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2001 DIGILAW 14 (CAL)

Ram Ch. Oraon v. State of W. B.

2001-01-12

Dilip Kumar Seth

body2001
JUDGMENT Dilip Kumar Seth, J. A notice under section 12 of the Panchayat Act for removal of pradhan was issued on 22nd April, 2000, convening a meeting on 2nd May, 2000. Mr. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, contends that the said meeting did not take place or could not be held. A second notice was issued on 16th June, 2000 convening a meeting on 23rd June, 2000. Mr. Banerjee had not questioned the validity of the notice convening the said meeting but had contended that in view of 3rd proviso to section 12 within 6 months from 2nd May, 2000, no further meeting for removal of pradhan could be held. Therefore, convening a meeting on 23rd June, 2000, which is within 6 months, was void and cannot be sustained in view of 3rd proviso to section 12. He had pointed out from the decision in the case of Mustakin Hossain vs. The State of West Bengal, 1998 (2) Calcutta Law Times, 28, that the Division Bench judgment did not take note of the settled principle of law and as such the said judgment is per incurium and is not binding on the learned single Judge. He, therefore, contended that reliance placed on the said decision by the learned counsel for the respondents is of no consequence. According to him the proviso curbs out an exception from the general provision provided in the section. It is when the legislature intends that some parts are to be excluded from the general application of the main section then it curbs out an exception by incorporation of proviso. The proviso as intended by the legislature is to be interpreted meaning-fully. It cannot be overlooked. It has to be given effect to, even if it is inconsistent or is contrary to the general provision, inasmuch as the legislature had intended to curb out an exception from the general application of the main section. In order to substantiate his contentions, he had relied upon a passage from Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, page 219, on construction of repugnant proviso and saving clause. In order to substantiate his contentions, he had relied upon a passage from Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, page 219, on construction of repugnant proviso and saving clause. He also relied on a decision in the case of Sales Tax Officer, Jabalpur vs. Hanuman prasad, AIR 1967 SC 595 and in the case of Satnam Singh vs. Punjab & Haryana High Court & Ors., 1997 (III) SC.C, 353, in order to support his contention that the proviso curbs out an exception to the general provision by way of introducing the saving clause. He also relied on a decision in the case of A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC., 1531, in order to substantiate the principle of per incurium relying on paragraph 44 of the said judgment. Therefore, according to him, the said decision in the case of Mustakin Hossain(supra) is not binding on the learned single Judge. Therefore, this Court should pass appropriate order in this case, having regard to the 3rd proviso to section 12 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973. 2. Mr. Yamin Ali, learned Counsel for the respondent petitioner on the other hand contends that the 1st notice dated 22nd April, 2000, convening a meeting on 2nd May, 2000 was ultimately withdrawn, therefore it cannot be said that no meeting could be held. According to him, if notice is withdrawn there 'is no meeting convened and as such the application of 3rd proviso to section 12 is not attracted. Ultimately he argues that proviso can not eclipes the main provision. If it is in conflict with the main provision, in that event, the proviso has to yield to the main provision. He also relies the said decision in the case of Mustakin Hossain(supra) and points out that in the said decision an interpretation has been given having regard to the principle of law. The said decision cannot be termed as per incurium. At best it can be an alternative interpretation. It can be said to be an interpretation made by the court according to its wisdom. When there is possibility of alternative interpretation, in that event, the interpretation one way, or other will not attract the principle of per incurium. The said decision cannot be termed as per incurium. At best it can be an alternative interpretation. It can be said to be an interpretation made by the court according to its wisdom. When there is possibility of alternative interpretation, in that event, the interpretation one way, or other will not attract the principle of per incurium. He had pointed out that in the present case there is every possibility of interpretating the provisions in a different manner and as such in the present case the principle of per incurium cannot be attracted. 3. Mr. Soumitra Dasgupta, learned Counsel appearing for the State had supported the submissions of Mr. Yamin Ali and had pointed out that this decision is binding and the law has been correctly interpreted in the case of Mustakin Hossain(supra). He has also referred to a decision of the Division Bench upholding the decision of the learned Single Judge directing holding of meeting in a given case to be held within 6 months from the date of earlier meeting, the result whereof was struck of or set aside by the Court. Therefore, according to him the second meeting is permissible even within 6 months despite existence of 3rd proviso to section 12. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. The decision on which Mr. Dasgupta had relied upon is distinguishable or the facts and circumstances of the present case for 2 reasons. The first reason is that in the said decision, the case Mustakin Hossain (supra) was not cited and that the question involved therein was the validity of the resolution of the meeting held, was under consideration. In the said case a meeting was held and a resolution removing the Pradhan was adopted. Thus, it did not satisfy the condition that no meeting was held or though held no resolution removing the Pradhan could be taken. In such a case, when the resolution is struck off by the Court, the court could pass such order for holding of the same meeting again in accordance with law. Thus, it did not satisfy the condition that no meeting was held or though held no resolution removing the Pradhan could be taken. In such a case, when the resolution is struck off by the Court, the court could pass such order for holding of the same meeting again in accordance with law. The second reason is that in the said case the Upa-Pradhan was present in the meeting who is supposed to preside but he was not allowed to preside over the said meeting and therefore the resolution taken was held to be illegal and set aside and then a direction was given to hold the same meeting afresh though within 6 months. In fact, it was not the second meeting, it was the same meeting pursuant to the same notice that was permitted to be held afresh that too by an order of the Court. It was not a case that the meeting was not held and that the second meeting was called within the meaning of3rd proviso to section 12 of the said Act. Therefore, the said decision in the case of A. Singh & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors., in F.M.A.T. No. 3195 of 2000 disposed of on 22nd September by their Lordships Mr. S.B.Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was) and Mr. P.K. Roy, J., does not help us in the facts and circumstances of this case. Section 12 reads as follows: Removal of Pradhan and Upa-Pradhan (subject to the other provisions of this section, a Pradhan or a Upa-Pradhan) of a Gram Panchayat may, at any time, be removed from office (by a resoiution carried by the majority of the existing members referred to in clause (i) of subsection (2A) of section 4 at a meeting specially convened for the purpose. Notice of such meeting shall be given to the prescribed authority.: Provided that at any such meeting while any resolution for the removal of the Pradhan from his office is under consideration, the Pradhan, or while any resolution for the removal of the Upa-Pradhan from his office is under consideration, the Upa-Pradhan shall not though he is present preside and the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 16 shall apply in relation to every such meeting as they apply in relation to a meeting from which the Pradhan or, as the case may be, the Upa-Pradhan is absent: Provided further that no meeting for the removal of the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan under this section shall be convened within a period of one year from the date of election of the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan: Provided also that if, at a meeting convened under this section either no meeting is held or no resolution removing an office bearer is adopted, on other meeting shall be convened for the removal of the same office bearer within six months from the date appointed for such meeting". Section 12 prescribes that the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan can be removed from his office by a resolution at any time. Thereafter, the 3rd proviso has been provided in the said section. We are not concerned with the first two provisos. The third proviso is relevant for our present purpose. The 3rd proviso prescribes that no meeting can be convened for removal of the same office bearer within 6 months of the date appointed for a meeting could not be held or though held 'no resolution could be adopted removing such office bearer. The plain reading of the said provision does not appear to contradict the main provision. On the other hand, it puts a limitation with regard to a second meeting. The main section had prescribed 'at any time' which means at any point of time. But the legislature in its wisdom thought it fit that there should be some exception or saving or restriction or limitation. Therefore, it had excluded certain period for the purpose of application of section 12. Accordingly it had provided the 6 months embargo after a meeting fails i.e. could not be held or though held no resolution for removal could be adopted. Therefore, it had excluded certain period for the purpose of application of section 12. Accordingly it had provided the 6 months embargo after a meeting fails i.e. could not be held or though held no resolution for removal could be adopted. Therefore, it is in the wisdom of the legislature the application of the general provision was intended to be restricted or excepted in a given case. 5. The intention of legislature was clear to the extent that it had intended that there should be some exception and that certain situation should be excluded from the general application of the main section. The Court is not supposed to question the wisdom of the legislature. The enactment of the statute is made in the plenary jurisdiction of the legislature. The Court is not empowered to question such wisdom of plenary jurisdiction of the legislature. It is the interpretaion of the statute that has been enacted by the legislature, which the Court can examine for the purpose of interpreting it. The intention of the legislature is one of the principal guiding factor for the purpose of interpreting a particular provision. The intention could be deciphered from the scheme of the provision itself. Incorporation of the proviso to the general provision clearly indicates the legislative intent to restrict or exclude application of the general provision in respect or certain situation. It is in the form of saving clause or in other word an exception curved out of the general provision. While interpreting the statute the entire provision is to be reconciled. One part cannot be read out of context. The purpose, object and the scheme of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 no where prescribes that there would be no exception to a particular provision. Thus the proviso by no stretch of imagination could be stated to be contradictory. The purpose and object of the scheme of the section with the exception provided in the proviso cannot be said to be in conflict with the purpose or object or the scheme of the Act. The said proviso has provided a restriction with regard to the application of the section itself. The purpose and object of the scheme of the section with the exception provided in the proviso cannot be said to be in conflict with the purpose or object or the scheme of the Act. The said proviso has provided a restriction with regard to the application of the section itself. Section 12 is absolutely clear and that there is no ambiguity with regard to the intention of the legislature that it had intent that there will be certain exception to the general application of the main section, or in other words the expression 'at any time' is admitted to be excepted in its application with regard to certain situation. It is in a particular situation' the application of the expression 'at any time' has been qualified and/or restricted or limited. It has not altogether obliterated the said expression 'at any time'. It is only h restriction that is put to at a given situation. It is in the wisdom of the legislature such restriction or limitation has been incorporated. The principle of interpretation have been almost settled with regard to the meaning and purpose of incorporating proviso to statute. Now we may examine how far the proposition discussed above are settled principle of law with reference to the ratio decided in various decisions of Courts. 6. A proviso is something engrafted on a proceeding enactment. It follows the enacting part of a section and is in a way independent of it (Kartar Singh vs. Lallen Singh, AIR 1962 MP 104 ). Normally it does not enlarge the section, and in most cases it cuts down or makes an exception from the ambit of the main provision (Villiammal vs. Area Committee for Madras City, ILR 1962 Mad 812). It exempts something, which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of the statute. It reserves something which would otherwise, included in the words of the enacting part (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 154). 7. It exempts something, which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of the statute. It reserves something which would otherwise, included in the words of the enacting part (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 154). 7. An exception exempts something which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of the statute: It is a fair principle of the statutory construction that where you find in the same section express exceptions from the operative part of the section, it may be assumed, unless it otherwise appears from the language employed, that this exceptions were necessary, as otherwise the subject matter of the exceptions would have come within the operative provisions of the sections. (Government of the Province of Bombay vs. Harmusji Maenkji, AIR 1947 PC 200 at pages 205,206.). In Brown vs.Meryland (12 Wheat 419 at page 438) Marshall C.J. observed" ifit be a rule of interpretation to which all assent, that the exceptions of a particular thing from general words, proves that, in the opinion of the law giver, the things excepted would be within the general clause had the exception not been made, we know no reason why this general rule should not be as applicable to the constitution as to other instrument, Dunkun vs. State of Queens Land, 22 CLR 556 at page 592. Sometimes it is also used to explain the general words of the Act and to exclude some ground which would extend to cases not intended to be brought within its operation or purview (Crawford, pp 128, 891"). 8. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment (Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12 p. 14 (para 8); Ishvarilal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhani Nagjibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459 , P. 465; Nizam's Religious Endowment Trust, Hyderabad vs. CIT, A.P., AIR 1966 SC 1007 , p.1010). Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12 p. 14 (para 8); Ishvarilal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhani Nagjibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459 , P. 465; Nizam's Religious Endowment Trust, Hyderabad vs. CIT, A.P., AIR 1966 SC 1007 , p.1010). As stated by LUSH, J., "when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso" (Mullins vs. Treasurer of Survey, (1980) 5 QBD 170, P. 173; referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory vs. Subhas Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 , p. 1600; Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1965 SC 1728 , p. 1730). In the words of Lord Macmillan: "The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case" (Madras & Sourhern Maharatta Rly. Co. Ltd. vs. Bezwada Municipality, AIR 1944 PC 71 p. 73; referred to in CIT, Mysore etc. vs. Indo mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713 , p. 719; S. Sundaram Pillai vs. P.Pattaviraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591 , P. 608 : AIR 1985 SC 582 ). The proviso may, as Lord Macnaghten laid down, be" a qualification of the proceeding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate" (Local Govt. Board vs. South Stoneham Union, (1909) AC 57 (HL), P. 62). The general rule has been stated by HIDAYATULLAH, J., in the following words;" As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and oridinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule" (Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 , p. 1600; S. Sundaram Pillai vs. P.Pattaviraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591 , p.608: AIR 1985 SC 582 ; Motiram Ghelabhai vs. Jagnnagar, (1985) 2 SCC 279 , p. 285: AIR 1985 se 709). And in the words of KAPUR, J. "The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment" (CIT, Mysore etc. vs. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1956 SC 713 , P. 717; Kedarnath Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12 , P. 14; T. M. Kanniyan vs. ITO, Pondicherry, AIR 1968 SC 637 , P. 641. As consequence of the aforesaid function of a true proviso certain rules follow. 9. A distinction is said to exist between provisions worded as 'proviso' 'Exception' or 'Saving clause',. Exception is intended to restrain the enacting clause to particular cases; 'proviso, is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially; and 'Saving Clause' is used to preserve from destruction certain rights, remedies or privileges already existing, (Horack: Cases and Materials on Legislations, 2nd Edition, P. 572). 'Saving' means that it saves all the rights the party previously had, not that it gives him any new rights. Saving Clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others to safeguard rights which, but for the savings would be lost and these clauses are seldom used to construe the Act. (Arnold vs. Mayor and Corporation of Gravesend, 2K & J. 574 : (1856) 25 LJ Ch 776, (Page Wood V.C.): Fitzgerald vs. Champneys, (1861) 30 LJ Ch 777, P.783 (page Wood V.C.); Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills vs. Sub hash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 p. 1600). The better rule appears to be not to give undue weight to the aforesaid distinction which are somewhat obscure, and to direct one's attention to the substance rather than to the form adopted by the legislature. Referring to the proviso appended to section 3(1) of the Indian Press Act, 1910. The better rule appears to be not to give undue weight to the aforesaid distinction which are somewhat obscure, and to direct one's attention to the substance rather than to the form adopted by the legislature. Referring to the proviso appended to section 3(1) of the Indian Press Act, 1910. LORD PHILLIMORE, differing from the construction placed on it by the majority of the Madras High Court, said: "It is well settled that there is no magic in the words of a proviso and that the plain meaning must be given to the words of the legislature" (Besant vs. A.G. of Madras, ILR, 43 Mad 146 (PC), p. 155). Therefore, where the language used in a proviso is quite clear and no alternative view is possible, it is futile to go into the question whether the proviso operates as a substantive provision or only by way of exception and the plain meaning must be adopted (CIT, U.P. vs. Jagannath Mahadeo Prasad, AIR 1969 SC 209 ). Countering an argument against literal construction of the proviso in section 29 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1907-1939, based on the well-known principle that a proviso must be construed in relation to the principle matter to which it stands as a proviso, DU PARCO, L. J., observed:" The object of the Rule is to ensure that effect shall be given to the true intention of Parliament, and not to prevent the court from giving effect to that intention. Still less in the rule designed for the purpose of defeating the intention of the Legislature (No Nail Cases Proprietary Ltd. vs. No-Nail Boxes Ltd., (1944) 1 All ER 528 (CA), pp. 529, 530; affirmed in Craddock vs. Zevo Finance Co., (1946) 1 All ER 523 (HL). Just as a proviso is expected to except or qualify something in the enacting part and presumed, to be necessary. So also a saving clause may, in a proper case, negative an argument which results in making it unnecessary (Punjab Province vs. Daulat Singh, AIR 1942 PC 38, p. 42.). And just as a proviso may be redundant having been added to allay, so also a saving clause may often be added by way of a abundant caution (Punjab Province vs. Daulat Singh, supra p. 42; London Borough of Ealing vs. Race Relations Board, (1972) 1 All ER 105 (HL) p. 115.). And just as a proviso may be redundant having been added to allay, so also a saving clause may often be added by way of a abundant caution (Punjab Province vs. Daulat Singh, supra p. 42; London Borough of Ealing vs. Race Relations Board, (1972) 1 All ER 105 (HL) p. 115.). The thin distinction existing between' an 'Exception', a 'Proviso' and a 'Saving Clause' and use of such forms having often been corrupted by Draftsmen, the more safe rule is stated in KENT'S Commentaries on American Law (12th Edition, vol. 8, y. 463). "The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation' and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail" (Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, P. 155). The House of Lords has affirmed this principle (Jennings vs. Lelly; (1939) 4 All ER 464 (HL) : VISCOUNT MAUGHAM observing that there can be no doubt that the view expressed in the above quotation is correct. In the same case, LORD WRIGHT stated: "The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. I do not think there is any other rule, even in the case of a proviso in the strict and narrowest sense". These views have been accepted and applied also by the Privy Council (Commr. of Stamp Duties vs. Atwill, (1973) 1 All ER 576 (PC), 579, 'pp. 580, 581.). And our Supreme Court (Tahsildar Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 , p. 1022; Madanlal Fakir Chand Dudhediya vs. S.Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1543 , p. 1551; CIT, Kerala vs. P. Krishna Warrier, AIR 1965 SC 59 , p. 63; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Madras vs. Ramkishan Srikishan Jhaver, AIR 1968 SC 59 , p. 64. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. Sales Tax Officer III, Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1034 , p. 1039: 1973 SCC (Tax) 307; Dwarka Prasad vs. Dwarka Das Saraf, AIR 1975 SC 1758 , p. 1764: (1976) 1 SCC 128 ). Hiralal Ratanlal vs. Sales Tax Officer III, Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1034 , p. 1039: 1973 SCC (Tax) 307; Dwarka Prasad vs. Dwarka Das Saraf, AIR 1975 SC 1758 , p. 1764: (1976) 1 SCC 128 ). A sincere effort should be made to reconcile the different provisions in case of apparent conflict bearing in mind that Parliament will not at the same time give something by one hand and take back the same thing by another. In case, however, of a real conflict, a question will arise as to which of the two conflicting provisions should prevail. The answer to such a question should not be so much made to depend on the form of the provisions or on their sequence in the statute as on their substance by determining which of them is the leading provision and which the subordinate one. The provisions are always included only to curve out certain exception in the form of proviso or saving clause. In page 219 in eraies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, it has been pointed out as follows: "It sometimes happens that there is a repugnancy between the enacting clauses and the provisos and saving clauses. The question that arises, how is the Act, taken as a whole, to be construed? The generally accepted rule with regard to the construction of a proviso in the Act which is repugnant to the purview of the Act is that laid down in Att. Gen. vs. Chelsea Waterworks, (1731) Fitzg 195 namely' that where the proviso of an Act of Parliament is directly repugnant to the purview, the proviso shall stand and be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers.' (Wood vs. Riley, (1867) L.R. 3 C.P 26, 27; Jobbins vs. Middlesex County Council, (1949) 1 KB. 142; Maxwell 11th Edition page 155." 10. Having regard to the said passage, it appears that even though the proviso is repugnant to the scheme than it stand as it speaks the last intention of the legislature. In the present case, it does not appear that the 3rd proviso to section 12 is repugnant to the purview of the whole Act. It is also not repugnant even to the main section. It is not in conflict with the section. It only qualifies or puts a restriction to the expression 'at any time'. In the present case, it does not appear that the 3rd proviso to section 12 is repugnant to the purview of the whole Act. It is also not repugnant even to the main section. It is not in conflict with the section. It only qualifies or puts a restriction to the expression 'at any time'. It does not obliterate the expression 'at any time' altogether neither does it make the main section in-effective. Thus the interpretation that was given in the decision of Mustakin Hossain (supra) is directly opposite or contrary to the principle of law laid down for interpretation of statute with regard to the meaning and purpose of incorporation of the proviso. 11. In Hanuman Prasad's case (supra), the Apex Court had held in paragraph 5 that in section 19(1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act certain amendments were made, but while making such amendment the proviso to the unamended section was not deleted or amended. Therefore, it had observed that it is the section that the principle clause to section 19(1) was amended, proviso to it was not deleted by the amending Act. The proviso was continued to remain in force. It is well recognised principle that the proviso is added to the principle clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principle clause what is included the legislature desires should be excluded. Thus, it had laid down the meaning and intent of the proviso to the extent of general provision in certain situation. 12. In the case of Satnam Singh, the Apex Court had again taken the similar views in paragraph 9 of the said decision. The Apex Court in the said decision had observed that the proviso curves out an exception. The proviso has to be strictly construed since it curves out the exception to the General Rule. The General Rule enacted in the main part is not to be unduly restricted by the expanding contents of the proviso which is intended to curve out the exception from the general rule. It is settled that a proviso cannot expand or limit the clear meaning of the main provision. Thus it appears that it curves out the exception but exception is to be construed strictly according to the intention of the legislature as incorporated in the proviso itself. 13. Thus the expression used in the proviso is an embargo. It is settled that a proviso cannot expand or limit the clear meaning of the main provision. Thus it appears that it curves out the exception but exception is to be construed strictly according to the intention of the legislature as incorporated in the proviso itself. 13. Thus the expression used in the proviso is an embargo. The Court is not supposed to give it a different meaning. It does not appear that the 3rd proviso unduly restricted the application of the general provision. The interpretation of 3rd proviso as addressed by Mr. Banerjee is also not expanding the exception but was a curving out by the legislature. In fact the legislature had intended to curve out an exception through the proviso so incorporated. 14. Legislature is deemed not to waste its words of to say anything in vain, (Laboadonco Vier(1983), AC 104). The presumption is always against super fluity in a statute. An Act should be construed as to avoid redundent or surplusage, (Aidal Singh vs. Karain Singh, AIR 1957 Allahabad 414). It is no doubt true that as a general rule legislature should be presumed not to make a superfluous provision. It is a well settled principle of construction that no part of a statute shall be so construed as to ascribe the legislature of having enacted a statutory clause which would be of no purpose or avail to anyone,. (Ahmed Roja Khan vs. Bhola Proceed, (1979) 27 BLJR 699). In short a Court should not be prompt to ascribe, and should not without necessity or sound reason impute to the language of a statute tautology or superfluity, (Manicka Gounder vs. Arunachala Gounder, AIR 1965 Madras 1). Every part of a statute should be given as far as possible its full meaning and effect and no word or clause should ordinarily be rejected as superfluous. An interpretation which makes a provision of law completely nugatory cannot be correct, (Shantilal vs. State, AIR 1958 Rajasthan 7). 15. Statute is to be construed as far as its different parts are concerned so as to reconcile each other in order to present one complete picture. Statute should be construed in a manner so that there may not be any repugnancy or inconsistency between its different portions. When two provisions are mutually contradictory they should be interpreted to read together as to obviate too aparent inconsistency. Statute should be construed in a manner so that there may not be any repugnancy or inconsistency between its different portions. When two provisions are mutually contradictory they should be interpreted to read together as to obviate too aparent inconsistency. It is well settled that all provisions have to be read together and construed harmoniously, and even when there are apparent inconsistency between a section of the Act and the proviso, there should •be a harmonious construction, so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature and to achieve the object of the Act. Inspiration may be drawn from Malik Singh Sitaram Maniwale vs. Jagat Singh Thakur Singh Kallwale, AIR 1987 Born 283 (DB). 16. One of the implied ground that weighed in the mind of the Division Bench, as it appears from the reading of the reasoning given in the decision of Mustakin Hossain (supra), was that the proviso leads not only to repugnancy but also to unreasonableness, futility, hardship, inconvenience, anomaly or absurdity. But these questions are already settled. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity, (Reg vs. Judge of the City of London Court, (1892) 1 QB 273). The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature, their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning; if, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are suceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same; but if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation (Veerappa vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 Mys 227). It matters not in such a case what the consequence may be. When by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced, even though it is absurd or mischevious, (Ghulam Mohd. vs. Panna Ram, AIR 1924 Lah 374). Where the language of law is clear, it is not necessary to see whether the interpretation put on the law is likely to lead or not to hardship and absurdities. The Court is not supposed to question the wisdom of the legislature (Mst. Kaulapati vs. Ram Baran, AIR 1932 All 494, at p. 498 (FB)). Where the language of law is clear, it is not necessary to see whether the interpretation put on the law is likely to lead or not to hardship and absurdities. The Court is not supposed to question the wisdom of the legislature (Mst. Kaulapati vs. Ram Baran, AIR 1932 All 494, at p. 498 (FB)). It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute Courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective; an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by statute (Sirajul Haque Khan vs. Sunni Central Board of Wakf, U.P., 1959 SCR 1287 ). The cannons of construction of statute do not permit the Court to take the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the consequences of a particular interpretation, as it is in substance a question of expedience for the legislature, (Ajit Kumar Roy vs. Surendra Nath Ghosh, AIR 1953 Cal 733 (FE). It is not the duty of the Court to make the law reasonable but it is its duty to expound it as it stands according to the real sence of the words and leave the remedy to others, (Venugopalan vs. Vijawada Municipality, AIR 1957 AP 833 ). When the language of a section of an Act is not ambiguous, in interpreting the plain words of such a positive enactment any suggestion of hardship is out of place (Amarnath vs. Tekchand. 1972 RCR 380, at p. 383(SC)). When the words of an enactment are clear and imperative, consideration of inconvenience or hardship have no place in its application to circumstances falling within the, words (Gulam Md. Ali vs. Corporation of Madras, ILR 52 Mad 866). The argumentum ab inconvenienti is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Parliament, and not for the Courts, to consider. In such a use the suffering citizen must appeal for relief to the lawgiver, and not the lawyer (Satyanarayana Murthl vs. Pappaya, ILR 1941 Mad 824). It is not for the court to extend the scope of the Act on the Ground of convenience when the language of the law is clear beyond doubt. In such a use the suffering citizen must appeal for relief to the lawgiver, and not the lawyer (Satyanarayana Murthl vs. Pappaya, ILR 1941 Mad 824). It is not for the court to extend the scope of the Act on the Ground of convenience when the language of the law is clear beyond doubt. Courts are bound to construe a section of an Act, according to the meaning of the language unless either in the section itself, or in any part of the Act anything is found to modify, quality or alter the statutory language, even if absurdity or anomaly be the result of such interpretation .(Rajib Panda vs. Lakhun Sendh Mahapatra, ILR 27 Cal 11). Where the text is clear and the anomalous interpretation is irresistable, the Court has to accept it, leaving it to the legislature to remove the anomalies. If the language employed is plain and unambiguous the same must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences that may arise (Daryabi vs. Surajmal, 1979 MPLJ 413 ). 17. Having regard to the text of the section 12 and the proviso in view of the decision cited and the discussion made above, it appears that the proviso is neither nor inconsistent with the main section. Nor it leads to absurdity. Neither it brings about any unreasonableness nor inconvenience, nor anomally nor hardship. On the otherhand it had intended to prevent abuse of the main section which is clear from the scheme of the section. The legislature had intended to provide for some safeguard through the proviso. Unless the proviso was provided unscrupulous people would continuously resort to sub-section (1) affecting the functioning of the panchayat. It is with that view, the legislature had intended to curb out an exception to the extent as provided in the proviso. Such intention of the legislature appears to be clear and unambiguous. 18. Thus having regard to the discussion made above, it appears that the principle of interpretation with regard to the proviso has not been followed by the Division Bench while interpreting the 3rd proviso as non-existent and irrelevant. The settled principle of interpretation has completely been overlooked in the said decision. 18. Thus having regard to the discussion made above, it appears that the principle of interpretation with regard to the proviso has not been followed by the Division Bench while interpreting the 3rd proviso as non-existent and irrelevant. The settled principle of interpretation has completely been overlooked in the said decision. If the said decision is accepted in that event, the 3rd proviso would be altogether redundant and that will be striking out of the 3rd proviso without holding that the same is ultra vires, which the Court cannot do. In fact, if the said interpretation is accepted, in that event, the Court will enter into the arena of legislation. In other words the Court has amended the 3rd proviso by deleting the same from the statute. The Court had no jurisdiction to legislate. Therefore, it cannot delete or amend the 3rd proviso or render it non-existent, This is also a settled principle of law which has been completely over-looked in the decision of Mustakin Hossain (supra). 19. The judgment that overlooks or is oblivious of the settled principle of law or had over-looked the particular decision on the question, in that event, the same could be termed as per incurium. In the decision in the case of A.R. Antulay, in paragraph 44, the Apex Court had held: "44. It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid directions on 16th February, 1984, for the disposal of the case against the appellant by the High Court, the directions were given oblivious of the relevant provisions of law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ) (supra). See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26 page 297, para 578 and page 300, the relevant notes 8,11,15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn. Pages 128 & 130; Youngy, Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 2 All ER 293 at p. 300 also see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore vs. Hewitt, (1947) 2 All ER 89, 92A. 'per incurium' are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness or some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is bases, is found, on that account to be demostravly wrong. See Morelee vs. Wakeling, (1955) 1 All ER 708, 718F. See Morelee vs. Wakeling, (1955) 1 All ER 708, 718F. Also see State of Orissa vs. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., (1985) 3 SCR 26 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1293 ). We are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions were legally wrong." 20. In the present case, in fact, the said decision has been given in ignorance of or forgetfulness of the settled principle of law as discussed above with regard to the interpretation of statute particularly with regard to the meaning of the proviso discussed hereinbefore. Since the judgment is per incurium, it has no binding effect. Therefore, the said decision can not stand in the way of deciding the issue involved in this case in accordance with law. 21. In the present case, admittedly the 1st notice was issued on 22nd April, 2000 and the meeting dated 2nd May, 2000 was not held. It is contended by Mr. Yamin Ali, that the notice was withdrawn. But no material has been produced to show that the notice was ever withdrawn. Mr. Banerjee submits that no notice withdrawing the said convened meeting was ever served upon any of the members of the panchayat. Mr. Yamin Ali has not been able to point out that such notice was served on the members oft he panchayat. There is nothing to indicate that the meeting so convened was withdrawn. In such circumstances it is to be presumed that the meeting convened by the notice dated 22nd April, 2000 was not held or could not be held. Therefore, the 3rd proviso to section 12 is attracted and no meeting could be held within a period of 6 months from 2nd May, 2000. Admittedly, the 2nd notice was issued on 16th June, 2000, for convening the meeting on 23rd June, 2000, within 6 months from 2nd May, 2000.Therefore, the said' meeting is hit by the mischief of 3rd proviso to section 12 and as such could not be held. Therefore, holding of the said meeting and passing of the resolution are void ab-initio and cannot be sustained in law. Therefore, holding of the said meeting and passing of the resolution are void ab-initio and cannot be sustained in law. Therefore, the minutes of the said meeting dated 23rd June, 2000 as well as the resolution adopted therein and all other or further consequential steps taken cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. Let a writ of Certiorari do issue accordingly. . 22. Mr. Yamin Ali, learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents points out that in the meantime 6 months from 2nd May, 2000 has lapsed. In fact 6 months having lapsed, now it is open to the respondents to convene a fresh meeting. This order will not prevent them from convening a fresh meeting under section 12, if they are so advised. 23. Thus the writ petition is disposed of without any order as to costs. 24. Let a xerox certified copy of this order be supplied to the applicant, if applied for, as early as possible. Writ petition allowed and a writ of certiorari issued.