Judgment :- 1. Defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. No. 263/1981 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai are the appellants in this appeal. Respondents 1 to 3 are the plaintiffs in that suit while respondents 4 and 5 are the other defendants in the suit. That suit was filed for declaration of title, for recovery of possession, for past mesne profits and for other reliefs. On contest, the learned trial Judge granted a decree declaring the plaintiffs title and for recovery of possession. He relegated the enquiry into the mesne profits from the date of plaint to a later stage. No decree had been granted for past mesne profits. Defendants 1 and 2 are therefore before this Court in this appeal. Heard Mr. AR.L Sundaresan learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for R1 to R3. 2. The case of the plaintiffs in short is as follows: One Raman Chettiar @ Ramasamy Chettiar was owning the suit property. He executed a settlement deed dated 09.04.26. His wife is Sankarammal and his foster daughter is Subbammal. The settlement deed provides for a life interest in favour of the settlor ad his wife and after their lifetime, the vested remainder on their adopted daughter Subbammal. There is another registered deed of settlement dated 29.05.31 executed by Raman Chettiar Ramasamy Chettiar and Subbammal. Both the documents relate to the suit property. Under the latter settlement deed a life estate was created in favour of Gomathiammal (daughter of Subbammal) and after her death, the property should go to the children of Veerabadran, who is the brother of Gomathiammal. The plaintiffs are the heirs of said Veerabadran while defendants 1 and 2 claim under Gomathiammal. Gomathiammal died on I 17.02.80 and therefore on that day I succession for the plaintiffs opened as per the settlement deed dated 29.05.31. Defendants 1 and 2 are the children of Gomathiammal. Defendants 3 and 4 are in possession of the property claiming some interest under Gomathiammal. As Gomathiammal herself was a mere life estate holder under the settlement deed dated 29.05.31, all her subsisting rights in the suit property came to an end on her death on 17.02.80. Therefore, the defendants cannot have any interest in the suit property at all, Hence, the suit. 3. As Gomathiammal herself was a mere life estate holder under the settlement deed dated 29.05.31, all her subsisting rights in the suit property came to an end on her death on 17.02.80. Therefore, the defendants cannot have any interest in the suit property at all, Hence, the suit. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement in substance contending as follows: It is true that there is a settlement deed dated 09.04.26. The settlement deed dated 29.05.31 is not true and valid. It is void abinitio. On the death of Ramasamy Chettiar and Sankarammal, it is not correct to say that none else has any interest in the suit property. The settlement deed dated 09.04.26 would alone govern the situation. It is an irrevocable settlement deed and the terms of it cannot be changed. The third plaintiff was not then the heir of Veerabadran. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not born then. Subbammal died before 1931 and a few year thereafter, Raman Chettiar Ramasamy Chettiar also died. On the death of Ramasamy Chettiar, S ubbammal became the absolute owner of the property comprised in the settlement deed dated 09.04.26. She was, therefore, in possession of settled properties in her own rights till her death. On Subbammals death her daughter Gomathiammal had become entitled to the suit property on her own. Gomathiammal was in absolute enjoyment of the suit property in her own right till she died in the year 1980. On her death, defendants 1 and 2 succeeded to the suit property. Gomathiammal never had a life estate under the settlement deed dated 29.05.31. Even assuming it is so, yet the settlement deed is in recognition of Gomathiammals preexisting rights to maintenance and residence and to be in possession having advanced Rs. 800/- for discharge of debts. Gomathiammal had to get a sum of Rs. 800/- from the settlors. The settlement deed of the year 1931 is not a mere gift deed. Gomathiammal was a young childless widow on that date and only in that context, restrictions on her power of alienation were incorporated in that document. Gomathiammal married Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar later and defendants 1 and 2 are their off springs out of that lawful wedlock. Gomathiammals right over the suit property under the settlement deed of the year 1931 had enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Gomathiammal married Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar later and defendants 1 and 2 are their off springs out of that lawful wedlock. Gomathiammals right over the suit property under the settlement deed of the year 1931 had enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14(2) of the said Act has no application to the case on hand. Hence the suit must be dismissed. Defendants 3 and 4 filed a separate written statement sustaining their interest in the suit property. 4. The learned trial Judge on the pleadings framed the following issues: (a) Whether the settlement deed dated 29.05.31 is true, valid and binding on defendants 1 and 2? (b) Whether the plaintiffs have any claim in the suit property? (c) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to future mesne profits? (d) To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled to? On the side of the plaintiffs, two witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 1 and 2 of whom P.W.I is the third plaintiff. The first defendant examined himself as D.W.1. On the side of the plaintiffs eight exhibits have come to be marked as Exs.A.1 to A.8 and on the side of the defendants, four exhibits were marked as Exs.B.1. to B.4 The learned trial Judge on merits answered issues 1 to 3 in favour of the plaintiffs. On issue No. 4, he found that the plaintiffs are entitled to future mesne profits. But, however, directed them to have it quantified at a later stage. On going through the materials available on record, the only issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is as follows: “What is the legal right which Gomathiammal possessed under the document dated 29.05.31 and whether does it get enlarged into an absolute estate in her favour on and with effect from coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956” 5. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresa, learned counsel appearing for the appellants strenuously contended that a perusal of the settlement deed of the year 1931 definitely shows that it does not come within the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Assuming Gomathiammal was given only a life estate under that instrument and she having died only in the year 1980, her rights get enlarged into an absolute estate under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Assuming Gomathiammal was given only a life estate under that instrument and she having died only in the year 1980, her rights get enlarged into an absolute estate under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In sustaining his argument on the above line, the learned counsel took me through the recitals in the settlement deed of the year 1931. Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 would contend that the settlement deed of the year 1931 is a mere gift deed coming into force for the first time on the date of that instrument itself and not in recognition of any pre-existing rights in her and, therefore, Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 alone would operate in this case, which means, on the death of Gomathiammal succession for the plaintiffs had opened and it would exclude defendants 1 and 2 from claiming any interest. Since the controversy between the parties revolves around the settlement deed dated 29.05.31. I applied my mind carefully to the terms of the settlement deed in the context of the legal authorities available as on date. 6. Ex. A-1 is the settlement deed dated 29.05.31. Ex.B1 is the earlier settlement deed dated 09.04.26. The settlor under Ex.B.1 is Raman Chettiar Ramasamy Chettiar. There is no dispute that Raman Chettiar is the absolute owner of the suit property. A perusal of that settlement deed undoubtedly shows that the settlor and one of the settlees Sankarammal would have life interest and after their life time, Subbammal, their adopted daughter, would succeed to it. The terms of the settlement deed really do not have any impact on the present controversy. By the time Ex.A-1 had come to be executed one of the settlees namely, Sankarammal was dead. In fact, Ex.A.1 is executed by Raman Chettiar Ramasamy Chettiar and Subbammal in favour of Gomathiammal. Gomathiammal is the daughter of Subbammal. The document is in Tamil language. By the time Ex.A-1 had come to be executed one of the settlees namely, Sankarammal was dead. In fact, Ex.A.1 is executed by Raman Chettiar Ramasamy Chettiar and Subbammal in favour of Gomathiammal. Gomathiammal is the daughter of Subbammal. The document is in Tamil language. The relevant recitals in the document translated into English are as follows: “The settlee is the grand daughter of settlor No. 1 and daughter of settlor No. 2; she has been living with the settlors since the death of her husband and making her livelihood as such; settlor No. 1 had already executed a settlement deed in the year 1926; one of the settlees namely Sankarammal died a few years before, after that, a part of the settled properties had been encumbered by settlor No. 1 in favour of one Shanmugam Chettiar; Shanmugam Chettiar was demanding money due under the mortgage from settlor No. 1; as a result settlor No. 1 othied the property once again in favour of one Thavadi Ammal for a sum of Rs. 600/- and discharged the earlier mortgage; later on Thavadi Ammal also insisted for the payment of money; the settlee sold her jewels; as the sale proceeds were not sufficient, the settlee borrowed money from Muthukaruppa Chettiar by executing a promissory note dated 21.09.30 in his favour; the mortgage in favour of Thavadi Ammal was redeemed; the settlors owe a sum of Rs. 800/- in all to the settlee; as the settlee is the grand daughter of settlor No. 1; daughter of settlor No. 2; she being an issue less widow and as she has been making her livelihood only depending on the settlors. She has to likewise maintain herself in the future also for her clothings and maintenance; therefore to meet the above contingencies, the property valued at Rs. 800/- and belonging to the settlor were settled in favour of the settlee and possession was handed over to her; from that day the settlee can en joy the property for her life without power of alienation, utilising the income arising therefrom and after her life time, the property should go to the children of her brother Veerabadran Chettiar”. 7. The following judgments are brought to my notice by Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan learned counsel for the appellants in support of his case. 7. The following judgments are brought to my notice by Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan learned counsel for the appellants in support of his case. (a) A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944 = 90 L.W. 89 S.N. (V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi) (b) 1996 (5) S.C.C. 458 (Laxmappa v. Balawa Kom Tirkappachavdi) Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan learned counsel appearing for R1 to R3 brought to my notice a judgment reported in 2000 (6) S.C.C. 310 = 2000 3 L.W. 336 (Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh). 8. On going through the first judgment referred to above, the following position in law clearly emerges; Sub section (2) of Section 14 of the Act is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to subsection (1). It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision, which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of woman in Hindu Society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944). In 1996 (5) S.C.C. 458 the question that arose for consideration was what would be the character of the property in the hands of a destitute daughter on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956? The facts in that case are as follows: “The plaintiff, being a lady, had a brother, whom she adopted as her son with the consent of the father. As such, the relationship demands the adoptive son to maintain his mother. Being a widow as she was, her father and adopted son jointly made a gift in her favour acknowledging in that document itself mat since she was destitute and unable to maintain herself provision had to be made for her, for her life time. It was held in that case that daughters, till their marriage, are bound to be maintained by the father; But the position in the above case is about a widowed daughter. It was held in that case that daughters, till their marriage, are bound to be maintained by the father; But the position in the above case is about a widowed daughter. In that context it was held that father might not have had a legal obligation to maintain her but all the same there existed a moral obligation and if in acknowledgement of that moral obligation father had transferred to his daughter, then it is an obligation well fructified. It was further held that a moral obligation, even though not enforceable under the law, would by acknowledgment, bring it to the level of a legal obligation, for, it would be perfectly legitimate for the father to treat himself obliged out of love and affection to maintain his destitute daughter even impinging to a reasonable extent on his ancestral properties.” A similar situation as in the above case about the character of the property possessed by a destitute daughter came up for consideration again before the Honble Supreme Court of India in the case reported in Balwant Kaur & another v. Chanan Singh & others ( 2000 (6) S.C.C. 310 . The facts in that case are as follows: “B” was the widowed daughter of “S”, who was the sole owner of the property in dispute; “S” had no other issue; “B” had no estate of her deceased husband or her father in law to fall back upon for claiming dependency benefit nor had she any other source of income; she was also issueless and living with her father “S” being a destitute and solely dependent upon him for her maintenance; “S” executed a “Will” dated 21.08.1959 by which he gave to his two brothers, being predecessors in interest of the respondents, 1/3rd share each in the land as full owners and conferred on “B” interest to the extent of the residue 1/3rd; creating a life interest on her over the same, to be reverted to his two brothers on “B” s death the recitals in the “Will” show that the testator was himself anxious about making provision for her maintenance even after his demise; testator died on 11.10.60; “B” executed a “Will” in respect of her 1/3rd share on 06.02.70 and the “Will” referred to above was the subject matter of attack in the suit for declaration of title by the legal heirs of the two brothers of “S”. The question before the Honble Supreme Court of India therefore was whether “B”, who is the widowed destitute daughter of the testator, had acquired full ownership of 1/3rd interest pursuant to the “Will” of her father or whether she had only a life interest. In this case also, the existence of a pre-existing legal right in favour of a female Hindu, who claims to be protected under sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act was emphasised and if there is no such right, she would be covered only under Section 14(2) of the Act. But however relying upon Sections 18 to 22 of the Hindu Maintenance & Adoption Act, 1956 and on the averment in the “Will” itself that the testator was all the time keen to provide maintenance to his destitute daughter, the Supreme Court held that her rights with reference to 1/3rd share got enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act. 9. In Tulasamma case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India made it emphatically clear that sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1). The relevant portions of that judgment declaring the law on the subject are extracted hereunder: “Sub-section (1) of Section 14 is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude the words any property are even without any amplification, large enough to cover any and every kind of property.. The relevant portions of that judgment declaring the law on the subject are extracted hereunder: “Sub-section (1) of Section 14 is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude the words any property are even without any amplification, large enough to cover any and every kind of property.. whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable and whichever be the mode of acquisition it would be covered by sub section (1) of Section 14 the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered..; this Court has also in a series of decisions given a most expansive interpretation to the language of sub-section (1) of Section 14 with a view to advancing the social purpose of the legislation ; it will therefore be seen that sub-section (1) of Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance..; sub-section (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) ; the language of subsection (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female which may include a property given to her in lieu of maintenance but that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1) for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument etc.. etc., would be included from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub section (1).; sub-section (2) would be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or Will. Where however the properties acquired by a Hindu female etc., etc., is in virtue of a preexisting right, such acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2). Where however the properties acquired by a Hindu female etc., etc., is in virtue of a preexisting right, such acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2). Therefore, if possession and ownership of a property of a Hindu female is traceable to a pre-existing right, then sub-section (1) to Section 14 of the act alone would apply.” In 1989 (3) S.C.C. 572 (Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpar Singh) it was held as follows: “It is now settled law that if a female Hindu acquires property under a written instrument or a decree of the court and where such acquisition is not traceable to any antecedent right, then sub-section (2) of section 14 would be attracted and where an antecedent right is traceable, a document in the nature of “Will” is of no consequence and the case will be covered by provisions contained in Section 14(1) of the Act.” In the case reported in A.I.R. 1964 Patna 187 (Sheajee Tiwary & another v. Prema Kuer & others) a Division Bench of that Court held as follows: “Where her possession before 1956 was in lieu of maintenance, on the Act coming into force on the 17th of June 1950, she becomes absolute owner of those properties and the revisioners thereafter will have no cause of action against her. The same view also becomes irresistible if the properties are held to have been acquired by her not in lieu of maintenance but in any other manner whatsoever”. The word “whatsoever” indicates wide amplitude. If a person puts a female Hindu in possession of some properties belonging to him without executing a deed of transfer as envisaged under the Transfer of Property Act, the acquisition in that case, of the property by the female Hindu will not be unlawful and will be covered by the explanation given to sub section (1) similar will be the position in case where a female Hindu acquires property by “exchange”, all though “exchange” has not been included in the explanation.” In A.I.R. 1963 Madras 452 (Andal Ammal & another v. Sivaprakasa Sethurayar and others) a learned Judge of this Court held as follows: “The Explanation to Section 14(1) lays down certain categories of property which could be included in the term “property” in Section 14(1). They include property acquired by inheritance, device, partition, in lieu of maintenance, gift, by skill, exertion or purchase or by prescription or any other manner whatsoever.. The explanation of the meaning of the term “property” will also indicate that the property should be one whose ownership has come to be vested in the Hindu female under one or more of the various methods mentioned in the explanation. The term “in any other manner whatsoever” must be interpreted only ejusdem generis with the other terms which confer right of ownership and cannot be extended to cover a trespasser.” Therefore it is clear that a female Hindu can come to acquire or possess a property in any one of the modes mentioned in the Explanation to Section 14(1) and each mode appear to be mutually exclusive of the other. It may be open to a female Hindu to possess a property under more than one heads mentioned in the Explanation. The emphasis of the law is that, in whichever mode female Hindu come to possess, the ownership of the property should vest in her. In 1987 2 S.C.C. 572 = 100 L.W. 570 (Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapatham Pillai & others) it was held as follows: “Once it is shown that at the point of time when the question regarding title of property held by a Hindu female arises, she was “possessed” of the property on that day in the eye of law, the property held by her would be held by her as “full owner” and not as “limited owner”. In other words, all that has to be shown by her is that she had acquired property and that she was “possessed” of the property at the point of time when her title was called into question.” In 1966 S.C. 1879 (Eramma v. Veerupana) it was held as follows: “the property possessed by a female Hindu, as contemplated in the section, is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the act. It may be noticed that the Explanation to Section 14(1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicates that the section applies only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be”. It may be noticed that the Explanation to Section 14(1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicates that the section applies only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be”. “It does not in any way confer a title on the female Hindu where she did not in fact possess any vestige of title.” The position in law therefore can be summarised as follows: A Hindu female must possess a property; that should have been acquired by her before or after the commencement of the Act; the acquisition of the property by a female Hindu may be in any one of the modes provided for in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14; such acquisition and possession must be in recognition of a pre-existing right in her, and if all these requirements are established, then her rights in the property get enlarged into an absolute estate. 10. On the above settled position in law, I applied my mind to the settlement deed of the year 1931 marked in this case as Ex.A.1. Whether the interest of Gomathiammal, the settlee under that instrument, would get enlarged into an absolute estate or not would entirely depend upon the nature of the said instrument and the rights that flow to her. Settler No. 1 alone is the absolute owner of the suit property. Under the 1926 settlement deed marked as Ex.B.1 in this case, he had created a joint life interest in his favour as well as in favour of his wife Sankarammal. One of the settlees under that document is their adopted daughter Subbammal. The document provides that the settlor and the settlee should enjoy the property in common and during the lifetime of settlor and settlee No. 1 (wife of settler), the property cannot be encumbered in any manner and after the life time of Sankarammal, the adoptive daughter should have it absolutely, and in case the adoptive daughter pre-deceases the others, then her children should enjoy the property absolutely after the life time of the settlor and his wife. Sankarammal died later on and in such changed circumstances, Ex.A1 dated 29.05.31 had come to be executed. The settlors under this document are the original owner and Subbammal, who is settlee No. 2 under the earlier document. Sankarammal died later on and in such changed circumstances, Ex.A1 dated 29.05.31 had come to be executed. The settlors under this document are the original owner and Subbammal, who is settlee No. 2 under the earlier document. Therefore it is clear that Subbammal had waived her rights under the earlier document. The rights of Gomathiammal have to be decided only with reference to the document marked in this case as Ex.A.1. I have already extracted the relevant clauses of this document in the earlier portion of this judgment. It definitely shows that when setter No. 1 was in difficulties, he borrowed money by mortgaging the suit properties along with others. Gomathiammal/settlee sold her jewels; borrowed money; redeemed the mortgage and thus saved the property. It also shows that Gomathiammal was a destitute and issueless grand daughter having no support whatsoever from any source including from her husband side and that she was solely depending upon the settlor for her maintenance. The document also in clear term shows that it had come to be executed in favour of Gomathiammal by the settlors having in their mind their monetary liability to the tune of Rs. 800/- to the settlee. The document also further shows the anxiety and deep consideration on the mind of the settlors to provide for future maintenance of the settlee. Therefore it is clear to my mind that the transfer as referred to above under Ex.A.1 had come to be effected only in recognition of a pre-existing right in favour of the settlee. Though the right to get money by the settlee from the settlors may be a legal right, yet her right to be maintained as the destitute grand daughter of settlor No. 1 may not have the colour of a legal right. At best it may be a moral obligation on the part of the settlors to provide for her. In as much as there is a clear admission and acknowledgement in the document itself that the settlee depended upon them for her future maintenance I am inclined to hold that the said admission itself acknowledges the existence of a pre-existing right in her favour on the day when Ex.A.1 had come to be executed by them. In as much as there is a clear admission and acknowledgement in the document itself that the settlee depended upon them for her future maintenance I am inclined to hold that the said admission itself acknowledges the existence of a pre-existing right in her favour on the day when Ex.A.1 had come to be executed by them. Therefore I have no doubt at all in my mind that all the requirements of subsection (1) of Section 14 stand fully established in this case, which means the limited estate, which Gomathiammal possessed under the document and which admittedly she came to possess prior to coming into force of the 1956 Act, had definitely enlarged into an absolute estate. Therefore on the date of her death namely, 17-02-80, he was the absolute owner of the suit properties and the reversioners cannot have any claim at all. The learned trial Judge had not applied his mind at all to this legal aspect flowing out of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which had definitely vitiated his judgment. In fact the learned trial Judge had not even framed an issue on this aspect. This shows total non-application of mind on the part of the learned trial Judge to a legal question arising on the materials placed before him. 11. In the light of my discussion as referred to above, I answer the issue framed by this Court holding that the rights which Gomathiammal possessed under the settlement deed of the year 1931 enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which means the plaintiffs cannot have any claim based on the said settlement deed. Accordingly the judgment under challenge is set aside and the appeal is allowed. However there will be no order as to costs throughout.