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2001 DIGILAW 139 (KAR)

H. M. KRISHNA REDDY v. N. K. PARAMESHWARAN

2001-02-14

V.GOPALA GOWDA

body2001
GOPALA GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is filed by the defendant challenging the legality and validity of the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court in R. A. No. 171/95 dated 27. 9. 1996 in affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Principal Second Munsiff Court, bangalore in O. S. No. 359/92 dated 21. 10. 1995 framing certain substantial questions of law for consideration of this Court in exercise of its power under Section 100 C. P. C. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, rank of the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the trial Court. ( 3 ) CERTAIN relevant brief facts which are necessary for the purpose of answering the rival contentions of the parties are stated as hereunder:-the plaintiff filed O. S, No. 359/92 on the file of the learned principal II Munsiff, Bangalore, for grant of judgment and decree declaring that he is the lawful owner of the suit schedule property noted as letters ABCDA in the rough sketch and for a direction to the defendant to handover the same; for grant of mandatory injunction for demolition of the hut put up which is described in the schedule-ii of the plaint and noted as EFGH in the sketch; further for demolition of the two houses built which is referred to by letter ljkl and MNOP in the rough sketch No. 2 and described in the schedule as Item no. 3; for grant of decree in the nature of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from causing interference with regard to the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property claiming that he is the absolute owner of the property in question by producing number of documents to substantiate his claim. The subject matter of the property was originally mentioned as Sy. No. 26/2 of Battarahalti village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Hoskote Taluk, which came to be amended by filing an amendment application as Sy. No. 26/2b measuring 1 acre 7 guntas. The subject matter of the property was originally mentioned as Sy. No. 26/2 of Battarahalti village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Hoskote Taluk, which came to be amended by filing an amendment application as Sy. No. 26/2b measuring 1 acre 7 guntas. Further, it was contended that the land in question is a personal and miscellaneous inam land vested with the State government under the provisions of the Karnataka (Personal and miscellaneous) Inarms Abolition Act, 1954; that his vendor Sri muniswamappa claimed occupancy rights in respect of the land in question before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of inams, Bangalore, who in exercise of his power granted occupancy rights vide Ex. P. 2 dated 4. 7. 1960 and registered him as an occupant under the provisions of the Act, 1954; that thereafter his vendor was in possession and enjoyment of the property, his name was mutated in the revenue records; katha was entered in his name; that thereafter he sold the property in favour of the plaintiff vide registered sale deed dated 21. 5. 1973; that pursuant to the said sale deed he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property; that the defendant who has no title, interest upon the property tresspassed into the schedule property during the month of September, 1990 for which the plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 27. 10. 90 as per Ex. P. 14; despite acknowledging the same, the defendant did not send any reply; therefore, he filed the original suit praying for the reliefs as indicated above. The claim of the plaintiff was seriously disputed by the defendants traversing all the plaint averments and contended that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property land bearing Sy. No. 26/1 of Sheegehalli Village, K. R. Puram Hobli; that the said property measuring 5 acres 13 guntas belonged to his grandfather and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same and the identity of the suit schedule property was seriously disputed. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings framed five issues at paragraph (14) of the judgment of the trial Court. To substantiate their claim, the plaintiff's power of attorney holder Mr. Beerappa was examined on 20. 3. 1985 and documents Exs. P. 1 to P. 33 were got marked. The defendant himself got examined as D. W. 1 and got marked Exs. D1 to D. 15. To substantiate their claim, the plaintiff's power of attorney holder Mr. Beerappa was examined on 20. 3. 1985 and documents Exs. P. 1 to P. 33 were got marked. The defendant himself got examined as D. W. 1 and got marked Exs. D1 to D. 15. The trial Judge on appreciation of the evidence on record, while answering the contentious issues framed by it has categorically recorded a finding of fact holding that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the property in question and granted the reliefs as prayed for in the original suit vide its judgment and decree dated 21. 10. 1995. Being aggrieved by the same, the defendant filed R. A. No. 171/95 under Section 96 CPC on the file of the II Addl. Civil Judge, Bangalore hereinafter called as first Appellate court urging various legal contentions including the ground that the judgment and decree is vitiated on account of the fact that the original suit is barred by limitation. On the basis of the rival contentions urged by the parties, the first appellate Court has formulated seven points for its determination and on appreciation of the evidence on record, with reference to the rival contentions points Nos. 1 to 3 and 7 framed by it are answered in the negative and point Nos. 4 to 6 were answered in the affirmative by recording its reasons on the points referred to supra at paragraphs 17 to 40 of the impugned judgment affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 27. 10. 1996. Aggrieved of the said judgment and decree, the defendant has preferred this second appeal. ( 4 ) THIS Court at the time of admission of this appeal on 19. 11. 1996 has formulated the following questions of law for its consideration. " (A) Whether LAC was justified inholding that plaintiff's suit for possession based on title was not barred by limitation?; (c) Whether having regard to the evidence of P. W. 1 that the encroachment was in 1980 (as against the plaint averment that the encroachment was in 1990) and non-examination of plaintiff, the Courts were justified in decreeing the suit?; and (d) Whether LAC ought to have allowed I. A. s 2 and 3 for additional evidence?"the plaintiff's counsel had taken the notice of the aforesaid substantial questions of law. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties have addressed their arguments for and against the substantial questions of law which are referred to during the course of this judgment with a view to avoid repeation of facts and contentions. The contentions of the learned Counsel advanced in support of their respective cases are considered by this Court by assigning reasons with reference to their respective legal contentions urged by the learned Counsel on each one of the substantial questions of law referred to supra. ( 5 ) ANSWER to question No. (a) :- The original suit was filed by the plaintiff on 1. 6. 1992. In the plaint at Paragraph (6) it is stated that the plaintiff's assistant V. R. Palani visited the property in question in the month of September, 1990; at that time it was noticed by him that the defendant who is a total stranger to the schedule property and who has no right, title and interest upon the property in question has erected a hut wrongfully. Pursuant to the General Power of attorney which was executed by the plaintiff which was produced and marked as Ex. P. 1, P. W. 1 the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff has deposed at Paragraph 4 of his deposition that in the year 1980 that V. R. Palani, assistant of the plaintiff who was deputed to the schedule properly verified the possession of the same and informed the plaintiff that defendant had put up a shed on the property. With reference to the said plaint averment and the evidence, though the question of limitation was not raised before the trial Court, as the defendant/appellant urged regarding trie maintainability of the original suit on the ground of limitation that as on the date of deposition of P. W. 1 and as on the date of filing of the statement the same was barred by limitation as prescribed under Article 64 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the first appellate Court has framed the second point for its consideration with reference to the said contention. The same has been answered by the first appellate Court referring to the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant at Paragraphs 20 and 21 it has recorded its findings and assigned its reasons, and held that the original suit is not barred by limitation by answering the same in the negative against the defendant. The finding on this point recorded by the first appellate court has been seriously challenged by Sri Jayavttal Rao Kolar, learned Counsel for the appellant in this appeal With reference to the material evidence on record and contended that the first appellate court has gravely erred in fixing the date in the month of September 1980 though there is no evidence in this regard; that the first appellate court has substituted the month of September to the evidence of the plaintiff on record and recorded a finding; in favour of the plaintiff while the point was answered in his favour and therefore he would urge that the said finding is erroneous in law for want of evidence and he has made his submission in support of the substantial question of law referred to above. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff Mr. P. T. Sreenivasa Reddy sought to justify the same contending that at Paragraph (6) of the plaint averment, it has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff that in the month of september 1990, plaintiff's assistant was deputed to the schedule property; that he noticed unauthorised hut put up upon the schedule property; there is variance from the pleading and the evidenced that pw. 1 has deposed with regard to the date of tresspass made by the defendant. 1 has deposed with regard to the date of tresspass made by the defendant. Therefore, the first appellate Court being the fact finding authority has appreciated the evidence on record and the pleadings recorded its finding on the basis that the date given by p. W. 1 in his evidence is the date of the dispossession of the plaintiff and further considering the evidence of D. W. 1 a finding of fact has been rightly recorded by the first Appellate Court holding that the original suit is filed within twelve years from the date of its institution, even taking the date of dispossession in the year 1980 which finding in the impugned judgment is based on facts and evidence on record and the same should not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction. The above said contentions of the learned counsel on behalf of the parties are examined by this Court. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance upon the decision reported in the case of VEERAIAH vs VEERABHADRAIAH1 with reference to the question as to whether the Article applicable is either article 142 or 144 to the schedule of the Limitation Act, the relevant portion is extracted at paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel for the defendant has placed strong reliance upon the decision reported in QADIR BUX vs. RAMCHAND AND OTHERS in support of the proposition that the original suit is barred by limitation contending that the trial Court has lost sight of the said relevant fact and urged that the law laid down in the aforesaid cases with all force are applicable to the facts of this case. With reference to the said contentions at paragraph 21 the first appellate Court's judgment it has referred to the legal notice got issued by the plaintiff on 26. 10. 1990 Ex. P. 14 which was acknowledged by the defendant vide Exs. P. 15 and P. 16 endorsement issued by the Post Office to show that Ex. P. 14 was served upon the defendant, no reply was given by him and he has not pleaded in the written statement that he has dispossessed the plaintiff from the schedule property in the year 1980 and further recorded a finding that the plaintiff was dispossessed and the defendant has been in possession since from 1980. P. 14 was served upon the defendant, no reply was given by him and he has not pleaded in the written statement that he has dispossessed the plaintiff from the schedule property in the year 1980 and further recorded a finding that the plaintiff was dispossessed and the defendant has been in possession since from 1980. The pleading of the plaintiff is referred to in the impugned judgment and the fact of dispossession of the plaintiff has been specifically mentioned at Exs. P. 14 and in the written statement, the defendant has not averred stating that the Original suit is barred by limitation. For the first time, in the appeal, it was urged that the suit is barred by limitation with reference to the evidence of P. W. 1 at paragraph 4 and further the first appellate Court with reference to the evidence of P. W. 1 it has referred that the defendant has not cross-examined by putting a suggestion to PW1 that he has been in possession of the suit schedule property since 1980 by dispossessing the plaintiff. With reference to the material evidence on record, the first appellate Court being the last Court for appreciation of the facts and evidence on record has alternatively recorded a finding on fact taking into consideration that dispossession of the plaintiff from the suit schedule property was in the month of September 1990; and the original suit was filed in the year 1992. Having regard to the pleading at Paragraph 6 of the plaint that the plaintiff was dispossessed on 20. 9. 1990 which fact has not been denied by the defendant in the written statement as required under Order 8 Rule 5 cpc, the first appellate Court with reference to the said pleading and facts stated at Ex. Having regard to the pleading at Paragraph 6 of the plaint that the plaintiff was dispossessed on 20. 9. 1990 which fact has not been denied by the defendant in the written statement as required under Order 8 Rule 5 cpc, the first appellate Court with reference to the said pleading and facts stated at Ex. P. 14 which fact was not denied by the defendant by issuing a reply notice despite the fact he has acknowledged the same, therefore the first Appellate Court has recorded its reasons with reference to the evidence on record and the pleadings of the parties and it has held that the material evidence on record would clearly establish the fact that the original suit in within twelve years from the date of dispossession of the schedule property and further recorded a finding that the defendant has not placed any material to show that he was in possession of the suit schedule property much earlier to the institution of the suit. Therefore, the finding recorded on point No. 2 by the first appellate Court, in my considered view is based on appreciation of facts and material evidence on record. Therefore, I have to answer the substantial question of law against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. Further reliance placed upon the judgments referred to supra by the learned Counsel on behalf of the defendant have no application to the facts of this case having regard to the fact that the first appellate court on appreciation of the evidence on record it has recorded a finding of fact which finding is not shown by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant to be erroneous in law with reference to the evidence on record. ( 6 ) TO answer substantial question (c) it would be proper to refer to substantial question (d) as the first Appellate Court has rejected the I. As. II and III filed by the defendant before it seeking appointment of the Court Commissioner and to adduce additional evidence by the defendant in support of his case. With reference to the said substantial question of law, this Court proceeds to answer the same by recording its reasons as could be seen from the order sheet maintained in this appeal that this Court on 10. 2. With reference to the said substantial question of law, this Court proceeds to answer the same by recording its reasons as could be seen from the order sheet maintained in this appeal that this Court on 10. 2. 1998 appointed the assistant Director of Land Records as a Court Commissioner after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and with reference to the joint memo filed by them for appointment of Commissioner to identify the plaint schedule property having regard to the defence taken in the written statement. Pursuant to the said order, the Asst. Director of Land Records and Survey Settlement, Bangalore, on the basis of the memo of instructions filed by the parties visited the land in question and submitted a report which report was objected to by the plaintiff's Counsel on the ground that in the report filed in reply to the plaintiffs memo of instructions the plaint schedule land agrees with the rough sketch, however, the location of the building is shown as per the sketch prepared by him as being located on the land within the Seegehalli boundary. Since the said report gave room for a doubt as to whether the building identified by the Commisssioner is located in Re. Sy. No. 26/2b or outside it, the Commissioner was directed to revisit the land and submit his report as indicated in the order passed in this appeal dated 9. 12. 1998. Accordingly, the deputy director of Land Records, Bangalore, has visited the schedule property and submitted his report along with the sketch prepared by him furnishing the boundaries of the schedule property and the extent of the building portion upon the land bearing Sy. NO. 26/2b of bhattarahalli village and the buildings which are situated in the place belonging to Seegehalli Village, vide his report dated 21. 12. 2000. The same has been taken as evidence on record. Either of the parties have objected for this report. The Commissioner's report is very relevant for the reason that the identity of the suit schedule property was disputed by the defendant and the same shall be taken as the material evidence on record in addition to the evidence already adduced before the trial Court, as he had submitted his report after inspection of the schedule property in pursuant to the order of this court by consent of the parties. As this evidence was not on record before the Courts below and at the instance of the parties having regard to the disputed questions regarding the identity of the property, the Commissioner was appointed for the purpose of identification of the schedule property, this Court has taken the said evidence on record and considered the same in exercise of the power under section 103 for the limited purpose in addition to the findings recorded by the Courts below on the basis of the evidence before them to answer the above referred substantial question of law. Since either of the parties have not objected for the same, the same is taken as evidence on record as provided under Order 26 Rule 10 (2)cpc which sub-rule states that the report of the Commissioner and evidence taken in the course of execution of the commissioners warrant the same shall be the evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. I have perused the ieport. The said report has been prepared on the basis of the memo of instructions filed in this appeal by the parties and the documents produced by them at the time of conducting the spot inspection the schedule property by the court Commissioner, in the said report, he has clearly stated at paragraph (3) that two hissas (sub-division) as Sy. Nos. 26/2a and 26/2b have been formed on 11. 9. 1979 and Sy. No- 26/2b the Sy. No. 26/2b as assigned to N. K. Parameshwaran is shown in para (1) of the report. Paragraph (4) of the reports are relevant and the same are extracted hereunder for the purpose of considering the case of the parties to answer the substantial question (c) framed by this court:-commissioner REPORT ON THE MEMO OF INSTRUCTlons of THE APPELLANT "4. The Schedule property is existing on the field. 5, It is submitted that the building shown in blue colour in sketch is coming under the limits of Bhatrahalli and the Building shown in yellow red colours actually lie within the limits of seegehalli village. Which is adjacent to Bhatrahalli village. The building now existing on the field are not tally with the rough sketch available in the file. ( 7 ) THE spot inspection of the schedule property and the existing buildings has been done after due to the intimation in the parties concerned. Which is adjacent to Bhatrahalli village. The building now existing on the field are not tally with the rough sketch available in the file. ( 7 ) THE spot inspection of the schedule property and the existing buildings has been done after due to the intimation in the parties concerned. The building portion which is situated in s. No. 26/2b of Bhatrahalli and Seegehalli are (i. e. building 1 and 2} under the possession and enjoyment of Sri H. M. Krishna reddy, appellant. The portion shown in blue colour lie within the s. No. 26/2b of Bhatrahalli and the building shown in yellow red colours lie within Seegehalii. The sketch may kindly be perused which reveals the full details. ( 8 ) THE scheduled property narrated in the sale deod on 21/5/1973 tally as per field. As already narrated in paragraph (5) and (7) the buildings are actually not coming within the limits of bhatrahalli (except blue portion) and they are lie within the boundary of Seegehalli Village. The appellant has not produced any documents. However the commissioner has carry out the work keeping in view the documents produced by the respondents and the reference available in the file. " commissioner REPORT ON THE MEMO OF INSTRUCTIONS of THE RESPONDENT"4. The survey records in respect of SNO. 26/2sa and 26/ 26b have been prepared on 11. 09 1979 as shown in para (1)supra. The measurement of AD and BC lines in 317 and 408 links respectively. Since the measurements of the given side are noted in the recorded in the survey records the same has not been mentioned in the sketch now prepared by the commissioner. "8. The particulars specified in para (2) and the sketch may kindly be perused, but the building now existing at the spot are situated in Sy. No. 32 of Seegehalli except portion shown in blue colour. Also the building are not coming with in the limits of SNO 26/1 of Bhatrahalli the building portion shown in blue colour is lies within the limits of SNO 26/2b of Bhatrahalli. In view of the order passed on IA No. 2 by this Court vide its order dated 10. 2. 98 this Court need not consider the substantial question no (d ). In view of the order passed on IA No. 2 by this Court vide its order dated 10. 2. 98 this Court need not consider the substantial question no (d ). However this Court by consent of the learned counsel for the parties appointed Court Commissioner who submitted his reports on the instructions of the parties separately with sketch on 21. 12. 2000, which reports are not objected by either of the parties, the same are taken on record and considered to answer the substantial question No. (c ). 7. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently contended that the Courts below were not justified in accepting the evidence of P. W. 1 who has no personal knowledge and in view of the law laid down by Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1999 RAJASTHAN 185 in support of the proposition that general Power of Attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of the party but he cannot give witness on behalf of the party; the party has to appear only in his own capacity but he cannot delegate the G. P. of Attorney holder his power to appear in the Court and enter the witness box on behalf of himself, and adduce evidence as witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of the GPA. ' He has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 1441 wherein with reference to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act at paragraphs 15 and 16 law has been laid down by the Apex Court with reference to the Privy Council judgment and the judgments of the Lahore, Allahabad High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court in support of the proposition that where the party to the suit does not enter the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, the presumption that arises under section 114 of Indian Evidence Act with the case set up by him is not correct. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme court in AIR 1979 SC 553 , AIR 1986 KAR 70 (Division Bench)paragraph 12 to 15 and 1999 (1) KCCR 199 paragraph-7 in support of the proposition that PA holder is authorised to act, to do certain acts on behalf of the executant by assigning the plaint, applications, the appeal and that he can also tender evidence in the case on behalf of the party if it is expressly authorised in that regard and submitted that this question has been considered and law has been laid down by the Apex Court and this Court that the P. A. holder can give evidence on behalf of the party and therefore, it is not open for the defendant to question the evidence given by P. W. 1 as G. P. A. holder on behalf of the plaintiff before the trial Court. In this regard, the submission made is considered with reference to the case law cited by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. In the case reported in 1999 SC 1441 upon which reliance is placed upon by the learned Counsel for the defendant, it is not forthcoming in the s0aid judgment as to whether there was any express condition in the general Power of Attorney executed by the executant authorising him to give evidence on behalf of the party/executant. In rajasthan High Court case, referred to supra the application filed before the trial Court seeking permission to adduce evidence on behalf of the party on the basis of Power of Attorney, was rejected and the same was challenged in the revision petition under Section 115 before that Court while considering the legality and validity of the order, the Court referring to the Clause in the Power of Attorney upon which the reliance was placed by the authority in the said case has held that GPA Holder cannot depose evidence on behalf of the executant. Further the judgment of the Supreme Court in vidyadar's case reported in AIR 1999 SC 1441 upon which reliance is placed is a case where with reference to the facts of that case, presumption under Section 114 has been taken into consideration and held that party to the suit does not appeal into the witness box and state his case on oath and he does not offer himself for cross-examination by the other side In the background of that facts of the case, law has been correctly laid down by the supreme Court. The question for consideration of this Court is as to whether the law laid down in that case is applicable to the facts of this case and the same is examined with reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in SYED ABDUL KHADER vs RAMl REDDY and OTHERS interpreting Section 182, 133, 186 and 188 of the contract Act (9 of 1872) at Paragraph 17 wherein with reference to the power of attorney in that case and the terms and conditions incorporated in the said Power of Attorney it is held each term was an independent power conferred upon the P. A holder, such power of wide amplitude conferring such vide authority cannot by construction be narrowed down to deny an authority of the power of attorney holder which the donors expressly granted that the ordinary authority given in one part of the instrument will not be cut down because there are ambiguous and uncertain expressions elsewhere but the document will be considered as a whole for interpretation of particular words or directions. The said judgment is followed by the Division bench of this Court in AIR 1986 KAR 70 wherein with reference to section 226 of the Contract Act and Section 2 of the Power of attorney Act of 1882 it is held at Paragraph 12 as follows: having regard to the clear language used in para 2 extracted above, it is evident that power to sell the immovable properties was indeed given to 8th defendant by the first defendant on behalf of himself and defendants 2,3,6 and 7. Even apart from the plain language employed to remove ambiguity. Mr. Krishnamurthy now wants us to read into that Clause ambiguity which did not exist when plaintiff had the inspection of Exhibit P-8 and other documents. Even apart from the plain language employed to remove ambiguity. Mr. Krishnamurthy now wants us to read into that Clause ambiguity which did not exist when plaintiff had the inspection of Exhibit P-8 and other documents. Plaintiff in his evidence has staled that he verified that the 8th defendant had necessary power to sell the property. He further stated that seeing the documents he satisfied himself that he could purchase the property. If that is how he understood exhibit P-8 at the relevant time before he made up his mind to bid at the auction, he cannot now call upon this Court to clear the ambiguity which does not exist in the document and to give benefit of construction to deny the power ot sale to 8th defendant under Exhibit P-8. The rule of construction commended by the learned Author in Page 75, is that power of attorney should be construed and interpreted so as to give only such authority as is conferred expressly or by necessary implication. The rules of constructions suggested by him are that the operative part of a deed should be controlled by the recitals where there is ambiguity where authority is given to do particular acts, followed by general words, the general words should be restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular acts authorised; general words do not confer general powers, but should be limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and should be construed as enlarging the special powers only when it is necessary for that purpose; and the deed must be construed so as to include all incidental powers necessary for its effective execution. If we apply the above rules of construction commended and accepted, in our jurisprudence, it is easy to see that Mr. Krishna Murthy's contention cannot succeed. " same view has been taken by this Court in the case of SMT. ELIAZABETH MATHEW AND ANOTHER vs PROF. If we apply the above rules of construction commended and accepted, in our jurisprudence, it is easy to see that Mr. Krishna Murthy's contention cannot succeed. " same view has been taken by this Court in the case of SMT. ELIAZABETH MATHEW AND ANOTHER vs PROF. S. K. NARAYAN and ANOTHER" wherein with reference to Section 2 of the P. A. Act of 1882 law has been laid down holding that where an act purporting to be done under a power of attorney is challenged on the ground of being in excess of the authority conferred by the principal, it is necessary to show that on a fair construction of the whole instrument, the authority so conferred is to be found in the instrument either in express terms or by implication. While interpreting section 2 of the power of Attorney Act at Paragraph (7), of the said judgment this Court has held that some of the principles governing the interpretation of the power of attorney would include to assume that a power is construed so as to include all incidental powers necessary for its effective execution. 8. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court and Division bench Judgment and another judgment referred to in the earlier paragraph of this Court with reference to the relevant provisions of the Contract Act and Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882 rnd by reading Ex. P. 1. the relevant portion has been expressly incorporated with regard to deposing evidence on behalf of the plaintiff in the Genera! Power of Attorney before the Court which is extracted hereunder: "to institute any suit or any other proceedings in respect of the schedule property before any court of law or authority and to file any applications and sign all pleadings, affidavits, statements, revisions petitions and tender for evidence before the Court of law and produce the documents and take back the same. " ex. P1 is the General Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of PW. 1 the GPA holder for the purpose of institution of present suit by signing the application, tho appeal and other connected matters including to tender the evidence before the Court of law on behalf of Plaintiff and produce the documents. " ex. P1 is the General Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of PW. 1 the GPA holder for the purpose of institution of present suit by signing the application, tho appeal and other connected matters including to tender the evidence before the Court of law on behalf of Plaintiff and produce the documents. In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Abdul's case and other cases referred to supra. The Apex Court and the division Bench of this Court has interpreted the provisions of Contract act and Power of Attorney Act, 1882 and law has been succinctly laid down holding that, the authority given to the power of attorney holder by expressly in the general power of attorney in favour of its holder PW1 it has to be interpreted the terms in the power of attorney document and the same shall not be narrowly interpreted. ( 9 ) THE plaintiff-executant has given reasons under what circumstances he has executed the power of attorney Ex. P1. Therefore the reliance placed upon the Judgment of Rajasthan High court and Supreme Court by the learned Counsel on behalf of the defendant with reference to Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act that said cases have no application to the facts of the case in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Khader's case, Division Bench judgment and another judgment, wherein the relevant provisions of the Indian contract Act and power of Attorney Act are interpreted and succinctly laid down by the law which Judgments are applicable to the facts of this case with all fours. Therefore, I have to answer that portion of substantial question of law at No. (c) against defendant/appellant. Therefore, his evidence has been rightiy considered by the Courts below in favour of the plaintiff on proper appreciation of evidence on record. Further this Court is required to consider whether the findings recorded by the Courts below are based on legal and substantive evidence on record or not. The learned Counsel for the parties have taken me through the Judgments of the Courts below and evidence of PW1 and DW1 and the pleadings of the parties to answer the substantal question of law. The learned Counsel for the parties have taken me through the Judgments of the Courts below and evidence of PW1 and DW1 and the pleadings of the parties to answer the substantal question of law. The definite case of the plaintiff is that the property was purchased by him from one Mr. Muniswamappa as per Ex. P3 dated 21. 5. 1973. It is the case of the plaintiff that he had title to the property vide order of the Spl. Deputy commissioner conferring occupancy rights in favour of the plaintiff's vendor in respect of the land in question in exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Karnataka (Personal and Miscellaneous)inams Abolition Act, 1954. The Spl. Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his quasi-judicial power after satisfying himself with regard to the legal requirement for conferment of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question he had recorded a finding holding that plaintiff's vendor was entitled to register as an occupant in respect of land in question. The evidence of DW1 has been referred to by the Trial court as well as the first appellate Court extensively on the basis of ex. P2 the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner which order has conferred occupancy rights upon the plaintiff's vendor in respect of the land in question and his name has been mutated in the record of rights. ( 10 ) PURSUANT to the order at Ex. P2, the name of the vendor of the plaintiff has been shown in the IL and RR vide mutation Entry no. MT8/73-74 as per Ex. P3. Ex. P4 the record of rights mutation entry has been made in the name of plaintiff's vendor and the name of the plaintiff is in the year 1973-74 his name was entered on 26. 5. 1973. Further, Muniswamy the vendor of the plaintiff executed the safe deed Ex. P3 on 21. 5. 1973 in respect of the property in question wherein there is recital that the possession of the property has been delivered to the plaintiff. That fact is further substantiated from perusing the document Ex. P11. The name of the plaintiff's vendor is entered for the year 1974-75. Thereafter, the name of the plaintiff was entered in the cultivators col. vide Ex. P20. That fact is further substantiated from perusing the document Ex. P11. The name of the plaintiff's vendor is entered for the year 1974-75. Thereafter, the name of the plaintiff was entered in the cultivators col. vide Ex. P20. ( 11 ) THE Trial Court on the basis of oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties and on appreciation of the same while answering lssues Nos. 1 and 2 has referred to bcth oral and documentary evidence Ex. P2 the grant of occupancy rights in favour of plaintiff's vendor Ex. P3 sale deed IL and RR in the name of plaintiff ex. P4 and P5 respectively. With regard to the conversion of land document and no objection certificate from Bidarahalli Panchayat, the RTC extracts for the period from 1968-69 and 72-73 in the name of plaintiff's vendor Ex P11 and 'utara' copies and also the documents referred to at paragraph 18 Ex. P22, Ex. P23 Hissa Survey Copy, ex. P24 Atlas Utara, Ex. P25 Tippani Utara in respect of land bearing sy. No. 26/2b. The certified copies are referred to and recorded a finding of fact holding that after the purchase of the property by the plaintiff there was a sub-division of Sy. No. 26/2 as 2a and 2b of schedule property bearing Sy. No. 26/2 as the property of the plaintiff. Ex. P23, 24 and 25 would go to show that there is sub-divsion of the property in question as 26/2b which property is of Bhattarahalli village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Hoskote Taluk. At paragraph-23, of the impugned judgment with reference to the evidence on record examining the case of the defendant with regard to claim in respect of Sy. no. 26/1 of Seegehalli Village, K. R. Puram measuring 1 acre 3 guntas as per Ex. D1 the Akar Bandh settlement Ex. D2 Tippani Utara in respect of land bearing Sy. No. 26/1 and 27 to show that defendant was the owner of the aforesaid land. The same have been considered on the basis of document produced such as RTC Extract in respect of Sy. No. 26 of Seegehalli measuring 5 acre 13 guntas, a finding of fact has been recorded by the Courts below that there is no sub-division as contended by the defendant stating that said land is in Seegehalli Village. The same have been considered on the basis of document produced such as RTC Extract in respect of Sy. No. 26 of Seegehalli measuring 5 acre 13 guntas, a finding of fact has been recorded by the Courts below that there is no sub-division as contended by the defendant stating that said land is in Seegehalli Village. Further a finding of fact is recorded that said land belongs to Abdul Rahim Sab, and the same is not subdivided. Further Sy. No. 26/1 of Seegehalli Village measures 5 acres 13 guntas according to said documents D1, D2 and D3-D15 it is entirely a different land as contended by defendant and Ex. P30 does not tally with his claim and right over the said property and the village map vide Ex. P33 (a ). The sketch Ex. P26 showing the suit schedule Sy. No. 26/2b wherein Sy. No26 of Seegehalli has been located and it does not tally with schedule property and held that at para 25 of the impugned Trial Court judgment that, Sy. No. 26/2b of the property in question has come into existence as per Ex. P23 and further recorded a finding on appreciation of evidence on record it has recorded a finding stating that aforesaid documents would clearly go to show that the plaintiff's vendor had the title to the property in question, he was in possession of the same till the date of execution of sale deed Ex. P3 and after the purchase the plaintiff has been in possession. At paragraph-27 of the impugned judgment it has been clearly held that the defendant had dispossessed the plaintiff in the month of September 90 and he has put up the shed/hut measuring 6 ft x 5 ft NS and EW and also put up Pucca construction RCC building vide IJKL and MNOP which is marked at Ex. P6. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly recorded a finding that plaintiff has rightly filed the suit for possession. Further taking into consideration the evidence of DW1 of the defendant, in his cross examination he has stated that, his property is in Sy. No. 26/1 and he has given boundaries according to him it belongs to his grand-father. P6. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly recorded a finding that plaintiff has rightly filed the suit for possession. Further taking into consideration the evidence of DW1 of the defendant, in his cross examination he has stated that, his property is in Sy. No. 26/1 and he has given boundaries according to him it belongs to his grand-father. Further documents which have been produced by him would show that the has succeeded to the said property and further on the basis of his evidence a finding has been recorded that he obtained licence for construction of the building and NOC from the village Panchayath. Further it has been held by the Trial Court that those documents have not been produced before the Court. Further a finding has been recorded holding that the defendant has set up a rival claim in order to establish his claim, further finding of fact is recorded by the trial Court that he has not produced any document to show that he is owner in possession of the schedule property. With reference to ex. D1 and D2, the Trial Court has recorded a finding stating that those documents are not title deeds therefore he has not proved his claim. Accordingly, the Trial Court has answered the Issue Nos. 2 and 3 and stated that dispossession of the plaintiff from the schedule property by the defendant is illegal and therefore, the prayer sought for possession by the plaintiff is justified. The said finding is recorded with reference to the evidence at paragraph-14 of DW1 wherein he has categorically stated that he has no objection for granting decree in respect of Sy. No. 26/2b in favour of the plaintiff. Further, he has stated with regard to the suit schedule property that same does not belong to him and further a finding of fact is recorded on the basis of evidence on record holding that he has not obtained 'pahani1 copies in respect of land bearing Sy. No. 26/1 of Seegehalli Village. Therefore, the trial Court has categorically held that he has failed to establish link between suit schedule property and also the property referred to at Ex. D10 to D15 and further held with reference to the said documentary evidence that defendant has not produced any document for his lawful possession of the suit schedule property. While answering Issues Nos. Therefore, the trial Court has categorically held that he has failed to establish link between suit schedule property and also the property referred to at Ex. D10 to D15 and further held with reference to the said documentary evidence that defendant has not produced any document for his lawful possession of the suit schedule property. While answering Issues Nos. 3 and 4 by the Trial Court after appreciation of evidence on record, it has extensively dealt with the documentary evidence referred to supra and recorded its findings with valid and cogent reasons holding that plaintiff's vendor and title to the property based on Ex. P2 the occupancy rights granted by the special Deputy Commissioner showing that he was in possession and enjoyment of the property till the execution of sale deed Ex. P3 in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, name of the plaintiff was mutated in the record of rights and IL records. All the documents have been produced by the plaintiff in respect of Sy. No. 26/2b of Battarahalli village of Bidarahalli Hobli, Hoskote Taluk. Further on appreciation of material evidence on record, the trial Court has recorded a finding holding that the Plaintiff has established his title to the property and his dispossession by the defendant is unlawful and the construction of buildings is illegal. The evidence on record read along with commissioner's report submitted before this Court which is treated as evidence in this Appeal for the reason that, at the instance of the parties while considering I. A. II as referred to above appointed the court Commissioner which has been taken on record as the same was submitted by the Court Commissioner on the basis of memo of instructions given by the parties after inspection of the suit property with reference to the documents produced bv the parties in the report it has clearly stated that, way back in the year 1979 there was subdivision in respect of the property in question. Further, the sketch produced in respect of Sy. No. 26/2b clearly shows that it is the schedule property in respect of which the structure is put up on the site in question to the extent as entered in Blue Colour Pencil Mark the construction is made on property bearing Sy. No. 26/2b, which tallies with the schedule property with a rough sketch produced at ex. P26. No. 26/2b clearly shows that it is the schedule property in respect of which the structure is put up on the site in question to the extent as entered in Blue Colour Pencil Mark the construction is made on property bearing Sy. No. 26/2b, which tallies with the schedule property with a rough sketch produced at ex. P26. This evidence would clearly go to show that the findings of the Trial Court and first Appellate Court on the claim and counter claim of the parties have been further held to be legal and valid. ( 12 ) THE findings and the reasons assigned on the issues recorded by the Trial Court has been re-examined in detail on the basis of legal contentions urged by the parties, by the first Appellate Court being the last Court of appreciation of facts and evidence on record the same has been extensively considered and answered the points formulated by it in the Judgment and answered all the points against the defendant. The first appellate Court has also referred to the evidence on record and recorded its reasons by assigning valid and cogent reasons in support of its findings and conclusions. I have carefully gone through the same. At paragraph-20, 25, 26, 27 of the impugned judgment with reference to the documentary evidence namely Ex. P24, the survey sketch P23 the record of sub-division, p. 11 record of right and further at paragraph-31 on appreciation of evidence on record, it has recorded a finding of fact that the findings of the Trial Court are legal and valid as the plaintiff has established his title to the property as the absolute owner. At paragraph-32, the case sought to be established by the defendant with reference to sy. No. 26/1 of Seegehalli Village, the boundaries are given by the defendant. It has considered and examined with reference to his claim that his grand-father over a period of 70 years is in enjoyment of the property and about 12 years earlier to the dis-possession i. e. during 1990 the defendant's name was changed as Khatedar. At paragraph-33 with reference to the legal contentions urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of plaintiff it has rightly held that he must succeed on the strength of his own title. At paragraph-33 with reference to the legal contentions urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of plaintiff it has rightly held that he must succeed on the strength of his own title. In the absence of production of relevant title deeds, his claim shall not strengthen or the weakness of the case of defendant is also considered with reference to the judgment of the Apex Court, this Court and Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1954 SC, AIR 1953 MYS 44 and AIR 1959 Cal 50 and recorded a finding holding that burden was on the plaintiff to prove his title on the basis of issues framed by me Trial Court to establish his title to the property has been extensively considered by the first Appellate Court and findings have been recorded with reference to the documentary evidence and recorded a finding holding that the plaintiff had title to the property in question as the finding is based on documentary evidence. Therefore, neither the trial Court nor the first appellate Court had recorded the finding in favour of the plaintiff solely on the basis of defective title of the defendant in respect of Sy. No. 26/1 of Seegehalli village. On the other hand, for the reasons stated supra, the Courts below have extensively referred to the documentary and oral evidence on record in support of the case of the plaintiff and recorded a finding holding that the plaintiff has established his title to the property in question. In this view of the matter reliance placed on the Judgment of the Apex court, this Court and Calcutta High Court referred to supra are totally inapplicable to the facts of this case and therefore they are misplaced and hence the same cannot be accepted by this Court. ( 13 ) FURTHER, the contentions urged on behalf of the defendant-appellant that the plaintiff had no personal knowledge to speak to the contents of the documents. The power of attorney holder pursuant to Ex. P1 given authority to depose evidence on behalf of plaintiff to depose that the plaintiff has title to the property as the owner and entitled for the reliefs as prayed is the original in respect of the property in question. The defendant has clearly deposed in his evidence that he has no objection for grant of decree in respect of suit schedule property. The defendant has clearly deposed in his evidence that he has no objection for grant of decree in respect of suit schedule property. In this view of the matter he has not disputed the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the property in question. Further it is substantiated by the plaintiff on the basis of the document Ex. P2 the order passed by the Spl. Deputy Commissioner in respect of the land in question which clearly speaks with respect to land in question conferring occupancy rights in the name of the plaintiff's vendor and his name has been mutated, after purchase, the name of the plaintiff is entered. Since the documents themselves speak, the examination of the plaintiff and competent officers to prove the contents of the documents Ex. P22, 23 and 24 is wholly untenable in law for the reasons that conferment of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question in favour of the plaintiffs vendor is established vide Ex. P2. Further entries in the revenue records in respect of the land in question in the name of the plaintiff's vendor and his name would clearly speak the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the property in question till he was dispossessed by the defendant as pleaded in the plaint. The entries in these documents have got presumptive value as rightly held by the first appellate Court under the provisions of the KLR Act of 1964. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons stated supra, PW 1 with reference to the documents produced by the plaintiff non-examination of the officers to prove the contents of the documents as contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the defendant, the findings are not vitiated for the reason that the Courts below have placed reliance upon these documents and recorded findings on proper appreciation of the same and rightly answered the points in favour of the plaintiff, which findings and conclusions are legal and valid in law, therefore the same cannot be interfered with by this Court. ( 15 ) FURTHER, the concurrent findings of the first Appellate Court should not be interfered with by this Court unless they are shown to be erroneous in law as laid down by the Supreme Court. For the reasons stated supra, the substantial question of law No. (c) is answered against defendant-appellant. Hence, the appeal must fail. ( 15 ) FURTHER, the concurrent findings of the first Appellate Court should not be interfered with by this Court unless they are shown to be erroneous in law as laid down by the Supreme Court. For the reasons stated supra, the substantial question of law No. (c) is answered against defendant-appellant. Hence, the appeal must fail. Accordingly, I pass the following order : the Appeal is dismissed. ( 16 ) AFTER dictating the Judgment, the learned Counsel for the defendant/appellant has made oral application in view of dismissal of the appeal as he had the benefit of conditional interim order granted by this Court on 19. 11. 1996 on the undertaking given by him stating that he shall not alienate the schedule property and not to make any improvement upon the property including the construction of buildings. The said conditional interim order may be continued for another 90 days. ( 17 ) LEARNED Counsel for plaintiff/respondent has opposed the prayer. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and defendant-appellant had the benefit of conditional interim order and as the appeal is dismissed, it would be proper and appropriate for this Court to direct the defendant-appellant to work out his rights. Hence, the interim order granted by this Court is extended for a period of 60 days from today on the same conditions that were imposed by this Court in this Appeal.