petitioners are not in possession of any mulgi in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The petitioners require the suit mulgi for their own self occupation for the purpose of commencing a business. ( 4 ) THE 6th respondent in the said RC filed a counter, which was adopted by others by a memo. The 5th respondent was called absent and set ex parts. The allegations in the counter are as follows: The petitioners have not impleaded the parties who are connected to the schedule property. The 4th respondent is not a proper and necessary party as he is not the partner of the 1st respondent firm. The 5th and the 7th respondents are not partners of the 1st respondent firm. Apart from the other partners who are to be brought on record have not been brought on record. Therefore, the application is not maintainable, as all the parties of the 1st respondent firm have to be impleaded as proper and necessary parties. The application on the ground of self-occupation to seek the eviction of these respondents was filed with a mala fide intention. In the past, the 1st respondent herein has filed some cases on the same ground of self occupation and they were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller, secunderabad which was carried in appeal and even in the appeal stage, the petitioner did not pursue the same, thereby it was dismissed for default. Thereafter the petitioner herein has filed the present petition along with the petitioners 2 and 3 on false and frivolous grounds once again seeking the same relief on self-occupation. There are no new circumstances or no new grounds putforth by the petitioner to seek eviction of the respondent in the present case. The main intention of the petitioner is to enhance the rent on one reason or the other. The petitioner in the past when he filed the RC against these respondents and subsequently withdrawn, had taken the same plea of self occupation . On increasing the rent by one of the tenants he had taken the steps to withdraw the case. In another case, having obtained the vacant possession of the property, the petitioner has left out the same for higher rents to Nandi Hotels. On increasing the rent by one of the tenants he had taken the steps to withdraw the case. In another case, having obtained the vacant possession of the property, the petitioner has left out the same for higher rents to Nandi Hotels. This respondent has already filed application for a certified copy of the earlier RC filed by the 1st petitioner against the earlier tenant on another property which has been let out to Nandi Hotels. The same will be filed after obtaining certified copy from the hon ble Court. The petitioners demanded more rents after dismissal of their Appeal respondents agreed to increase marginally but not what they demanded. Petitioners insisted Rs. 15007- per month. The petitioners have no capacity, experience or financial capacity to start a business. He has no capacity to start the business as stated. The need of the petitioner is not genuine. He needs more rent. The petitioners 2 and 3 are grown up sons of the 1st petitioner and employed elsewhere and they did not require the schedule property for their own. The petitioners are having several other non-residential premises, but never utilized them for their bonafide requirement when they fell vacant as they need more rent. The petitioners have property bearing no. 4-l-54/a, 4-1-54/b, another mulgi at gasmandi which was let out to Nandi Hotel, another premises was let out to another hotel. Mulgi Nos. 4-l-54/a and 4-1-54/a fell vacant and subsequently the same were let out to another tenants. The requirement of the petitioners is not bona fide and this petition is filed only to get more rent. ( 5 ) THE learned Rent Controller had framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the petition is maintainable? 2. Whether the requirement of the petitioner is bona fide? 3. Whether this petition is barred by res judicata under Section 16 of A. P. Rent Control Act? on behalf of the landlords, the 1st petitioner was examined as PW1 and on behalf of the tenants, RW 1 was examined and also exs. Rl to R8 were marked. 2. Whether the requirement of the petitioner is bona fide? 3. Whether this petition is barred by res judicata under Section 16 of A. P. Rent Control Act? on behalf of the landlords, the 1st petitioner was examined as PW1 and on behalf of the tenants, RW 1 was examined and also exs. Rl to R8 were marked. On appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence it was held that the landlords had established their bona fide requirement, but however had arrived at a conclusion that eviction petition is barred by Section 16 of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1960, in short referred to as "act" hereinafter and had dismissed the eviction petition with costs and the landlords, aggrieved by the same had filed RA No. 415 of 1995 on the file of Additional Chief judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and the appellate authority had allowed the appeal with costs directing the tenants to vacate and handover vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the landlords within two months from the date of the order and aggrieved by the same, the tenants had preferred the present civil revision petition. The appellate authority had framed the following points for consideration:1. Whether the requirement of the petitioner of the suit schedule premises is bona fide one or not?2. Whether this petition is maintainable and barred be resjudicata ?the appellate authority after discussing these points at paragraphs 8 to 14 had arrived at the conclusion that the landlords had established their case and had set aside the findings of the learned Rent Controller so far as it relates to Section 16 of the Act and had consequently allowed the appeal with costs. ( 6 ) SRI Madhava Rao, the learned counsel representing the tenants with all his vehemence had contended that the 1st landlord, the father of landlords 2 and 3 had filed RC No. 28 of 1981 for eviction on the same ground with the same allegations and the same was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, the 1 st landlord preferred appeal ra No. 95 of 1988 on the file of Additional chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, hyderabad and the same was dismissed as not pressed and hence the present eviction petition is barred by resjudicata and hence it is not maintainable. The learned Counsel had drawn my attention to Ex. The learned Counsel had drawn my attention to Ex. R2, certified copy of the petition in RCC No. 28 of 1981, ex. R3, certified copy of the order in rc No. 28 of 1981 and Ex. Rl, certified copy of the order in RA No. 95 of 1988. The learned Counsel also had contended that there are no changed circumstances at all and virutally the pleadings in the prior eviction petition and the present eviction petition are one and the same except for the fact that the two sons of the 1 st landlord also were shown as 2nd and 3rd landlords respectively and the mere inclusion of those parties will not alter the situation in any way and it cannot be taken as a changed circumstance. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the pleadings are to be looked into and no amount of evidence let in without a pleading is of no consequence. The learned Counsel also had pointed out several aspects in the pleadings and also the averments made in the course of evidence. The learned Counsel also had stated that except the evidence of PW1, there is no other evidence let in by the landlords to substantiate the bona fide personal requirement. The learned Counsel had placed strong reliance on the decision of Apex court in Sajjadanashin Syed Md. B. E. EDR v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, 2000 AIR SCW 901. ( 7 ) SRI R. Chandrasekhar Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the landlords had brought to my notice that the 3rd landlord G. Srikanth is no more and he died after the disposal of RA No. 415 of 1995. But however, no legal representatives were brought on record as far as the said G. Srikanth is concerned. The learned Counsel also had submitted that there is lot of change in the subsequent pleading and also the evidence let in and here are several changed circumstances which had been in detail dealt with by both the Courts below and hence the concurrent findings of fact relating to the bona fide personal requirement, since those findings are based on evidence, cannot be said to be perverse and such evidence cannot be disturbed while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had submitted that a specific plea was taken that landlords 2 and 3 also are the owners of the premises, which was not denied at all by the tenants. Apart from it, the bona fide personal requirement in an eviction matter is a continuous recurring cause of action and there are several changed circumstances like the training obtained in cloth business and gaining experience and several other aspects which had been discussed in detail. The learned Counsel also submitted that there is lot of gap in between the two proceedings and there is a change also in respective ages and all these aspects can be definitely taken judicial notice of which need not be proved by any other evidence. The learned Counsel also had submitted that since the present eviction petition is based on different set of facts, in changed circumstances, it cannot be said that Section 16 of the Act operates as a bar. The learned counsel had placed strong reliance on a decision in G. Paydi Raju and others v. T. Mohalan Bai, (CRP No. 1358 of 1969, dated 20-4-1970), 1970 (2) APLJ 16 (SN) and also Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah and Sons v. Pushpa Trading Company, (1998) 5 scc 572 , Kedarnath Gupt v. Nagindra narayan, AIR 1954 Pat. 97 , Surajmal v. Radheshyam, AIR 1988 SC 1345 , K. Mahalakshmamma v. Mana, 1982 (1) an. WR 369, T. Shihari and another v. M/s. Haneef Brothers and others, 1996 (1) ALT 678 , Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (P) Limited v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa begum, 1994 (2) RCR 121 (SC) and K. S. Sundararaju Chettiar v. MR. Ramachandra naidu, 1994 (2) RCR 236 (SC ). ( 8 ) THE main contention of the landlords is that the demised premises is required for the purpose of the proposed cloth business for the 2nd and 3rd landlords and no doubt at present the 3rd landlord is no more in this world. However, the stand taken by the tenants is one of total denial. ( 8 ) THE main contention of the landlords is that the demised premises is required for the purpose of the proposed cloth business for the 2nd and 3rd landlords and no doubt at present the 3rd landlord is no more in this world. However, the stand taken by the tenants is one of total denial. While discussing about the other premises available at paragraph 13 the appellate authority had clearly discussed that there is no evidence available on record to show that those premises also are suitable for cloth business and further it is in evidence that near Nandi Hotel there are no cloth shops at all and however, a tenant is not expected to dictate terms and direct the landlord to occupy a particular building and in the present case it is a building where hotel business is being run for the last 30 years and where there are no cloth shops at all in the vicinity. Both the learned rent Controller and also the appellate authority had arrived at a conclusion that the landlords had established their bonafide personal requirement and these findings are findings of fact recorded by both the courts below on appreciation of evidence. In the decision referred (9) above, it was held that the contention that the Rent Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant will be oversimplification of the legislative import of the Rent Act and it will be more appropriate to hold that the Rent Act regulates the existence of tenancy and inter se rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant. In the decision (8) referred above, it was held that it is not correct to hold that the Rent Control Act is a beneficial enactment only to the tenant. The same view was expressed in the decision referred (7) above. Though Sri D. Madhava rao had made an attempt to take me through the respective pleadings and absence of certain allegations, I am of the considered opinion that the pleadings are to be liberally construed and in substance the principal contention of the landlords is that they require the premises bona fide for running cloth business and there is also material available that the 2nd and the 3rd landlords i. e. , sons of the 1 st landlord, bona fide require the premises for the purpose of running the said business. No doubt, already as stated supra, the 3rd landlord is no more. The main contention of the tenants which found favour by the learned Rent Controller was the maintainability of the second eviction petition in view of the bar imposed under Section 16 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act dealing with decisions which have become final not to be reopened reads as follows:"the Controller shall summarily reject any application under sub-section (2), or sub- section (3) of Section 10 or under Section 12 which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, substantially the same issues as have been finally decided or as purport to have been finally decided, in a former proceeding under this Act or under any law corresponding thereto in force at the relevant time prior to the commencement of this Act. "in the decision referred (1) supra, it was held that the test to determine whether a issue was directly or substantially in issue in earlier proceeding or collateral or incidental is that if the issue was necessary to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and so decided, it would have to be treated as directly any substantially in issue and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be res judicata in a latter case. It is not in dispute that there is sufficient gap of time between the disposal of the first eviction petition and the present eviction petition and by passage of time there will be several changed circumstances as had been deposed by the 1st landlord on behalf of his family. It is not doubt true there is no evidence available on record, but the best person to speak about the bona fide personal requirement of the family including that of his sons will be the father and hence the courts below on appreciation of evidence and taking into consideration several aspects like sons getting experience and undergoing training for running cloth business, felt that the bona fide personal requirement of the landlords had been established. As already referred to supra, though the 3rd landlord died after the disposal of the RA except showing that the party died no steps had been taken to implead the proper legal representatives in this regard. As already referred to supra, though the 3rd landlord died after the disposal of the RA except showing that the party died no steps had been taken to implead the proper legal representatives in this regard. In the decision referred (2) supra (CRP No. 1358 of 1969, dated 20-4-1970) while dealing with a similar question under Section 16 of the Act, the dismissal of the previous eviction petition on the ground of personal occupation will not operate as res judicata relating to subsequent eviction petition on the same ground due to the changed circumstances. The changed circumstances always can be treated as question of fact and this aspect will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, which cannot be specified or defined by following any straight jacket formula in this regard. In the decision referred (6) supra it was held that the right of the landlord to ask for eviction on the ground of personal requirement must be held to be a continuing and recurring cause of action. The Apex Court in the decision referred (5) supra held that where a suit for eviction from premises comprising of shop on ground of bona fide need was dismissed, a second suit on the same ground would be competent and the bona fide need must be considered with reference to the time when a suit for eviction is filed and it cannot be assumed that once the question of necessity is decided against the landlord, it has to be assumed that he will not have a bona fide and genuine necessity ever in future. In the decision referred (4) supra, while dealing with a case under bihar Buildings Rent and Eviction Control act, 1947 it was held that the dismissal of an eviction petition on the ground of bona fide requirement will not bar a subsequent eviction petition on the same ground in changed circumstances. In the decision (3) referred above the Apex Court held that mere occupation of another building may not be sufficient and the landlords contention that the non-residential premises he owned will not serve the purpose of his need of setting up of textile and cloth business needs examination. In the decision (3) referred above the Apex Court held that mere occupation of another building may not be sufficient and the landlords contention that the non-residential premises he owned will not serve the purpose of his need of setting up of textile and cloth business needs examination. However, in view of the facts and circumstances and also the findings recorded by both the Courts relating to bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlords for carrying on cloth business, it can be concluded that since the son of the 1st landlord i. e. , 2nd landlord is having sufficient experience to run the cloth business, the ground of bona fide requirement can be taken as clearly established by the landlords. In view of the clear findings recorded it is clear that the bar under Section 16 of the act also does not operate in view of the changed circumstances. In matters of eviction, it cannot be said that merely because that at a particular point of time, the eviction petition was thrown out on a particular ground, for all times to come a subsequent eviction petition on the same ground in view of the changed circumstances or changed facts, cannot be maintained at all. Hence, especially in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below relating to the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the landlords, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order made by the appellate authority. ( 9 ) HENCE, the CRP is devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. But however in view of the fact that the premises is a non-residential premises and the revision petitioners are running some business, I am inclined to grant six months time to the tenants for vacating the petition schedule premises. No costs.