Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks quashing of complaint dated 9.4.1996 (Annexure P-1) for prosecution of the petitioners under Section 3(k)(i) read with Sections 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 and also Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act and the Rules respectively). 2. The facts necessary for deciding the controversy may briefly be mentioned. On 18.7.1994, Insecticide Inspector, Bhatinda, Shri Prithipal Singh inspected the shop of M/s Rallis India Limited, Bhatinda in the presence of Bikkar Singh an Agricultural Officer, Bhatinda. At the time of inspection, Shri Rakesh Sanwal, one of the petitioners who is Area Sales Manager of M/s Rallis India Limited was present. The Insecticide Inspector selected 3 pieces of Acephate 75% SP in the packing of 250 grams each out of the lot of 2560 packets. Three packets picked up by the Insecticide Inspector bore Batch No. B-3 with dates of manufacturing January, 1994, Expiry December, 1995 inscribed on it and also declaring that it was manufactured by M/s Rallis India Limited, Bombay. Three packets were purchased by the Insecticide Inspector and consent of the dealer was taken before taking the sample. Various other formalities like preparing of Form No. XII and XIII, signing by the Area Sales Manager Shri Rakesh Sanwal on Form No. XII, packing of the three samples in polythene bags and then putting the bags in three separate cloth bags along with Form No. XIII and sealing the same with the Inspector Seal No. 1.1/1/Bti were undertaken. One sealed sample and Form No. XII was handed over to Shri Rakesh Sanwal and the remaining two samples were deposited in the office of Chief Agricultural Officer, Bathinda along with Form Nos. XII and XIII. The Chief Agricultural Officer sent the sample along with Form No. XIII to the Central Insecticides Laboratory, Faridabad (for brevity, CIL) on 21.7.1994 for analysis through a registered parcel. The test report of the sample was received from the Scientific Officer, CIL vide his letter No. Chem/CIL/Pb/94- 95/1/RIS dated 24.8.1994. The test report was received in the office of Chief Agricultural Officer, Bhatinda on 9.9.1994 and the sample was declared misbranded as it did not conform to the specification in the active ingredients which were found to be 67.9% instead of 75% SP. 3. The test report was received in the office of Chief Agricultural Officer, Bhatinda on 9.9.1994 and the sample was declared misbranded as it did not conform to the specification in the active ingredients which were found to be 67.9% instead of 75% SP. 3. On 29.9.1994 the analysis report was furnished by the Chief Agricultural Officer, Bhatinda to Shri Rakesh Sanwal along with the show cause notice in accordance with the requirement of Section 24(2) of the Act and also to the manufacturing firm vide letter No. 9375 dated 3.10.1994. The licence of the firm M/s Rallis India Limited, Bhatinda which was issued vide licence No. IN-Best/Bhatinda/11/92-3 was cancelled vide CAO office letter No. 13681 dated 15.11.1994. 4. It is alleged that Shri Rakesh Sanwal, Area Sales Manager of M/s Rallis India Limited, Bhatinda committed an offence under Section 18 read with Section 3(k)(i) of the Act by selling misbranded insecticide. It was further alleged that Shri Hardip Singh, Director and Shri I.J. Vernal, Chief Chemist of M/s Rallis India Limited, Bombay, the manufacturing firm have committed an offence under Sections 17, 18 and 33 of 1968 Act by formulating and supplying misbranded insecticide. 5. The complainant-Insecticide Inspector also enclosed a notification declaring him as Insecticide Inspector and also authorisation to lodge the complainant under Section 27 of the Rules. It has been further claimed by the complainant that he is a public servant under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and has also been given sanction to launch prosecution against the petitioners, which is required by Section 3(k)(i) of the Act and copy of the sanction issued by the Joint Director, Agricultural Punjab, Chandigarh was enclosed. 6. The complainant made a prayer to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhatinda to take cognizance of various offences committed by the petitioner and issue summons to them to face trial under Sections 17, 18, 29 and 33 read with Section 3(k)(i) of the Act and also under Rule 27(5) of the Rules. The Chief Judicial Magistrate after hearing the complainant in person issued process for 20.5.1996 vide his order dated 10.4.1996. 7. The Chief Judicial Magistrate after hearing the complainant in person issued process for 20.5.1996 vide his order dated 10.4.1996. 7. The case set up by the petitioner is that when the notices were issued to them on 29.9.1994, they sent their replies on 10.10.1994 to the Chief Agricultural Officer-cum-Insecticide Inspector, Bhatinda vide Annexures P6 to P8 and claimed that the second unit of sample lying with the Insecticide Inspector/Chief Agricultural Officer may kindly be got re-analysed. They based their claim for re-analysis of the sample under Section 24(3)(4) of the Act. They also offered to deposit the cost of re-testing as required by Section 24(5) of the Act. In the reply submitted by the factory Manager of M/s. Rallis India Limited, Thane, it was claimed that the company had analysed its preserved counter sample of the same Batch i.e. B-3 - January 1994 - December 1995 and found the same to be satisfactory. The analytical report was sent with the reply which is annexed as Annexure P-9. However, it failed to satisfy the Insecticide Inspector who had applied for grant of sanction for launching the prosecution and authorisation to take further action under Rule 25(5) of the Rules. The necessary sanction was granted to him on 21.12.1995 vide letter No. 19191-93/31-751/41-25-III issued by the Joint Director, Agriculture (Plant Protection) Punjab. 8. The question which requires consideration in the present petition is whether the right of the petitioners to defend has been obstructed because of the fact that the opportunity to get the sample re-analysed and re-tested is adversely affected. According to the plea taken in the petition, the shelf life of the insecticide had expired in December, 1995 and the complaint was filed on 9.4.1996 which has hampered their right to apply to the Court for re-testing the sample. It is claimed in their separate replies filed on 10.10.1994 that a prayer for retesting was made but it was not acceded to. Further plea of the petitioners is that once the shelf life of the insecticide has expired, the order of retesting by the Court is impossible and it violates the provisions of Section 24(4) of the Act. In support of the plea, numerous judgments have been cited by the petitioners, namely : M/s. United Presticides and anr. Further plea of the petitioners is that once the shelf life of the insecticide has expired, the order of retesting by the Court is impossible and it violates the provisions of Section 24(4) of the Act. In support of the plea, numerous judgments have been cited by the petitioners, namely : M/s. United Presticides and anr. v. State of Punjab and ors., 1992(1) Recent CR 678; V.K. Pahwa v. State of Punjab through Insecticide Inspector, 1994(3) Recent CR 377; M/s. Jai Chemicals, Faridabad v. State of Punjab, 1995(3) Recent CR 220; M/s. Kissan Trading Co. v. State of Punjab, 1996(1) Recent CR 132 and Surinder Pal Saini v. State of Punjab, 1997(1) Recent CR 602. 9. The petitioner has further claimed that there are no allegations against them in the complaint showing that they have committed any offence and in the absence of any allegation that the petitioners were incharge or were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, no criminal prosecution could be launched against them. 10. Shri S.S. Gill, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab has argued that sub- section (4) of Section 24 of the Act is not attracted to the facts of the present case. He has pointed out that the proposition of law laid down in the judgments cited above cannot be disputed because in those cases, the tests were not carried by the CIL as has been done in the present case. He drew my attention to the report dated 22.8.1994 prepared by the CIL and argued that the right of retesting could be availed only in a case where the sample is not already tested by the CIL. However, in a case where the sample has already been tested by the CIL, there would be no legal ground to get it retested from the same laboratory. Relying on sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act, learned State counsel submitted that the report in the question dated 22.8.1994 is conclusive evidence. In so far as the plea of filing complaint after the date of expiry i.e. December, 1995, learned counsel submitted that the argument will not survive in view of his first submission. He further submitted that there was no substance in the arguments that no allegations have been levelled against the company or its officers as required by Section 33 of the Act. He further submitted that there was no substance in the arguments that no allegations have been levelled against the company or its officers as required by Section 33 of the Act. In this regard he drew my attention to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint. 11. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by the learned State counsel and I am of the considered view that the pleas taken by the petitioner do not merit acceptance. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners are entirely different than the facts revealed in this case. The requirements of sub-section (4) of the Section 24 of the Act is that the right of retesting would remain if the test has not been carried by the CIL. In a case where a test has been carried by the CIL, the right of retesting is not available. Section 24 of the Act reads as under :- "24. Report of Insecticide Analyst. - (1) The Insecticide Analyst to whom a sample of any insecticide has been submitted for test or analysis under sub- section (6) of Section 22, shall, within a period of sixty days, deliver to the Insecticide Inspector submitting it is signed report in duplicate in the prescribed form. (2) The Insecticide Inspector on receipt thereof shall deliver one copy of the report to the person from whom the sample was taken and shall retain the other copy for use in any prosecution in respect of the sample. (3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by an Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken has within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of the report notified in writing the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report. (4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory, where a person has under sub-section (3) notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversion of the Insecticide Analyst report, the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, cause the sample of the insecticide produced before the magistrate under sub-section (6) of Section 22 to be sent for test or analysis to the said laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by, or under the authority, of the Director of the Central Insecticides Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. (5) The costs of a test of analysis made by the Central Insecticides Laboratory under sub-section (4) shall be paid by the complainant or the accused, as the Court shall direct." 12. A perusal of above section makes it obvious that the report of the Director, CIL shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. It is also clear that if the Insecticide Inspector has not already got the sample tested or analysed from the CIL, then the right of retesting is a mandatory right. In cases where the sample has already been got tested from the CIL, the right of retesting stands exhausted. Therefore, I have no hesitation in rejecting this plea of the petitioners. 13. The second plea of the petitioners that the complaint has been filed after the date of expiry of the insecticide also does not merit acceptance. The insecticide in this case expired in December, 1995 and the complaint was filed on 9.4.1996. However, the sample was got tested from the CIL on 22.8.1994. Although, the petitioners have requested for retesting of the sample in their replies dated 10.10.1994 but I do not find any infirmity or any justification for such a request in view of the fact that the Insecticide Inspector-complainant had got the same tested already from the CIL. Therefore, even this plea of the petitioner is meritless and is rejected. 14. Although, the petitioners have requested for retesting of the sample in their replies dated 10.10.1994 but I do not find any infirmity or any justification for such a request in view of the fact that the Insecticide Inspector-complainant had got the same tested already from the CIL. Therefore, even this plea of the petitioner is meritless and is rejected. 14. In so far as the plea of lack of specific allegations against one or the other petitioners are concerned, it does not merit serious consideration for the simple reason that provisions of Section 33 read with Sections 17, 18 and 29 of the Act have been adequately complied with. The averments made by the Insecticide Inspector-complainant in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complainant can further be proved by leading evidence at the trial. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, 1985(1) RCR(Crl.) 539 : AIR 1985 SC 628 the Supreme Court held that once a prima facie case is made out, then complainant should be given an opportunity to prove his/her case, rather than quashing the complaint and such an exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure would be totally unwarranted. The majority view of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reads as under :- "A perusal of the allegations made in the complaint undoubtedly makes out a positive case of the accused having dishonestly misappropriated the articles handed over to them in a fiduciary capacity. To characterise such an entrustment as a joint custody or property given to the husband and the parents is wholly unintelligible to us. All the ingredients of an offence under S. 405 IPC were pleaded and a prima facie case for summoning the accused was made out. In such circumstances, the complainant should have been given an opportunity by the High Court to prove her case rather than quashing the complaint. Such an exercise of jurisdiction under S. 482 Cr.P.C. is totally unwarranted by law. ........" 15. Similar view has been taken in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1991(1) RCR(Crl.) 383 : JT 1990(4) SC 650. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down detailed guide-lines where the inherent powers conferred by section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure could be exercised. Their Lordships framed the following guide-lines :- "1. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1991(1) RCR(Crl.) 383 : JT 1990(4) SC 650. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down detailed guide-lines where the inherent powers conferred by section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure could be exercised. Their Lordships framed the following guide-lines :- "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Whether the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of the which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 16. For the aforementioned reasons, this petition fails and is dismissed. It is directed that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate may decide the case expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months as proceedings have remained stayed.