JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.:- This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 2.12.1991 passed by the learned District Judge, Chamba, whereby the appeal of the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1990 passed by the learned sub Judge, Chamba dismissing the suit of the appellants and proforma respondent No.5 for possession of land measuring 7 bighas 3 biswas comprising Khasra Nos. 145, ] 46,201,238,251,308,311,318,322 and338 Khata Khatauni No.8/13 situate, Distt. Chamba (hereafter referred to as the suit land) had been dismissed. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of this appeal are that the appellants and proforma respondent No.5 instituted a suit for possession of the suit land against the contesting respondent Chuhru (hereafter referred to as the respondent). As per the plaint, case of the appellants is that they were owners in possession of the land measuring 13 bighas 3 biswas comprising khata khatauni Nos. 8/13 and 14 in the said village along with proforma respondents and they never inducted the defendant as a tenant over the said land. However, in the absence of the appellants, without their knowledge and in collusion with the revenue officials, the respondent got himself recorded as non occupancy tenant in respect of the suit land and on the basis of these erroneous entries, took unlawful possession of the land in suit in October 1985. Since the respondent has no right to remain in possession of the suit land, therefore, the suit for possession was instituted by the appellants. 3. The respondent contested the claim of the appellants and proforma respondent No.5. In the written statement, he claimed that the suit land was sold to him by the appellants and plaintiff respondent No.5 vide a written document dated 3.6.1982 for consideration in the sum of Rs.8800/-. At the time . f the said sale dated 3.6.1982, the respondent was put in possession of the suit land. He has, therefore, denied taking unlawful possession of the suit land. 4. The Appellants and proforma respondent No.5 filed replication wherein they denied any writing having been executed by them and claimed that if there was any such writing, it was obtained by fraud and was not binding on them and reiterated the averments as made in the plaint. 5. He has, therefore, denied taking unlawful possession of the suit land. 4. The Appellants and proforma respondent No.5 filed replication wherein they denied any writing having been executed by them and claimed that if there was any such writing, it was obtained by fraud and was not binding on them and reiterated the averments as made in the plaint. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues: 1. Whether entries in favour of defendant No. 1 as tenants of the suit land are illegal and in connivance with the revenue staff, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether on the basis of wrong entries, defendant No. l forcibly took possession of the land in dispute as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether plaintiff sold the suit land to defendant No. l on3.6.1982for a consideration of Rs.8800/- and put him into possession, as alleged? OPR 3-AWhether the writing dated 3.6.1982 is inadmissible in law and does not confer any title upon the defendant? OPP. 4. Relief. 6. The trial Court decided issues 1,2 and 3 - A against the appellants and on issue No.3 held that appellants and proforma respondent No.5 though did not sell the suit land in the strict legal sense but had agreed to transfer their interest therein for consideration of Rs.8800/- and as a consequence dismissed the suit. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge in the Court of the learned District Judge, Chamba, who dismissed the same by the impugned judgment. Hence the present appeal. 8. This appeal had been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions: 1. Whether both the courts below have not taken into consideration the evidence on record and have passed their findings on conjectures and surmises. If so, its effect. 2. Whether Decree and the judgments are vitiated because the Courts below have made out a new case for the Defendants/Respondents which they never pleaded. 3. Whether the document Ex.D-4 witnesses the transfer of the right, title and interest in the suit land by the plaintiff inspite of the admitted fact that Abdul Rajak one of the Plaintiff-Appellant is insane. 4. Whether the Defendant/Respondent can be benefited by the principle of part performance without pleading it. 9. 3. Whether the document Ex.D-4 witnesses the transfer of the right, title and interest in the suit land by the plaintiff inspite of the admitted fact that Abdul Rajak one of the Plaintiff-Appellant is insane. 4. Whether the Defendant/Respondent can be benefited by the principle of part performance without pleading it. 9. At the time of bearing, it was noticed that question No. 1 in fact calls in question the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below and question No.2 is fully covered By question No.4. this position was conceded even by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, question No. 1 supra was treated as not a substantial question of law" and question No.2 was treated as redundant and thus, arguments on these questions were not addressed. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the remaining two questions. Question No.3 11. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that it is case of the appellants that Abdul Rajak is insane and he sued through next friend. The averments regarding his being insane are made vide para 1 of the plaint which have been admitted by the respondents vide para 1 of the written statement. Thus, there is no dispute that appellant Abdul Rajak is insane, therefore, the writingJ2x.D-4 allegedly executed by him is void. Therefore, on the basis of this document, the respondent could not be held in possession of the suit land in part performance of the agreement and his possession could not be protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act (hereafter referred to as the Act). 12. Section 12 of the contract Act reads as follows: "2.What is a sound mind for the purposes of contracting: A person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if, at the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests. A person who is usually of unsound mind, but occasionally of sound mind, may make contract when he is of sound mind. A person who is usually of sound mind, but occasionally of unsound mind, may not make a contract when he is of unsound mind." 13. A person who is usually of unsound mind, but occasionally of sound mind, may make contract when he is of sound mind. A person who is usually of sound mind, but occasionally of unsound mind, may not make a contract when he is of unsound mind." 13. It is clear from a bare reading of the above section that a contract by an insane person is void. However, even an insane person can enter into a lawful agreement during lucid intervals and if such person was of sound mind at the time of execution of the agreement/deed and subsequently became of unsound mind, such agreement/deed executed by him prior to his becoming insane will undoubtedly be valid. 14. It is admitted case of the respondent that at the time of institution of the suit, said Abdul Rajak was insane. However, there is nothing on the record to show that at the time of execution of Ex.D-4 he was of unsound mind. 15. The respondent pleaded execution of Ex.D-4 vide para 2 of the written statement. In reply to this para, the appellants in their replication, never raised the objection that at the time of execution of Ex.D-4, said Abdul Rajak was of unsound mind. Instead, it was pleaded that the alleged writing was never executed by the appellants and proforma respondent No.5 and if there is any such writing signed by them, their signatures had been obtained by fraud. Thus, instead of insanity of respondent Abdul Rajak, defence of fraud was pleaded. For want of pleadings, there is no issue regarding he insanity of the said respondent nor there is any evidence to show that at the time of execution of Ex.D-4, he was of unsound mind. It has not been put even to the scribe and marginal witnesses of Ex.D-4 nor is stated by any of the PWs that the said respondent was of unsound mind at the time of execution of Ex.D-4. Be it stated that Ex.D-4 was executed on 3.6.1982 whereas the suit was instituted more than 5 years thereafter on 29.7.1987. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly concluded that there were neither pleadings nor evidence to prove that; at the time of execution of Ex.D-4, respondent Abdul Rajak was insane. The document Ex.D-4, therefore, cannot be said to be void. Question No.4 16. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly concluded that there were neither pleadings nor evidence to prove that; at the time of execution of Ex.D-4, respondent Abdul Rajak was insane. The document Ex.D-4, therefore, cannot be said to be void. Question No.4 16. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the respondent had not pleaded in his written statement that he is in possession of the suit land in part performance of a contract, therefore, the appellants could not be non-suited by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 53-A of the Act, more so when the alleged writing Ex.D-4 is inadmissible in evidence for want of being unstamped and unregistered and could not be read in evidence to make out a case under the said Section for the appellants. 17. The plea of part performance under Section 53-A of the Act is a mixed question of law and fact. There for the defendant claiming the benefit thereof must raise the plea in the written statement. It is, however, not necessary that to take the benefit of the doctrine of part performance plea must be specifically and expressly raised with reference to the provisions of Section 53-A of the Act. It would be sufficient if all the relevant facts which constitute a plea of part performance of a contract are mentioned in the written statement. 18. Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act reads as under:-"53A. It would be sufficient if all the relevant facts which constitute a plea of part performance of a contract are mentioned in the written statement. 18. Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act reads as under:-"53A. Part performance: Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty: and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof." 19. It is evident from a bare reading of the above section that to constitute f the defence of part performance, the necessary conditions are (1) that the I transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property I by writing signed by him or on his behalf, (2) that the terms and conditions to constitute the transfer can be ascertained from such writing with reasonable certainty, (3) that the transferee has in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract, (4) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract and (5) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. 20. 20. It may also be stated that Section 53-A is intended to protect ignorant transferees who take possession or spend money in respect of the property relying on the documents which are ineffective as transfers or on contracts which cannot be proved for want of registration. The section, therefore, relaxes the rigors of the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act by embodying the doctrine of part performance as a defence. 21. The respondent, vide paras 2 and 3 of his written statement, has specifically averred that the suit land was sold to him by the plaintiffs by a writing dated 3.6.1982 after having received consideration in the sum of Rs.8800/- and the possession was also delivered to him and he was authorised to get the mutation attested in his name. After the execution of the said writing, the respondent is in continuous possession of the suit land and the entries regarding his possession were made in the Khasra girdawari in Khrif 1982 but since such entries were not incorporated in the jamabandi for the year 1983-84, therefore, such entries were again made in his favour from Khrif 1984 and that a report in the rojnamcha dated 14.11.1984 was also made and the respondent remained in possession of the suit land on the basis of the said writing. The writing referred to in the written statement, is Ex.D-4 and was filed along with the written statement and witnesses that the appellants and proforma respondent No.5 sold the land owned and possessed by them in Mohal Daloi in favour of the respondent for consideration in the sum of Rs.88OO/- and that the possession of the land was delivered to the respondent on the date of execution of the writing Ex.D-4 i.e. on 3.6.1982. Thus, the ingredients constituting the plea of doctrine of part performance were sufficiently pleaded in the written statement. Therefore, it cannot be said that the courts below have wrongly taken into account the provisions of Section 53-A of the Act to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff for possession of the suit land. 22. Thus, the ingredients constituting the plea of doctrine of part performance were sufficiently pleaded in the written statement. Therefore, it cannot be said that the courts below have wrongly taken into account the provisions of Section 53-A of the Act to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff for possession of the suit land. 22. The plea as raised for the appellants that document Ex.D-4 could not have been taken into account to come to a conclusion that the possession of the plaintiff was protected under Section 53-A of the Act, as this document is neither stamped nor registered and was, therefore, inadmissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1999 and Section 49 of. the Registration Act is also unsustainable. No doubt, Section 35 of the Stamp Act provides that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for arty purpose but Section 36 of the Stamp Act provides an exception to the general rule laid in Section 35. Section 36 of the Stamp Act provides that where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such an admission shall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceedings on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped, save and except as provided in Section 61 of the Stamp Act. thus, once a document is admitted in evidence and is exhibited, its admissibility cannot be subsequently challenged or objected to at a later stage of the suit on the ground of its being unstamped or insufficiently stamped. 22. In Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana AIR 1961 SC 1655, the Apex Court, while considering the ambit and scope of Sections 35 and 36 of the Stamp Act, held as under: "Section 36 is in these terms :- "Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped." That section is categorical in its terms that when a document has once been admitted in evidence, such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the suit or the proceedings on the ground that the instrument had not been duly stamped. The only exception recognized by the section is the class of cases contemplated by S.61, which is not material, to the present controversy. Section 36 does not admit of other exceptions. Where a question a to admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the Court, rightly or wrongly, decides to admit the document in evidence so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed. Section 35 is in the nature of a peal provision and has for reaching effects. Parties to a litigation, where such a controversy is raised, have to be circumspect and the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. The Court has to judicial determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. The record in this case discloses the fact that the hundis were marked as Exs. P-l and P- 2 and bore the endorsement admitted in evidence under the signature of the Court. It is not, therefore, one of those cases where a document has been inadvertently admitted, without the Court applying its mind to the question of its admissibility. Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and the trial has proceeded all along on the footing that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross examination of their witnesses, S.36 of the Stamp Act comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence, as afore said it is not open to either to the Trial Court itself or to a Court of Appeal or revision to go behind that order. Such an order is not one of those judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or revised by the same Court or a Court of superior jurisdiction." 23. In the case in hand, the document in question, was first of all put to appellant Badar Deen (PW-1) and was marked X. He admitted his signatures thereon. Such an order is not one of those judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or revised by the same Court or a Court of superior jurisdiction." 23. In the case in hand, the document in question, was first of all put to appellant Badar Deen (PW-1) and was marked X. He admitted his signatures thereon. He showed his ignorance as to how this document came to have the signatures of the appellants and proforma respondent No.5. The respondent (DW-1) has stated that the suit land was given to him by the plaintiffs and a writing was executed which is Mark X. Thereafter, Ali Mohammad (DW-2), a marginal witness of the document, has proved the execution of this document and it was exhibited as Ex.D-4 in his statement. From a bracketed not "objected to" it can be inferred that the exhibiting of the document was objected to at the time of recording of the statement of DW-2. However, it is not clear as to whether the objection was raised regarding inadmissibility of the document in view of the provisions of Section 35 of the Stamp Act or Section 49 of the Registration Act or both. In any case, the document was admitted in evidence vide endorsement on the document Ex.D-4 as required under Order 13 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the Said endorsement which is signed by the trial Judge, the document was admitted in evidence as Ex.D-4. In view of the ratio in Jayer Chands case (supra), the document Ex.D-4 having been v admitted in evidence, its admission cannot be now called in question on the 1 ground that it is not stamped or is insufficiently stamped. 24. By the Said endorsement which is signed by the trial Judge, the document was admitted in evidence as Ex.D-4. In view of the ratio in Jayer Chands case (supra), the document Ex.D-4 having been v admitted in evidence, its admission cannot be now called in question on the 1 ground that it is not stamped or is insufficiently stamped. 24. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 reads as follows: "Effect of non-registration of document required to be registered: No document required by Section 17 (or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) (4 of 1882), to be registered shall - (a) Affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) Confer any power to adopt, or (c) Be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: (Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), or as evidence e of part performance of a contract for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.") 25. The proviso to the above quoted section clearly provides, amongst others, that a unregistered document affecting immovable property may be received as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purpose of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The Courts below, therefore, have not committed any legality in reading in evidence the document Ex.D-4 for the limited purpose of finding that the possession of the responded was or was not protected by Section 53-A of the Act. 26. The Courts below, therefore, have not committed any legality in reading in evidence the document Ex.D-4 for the limited purpose of finding that the possession of the responded was or was not protected by Section 53-A of the Act. 26. In view of the statements of the scribe (DW-4), the marginal witness (DW-2 and DW-3), the respondent (DW-4) and the admission of the signatures by PW-1 Badar Deen, appellant (PW-1) as one of the executants, of Ex.D-4 and his implied admission of the signatures of other appellant and respondent No.5 on this document and the other evidence on record, it is established that the appellants transferred the suit land to the respondent and the respondent took possession of the suit land pursuanct to Ex.D-4 and paid the due consideration. After the payment of the consideration and having come into possession and such possession having been recorded in the revenue records, no part of the contract remained to be performed by the respondent as the registered deed of transfer was to be executed by the appellants and respondent No.5 and was refused on the pretext that there was no time, at the material, time to do the same as stated by DW-1. 27. In view of the above discussion, it cannot be held that the benefit of the principle of part performance has been give to the defendant respondent by the Courts below without pleading it or on the basis of an inadmissible document. 28. As a result, the present appeal merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Costs on parties. -