Judgment Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. 1. The petitioner, who is in occupation of the premises since the year 1945, was ordered to be evicted. Faced with the judgment given by the Rent Controller, he has approached this Court through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, so as to challenge the validity of Section 13(3-A) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973. The petitioner alleges that the provision regarding `personal necessity is vague. The landlord has not even disclosed the source of money so as to be able to run the business. The provision is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Thus, clause (3A) of Section 13 of the 1973 Act deserves to be struck down. 2. We have heard Mr. I.D. Singla, learned counsel for the petitioner. He submits that even though the amendment was made in the year 1978 for the benefit of the tenant, the provision is actually being used for the benefit of the landlord. The phrase `personal necessity is vague. It is discriminatory and violative of the petitioners right to carry on business. On these premises, the counsel prays that the provision should be struck down as being unconstitutional. 3. Admittedly, the petitioner has remained in possession of the premises for the last more than 56 years. It is also not disputed that respondent No. 3 represents the third generation in the family of the original landlord. His predecessors in two generations have not had the opportunity to enjoy their property. Still further, the claim of respondent No. 3 for eviction on account of personal necessity has been upheld by the competent Court. The date on which the proceedings were initiated and as to when the order of eviction was passed by the competent Court has not been disclosed. Even the judgment of the learned Court has not been produced. It is only after having lost the case that the petitioner has chosen to challenge the provisions of the Act. He had remained sitting on the fence. After the Court had found in favour of respondent No. 3, the petitioner has devised this method to delay his eviction. 4. As for the contention raised by the counsel, we find that the provisions of Section 13(3-A) of the 1973 Act are not vague. He had remained sitting on the fence. After the Court had found in favour of respondent No. 3, the petitioner has devised this method to delay his eviction. 4. As for the contention raised by the counsel, we find that the provisions of Section 13(3-A) of the 1973 Act are not vague. Clause (3-A) clearly stipulates that a landlord can seek the eviction of the tenant from a non- residential building, if his personal need is `bona fide. It is only when the claim is found to be well-merited that the Court can uphold the landlords claim. What were the facts of the present case ? On what ground did the landlord seek the eviction of the petitioner ? What are the findings of the Court ? There is nothing on the record. The petitioner has withheld the information from the Court. However, even ex-facie, it cannot be said that `personal necessity is a vague expression. The `text has to be read in its `context. The Court has to examine the evidence and to see whether the need of the landlord is bona fide. The aggrieved party has the remedy of appeal and revision etc. The Legislature is not required to define every expression. `Personal Use is a term which is clear and understandable. When the need of the landlord is established, the Court has been empowered to order the eviction. The statute contains an in-built safe-guard and it does not suffer from the vice of vagueness. 5. Mr. I.D. Singla contends that the provisions suffers from the vice of discrimination. In the case of residential building, the tenant is entitled to move the Court for restoration of possession at the expiry of the one year. However, in the case of non-residential building, the period has been fixed at three years. Thus, the provision deserves to be struck down. 6. The contention is misconceived. The distinction between a `residential and `non-residential building is well-known. While occupation of the residential premises can be soon after the eviction of the tenant, the establishment of a business needs longer time. Thus, the Legislature has chosen to prescribe different periods of time. In doing so, it has not violated the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 7. Mr. Singla contends that the provision is violative of the petitioners freedom to run his business and to carry on trade. 8. Thus, the Legislature has chosen to prescribe different periods of time. In doing so, it has not violated the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 7. Mr. Singla contends that the provision is violative of the petitioners freedom to run his business and to carry on trade. 8. Even this contention is misconceived. The facts of the case belie the petitioners contention. The petitioner remained in occupation of the premises for the last 56 years. The landlord, who was the owner, has not been able to enjoy his own property for more than five decades. Now when a person in the third generation of the original landlord is wanting to have the premises for his own use, the petitioner has approached this Court through the present writ petition. In the circumstances of the case, we find that there is no violation of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the restriction imposed by the impugned provision is absolutely reasonable, just and fair. It has stood the test of time. 9. Mr. Singla submits that the landlord has not disclosed the source from which he would get the funds for running the business in the demised premises. Thus, the order of eviction could not be sustained. 10. This plea had to be raised by the petitioner before the appropriate authority. It is not germane to the vires of the statute. Did the petitioner raise this plea ? What were the findings ? We have nothing on the file. No other point has been raised. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, we find that there is no merit in this petition. It is, consequently, dismissed in limine.