Desu Rooppailash Saibaba v. Land Acquisition Officer (Mandal Revenue Officer), Eluru
2001-11-07
S.ANANDA REDDY
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
S. ANANDA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is filed by the respondent before the executing Court aggrieved by the order passed by the executing Court wherein it was held that the petitioner before the lower Court is entitled for an amount of Rs. 8,21,731-61 from the respondent. ( 2 ) THE petitioner herein is the claimant in the land acquisition proceedings whose land in an extent of Ac. 3-85-1/2 cents was acquired and an award was passed as award No. 5/85-86, dated 31-12-1986 under which the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 40,000/-per acre. Thereafter there was a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the civil Court and the civil Court in OP No. 7 of 1986 by an order dated 10-12-1990, enhanced compensation to Rs. 70 per square yard. Thereafter appeal and cross appeal have been filed by both the petitioner and the respondent in AS No. 497/97 and AS No. 645 of 1991 which were disposed of by judgment dated 29-9-1993. The compensation awarded by the reference Court at the rate of Rs. 70/-per square yard was further enhanced by this Court to Rs. 100/- per square yard. Thereafter the State took the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court which were numbered as Civil Appeal Nos,8743 to 8745 of 1994 and the Supreme Court by its judgment dated 27-10-1994 modified the enhancement made by the Court below restricting it to Rs. 80,000/ -. During the pendency of the proceedings before various authorities the State deposited certain amounts, which were withdrawn by the present petitioner herein who is the claimant. As a result of the judgment of the Supreme Court the State is entitled to recover certain amounts which it had paid in excess of the amount to which the petitioner herein is entitled to. Therefore, the respondent-State has approached the executing Court by filing an execution petition in OP No. 7 of 1986 seeking restoration of the excess amount it had paid with interest at 18%. The executing Court granted interest at 18% as claimed and the amount thus determined by the executing Court at Rs. 8,27,731-61 is to be recovered from the respondent in the lower Court, the petitioner herein. Hence the present revision.
The executing Court granted interest at 18% as claimed and the amount thus determined by the executing Court at Rs. 8,27,731-61 is to be recovered from the respondent in the lower Court, the petitioner herein. Hence the present revision. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order with reference to the restitution proceedings. The learned Counsel contended that under the provisions of Section 144 CPC it is only the original Court which passed the decree, whose decree was subsequently modified, that has got power to pass an order of restitution and therefore the order passed by the executing Court is without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel also contended that there is a difference in the calculation with reference to the interest from various dates, apart from the rate of interest that was awarded by the executing Court. The learned Counsel contended that under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act the claimant is entitled for interest at the rate of 15% after the completion of the first year from the date of award and therefore the State if at all entitled it should be only at the rate of 15% and not at 18% as was held by the executing Court. The learned Counsel also relied on the decisions in support of his contention in State Bank of Saurashtra v. Chitranjan Ranganath, AIR 1980 SC 1528 ; Neelathhpara v. Montharapalla, AIR 1994 SC 1591 and Ramalingam v. Mahatma Gandhi Tuberculosis, Sanatorium, 1978 (2) MLJ 404 . The learned Counsel also contended that when once the executing Court has no jurisdiction the impugned order is liable to be struck down as without jurisdiction. He relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Das Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 410 . ( 4 ) THE learned Government Pleader on the other hand supported the order of the lower Court. it was contended that admittedly the petitioner herein who is the claimant has received over and above the amount to which he was entitled under the award which was finally confirmed by the Apex Court. When once the petitioner has received over and above the amount to which he is entitled, the State is entitled for restoration of the excess amount with interest as State has already paid the amount with interest.
When once the petitioner has received over and above the amount to which he is entitled, the State is entitled for restoration of the excess amount with interest as State has already paid the amount with interest. Therefore, it is contended that there is no illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Court below. The learned Counsel also contended that even the Division Bench of this Court held that the State is entitled for interest at the rate of 15% and therefore there is no merit in the revision. With reference to the jurisdiction the learned Counsel contended that the State has got power to recover the amount due even by resorting to the provisions of A. P. Revenue Recovery Act and therefore there is no illegality in the order passed by the executing Court, Hence there is no warrant to interfere with the order passed by the executing Court. ( 5 ) FROM the above rival contentions the issue to be considered in this revision is : whether the executing Court can pass order of restitution ? section 144 CPC reads: " (1) Where and insofar as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree order shall on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified and for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order.
Explanation :for the purpose of subsection (1), the expression "court which passed the decree or order" shall be deemed to include, (a) where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance; (b) where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate suit, the Court of first instance which passed such decree or order; (c) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were instituted at the time of making the application for restitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1 ). From the above, it is clear that where and insofar as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made. Therefore, from the said provision it is clear that it is only the Court whose decree is modified or altered has got jurisdiction. In fact the explanation under the said provision has even clarified about the expression the Court which passed the decree or order and as per the explanation the Court of first instance should be considered as the Court, which is entitled to pass order of restitution. Similar issue as to the power of restitution was even considered by the Apex Court in Chitranjan Rangadas case (supra ). The Apex Court after considering elaborately the scope of the provisions of Section 144 CPC has held as follows : "the limited question is whether this Court can grant restitution. Prior to Amendment Act 1976, an application for restitution under Section 144 in all cases had to be made to the Court of first instance.
The Apex Court after considering elaborately the scope of the provisions of Section 144 CPC has held as follows : "the limited question is whether this Court can grant restitution. Prior to Amendment Act 1976, an application for restitution under Section 144 in all cases had to be made to the Court of first instance. Even since the amendment the substituted expression "the Court which passed the decree or order" would as per clause (a) of the Explanation, mean the Court of first instance because the expression the Court which passed the decree or order has been deemed to include where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance. The present one is the simplest case where the suit in favour of the appellant and against the surety was decreed by the trial Court i. e. , the Court of first instance and this decree has been reversed by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In such a situation clause (a) of the Explanation would be attracted and an application for restitution will have to be made to the Court of first instance i. e. , the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gondal. It is nowhere suggested that such a Court does not exist. Therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to direct restitution. However, there will be no justification for the appellant bank to withhold the amount which was collected from the surety on a mere demand. Therefore, an application for restitution made by the surety would not He to this Court and it would stand disposed of accordingly. " this issue was also considered by the Apex Court in Neelathupara s case (supra) wherein the Apex Court after considering the provisions prior to Amendment Act, 1976 held as follows : "the Court of first instance would, therefore, mean the Court which passed the decree or order. The transferee executing Court is not the Court that passed the decree or order, but the decree was transmitted to facilitate execution of that decree or order since the property sought to be executed or the person who is liable for execution is situated or residing within jurisdiction of that executing Court.
The transferee executing Court is not the Court that passed the decree or order, but the decree was transmitted to facilitate execution of that decree or order since the property sought to be executed or the person who is liable for execution is situated or residing within jurisdiction of that executing Court. Therefore, the Court which is competent to entertain the application for restitution is the Court of first instance i. e. , Administrator s Court (Subordinate Judge) that decreed the suit and not the Court to which the decree was transmitted for execution. The Court of first instance of Administrator is now designated as Court of Subordinate Judge, but application for restitution was filed in executing Court, namely, the Court of District Munsif at Androth. Thus in the face of the language of Section 144 the District Munsif at Androth, by no stretch of imagination be considered to be Court of first instance. Its order of restitution is without jurisdiction and therefore it is a nullity. The High Court is accordingly right in its conclusion that the order for restitution is clearly vitiated by error of law and lack of jurisdiction. " the learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in Ramalingam s case (supra) wherein similar view was held. The learned Counsel also reiied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Gupta s case (supra) wherein the Apex Court held that once the executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction it is hut the duty of the High Court to correct the same and holding so the order of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court. The same view was expressed by the Apex Court while considering the scope of power of the executing Court while executing the decree. The learned Counsel for the State has relied upon a decision of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer v. M. Savithramma, 1992 (2) ALT 685 (DB ). This Court while considering the entitlement of interest on the excess amount deposited by the referring officer it was held that the referring officer is entitled to get the excess amount together with interest accrued on the said amount.
This Court while considering the entitlement of interest on the excess amount deposited by the referring officer it was held that the referring officer is entitled to get the excess amount together with interest accrued on the said amount. In Potharaju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1999 (3) ALT 366 , a Division Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 144 CPC applies even to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in view of Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act in the absen e of any inconsistent provision in the said Act. ( 6 ) IN this case writ petitions were filed questioning the orders passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalle under Section 144 CPC for quashing the said orders on the ground that provision of Section 144 CPC will not apply to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Aet. Rejecting the said contention the Division Bench held that the proceedings under Section 144 CPC apply to the Land Acquisition proceedings also. The learned Government Pleader also contended that the State Government has got power to recover excess amount paid even by resorting to the provisions of A. P. Revenue Recovery Act and therefore the impugned order passed by the executing Court does not suffer from any illegality as there is no dispute with reference to the excess amount paid by it to the claimant. ( 7 ) FROM the above referred cases it is clear that the proceedings under Section 144 CPC would lie only before the first Court which passed the decree and in this case the first Court refers only to the Court which passed the award in OP No. 7 of 1986, that can pass the appropriate decree under Section 144 CPC for restitution of excess amount paid by the State to the claimant. The respondent-State cannot file any execution petition by approaching the executing Court. to seek restitution of the excess amount. The executing Court has clearly no jurisdiction and therefore the impugned order passed is clearly without jurisdiction and the same is accordingly set aside. ( 8 ) AT the time of hearing it is brought to my notice that by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court an amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- was deposited before the lower Court.
The executing Court has clearly no jurisdiction and therefore the impugned order passed is clearly without jurisdiction and the same is accordingly set aside. ( 8 ) AT the time of hearing it is brought to my notice that by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court an amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- was deposited before the lower Court. If such amount has already been deposited, as it is not in dispute that the claimant is liable to pay certain amount, the said amount may be paid over to the State however subject to the final adjudication over the exact amount payable by the claimant. It is open to the respondent-State to make an application under Section 144 CPC to the appropriate Court which could go into the issue and determine the final amount that would be liable to be payable by the claimant, the petitioner herein. ( 9 ) CIVIL revision petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.