L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are preferred against the judgment and decree in OS No. 364 of 1993 of the Court of the III Additional Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad. CCCA No. 91 of 1996 is preferred by the 1st defendant whereas CCCA No. 210 of 2001 is preferred by the plaintiffs in the suit. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as plaintiffs and defendants. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the 2nd plaintiff is the wife, 1st plaintiff is the son and plaintiffs 3 to 5 are the daughters of late Sankuri Balaiah. It is the case of the plaintiffs that late Balaiah developed intimacy with one Chandramma since the year 1960 and both of them lived together as husband and wife. Late Balaiah provided maintenance as well as certain funds to Chadramma and she in turn invested them in the form of Fixed Deposits (FDs) in the 2nd defendant-bank. Two such FDs are dated 20-2-1992 and 28-4-1992 for an amount of Rs. 1,58,392-00 and Rs. 3,00,000. 00respectively. Balaiah died on 12-11-1992 and Chandramma died on 25-9-1993. The nominations said to have been made by Chandramma in favour of the 1st defendant as regards the two FDs are tainted with misrepresentation and the said nominations are alleged to be not valid. Since Chandramma was the 2nd wife of Balaiah, the plaintiffs are the legal heirs to succeed to her estate. The suit was filed claiming the relief of a declaration that the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and successors and entitled to be paid the amounts belonging to the estate of Chandramma and permanent injunction against the 2nd defendant (Karnataka Bank) restraining it from paying or transferring the amounts covered by the said FDs. ( 3 ) THE 1st defendant filed a written statement denying the averments in the plaint. It has been pleaded by the 1st defendant that late Chandramma had her own properties and she was never married to Balaiah and there was no relationship of wife and husband between them. It was the 1st defendant and his father that looked after Chandramma before her death and out of affection and gratitude for the service rendered to her, she nominated the 1st defendant to receive the amounts under the FDs. It was the 1st defendant and his father that looked after Chandramma before her death and out of affection and gratitude for the service rendered to her, she nominated the 1st defendant to receive the amounts under the FDs. It is not necessary to refer to the pleadings in the written statement in minute details. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:"1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration that they are heirs and successors of later Sunkuri Chandramma to entitle for the amounts belonging to the estate of late Chandramma?2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for injunction as prayed for?3. Whether the amounts belonging to Chandramma exclusively and either plaintiffs or late Balaiah had no right over the said amount as contended by defendant?4. Whether defendant No. 1 is nominee for the amounts of late Chadramma as such, he is only entitled for her amounts? The plaintiffs examined PWs. 1 to 3 and marked Exs. A1 to A3 and the defendant No. 1 examined DWs. 1 to 3 and marked Exs. B1 to B29. Apart from the same, the documents in Exs. X1 to X5 as well as Ex. C1 were also marked. ( 5 ) ON appreciation of oral and documentary evidence as well as the relevant case law, the trial Court answered Issue Nos. 1 to 3 against the plaintiffs and Issue No. 4 against the 1st defendant and ultimately dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the findings of the trial Court that the plaintiffs are not the legal heirs of late Chandramma, that they are not entitled for injunction against the 2nd defendant-bank and that the amounts in the FDs exclusively belong to late Chadramma and were not invested by late Balaiah, the plaintiffs preferred CCCA No. 210 of 2001. Aggrieved by the finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 4 that the nomination of defendant No. 1 as regards the payment of the amounts under the FDs is not proper, the 1st defendant filed CCCA No. 91 of 1996. ( 6 ) WE have heard Sri P. V. R. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs and Sri Ch. Dhananjaya, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent. ( 6 ) WE have heard Sri P. V. R. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs and Sri Ch. Dhananjaya, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent. ( 7 ) SRI P. V. R. Sharma contends that it was not in dispute that late Balaiah and Chandramma lived together since 1960 till Balaiah died in the year 1992 and a legal presumption can be drawn as to the relationship of husband and wife. Once such presumption exists, as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiffs, being the legal heirs and successors of late Chandramma, are entitled for her estate. He also submits that the signature of Chandramma on the nomination forms, which are marked as Exs. B19 and B20, are at variance with her admitted signatures on other documents and since the difference can be noticed with a naked eye, the nominations cannot be said to be valid. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, Sri Dhananjaya, the learned Counsel for the 1st defendant submits that mere living together of Balaiah and Chandramma does not bring about relationship of husband and wife between them in view of the fact that the 2nd plaintiff is no other than the legally wedded wife of late Balaiah and during the subsistence of that marriage, the 2nd marriage cannot be contracted, much less, presumed. Once the relationship between Balaiah and Chandramma cannot exist as husband and wife, there is no way the plaintiffs can inherit the estate of late Chandramma. So far as the nomination is concerned, he submits that late Chandramma had subscribed her signatures in the presence of the concerned bank officials and the minor variation in her signature, which is attributable to her old age and failing health, cannot invalidate her nomination. ( 9 ) IN view of the above submissions, the following questions arise for consideration in these appeals:1. Whether the plaintiffs can succeed to the estate of late Chandramma?2. Whether the nominations made by late Chandramma in favour of the 1st defendant as regards the two FDs (Exs. B19 and B20) are enforceable in law? ( 10 ) THE case of the plaintiffs depends mainly on the fact whether there existed the relationship of husband and wife between late Balaiah and late Chandramma. It is from this fact that all other subsidiary questions arise. B19 and B20) are enforceable in law? ( 10 ) THE case of the plaintiffs depends mainly on the fact whether there existed the relationship of husband and wife between late Balaiah and late Chandramma. It is from this fact that all other subsidiary questions arise. It is only the relationship of late Balaiah as husband of late Chandramma that would provide a bridge to the plaintiffs to have access to the estate of late Chandramma through succession. Sri P. V. R. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, strenuously contended that even the 1st defendant had admitted the fact that Chandramma and Balaiah lived together for almost three decades and the legal presumption can be drawn that such continuous cohabitation brings about the relationship of husband and wife between the two. Indisputably, the marriage between Balaiah and the 2nd plaintiff subsisted through out, till Balaiah died. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act stipulates the conditions that are to be fulfilled before solemnizing of any marriage. The first condition is that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. " Therefore, it has to be seen whether even the legal presumption that emerges on account of continuous cohabitation for a considerable period between late Chandramma and Balaiah, can bring about the marriage between them (even by presumption) de horse the subsistence of the matrimonial relationship of Balaiah with the 2nd plaintiff. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the plaintiffs contends that violation of the conditions contained in Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act by itself does not annul a marriage, unless the same has been declared void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. According to him, as long as there was no declaration by a competent Court under Section 11, nothing can interdict the existence of the 2nd marriage and the consequences flowing therefrom. In support of his contention that the continuous living together for over three decades by Chandramma and Balaiah should result in a presumption of the existence of relationship of wife and husband between them, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in S. P. S. Balasubrahmanyam v. Suruttayan, AIR 1992 SC 756 . In support of his contention that the continuous living together for over three decades by Chandramma and Balaiah should result in a presumption of the existence of relationship of wife and husband between them, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in S. P. S. Balasubrahmanyam v. Suruttayan, AIR 1992 SC 756 . While there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition laid down therein, it has to be seen whether such presumption can bring about the marriage, which is prohibited under the Hindu Marriage Act. Reference in this regard may be made to Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which declares any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of the Act as void, if, at the time of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living. When the Section is so unequivocal and when the parties, even by their specific and express acts and intentions, cannot bring about a valid marriage, as long as one or both of them have a living spouse, the question of such marriage being brought into existence by presumption does not arise. The judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh, (1994) SCC 407, is a total answer to this. In the said judgment, the principle lad down in B. S. Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1965 SC 1564 ) was reiterated and followed. The principle is as under:"if the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law. The bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the society treats them as husband and wife" ( 12 ) THE plaintiffs have also come forward with a plea that even though Chandramma and Balaiah are no more, the relationship between them can be decided by the Court. In support of their contention, they relied upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in Ponnuthayee Ammal v. Kamakshi Ammal, AIR 1978 Mad. 226 . This judgment was rendered prior to the amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act in the year 1976, particularly Section 11. In support of their contention, they relied upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in Ponnuthayee Ammal v. Kamakshi Ammal, AIR 1978 Mad. 226 . This judgment was rendered prior to the amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act in the year 1976, particularly Section 11. This aspect was dealt with by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurcharan Kaur v. Ramchand, AIR 1979 Pandh 206. Taking into account the amendment made to Section 11, it was held that the validity or otherwise of a marriage cannot be decided in the absence of the either party. When both the parties do not exist, the question of undertaking the enquiry into the same does not arise. At any rate, in view of the unequivocal provisions contained in Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the law laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court, this question pales into insignificance. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel made another submission on the very aspect. According to him, even if Chandramma cannot be treated as wife of Balaiah for the purpose of the Hindu Marriage Act, she can be treated so for the purpose of Hindu Succession Act. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in C. O. K. Reddy v. C. P. V. Lakshamma, AIR 1976 AP 43 . In our view, the said judgment is of no help to the plaintiffs for two reasons. Firstly, it related to a case of maintenance arising under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, where the considerations are totally different. Secondly, as a fact it was found in that case that the respondent herein whose marriage was in dispute was married to the appellant before the Hindu Marriage Act came into force. Having regard to the purpose underlying the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the Court had chosen not to adopt the test regarding the validity of a marriage prescribed under the Hindu Marriage Act. In view of this discussion, we hold that late Chandramma cannot be said to be the wife of late Balaiah and accordingly the plaintiffs cannot be treated as legal heirs of late Chandramma. In view of this discussion, we hold that late Chandramma cannot be said to be the wife of late Balaiah and accordingly the plaintiffs cannot be treated as legal heirs of late Chandramma. ( 14 ) IT is also contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are to be treated as successors to the estate of Chandramma under Section 15 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. He submits that under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, any property inherited by a Hindu woman from her husband or father in law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased, upon the heirs of husband and not upon the other heirs referred to in Sub-section (1) Section 15. Reliance is placed upon the judgment in State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh, AIR 191 SC 2301, to highlight the purpose underlying the enactment of Sub-section (2) of Section 15. A married Hindu woman, in the social context, may get the property from her parents or from her husband. Section 15 (1) enlists a line of descendents to succeed to the property on the death of the Hindu woman. The succession to the properly of the Hindu woman in the order of preference indicated in Section 15 (1) was to result in the properties, which the woman gets from the parents to her heirs from the husband s side and vice versa. To obviate such an eventuality, Section 15 (2) was enacted preserving the succession of the properties got by a Hindu woman from her parents or husband to the respective lineage s. Inasmuch as it was held that the relationship of husband and wife did not exist between late Chandramma and late Balaiah, this provision is of no avail to the plaintiffs. ( 15 ) THE next question is about validity of the nominations made by late Chandramma for the FDs made by her. During her life time, late Chandramma had made two FDs, one on 20-2-1992 for Rs. 1,58,392-00 and the other on 28-4-1992 for Rs. 3,00,000. 00. The FDRs are marked as B17 and 18. In these FDRs, she nominated the 1st defendant as the person entitled to receive the amounts in case of her death before maturity of the FDRs or withdrawal of the same. 1,58,392-00 and the other on 28-4-1992 for Rs. 3,00,000. 00. The FDRs are marked as B17 and 18. In these FDRs, she nominated the 1st defendant as the person entitled to receive the amounts in case of her death before maturity of the FDRs or withdrawal of the same. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the 1st defendant obtained the signatures on the nominations, which are marked as Exs. B19 and B20, by resorting to misrepresentation. Their pleadings in the plaint on this aspect are as under:"the 1st defendant, being a close relative, must have procured her signatures in the absence of plaintiffs by misrepresentation, on some papers on some pretext or the other-Plaintiffs, therefore, submit that the said nominations, allegedly produced before the 2nd defendant/bank are not genuine and, therefore, they questioned the truth, genuineness and validity of the alleged nominations produced by the 1st defendant. "in the evidence, PW1 states as under;"according to us, these cards Exs. B19 and B20 were manipulated by D1 and the signatures appearing thereon are not genuine. "it is evident from the reading of the pleadings and the evidence of the plaintiffs that their man objection to the nominations was that the signatures of late Chandramma were obtained through misrepresentation. ( 16 ) UNDER Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, misrepresentation is one of the grounds for rendering a contract voidable. Any contract, which is vitiated on account of misrepresentation, is voidable at the instance of the party whose consent was so caused. Misrepresentation is defined under Section 18 of the Contract Act. It is an inclusive definition. To establish misrepresentation, necessary facts constituting or leading to misrepresentation have to be pleaded and established. Except stating that the 1st respondent procured the signatures of Chandramma in Exs. B19 and B20 by misrepresentation, nothing was pleaded. Misrepresentation is not something, which is to be inferred. Even in a given case where misrepresentation is pleaded and established, that by itself does not render the contract inoperative. The reason is that Section 19 provides that a party to contract whose consent was obtained through misrepresentation may choose to insist on the performance of the contract instead of repudiating it. When such are the provisions of law, a bare allegation in the plaint and a half-hearted statement in the evidence do not enable the Court to invalidate the nominations. When such are the provisions of law, a bare allegation in the plaint and a half-hearted statement in the evidence do not enable the Court to invalidate the nominations. ( 17 ) MISREPRESENTATION or other factors affecting the free consent, such as coercion, undue influence, fraud, etc. , are matters of concern for the parties to the contract. The party may include the legal representatives. A 3rd party to a contract cannot raise any objection on these aspects. This is evident from the reading of Section 19 itself, which provides that "when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. " Admittedly, the plaintiffs are not parties to the contract. It has already been held that they are not the legal representatives of late Chandramma. Therefore, there was no locus standi to the plaintiffs to challenge the validity of the nominations. ( 18 ) EVEN otherwise, the objection raised by the plaintiffs to the nominations are that the 1st defendant may have misrepresented or illegally procured the signatures of late Chandramma and that the signatures marked as Exs. B19 and B20 are not genuine. These pleas cannot go together. The 1st objection pre-supposes that the signatures were in fact put by late Chandramma but the same were procured by misrepresentation. The 2nd one suggests that the signatures are forged. The question of forgery does not arise in view of their own pleading that the signatures were obtained through misrepresentation. It needs to be observed that late Chandramma had put her signatures on the nomination cards - Exs. B19 and B20 before DW2, who is the concerned Branch Manager of the 2nd defendant-bank. Nothing was suggested which shakes the credit worthiness of his evidence. The discrepancy in the signatures on Exs. B19 and B20 compared to the other signatures of late Chandramma appear to be mainly on account of old age and ill health. The trial Court had arrived at a conclusion that since the signatures are at variance, it has to be presumed that they are forged. ( 19 ) THE findings of the trial Court on this aspect are unsustainable for more reasons that one. The trial Court had arrived at a conclusion that since the signatures are at variance, it has to be presumed that they are forged. ( 19 ) THE findings of the trial Court on this aspect are unsustainable for more reasons that one. Firstly, having recorded a finding that the plaintiffs are not the legal heirs of late Chandramma, it ought not to have entertained any challenge by the plaintiffs to the nominations; Secondly, the trial Court failed to see that even according to the plaintiffs, Chandramma, during her last days, was living with the 1st defendant s family and they were looking after her. She in fact died in the house of the 1st defendant. Therefore, there was nothing unnatural about late Chandramma nominating the 1st defendant as the beneficiary to receive the amounts under the FDRs; Thirdly, the trial Court, having entertained the doubt as to the genuineness of the signatures of late Chandramma on Exs. B19 and B20, ought to have seen whether the plaintiffs have taken any steps to get the signatures of Exs. B19 and B20 compared by a Hand Writing expert with the undisputed signatures of late Chandramma. The trial Court ought not to have undertaken the exercise of comparison of signatures by itself. Last, but most important is that the declaration of the trial Court was academic and purposeless. Since the declaration was not going to benefit the plaintiffs in view of its own finding that they are not the legal heirs of late Chandramma, the trial Court ought to have desisted from adjudicating this issue. By it s finding on this fact aspect, if at all anything, it only disabled the 1st defendant from reaping the benefit of nominations. No such declaration, which does not ensure the benefits of the plaintiffs and which only takes away the rights of the 1st defendant is permissible under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court on this issue cannot be sustained. We accordingly set aside the same. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, the judgment and decree in OS No. 364 of 1993 is set aside and CCCA No. 91 of 1996 is allowed. Since we upheld the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs are not legal heirs of late Chandramma, CCCA No. 210 of 2001 is dismissed. We accordingly set aside the same. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, the judgment and decree in OS No. 364 of 1993 is set aside and CCCA No. 91 of 1996 is allowed. Since we upheld the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs are not legal heirs of late Chandramma, CCCA No. 210 of 2001 is dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs. Each party shall bear their own costs.