( 1 ) CONSTITUTIONALITY of Section 70-G of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act is in question in this writ petition. ( 2 ) THE following facts are not disputed: Elections of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad were conducted in the year 1986. The term of the elected body came to an end in the year 1991. Section 70-G was inserted in the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act by reason of Act 18 of 1991 empowering the Government to appoint special officer and by subsequent amendments the term of the special officer has been extended upto 4 years. When Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act inserting Part IX-A into the Constitution came into operation, the State enacted Act 17 of 1994 omitting Section 70-G from the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act which, however, did not come into force. Furthermore, by subsequent enactments -Act 25 of 1995, Act 19 of 1996, Act 21 of 1997, Act 18 of 1998, Ordinance 6 of 2000, Act 30 of 2000, Ordinance 10 of 2000 and Act 7 of 2001, Section 70-G has been amended extending the term of the special officer from time to time. ( 3 ) THE contention of Mr. Satya Prasad is that having regard to the scheme and object of Part IX-A and in particular Articles 243-U and 243-ZF inserted by the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act the constitutional provisions have been violated in retaining Section 70-G by several amending Acts as noticed. ( 4 ) PART XI and IXA were inserted in the Constitution by reason of Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act with effect from 1. 6. 1993. The scheme of the said provisions is to confer grass root democracy at the Panchayat and Municipal level. ( 5 ) ARTICLE 243-Q provides for constitution of Municipalities. Clause (1) of Article 243-R provides that all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituency in the Municipal area and for the said purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards. Clause (2) of Article 243-R enables the State to make a law for representation in a Municipality of person specified therein. Article 243-S provides for constitution and composition of wards committees. Article 243-T provides for reservation of seats. Clause (2) of Article 243-R enables the State to make a law for representation in a Municipality of person specified therein. Article 243-S provides for constitution and composition of wards committees. Article 243-T provides for reservation of seats. The duration of Municipality has been provided for in Article 243-U which is to the following effect: duration of Municipalities, etc : (1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer: provided that a Municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution. (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Municipality at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1 ). (3) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed, (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution; provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Municipality for such period. (4) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under Clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. ( 6 ) THE Municipalities constituted have power to impose tax and other powers as specified in Article 243-X. Part IX A of the Constitution contemplates right to conduct election by State Election Commission referred to in Article 243-K. Article 243-K reads thus: elections to the Panchayats : (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electrol rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats shall be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of a State, the conditions of service and tenure of office of the State Election Commissioner shall be such as the Governor may by rule determine: provided that the State Election Commissioner shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of a High Court and the conditions of service of the State Election Commissioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. (3) The Governor of a State shall, when so requested by the State Election Commission, make available to the State Election Commission such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions conferred on the State Election Commission by Clause (1 ). (4) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Panchayats. ( 7 ) ARTICLE 243-ZF deals with continuance of existing laws and Municipalities which is in the following terms: notwithstanding in this Part, any provision of any law relating to Municipalities in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier: provided that all the Municipalities existing immediately before such commencement shall continue till the expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of that State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, by each House of the Legislature of that State. ( 8 ) MR. Satya Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the principles underlying the purpose and object in enacting Part IXA stand defeated having regard to the fact that instead of one year, the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation has been allowed to function for a period of 10 1/2 years without there being an elected body. Satya Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the principles underlying the purpose and object in enacting Part IXA stand defeated having regard to the fact that instead of one year, the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation has been allowed to function for a period of 10 1/2 years without there being an elected body. The learned Counsel would contend that Act 17 of 1994 was enacted only with a view to meet the constitutional requirement in terms whereof a provision was made as regards appointment of special officer only for one year. Mala fide on the part of the Legislature would be evident that by reason of the said provision, although Section 70-G was admitted on 2. 5. 1994, the same had never been allowed to come into operation having regard to Section 1 (2) of Act 17 of 1994 as thereby the Government was empowered to modify the various provisions of the Act as regards its operation. Section 1 (2) of Act 17 of 1994 reads thus: it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette appoint and they may appoint different dates for different provisions. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel in support of his contention has strongly relied upon Saij Gram Panchayat v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 2 SCC 366 and State Election Commission v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (3) ALD 456 . ( 10 ) MR. Ramesh Ranganathan, the learned Additional Advocate-General submits that having regard to the fact that this Court has directed holding of election, the question has become academic. The learned Counsel would contend that only because the duration of Municipal Corporation expires the same by itself cannot render the Act invalid inasmuch as it is possible that election may not be held for one reason or the other. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , Pennar Delta Ayacutdars Association v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (3) ALD 715 and Hotel Balaji and others v. State of A. P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 1048 . ( 11 ) THERE cannot be any doubt that various clauses of Article 243 are required to be followed in letter and spirit. of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (3) ALD 715 and Hotel Balaji and others v. State of A. P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 1048 . ( 11 ) THERE cannot be any doubt that various clauses of Article 243 are required to be followed in letter and spirit. The State cannot be permitted to withhold elections to the Municipality except in cases of genuine supervening difficulties to hold such elections as for example unforeseen natural calamities in the State like flood, earthquake, etc. ( 12 ) I may notice that in an unreported decision in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 719 of 1995, dated 12. 8. 1997 the Supreme Court observed: it is necessary to emphasise that various clauses of Article 243 are to be followed in letter and spirit. The concerned States cannot be permitted to withhold election of Panchayat except in case of genuine supervening difficulties to hold such elections e. g. unforeseen natural calamities in the State like flood, earthquake, etc. , or extremely urgent situation prevailing in the State for which election of the Panchayats cannot be held within the time frame. It will be unfortunate if the concerned States remain insensitive to the constitutional mandate of holding election of Panchayats in time and by unjustified action, allows old bodies to continue in the office of the Panchayats. We hope and trust that the State Government will be alive and sensitive to the duties and responsibilities flowing from the mandates of the Constitution in holding Panchayat elections. ( 13 ) ARTICLE 243-U is mandatory in nature. Even if it is directory, it was necessary to be substantially complied with. I may further notice that a Full Bench of this Court in A. P. Sarpanchas Association v. Govt. of A. P. , 2001 (4) ALD 704 = 2001 (2) DT AP 193 (FB), has categorically held that Article 243-E which is mpari materia with Article 243-U is mandatory in nature. The Full Bench in the aforementioned case has clearly laid down the necessity of holding elections at the grass root level and they should not be postponed for one reason or the other. ( 14 ) THE Full Bench has noticed a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in G. Venkata Swami Naidu v. Dy. The Full Bench in the aforementioned case has clearly laid down the necessity of holding elections at the grass root level and they should not be postponed for one reason or the other. ( 14 ) THE Full Bench has noticed a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in G. Venkata Swami Naidu v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2001 (2) ALD 578 2001 (3) ALT 114 , wherein it has been held: constitution of Panchayats is no longer covered by statutory provisions. The democratic polity of Gram Panchayats now finds place in Part IX of the Constitution of India by reason of the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act, 1992. Article 243-B mandates that there shall be constituted in every State, Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels in accordance with the provisions of Part IX. Clause (1) of Article 243-C also provides for the composition of Panchayats. Clause (2) of Article 243-C speaks of filling up of the seats in a Panchayat by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area. By reason of the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act, democracy, which is the basic feature of the Constitution, has now been extended to the gross root level. In this connection, it is also relevant to note that Article 40 of the Constitution also directs the State to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self government. Self governance, therefore, is the key area which is visualized by the Constitution makers. Democracy in this country will be further strengthened by the active involvement and participation of the panchayats at all levels. The desired goal of making a Panchayat more vibrant and self reliant will be best achieved if the constitutional provisions are given its full play. It is, therefore, not permissible to thwart that object and goal by the State by taking recourse to such provisions under the Act, which, in our opinion, does not contemplate a total prohibition of holding elections to the societies; ( 15 ) IN that case a contention was raised that some rules should be directed to be framed. It is, therefore, not permissible to thwart that object and goal by the State by taking recourse to such provisions under the Act, which, in our opinion, does not contemplate a total prohibition of holding elections to the societies; ( 15 ) IN that case a contention was raised that some rules should be directed to be framed. The Court rejected the said contention but observed: only in a case where a legislation does not conform to the constitutional wisdom, the same either be declared ultra vires or may be read down or read up for upholding its validity, the Court can exercise its powers of judicial review. ( 16 ) IN the instant case by reason of several amending acts, the State has extended the tenure of the executive officer upto 10 1/2 years and the initial period from 2 1/2 years to 3 years. ( 17 ) THESE amending Acts are still in force. It cannot, therefore, be said that this Court is required to decide an academic question. In Saij Gram Panchayat v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 2 SCC 366 , it has been held: with effect from 1. 6. 1993, the Constitution 73rd and 74th Amendments came into effect. As a result, Parts IX and IXA were introduced in the Constitution. Part IX of the Constitution which dealt with the panchayats, provided under Article 243-B for Constitution in every State of panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels in accordance with the provisions of that part. Under Article 243-N, any provision of law relating to panchayats in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the 73rd Amendment, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier. Part IX-A which came into force under the Constitution 74th Amendment Act of 1992 deals with Municipalities. Under Article 243-Q which deals with the constitution of Municipalities, it is provided as follows: under Article 243-ZF, any provision of any law relating to Municipalities in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier. The Gujarat Municipalities Act, therefore, continued to operate and would do so until 1. 6. 1994 unless earlier repealed or amended. ( 18 ) IN State Election Commission v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (3) ALD 456 , it is held: the other "supervening difficulty" pressed into service by the State Government in not conducting elections to the Panchayat Raj bodies before the expiry of their term, is avoidable huge financial burden on the State exchequer if the Parliament passes the 87th Constitutional Amendment Bill, consequent to which the offices of MPTCs and ZPTCs would stand abolished. We are afraid, we cannot countenance to this reason as a "supervening difficulty" inasmuch as to keep the wheels of democratic bodies moving, holding of periodical and regular elections to these democratic bodies are like infusing life in these bodies. The system of democracy involves the process of elections. Financial constraint can never be a ground for postponing the elections. This ground, in our view, is untenable and cannot be accepted as one of the supervening difficulties seeking to postpone the elections to the Panchayat Raj bodies. For all the reasons, we hold that the Ordinance No. 3 of 2000 dated 5. 2. 2000 issued by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh is devoid of merits and consequently we declare it as invalid. Since we have declared the Ordinance No. 3 of 2000 dated 5. 2. 2000 as invalid, the consequent G. O. Ms. Nos. 85 and 86 dated 13. 3. 2000 issued by the Secretary to Government, Panchayat Raj Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, shall also stand quashed. ( 19 ) IN R. S. Joshi v. Ajit Mills, AIR 1977 SC 2279 = (1977) 4 SCC 98 , the Apex Court, referring to Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 US 113 and Labour Board v, Jones and Laughlin, (1936) 301 US 1, 33-34, observed: a prefatory caveat. When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, but rigid, forward looking, not static liberal, not verbal in interpreting the organic law of the nation. When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, but rigid, forward looking, not static liberal, not verbal in interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U. S. Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois (quoted in Labour Board v. Jones and Laughlin) - Corwin, Constitution of the U. S. A. A. , introduction) viz, that Courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies . Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. ( 20 ) ARTICLE 243-U clearly states that a Municipality shall continue for 5 years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. Clause (2) of Article 243-U which applies to the existing Municipality in relation to duration of its functioning has been circumscribed by the period specified in clause (1 ). Clause (3) of Article 243-U mandates that election shall be completed before the expiry of the duration specified in clause (1) thereof. Clause (4) in no uncertain terms states that a Municipality constituted upon dissolution of Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. The period fixed in terms of Article 243-U must, therefore be held to be mandatory. It may be held to be directory having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 719 of 1995 (supra) only for the limited purpose. Can it be said that despite the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act having come into force on 1. 6. 1993 the State could not hold elections for the aforementioned reasons? The answer to the said question must be rendered in emphatic No. The State, having regard to the constitutional mandate enacted Act 17 of 1994 in terms whereof Section 70-G was omitted. But despite legislative fiat, the executive did not implement the said Act. ( 21 ) THE Act has undergone six amendments by reason of six legislative enactments and two ordinances. But despite legislative fiat, the executive did not implement the said Act. ( 21 ) THE Act has undergone six amendments by reason of six legislative enactments and two ordinances. The initial aggregate period of 4 years had now been stretched to 10 1/2 years. These aforementioned amendments beyond the reasonable time having regard to the provisions of Articles 243-U and 243-ZF must be held to be a fraud on the Constitution as having regard to the constitutional scheme no amendment could have been brought to defeat the spirit behind Part IX-A of the Constitution particularly keeping in view the mandatory provisions contained in Articles 243-U and 243-ZF thereof. ( 22 ) ARTICLE 243-ZF, as noticed hereinbefore, contains a non-obstante clause which is of wide amplitude. ( 23 ) THE question raised is of grave importance. In my opinion, this issue should be answered. ( 24 ) THE grass root democracy which was sought to be foisted by reason of inserting Part IX-A of the Constitution had been torn apart by the State by taking recourse to amendments after amendments which are clearly ultra vires arid despite enacting Act 17 of 1994 the same had not been brought into effect. The State successfully by taking recourse to machinations postponed elections and thereby deprived the people from having a grass root democracy. ( 25 ) IT may be that the petitioner has not filed the writ petition earlier. The bona fide of the writ petitioner has not been questioned. Even the State having regard to the question raised in the connected writ petitions, agreed to hold elections but merely prayed for time to complete the process thereof, The learned Additional Advocate-General did not and could not raise any contentions as regards upholding the vires of the amendments. Technical pleas had merely been raised to thwart the decision on merit. The Court in a situation of this nature should, in my considered opinion, cannot refuse to answer the question raised in the writ petition. ( 26 ) I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Amending Act 7 of 2001 must be declared ultra vires. ( 27 ) WHAT would be the effect of the aforementioned declaration? ( 28 ) NO vaccum should be created by judicial interpretation. The consequences, however, although are not the concern of the Court, the same may be a relevant factor. ( 27 ) WHAT would be the effect of the aforementioned declaration? ( 28 ) NO vaccum should be created by judicial interpretation. The consequences, however, although are not the concern of the Court, the same may be a relevant factor. I may notice that a writ petition was filed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the State to hold elections. The learned single Judge of this Court directed the State and the State Election Commission to hold elections within 90 days. A writ appeal was preferred by the State against the aforementioned judgment which was marked as Writ Appeal No. 1248 of 2001. This Court while extending the period noticed:. . . . The parties before us accept the legal position that unless the Government completes certain steps, the SEC cannot conduct elections. The schedule of time required commences from 23. 7. 2001 and even according to the schedule, by 6. 8. 2001 the division of MPHS data Assembly constituency wise is completed. As noticed in the beginning of the judgment, the learned Additional Advocate- General submits that the Government requires 120 days for identifying BC voters from MPHS data and marking them in the Assembly electoral rolls, calling for objections and validating the BC voters in the electoral rolls after verification. This period of 120 days includes the period of training to be imparted to verification officers for a period of 10 days and marking BC voters in the electoral rolls as well as time required for making sufficient copies of the electoral rolls is 10 days. To our mind, this is too long a time for these two stages. The entire process of validating the marking of BC voters electoral rolls can be completed within a period of 80 days. Thereafter, even the preparation and publication of final electoral rolls and publication of notification reservations can be completed within a period of 40 days. After publication of Gazette notification specifying reservation of seats (wards) in Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, the State Election Commission can complete the election process within a period of 60 days. Thereafter, even the preparation and publication of final electoral rolls and publication of notification reservations can be completed within a period of 40 days. After publication of Gazette notification specifying reservation of seats (wards) in Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, the State Election Commission can complete the election process within a period of 60 days. In the result, for the aforementioned reasons, we dispose of this writ appeal by modifying the order of the learned single judge directing the Government to complete the process of identification of BC voters, preparation and publication of final electoral rolls with BC voters and specifying by Gazette notification reservation of seats/ wards in Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for backward classes and all connected requirements within a period of 120 days from today (as the process started on 23-7-2001) and in any event not later than 10-12-2001 and thereafter SEC shall commence and complete the netire election process within a period of 60 days from 10. 12. 2001. ( 29 ) IT is one thing to say that the Court may issue a declaration but it is another thing to say that the Court may in fact situation obtaining refuse to grant any relief. In the instant case I am of the opinion that having regard to our decision in Writ Appeal No. 1248 of 2001 it is not necessary to issue any directions upon the State. ( 30 ) EVEN when normally no relief can be granted the law can be declared as has been done by the Apex Court in Ramana v. LA. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . ( 31 ) ALTHOUGH strong case has been made out to declare the aforementioned provisions as unconstitutional I deem it fit and proper that having regard to the fact that a local authority has to discharge a public function that status quo should be permitted to continue till such time as in terms of our judgment aforementioned the State and the State Election Commission are to complete the process of election. The writ petition is dismissed with the aforementioned directions. No costs. ( 32 ) THE petitioner is a recognised National Political Party. It seeks a writ, in the nature of mandamus, to declare Section 70g of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1995 (hereinafter called the principal Act ) as amended by Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act 2001. The writ petition is dismissed with the aforementioned directions. No costs. ( 32 ) THE petitioner is a recognised National Political Party. It seeks a writ, in the nature of mandamus, to declare Section 70g of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1995 (hereinafter called the principal Act ) as amended by Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act 2001. A. P. Act No. 7 of 2001 (hereinafter called the Amendment Act ) as ultra vires of Part IX of the Constitution of India and also further direct the State of A. P. to conduct elections to Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (HMC ). ( 33 ) THE Hon ble the Chief Justice while declaring the Amendment Act ultra vires dismissed the writ petition directing that status quo should be continued till the respondents complete the elections for HMC. Such direction was issued having regard to the judgment of this Bench in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. C. Prakash Goud, ILR 2001 AP 675 (DB), wherein we directed to complete the entire election process before February, 2002. The question, which falls for consideration, in this case even on the date of conclusion of arguments in the Court as well as consideration by this Court has become academic. Therefore, going by conventional and traditional view, I am of the considered opinion that the question raised need not be decided by us especially having regard to our decision in Prakash Goud case (supra ). I am, respectfully, therefore, not able to agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that Amendment Act No. 7 of 2001 should be declared as ultra vires. \ therefore, wish to write a separate opinion. ( 34 ) THE relevant facts are stated by the Hon ble the Chief Justice and I do not intend to repeat the same. I am, respectfully, therefore, not able to agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that Amendment Act No. 7 of 2001 should be declared as ultra vires. \ therefore, wish to write a separate opinion. ( 34 ) THE relevant facts are stated by the Hon ble the Chief Justice and I do not intend to repeat the same. Proviso to subsection (1) of Section 70g of the principal Act lays down that the period or periods of appointment of the Special Officer shall not, in the aggregate exceed two years (Act No. 18 of 1991) The proviso to subsection (1) of Section 70-G was amended to the effect that the period of appointment of Special Officer shall not exceed three years by Act No. 4 of 1993; shall not in the aggregate exceed four years by Act No. 10 of 1994 ; shall not in the aggregate exceed four and half years by Act No. 25 of 1995; shall not in the aggregate exceed five and half years by Act No. 19 of 1996; shall not in the aggregate exceed six and half years by Act No. 21 of 1997; shall not in the aggregate exceed seven and half years by Act No. 18 of 1998; shall not in the aggregate exceed nine and half years by Act No. 30 of 2000; and shall not in the aggregate exceed ten and half years by Act No. 7 of 2001. In paragraph 2 of the affidavit accompanying the writ petition the petitioner states as follows:. . . . The present writ petition is filed seeking elections to the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation as State Government has utterly failed to conduct the elections to it years together i. e. , more than 10 years which is contrary to the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Therefore, the petitioner is having locus stands to challenge the inaction on the part of State Government and accordingly the present writ petition is filed by way of Public Interest Litigation. ( 35 ) THERE cannot be any doubt therefore that the object of filing the writ petition is seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents, namely, the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The Commissioner of Municipal Administration, Hyderabad, State Election Commission and Hyderabad Municipal Corporation to conduct elections to the Corporation. ( 35 ) THERE cannot be any doubt therefore that the object of filing the writ petition is seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents, namely, the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The Commissioner of Municipal Administration, Hyderabad, State Election Commission and Hyderabad Municipal Corporation to conduct elections to the Corporation. This basic fact cannot be lost site of while granting relief or not granting relief to the petitioner- Political Party in these writ proceedings. ( 36 ) THE State Government has filed counter-affidavit on 23. 7. 2001 through its Secretary to Government in Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, justifying the delay in conducting elections to HMC. It is stated that All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Musilimeen filed writ petition being WP No. 10355 of 1993. In WP No. 13097 of 1993 this Court by order dated 29. 12. 1994 directed the State Government not to hold elections to MCH until fresh divisions are made on the basis of 1990-91 census. Therefore, immediately after the expiry of the term of the elected body no elections could be held. In the mean while, General Elections to Parliament in 1991, General Elections to Legislative Assembly in 1994 and General Elections to Parliament in 1998 intervened. The Government issued G. O. Ms. No. 180 and other similar orders on 20. 4. 1999 merging nine Municipalities and Gaddiannaram Gram Panchayat into HMC to form Greater Hyderabad and by order dated 25. 4. 1999 in WP No. 9274 of 1999 this Court directed to maintain status quo ante as on 20. 4. 1999. Finally, Special Revision of Electoral Rolls-1999 was taken up 1. 1. 1999 as the qualifying date. Final Notification for delimitation of Wards was published on 23. 6. 2000. These are some of the reasons mentioned in the counter for not holding elections. It is also stated that a Division Bench of this Court in Prakasam District Sarpanches Association v. Government of A. P. , 2001 (1) ALD 143 , has directed to provide for reservation of seats in favour of Backward Classes by identifying the BC voters from the existing voters list and then reserving seats/offices in the descending order. In accordance therewith the Government also issued an amendment to Municipal Corporation (Reservation of Seats) Rules, 1995 in G. O. Ms. No. 44 dated 6. 2. 1995. In accordance therewith the Government also issued an amendment to Municipal Corporation (Reservation of Seats) Rules, 1995 in G. O. Ms. No. 44 dated 6. 2. 1995. The process of identifying BC voters, reserving seats/offices to them has been taken up and is likely to be concluded by November, 2001. As necessary steps are being taken for completing the elections, the State prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 37 ) THE State Election Commission, third respondent, also find a separate counter-affidavit on 26. 6. 2001 stating that in view of the pendency of WP No. 10355 of 1993 and interim order passed herein, the State Election Commission could not conduct elections. It is also stated that fresh divisions have not been notified by the Government under Section 8 of the principal Act. Therefore, on 2. 5. 2000 the third respondent convened a meeting and it was agreed in the meeting to notify fresh divisions by the Government finally by the end of July, 2001. The Government in G. O. Ms. No. 216 Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department permitted the Commissioner of MCH to issue final notification of Ward Divisions in A. P. Gazette. The third respondent received the communication dated 23-6-2001 from MCH enclosing the final notification of Ward Divisions and in view of this the third respondent will finalise election schedule immediately after the Government notifies the reservation to Wards. ( 38 ) DURING the course of arguments the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties have also brought to our notice various judgments of this Court including the judgment of this Court in Prakash Goud case (supra) wherein we have directed the Government and State Election Commission to complete the entire election process by February, 2002. ( 39 ) SRI A. Satya Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that after coming into force of Part IX-A of the Constitution of India and having regard to the provisions of Articles 243-U and 243-ZF of the Constitution, the Amendment Act 7 of 2001, by which the term of the Special Officer is extended upto 30. 9. 2001 is unconstitutional being contrary to the provisions of Article 243-U of the Constitution. ( 40 ) THE short question required to be considered is whether it is necessary to examine the constitutional validity of Section 70-G of the principal Act especially having regard to our judgment dated 10. 8. 9. 2001 is unconstitutional being contrary to the provisions of Article 243-U of the Constitution. ( 40 ) THE short question required to be considered is whether it is necessary to examine the constitutional validity of Section 70-G of the principal Act especially having regard to our judgment dated 10. 8. 2001 in Prakash Goud case (supra ). ( 41 ) THE principal Act was enacted to establish one single Municipal Corporation for the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The Act is a complete code providing for constitution of a Corporation consisting of city of Hyderabad and city of Secunderabad. The Corporation, the Standing Committee, the Commissioner and the Wards Committee are the Municipal authorities which are charged with carrying out the provisions of the Act. Section 104 of the principal Act empowers the Government to appoint Municipal Commissioner. Chapter III enumerates the obligatory and discretionary duties and powers of the Municipal authorities and the Corporation. The Commissioner, who is a whole time officer of the Corporation is Chief Executive Officer and as per Section 118 of the Act he shall discharge the powers, duties and functions conferred upon or vested in the Corporation subject to restrictions, limitations and conditions imposed by the Corporation. Section 118 of the Act is relevant and reads as under. 118. Commissioner to exercise powers and perform duties of Corporation under other laws : (1) Any powers, duties and functions conferred or imposed upon or vested in the Corporation by any other law for the time being in force shall subject to the provisions of such law and to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as the Corporation may impose, be exercised, performed or discharged by the Commissioner. (2) The Commissioner may, with the approval of the Standing Committee by order in writing, empower any Municipal officer to exercise, perform or discharge any such power, duty or function under the control of the Commissioner and subject to his revision and to such conditions and limitations if any as he may think fit to impose. ( 42 ) AT this stage, we may now refer to the constitution of the Corporation. As per Section 5 of the HMC shall consists of sixty-six members in the city of Hyderabad and twenty-eight members in the city of Secunderabad. ( 42 ) AT this stage, we may now refer to the constitution of the Corporation. As per Section 5 of the HMC shall consists of sixty-six members in the city of Hyderabad and twenty-eight members in the city of Secunderabad. The ward members shall be elected in a general election and the term of office of elected members shall be five years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation. The Mayor of the Corporation is elected by direct election by all the persons, whose names appear in the electoral roll of the Corporation and the Deputy Mayor is elected by ward members. Section 88 of the Act contains provisions regulating the Corporation s proceedings. Chapter XXI vests power of control upon the Government. Section 679-D empowers the Government to dissolve the Corporation and confer all or any powers and functions of the Corporation, its Mayor, Standing Committee and an officer as the Government may appoint in that behalf. Under sub-section (9) of Section 679-D when the Corporation is dissolved, the Government shall be entitled to all assets and be subject to the liabilities of the Corporation as on the date of the dissolution and on the date of reconstitution. In the event of dissolution or delay in the reconstitution though there are adequate powers there are certain difficulties in carrying out the duties and powers of the Corporation and its authorities. Therefore, the State Legislature by Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1991 inserted Section 70-G of the Act which reads as under. In the event of dissolution or delay in the reconstitution though there are adequate powers there are certain difficulties in carrying out the duties and powers of the Corporation and its authorities. Therefore, the State Legislature by Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1991 inserted Section 70-G of the Act which reads as under. 70-G. Appointment of Special Officer : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where in the opinion of the Government it is not possible to hold the elections to the Corporation in accordance with the provisions of this Act, before the date of expiration of the term, and to bring the newly elected Councillors into office on the date of expiration of the term as aforesaid, the Government may, by notification appoint a Special Officer to exercise the powers, perform the duties and discharge the functions of, (a) the Corporation, (b) the Standing Committee, and (c) the Commissioner, under the Act, for a period which shall not exceed one year from the date of such appointment: provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and for reasons specified therein extend the said period of appointment of Special Officer beyond one year, for a further period or periods so however that the period of appointment of the Special Officer shall not, in the aggregate exceed two years. (2) The State Government shall cause elections to be held to the Corporation under the principal Act, so that the newly elected Councillors may come into office on such date as may be specified by the State Government in this behalf by a notification, in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette : provided that the State Government may, from time to time, advance or postpone the date specified under this sub-section and fix instead another date: provided further that the date fixed under this sub-section shall be the date on which the appointment of the Special Officer expires. (3) The Special Officer shall exercise the powers, perform the duties and discharge the functions of the Corporation until the elected Councillors come into office, of the Standing Committee until a Standing Committee is appointed by the Corporation, and of the Commissioner until a Commissioner is appointed by the State Government so direct, receive remuneration for his service from the Municipal Fund. ( 43 ) THE term during which the appointment of Special Officer can be extended which was two years was amended by Amendment Acts- Act No. 25 of 1995, Act No. 19 of 1996, Act No. 21 of 1997, Act No. 18 of 1998, Act No. 30 of 2000 and Act No. 7 of 2001. The various amendments amending the terms as specified in proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 70-G of the principal Act is shown in tabular form as under.