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2001 DIGILAW 1412 (PNJ)

Saman Rani v. M. S. Malik

2001-12-20

BAKHSHISH KAUR

body2001
Judgment 1. This is a petition under Ss. 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (in short the Act) for intentionally and wilfully violating the judgment of this Court passed in CWP No. 443 of 1999 decided on 21-9-1999. 2. Petitioner was enrolled as Constable with Haryana Police on 31-8-1995. FIR was registered, followed by a show cause notice dated 8-4-1997 issued by the suprein-tendent of Police, Hissar, whereby the petitioner was asked to show cause why she should not be discharged from service under Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) for submitting a wrong date of birth certificate. The petitioner filed reply to the show cause notice, finding the reply not satisfactory, she was discharged from service vide order dated 20-4-1998 against which the petitioner approached this Court by filing CWP No. 443 of 1999. 3. After hearing both the parties, Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition by passing the order Annexure P-1, relevant portion of which reads as under :- "For the aforesaid reasons recorded above, we hold that the impugned order dated 20-4-1998 was clearly beyond the scope of Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, we also hold that the aforesaid order was illegal as the rules of natural justice had not been observed before adversely affecting the petitioners rights. The instant petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order dated 20-4-1998 is quashed. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in service and will also be entitled to all consequential benefits in the nature of pay and allowances etc. which she was deprived of by the impugned order. It is, however, clarified that it would be open to the authorities concerned to re-determine the issue relating to the date of birth of the petitioner by affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity as contemplated under the rules of natural justice." 4. The petitioner submitted copy of the judgment along with an application. The respondent No. 3, however, did not allow the petitioner to join the service on the plea that she had sent the communication to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for approval. The petitioner submitted copy of the judgment along with an application. The respondent No. 3, however, did not allow the petitioner to join the service on the plea that she had sent the communication to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for approval. Thus, a contempt petition No. 79 of 2000 was filed, which was disposed of on 20-4-2000 on the basis of reply by way of affidavit filed by Sohan Lal, the then Superintendent of Police that an SLP No. 2736 of 2000 (State of Haryana V/s. Suman Rani) is pending before the Supreme Court and the operation of the order passed by this Court has been stayed meanwhile. Therefore, the contempt petition was disposed of by giving liberty to the petitioner to approach this Court after the decision of the SLP. The SLP was dismissed in October, 2000. The petitioner was reinstated in the first week of January, 2001, but she has not been paid the arrears for the suspension period with effect from 20-1-1997 onwards except the subsistence allowance during the months of February and March, 2001. In this way, the respondents have committed contempt of Court by not honouring the order Annexure P-1 dated 21-9-1999. 5. The respondents in their reply in the form of affidavit, have averred that at the time of recruitment, she had produced educational certificate showing her date of birth as 14/04/1969, and on verification of its genuineness, it was found that her actual date of birth is 14/04/1972 as per Annexure R-1. She had thus, become over-age at the time of seeking recruitment as police constable on 21/08/1995. In this way, she sought recruitment fraudulently. Thus, she was discharged from service vide order dated 20-4-1998. It is, however, admitted that order dated 20/04/1998 was challenged in Civil Writ Petition No. 443 of 1999 and it was quashed by this Court vide order dated 21-9-1999. SLP filed against the order was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 6. It is, however, averred, inter alia, that she was under suspension on the date of discharge i.e. 20-4-1998 for having been arrested in case FIR No. 216 dated 19-7-1996 under Ss. 420/468, IPC registered at PS Civil Lines, Hisar vide order dated 21-11-1996. In view of the order passed by this Court dated 21-9-1999, she was reinstated in service from the date of discharge. 420/468, IPC registered at PS Civil Lines, Hisar vide order dated 21-11-1996. In view of the order passed by this Court dated 21-9-1999, she was reinstated in service from the date of discharge. Since she was under suspension on 20-4-1998, therefore, she was deemed to be under suspension continuously with effect from 2-8-1996. As she has been paid the pay and allowances which she was drawing prior to her discharge on 20-4-1998, the order passed by this Court dated 21-9-1996 has, therefore, been complied with. Copy of the order is Annexure R-2. 7. In addition to this, it is averred that the initial appointed of the petitioner has been quashed by the Apex Court in view of the judgment dated 17-12-2001 passed in Civil Appeals Nos. 15034-15036 titled Suresh Kumar and others V/s. State of Haryana and others (Annexure R-3). 8. I have heard Shri I.S. Balhara, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sultan Singh, Assistant Advocate-General Haryana. 9. The short point under consideration is whether passing of the order Annexure R-2 to the effect that the petitioner shall be deemed to be under suspension continuously since 2-8-1996 amounts to violation of the order passed by this Court dated 21-9-1999 whereby the order of petitioners discharge from service was quashed with the observation that she shall be continuing in service and will be entitled to all consequential benefits in the nature of pay and allowances etc. Pursuant to the order of this Court, the petitioner was reinstated in service on 12-12-2000. She has also been given the pay and allowances for the period she was under discharge i.e. with effect from 2-8-1996, from which date she was deemed to be continuously under suspension. 10. Mr. I.S. Balhara, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once the order of discharge has been quashed and it is specifically mentioned in the order that she shall be deemed to be continuing in service, therefore, the order passed by the authorities Annexure R-2 that she shall be deemed continuously under suspension with effect from 2-8-1996 is a clear violation of the order passed by this Court dated 21-9-1999, especially when the SLP preferred against that order, had also been dismissed by the Supreme Court. The expression "deemed to be under suspension" is a very clear and explicit and for that reason, the petitioner has been reinstated in service with effect from 20-4-1998, meaning thereby that the period with effect from 20-4-1998 onwards shall be treated as continuing in service and she shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. Nothing has been said with regard to the period she remained under suspension. 11. In State of Punjab V/s. Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy (1996) 5 JT (SC) 403, a somewhat similar situation had arisen. The delinquent therein was charged for being absent from duty and also for prolongation of leave. Inquiry was conducted and he was removed from service by the disciplinary authority. On challenge, the writ petition was allowed with a direction to reinstate him with all consequential benefits. On appeal, the SLP was allowed and it was observed by the Hon ble Judges of the Apex Court that pending inquiry, the delinquent must be deemed to be under suspension. The consequential benefits would be dependent upon the result of enquiry and the order passed thereon. 12. Thus in view of the observations of the Apex Court that when the enquiry was found to be faulty, it could not be proper to re-direct the reinstatement with consequential benefits. In this case, the authorities concerned passed order Annexure R-2 that the petitioner shall be deemed to be under suspension continuously since 2-8-1996. The passing of the order does not amount to contemptuous act on their part. It is well-settled that any infraction of the Courts order does not amount to contempt unless it is wilful and deliberate act on the part of the contemnor. 13. It is well settled that the contempt proceedings cannot be initiated merely at the asking of the party. The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. That is why the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of a case of contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the Court. 14. In Murray and Co. V/s. Ashok Kr. The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. That is why the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of a case of contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the Court. 14. In Murray and Co. V/s. Ashok Kr. Newatia (2000) 1 JT (SC) 337 it has been held by the Apex Court in para 21 that unless the Court is satisfied that contempt is of such a nature that the act complained of substantially interferes with the due course of justice, question of any punishment would not arise. It is not enough that there should be some technical contempt of Court but it must be shown that the act of contempt would otherwise substantially interefere with the due course of justice which has been equated with "due administration of justice." 15. In Niaz Mohammed V/s. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 332 , it has been observed that while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobdience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the Court, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order the Court may not punish the alleged contemner. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, no case is made for holding the respondents guilty in the manner complained of. Resultantly, this contempt petition is dismissed. Rule against the respondents is discharged.