JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ. (Oral):- This revision is instituted by the petitioner under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Nalagarh on 10th August, 1999 below application filed under order 2, Rule 2J read with Section 151 of the code. By the order, impugned in the present-revision, the application filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 2. Few relevant facts may now be stated. One Lekh Ram, son of Mani Ram resident of village Baddi filed a suit being Civil Suit No.415 of 1998 for declaration and partition or property by metes and bounds against the defendants claiming to be one of the co- sharers. The petitioner herein was arrayed as defendant No.3. It is not in dispute that the said suit is pending, defendant No. l and 2 filed a joint written statement and contended that the suit property was not coparcenary property and plaintiff had no interest therein. Defendants No.3 and 4 filed a written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiff. They also filed a counter claim under the provisions of Order 8, Rule 6A of the Code on 12th march, 1999. Objections were raised by the plaintiff against the maintainability of counter claim. 3. On 12th march, 1999, the petitioner herein, defendant No.3 in the suit) preferred an application, under order 2, Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code. In the application, it was, inter alia, stated that the petitioner (defendant No.3) and Smt. Ram Piari (defendant No.4) had filed written statement-cum-counter claim in the suit. It was also stated that defendant No. 1 with the consent of the plaintiff and defendant No.2 agreed to sell suit land to defendant No.3 by an agreement to sell dated December 2, 1996 and date of execution of sale-deed was fixed as May 15, 2000. Defendant No.3 had not filed suit for specific performance of contact inasmuch as the date of execution of sale deed had been fixed as 15th May, 2000. A prayer was, therefore, made by defendant No.3 that he reserved his right to file separate suit for specific performance of contract on or after 15th May, 2000 when a cause of action for filing a said suit would arise on final refusal by respondents-defendant No. 1 and 2 and by the plaintiff to execute sale deed. A prayer was, therefore, made by defendant No.3 that he reserved his right to file separate suit for specific performance of contract on or after 15th May, 2000 when a cause of action for filing a said suit would arise on final refusal by respondents-defendant No. 1 and 2 and by the plaintiff to execute sale deed. He would file such suit for refund of advance or other sums or amount found due as mentioned in the counter claim, as those, reliefs were still premature. 4. In paragraph 4, therefore, the following prayer was made: "It is, therefore, prayed that your applicant/plaintiff to file separate civil suit for specific performance of contract of sale dated 28.12.1996 and/or for refund of advance and other amount mentioned in the counter-claim-cum-Written Statement as well as damages and/or compensation for the said remedies falling due on or after 15.5.2000 AD." 5. A reply was filed by Mani Ram, defendant No. l, Kamal Singh defendant No.2, (respondents No.2 and 3 herein) to the said application. It was contended by them that the application was not maintainable; there was no privity of contract between defendant No. 1 and 2 and defendant No.3 and 4. It was also stated that defendant No. 1 had mortgaged his share in the suit land with defendant No.3 and 4 for Rs.50.000/- and defendant No. l could seek appropriate legal remedy in accordance with law. The very existence of the so called agreement to sell was denied by them and it was asserted that there was no mutuality of contract or agreement between the parties. Defendants No.3 and 4 were bound to prove existence of such agreement in their favour. According to defendant No. 1 and 2 hence, the stand taken by defendant No.3 was ill conceived and no application was maintainable and it was liable to be dismissed. 6. The learned Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the application stating that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code lay down that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. And if the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any portion of his claim without the Parmesan of the court, he would be debarred from filing the suit in respect of the same cause of action. And if the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any portion of his claim without the Parmesan of the court, he would be debarred from filing the suit in respect of the same cause of action. The learned Judge considered the provisions of Order 8, Rules 6A to 6G and observed that a counter claim could be filed if a cause of action had already arisen in favour of the defendants. In the case on hand, even according to defendant No.3, cause of action was to arise in his favour on the basis of an agreement said to have been entered into on or after 15th May, 2000, and, hence, the counterclaim was not tenable. The learned Judge, therefore, dismissed the application with no order as to costs observing that defendant No.3 will be at liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, if so advised." The said order is challenged by the petitioner in this revision. 7. I have heard Mr. G.D. Verma learned Senior Counsel instructed by Mr. Romesh Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3. Respondents No. 1 and 4 though served have not appeared. 8. Mr. Verma, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial Court has committed a jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the petitioner. He submitted that the contention of the petitioner was that there was an agreement between the petitioner and defendant’s No. 1 and 2 with the consent of the plaintiff. The trial Court, therefore, ought not to have dismissed the application as untenable. The counsel submitted that the trial Court has committed an error of jurisdiction in observing that no cause of action had arisen in favour of the petitioner and an application under order 2, Rule 2 of the Code was premature. He, therefore, submitted that an appropriate direction may be issued to the trial Court that counter claim was well founded and it was open to the petitioner to institute a suit after 15th May, 2000. Such an order in the submission of the learned counsel, would neither prejudice the petitioner nor to contesting respondents. 9. Mr. He, therefore, submitted that an appropriate direction may be issued to the trial Court that counter claim was well founded and it was open to the petitioner to institute a suit after 15th May, 2000. Such an order in the submission of the learned counsel, would neither prejudice the petitioner nor to contesting respondents. 9. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel, on the other hand, submitted that by filing the present revision, the petitioner wants to fill in lacuna, to which a serious objection was raised by the respondents before the trial Court. He submitted that the case of the respondents was that no agreement had ever been entered into between the defendants to which the plaintiff was a consenting party. It was, therefore, contested by the respondents in the trial Court seeking prayer that the petitioner may be directed to produce such agreement, but the petitioner failed to do so. The counsel, therefore, submitted that if it is open to the petitioner to take appropriate proceedings in respect of agreement to sell, no observations by this court are necessary. And if no proceedings can be initiated by defendant No.3, this court may not grant such liberty in his favour. The counsel stated that a bald assertion made by defendant No.3 that plaintiff was a consenting party to an agreement to sell cannot confer right in his favour. According to Mr. Sharma, as there was no jurisdictional error by the trial Court, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in my opinion, it is not necessary for this court to express any opinion as to so called agreement to sell said to have been arrived at on 28th December, 1996. since the agreement is not on record and the suit is pending, I refrain from observing anything. But one thing is clear. Even according to the petitioner himself, the said agreement was entered into on 28th December, 1996 and the date of performance of agreement was fixed as 15th May, 2000. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the learned Judge was wholly right and fully justified in holding that the counter claim set up by the petitioner on 12th March, 1999 was premature. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the learned Judge was wholly right and fully justified in holding that the counter claim set up by the petitioner on 12th March, 1999 was premature. Even the day on which the learned Judge disposed of the application i.e. on 10th August, 1999, it was premature as the cause of action was to accrue in favour of the petitioner on or after 15th May, 2000. The Supreme court in Mahendra Kumar and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (AIR 1987 SC 1395), observed that counter claim under rule 6A(a) of Order 8 of the Code can be filed by the defendant before he delivers his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired. 11. But even otherwise, the scheme of counter claim, in Rules 6A to 6G of Order 8 clearly envisages that such counter claim is treated as a plaint and is governed by the Rules applicable to Plaints (Rule 6A (4) of Order 8). It, therefore, necessarily means that a counter claim is concerned. The defendant is allowed to put forward his defence, which is in the nature of a written statement. The plaintiff against whom such counter claim is filed is the defendant and he will set up his defence, which is in effect a written statement. The code also states that a counter claim is governed by the Rules applicable to plaints. Hence, one has to go to the provisions relating to plaint as referred to in Order 7 of the Code. Rule 1 of Order 7 contains particulars to be included in the plaint. Clause (e) requires the plaintiff to state "the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose". In my opinion, therefore, before a suit is filed by the plaintiff, he has to disclose cause of action and when it arose. Since counter claim is really a plaint of the defendant and Clause (e) of Rule 1 of Order 7 of the Code applies to such counter-claim, it is incumbent on the defendant to disclose the facts constituting the cause of action and when it accrued. 12. In the instant case, the cause of action did not accrue in favour of the petitioner. It was to accrue with effect from 15th May, 2000. 12. In the instant case, the cause of action did not accrue in favour of the petitioner. It was to accrue with effect from 15th May, 2000. The trial Court was, therefore, right in observing that the counter claim of the petitioner was premature, ill conceived and untenable. Hence, application under Order 2, Rule 2 was not well conceived and the trial Court has not committed any error of jurisdiction in dismissing the same. On that ground alone, the revision deserves to be dismissed. 13. Before parting with the matter, I may state that I may not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter and particularly on the so called agreement. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 14. Since the suit is pending and the record of the trial Court is lying in this Court, the Registry will send back the same within two weeks from today. -