Honble LAKSHMANAN, CJ.¡State of Rajasthan through the Excise Commissioner, Udaipur, is the appellant in this appeal which is filed against the order dated, 18.9.2000, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3919/99. The said writ petition was filed by the State of Rajasthan challenging the order dated, 3.5.1999 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur, Annex. 1 in the writ petition under Sec. 9A (d) of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950. (2). The respondent Company obtained 52 import permits between 21.5.94 to 9.1.96 for importing the Indian made foreign liquor from distilleries at Bihar, Goa, Hyderabad and Maharashtra. The goods could not be imported against those permits. The Excise Officers of the said distilleries issued non-supply certificates. The Company applied for refund of the Vend Fee and Import Duty deposited for the permits alongwith the non-supply certificates to the District Excise Officer, Jaipur. The company requested for refunding the duty or renewing the permits or adjusting the said amount against the permits which will be issued in further. The Excise Commissioner refused to refund the amount. The appeal was filed by the respondent company. The State of Rajasthan took two-fold objections before the appellate authority -(i) with regard to the limitation and (ii) merits. The Divisional Commissioner, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal filed by the Company and directed the State to adjust the amount of Rs. 19, 91, 362.50 against the future permits. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, the State of Rajasthan filed the writ petition on the ground that the reasons given by the Divisional Commissioner for not importing the liquor against the permits issued were not justifiable and they have failed because of their own fault and that Rule 24 gives power to the Commissioner to refund the amount is discretionary in nature. (3). The Company filed reply to the writ petition disputing the legal averments. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated, 18.9.2000 against which the above appeal has been filed by the State. (4). We have heard Mr. R.B. Mathur, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned counsel for the Company Mr. (3). The Company filed reply to the writ petition disputing the legal averments. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated, 18.9.2000 against which the above appeal has been filed by the State. (4). We have heard Mr. R.B. Mathur, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned counsel for the Company Mr. Mathur made the following submissions: i) The company has not assigned any reason for not submitting the permits in time and no reason has been assigned for the inordinate delay for filing application for the refund/adjustment. ii) Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Excise Rules gives discretion to the Excise Commissioner for ordering the refund and that the discretion can be exercised by the Excise Commissioner only when the company has filed to import with justifiable reasons. iii) Rule 77 of the Rules clearly stipulates that except as otherwise expressly provided in these rules, the fee paid for any licence under these rules shall not be refundable except under the specific order of the government. Since the fee is for allowing the import from out side distilleries and when the State has done its duty and allowing the imports, the State cannot be asked to refund or adjust on the failure to import the liquor by the respondent company. iv) The fees or duty recovered by the government has already been used by the State in public interest and accordingly, the budget is declared and that only in exceptional cases, the refund can be allowed to be made. v) The reasons assigned for non-import, such as, shortage of trucks, non-arrangement of Bank Guarantee, labour problem etc. were not beyond the control of the Company and since the permits issued have lapsed after the stipulated time mentioned in the permit, it cannot be renewed. (5). Mr. Mathur invited our attention to the relevant sections and the rules and also cited two decisions reported in the Official Liquidator vs. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd : (1) and Chief Settlement Commissioner (Rural), Punjab and Another vs. Ram Singh and Others (2). Mr. Mathur also submitted that there cannot be any unjust enrichment so far as the fee paid by the company is concerned. (6). Per contra, Mr. Mr. Mathur also submitted that there cannot be any unjust enrichment so far as the fee paid by the company is concerned. (6). Per contra, Mr. Kamlakar Sharma submitted that the government has no authority to collect import duty unless the goods are imported into the State of Rajasthan and if such an event does not take place, the State would have no right to collect the import duty. Referring to rule 24(2) of the Rules, Mr. Sharma submitted that all that is required to be seen by the Excise Commissioner for the purpose of Rule 24(2) is whether in fact, an import has taken pace or not and if no import has taken place, the Excise Commissioner is bound to order refund of excise duty and fees paid. He would also further submit that the reasons given by the answering respondent were absolutely genuine and clearly show that the answering respondent was unable to utilise the permits and import the liquor for the reasons beyond its control. He, therefore, submitted that the order of the Divisional Commissioner and as confirmed by the learned Single Judge are correct and the appeal is liable to be rejected. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma in support of his contentions cited Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others (3), Deputy Commissioner, Andaman, District, Port Blair vs. Consumer Cooperative Stores Ltd : (4), Shri Rangaswami, the Textile Commissioner and Others vs. The Sagar Textile Mills (P) Ltd. and Another (5), L. Hirday Narain vs. Inkcome-Tax Officer, Bareilly (6), S.K. Pattanaik (dead) through LRS. vs. State of Orissa and Others (7) and M/s. Shroff and Co. vs. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay and Anr. vs. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay and Another (8). (7). On the arguments advanced by the counsel appearing on either side, the following basic question will arise for determination: Whether the import duty is paid or is payable on the import of goods in Rajasthan and unless the goods are imported, the State has no jurisdiction or authority to retain the import duty or fees therefor? (8). Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 reads as follows: 24. Condition of import. (8). Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 reads as follows: 24. Condition of import. (1) A person holding a licence for the sale of Indian made Foreign Liquor and Foreign Liquor or the Commandant of Regimental units of the Armed Forces of the Union of India stationed in Rajasthan may import Indian made Foreign Liquor on prepayment of import duty in Rajasthan and under a permit issued under the next succeeding rule, from a distillery brewery or warehouse of the exporting State. Provided that duty paid Rum possessed by any unit of the Indian Armed Forces may be imported into the State without payment of duty and such import shall not require any permit/pass from the State authorities. (2) If the person authorised to import Indian made Foreign Liquor under sub-rule (1), does not import the liquor for which he has deposited either the duty or the permit fee or both, he may be allowed refund by the Excise Commissioner. (9). Rule 77 reads as follows: ``77. Fees not to be refundable : The fee paid for any licence under these rules shall not be refundable except under the specific orders of the Government. (10). Sec. 28 and 29 of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 deal with duty of excisable articles and manner of levying duty respectively, which read thus: ``28. Duty on excisable articles. -An excise duty ( or a countervailing duty as the case may be) at such rate or rates as the (State Government) shall direct, may be imposed either generally or for any specified local area, on any excisable article imported or exported, or transported or manufactured, cultivated or collected under any licence granted under this Act, Act, or manufactured in any distillery, pot-still or brewery established or licensed under this Act. 29. Manner of levying duty -Subject to such rules regulating the time, place and manner of payment, as the State Government may prescribe, such duty may be levied in such one or more ways as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette direct. (11). We have already extracted Rule 24 of the Rules as above. A reading of the above rule would show that it is not the intention of the Legislature to order refund only in cases where the importer could not import liquor due to some circumstances beyond is control. (11). We have already extracted Rule 24 of the Rules as above. A reading of the above rule would show that it is not the intention of the Legislature to order refund only in cases where the importer could not import liquor due to some circumstances beyond is control. In our view, there is no such rider or condition in Rule 24 as suggested by Shri R.B. Mathur. The said rule does not provide refund of duty/fees only in cases of import was not possible for reasons beyond the control of the importer. It is an established principle of interpretation of Statutes that no provision can be read into an enactment unless it is specifically included therein. In our view, the State Government has no authority to collect import duty unless the goods are imported into the State of Rajasthan and if such a provision does not take place, the State would have no right to collect import duty. (12). Our attention was drawn to the Rules framed to show that prior to 1987 a person could import Indian made Foreign Liquor and Foreign Liquor in bond also. However, w.e.f. 26.3.87, Rules 20 to 23 which enabled the import bond, were deleted from the Rules and it was provided that a person may import foreign liquor of IMEL on pre-payment of import duty. Rule 24(2) provides that if a person has deposited the import duty or the permit fee or both, but was not able to import the liquor, he would be allowed a refund by the Excise Commissioner. The object of enacting Rule 24 (2) could very well be seen that unless there is an import, the State would not have the authority or jurisdiction to collect import duty or fees. (13). Rule 22 (1) (2) can also be beneficially looked into in this context, which reads as follows: ``22. Procedure on arrival in Rajasthan -(1) On the arrival in Rajasthan, the consignment of Indian made Foreign Liquor shall be taken direct to the warehouse or distillery; and the case may be mentioned in the permit, where it shall be tested and measured by the officer-in-charge of warehouse and shall be taken into store and entered in the importers accounts. Procedure on arrival in Rajasthan -(1) On the arrival in Rajasthan, the consignment of Indian made Foreign Liquor shall be taken direct to the warehouse or distillery; and the case may be mentioned in the permit, where it shall be tested and measured by the officer-in-charge of warehouse and shall be taken into store and entered in the importers accounts. (2) As soon as may be after such arrival, the officer-in-charge of the ware-house shall also certify on the importers copy of the pass issued in the exporting State full details regarding the liquor received in such form as may be prescribed by the pass or as may be required by the authority issuing the pass and shall return it to the office issuing it, after verifying by the District Excise Officer or Assistant Excise Officer, as the case may be. (14). A reading of the above provisions would show that no condition is laid down in the rule on the basis of which only the Excise Commissioner could make an order of refund. Therefore, the contention of Shri R.B. Mathur that to get a refund, the importer would have to prove that Liquor was not imported due to reasons beyond his control, is baseless and contrary to the specific provisions of Rule 24. Even assuming that the discretion is vested with Excise Commissioner in the matter of refund of duty or fees, the Excise Commissioner is bound to exercise his discretion in a proper manner and make an order of refund if the goods have not been imported. The charging of import duty by the State of Rajasthan without there being an import would be totally ultra vires to the powers of the State and beyond authority of law. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Sharma that all that is required to be seen by the Excise Authorities for the purpose of Rule -24 (2) is whether, in fact, as import has taken place or not and if no import has taken place, the Excise Commissioner is bound to order refund of duty and fees paid. (15). It was argued by Mr. Mathur that the reasons given by the Company for not importing the liquor are not valid and genuine. In our view, the said contention has no merit. The Company has explained their inability to import liquor which is beyond its control. (15). It was argued by Mr. Mathur that the reasons given by the Company for not importing the liquor are not valid and genuine. In our view, the said contention has no merit. The Company has explained their inability to import liquor which is beyond its control. Shortage of trucks, non-receipt of E.V.Cs., shortage of time etc. were the reasons which made the import of liquor in the instant case, impossible for the Company. The Excise Commissioner, in our view, has not applied his mind and considered reasons adduced by the Company. However, on appeal, the Divisional Commissioner has ordered refund for the cogent and convincing reasons recorded in the said order. A reading of Rule 24 would also show that there is no time limit for making application for refund of the duty in Rule 24 nor can the State with hold the refund on the ground that the application for refund may have been submitted belatedly. The State while asking the parties for the deposit of import duty in advance is acting merely as a Trustee of the amount and therefore, cannot claim any lien or authority to retain the amount in case the event of import has not occasioned. It is also not possible for the State to say that the duty which has already been received, has been used and utilised in public interest and, therefore, the same cannot be refunded or adjusted in future. The with-holding of the amount and refusal to adjust the same towards future imports, in our view, tentamounts to charging of duty without authority of law and also tentamounts to unjust enrichment on the part of the State. The State in our view, cannot invoke Rule 24 to augment revenue of the State in the manner in which it has been done. The State is authorised to collect import duty in case where there has been actual import and not otherwise. It is also not the case of the State that the respondent Company will not continue the business of import of Foreign Liquor in future. The goods, in the instant case, had never left distillery of export in that State and, therefore, neither the permits could be used nor there was any import of goods. Under such circumstances, the Divisional Commissioner and the learned Single Judge held that the appellant State was not entitled to retain the amount. The goods, in the instant case, had never left distillery of export in that State and, therefore, neither the permits could be used nor there was any import of goods. Under such circumstances, the Divisional Commissioner and the learned Single Judge held that the appellant State was not entitled to retain the amount. If Rule 24 is to be interpreted as suggested by Shri Mathur and in the manner it is being done by the State, it would give an unguided, uncontrolled and arbitrary powers to the Excise Commissioner, which would render Rule 24 ultra vires to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. In our view, the Excise Commissioner has not exercised his discretion in the just and proper manner and it can hardly be said to be a just and proper order. It lacks application of mind and has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice and without affording opportunity of hearing to the Company. If the refund or adjustment is refused, the respondent company would be deprived of such a huge amount. The State has no authority to utilise the amount until and unless the goods have actually been imported into the State of Rajasthan. Unless such an event, namely, the import of the goods takes place, the State has no authority to retain the amount paid for the purpose of import of goods into the State. (16). The cases of Official Liquidator vs. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. (supra) and Chief Settlement Commissioner (Rural) Punjab and another (supra) (by two Honble Judges of the Supreme Court) were cited by Mr. Mathur in support of his contention that since the word `may has deliberately been used, it is well within the discretion of the Excise Commissioner to refund or not to order refund of the amounts deposited. In the first case, the Supreme Court was considering the power of the Court to stay the proceedings in a Company Case is discretionary or not. In the first case, the Supreme Court was considering the power of the Court to stay the proceedings in a Company Case is discretionary or not. While interpreting the word `may used in the Section, the Supreme Court has held that the object of the two Sec. 442 and 446 when read together is served by a stay order that the stay order could be justified and that the object is to expeditiously decide and dispose of pending claims in the course of winding proceedings and the stay is not be granted if the object of applying for it appears to be as he does in the case before them, merely to delay adjudication on a claim and thereby to defeat justice. On the other hand, the Supreme Court held that it can only be made judiciously upon an examination of the totality of the facts which vary from case to case and that the order to be passed must be discretionary and the power to pass, it must, therefore, be directory and not mandatory. (17). In the second case the Apex Court was considering that scope of Rule 73(2), which does not create any legal right in favour of the displaced persons to whom land has been allotted in excess of their entitlement to insist on the land being sold to them either against cash payment or by way of adjustment against their verified claims etc. The Supreme Court has construed that the word `may in the rule cannot be read as `shall and that the rule merely confers a discretion on the Settlement Commissioner. (18). In this context Mr. K.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents, cited the case of Shri Rangaswami vs. The Textile Commissioner and others (supra) (by three Honble Judges bench of the Supreme Court), to show that the word `may used in Rule 24 of the Rules is capable of being interpreted as `must or `shall in the light of the context of the present case. (19). The question for determination in the above case was, whether, if the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appropriate directions to any manufacturer or class of manufacturers, it is obligatory upon him to specify therein the period for which the directions will remain in operation. (20). (19). The question for determination in the above case was, whether, if the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appropriate directions to any manufacturer or class of manufacturers, it is obligatory upon him to specify therein the period for which the directions will remain in operation. (20). The Supreme Court construed the above provision and held that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word `may, which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. (21). Applying the above principle to the case on hand, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, the public authority, namely, the Excise Commissioner, is conferred with an obligation and discretion to exercise the power. Under Rule 24, the Excise Commissioner has an obligation to order refund if the person authorised, namely, respondent herein, to import IMEL under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 24 does not import the liquor for which he has deposited either the duty or the permit fees or both. (22). The power conferred on the Excise Commissioner to order refund is coupled with duty and an obligation. A discretion is also vested with him. Therefore, the word `may used in Rule 24 of the Act which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command, to order refund if the importer does not import liquor for which he has deposited the duty or the permit fee or both. This judgment was rendered by three Hohble Judges of the Supreme Court. (23). In State of U.P. vs. Jogendra Singh (9) (3 Judges Bench), the Supreme Court has interpreted the word ``may and while considering the object of enacting Rule 4(2) of the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 which provides an option to the Gazetted government servants to request the Governor that their cases should be tried by an Administrative Tribunal and not otherwise, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that Rule 4 (2) imposes an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made by the Gazetted government servant that his case should be referred to the Tribunal under the Rules and not by an appropriate authority under Rules 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It was further held that Rule 4(2) deals with the class of Gazetted government servants and gives them the right to make a request to the Governor that their cases should be referred to the Tribunal in respect of matters specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-rule (1). The question for our decision is whether like the word ``may in Rule 4 (1) which confers the discretion on the Governor, the word ``may in sub-rule (2) confers the discretion on him, or does the word ``may in sub-rule (2) really mean ``shall or ``must? There is no doubt that the words ``may generally not mean ``must or ``shall. But it is well settled that the word ``may is capable of meaning ``must or ``shall in the light of the context. It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word ``may which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. Sometimes, the Legislature uses the word ``may out of difference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed. (24). In the case on hand, the whole purpose of Rule 24 of the Act would be frustrated if the word ``may in the said Rule receives the same construction. The object of the Rule 24 of the Act is to order refund if the importer does not import the goods. It imposes an obligation to grant a request for refund made by the importer. (25). Mr. Sharma submitted that if the order of the Divisional Commissioner is set aside then it would amount to unjust enrichment on the part of the State. In this context, he relief upon two decisions of the Supreme Court. (26). In Deputy Commissioner, Andaman District, Port Blair vs. Consumer Cooperative Stores Ltd. & Ors. (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court while rejecting the plea of the department have ordered refund to the licensee on the ground of unjust enrichment. In this case, a Notification was issued prescribing the rate of excise duty payable by the licensees of Indian Made Foreign Liquor. The licensees accordingly were paying the duty in advance. The High Court set aside the said Notification in a case and directed the Department to pass final orders on application of refund. In this case, a Notification was issued prescribing the rate of excise duty payable by the licensees of Indian Made Foreign Liquor. The licensees accordingly were paying the duty in advance. The High Court set aside the said Notification in a case and directed the Department to pass final orders on application of refund. Before the refund could be made, an Ordinance was promulgated validating the levy. The High Court held that the principles of unjust enrichment was not applicable as it was not proved that the duty paid in advance was recoverable by the merchants from the purchaser. The Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High Court for refund and rejected departments plea to deny the relief of refund to the licensee and ordered refund on the ground of unjust enrichment. (27). In support of his contention that the countervailing duty is imposable only on import. Mr. Sharma has cited two decisions in this regard. (28). In M/s. Shroff and Co. & Another vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Another (Supra), the Supreme Court held that for the liquor into municipal limits of Greater Bombay and stored in bonded warehouse liability to pay countervailing duty arises at the point of import i.e. the physical entry of the goods into Municipal limits for consumption. Honble Mr. Justice Ranganathan delivering the concurring judgment has also opined that the countervailing duty is attracted at the point of import i.e. physical entry of the goods into the taxing territory and only the payment of duty is deferred in case the goods imported are removed to a bonded warehouse, to a later point of time, for purposes of convenience of collection. (29). In the case of S.K. Pattanaik (dead) though L.Rs. vs. State of Orissa and others (Supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under:- ``Excise duty is essentially a duty on manufacture of goods, and the taxable event is the manufacture of the excisable goods. ``Countervailing duty on the other hand, is imposed when excisable articles are imported into the State, in order to counterbalance the excise duty, which is leviable on similar goods if manufactured within the State. So far as countervailing duty is concerned, the incidence of the impost is on the import of the excisable articles, i.e. at the time of entry into the State. So far as countervailing duty is concerned, the incidence of the impost is on the import of the excisable articles, i.e. at the time of entry into the State. Though countervailing duty or excise duty is required to be assessed and collected as soon as the taxable event arises, a facility for postponement of collection of excise duty is envisaged under Sec. 28 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 in case of sale of the excisable article from the bonded warehouse after its import into the State. While the expressing ``levy may include both the process of taxation as well as the determination of the amount of tax or duty, the expression ``collection refers to actual collection of the payable duty or or the tax, as the case may be. Since the taxable event for attracting excise duty or countervailing duty is the manufacture or import of excisable goods into the State, the charge of incidence of duty stands attracted as soon as the taxable event takes place and the facility of postponement of collection of duty under the Act or the rules framed thereunder, can in no way affect the incidence of duty on the imported goods. The fact that the liquor was rendered unfit for human consumption and destroyed after its import, which by itself attracted the levy of duty could not wipe off the liability of the appellant for payment of duty on the excisable goods, after their import, in the bonded warehouse. (30). As rightly explained by Saikia, J in Mahabir Kishore vs. State of M.P. (10), the principle of unjust enrichment requires-first that the defendant has been `enriched by the receipt of a `benefit; secondly, that this enrichment be unjust. The principles laid down in the above case squarely apply to the facts of the case on hand. (31). For the foregoing reasons the appellant is bound to refund the import duty and fee as it is established that the goods have not been imported but the respondent company itself by its letter dated 12th of December, 1996 (Annex. 3 to the writ petition) requested only revalidation of the expired permits though refund was incidentally asked for. The Divisional Commissioner has ordered adjustment of the amounts against the permits to be granted to the respondent company in future. 3 to the writ petition) requested only revalidation of the expired permits though refund was incidentally asked for. The Divisional Commissioner has ordered adjustment of the amounts against the permits to be granted to the respondent company in future. The said order, therefore, is affirmed and the appellant State is directed to adjust the entire amount as prayed for against the permits which may be issued in favour of the respondent company in future. The appeal fails and is, dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.