JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—This revision petition has been directed against the order dated 30.12.1997 of the learned Appellate Authority, Kullu upholding the order dated 13.12,1996 of the learned Rent Controller, Kullu whereby the petition filed by the petitioner for the ejectment of the respondent was dismissed. 2. The parties are related to each other. The petitioner is the maternal grand-father of the respondent. According to the petitioner, One shop situated within the Municipal Area of Banjar was let out by him to the respondent on 1.2.1986 on a monthly rent of Rs. 150. The petitioner preferred a petition under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 seeking ejectment of the respondent from the shop premises on the following grounds: (a) Non-payment of rent, with effect from 1.2.1986; The arrears of rent claimed till 30.11.1991 amounts to Rs. 10,500; (b) That the respondent has materially impaired the value and utility of the shop premises by allowing the same to remain closed and unoccupied for the last more than two years. 3. The respondent while resisting the petition denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. It was averred that the shop premises were in fact let out to her mother Smt. Kamla Devi. The arrears of rent were denied. It was further pleaded that the respondent has not materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises and that the shop is open being run by the tenant Smt. Kamla Devi. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller: 1. Whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? OPR 2. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent? If so, how much and since when? OPP. 3. Whether the respondent has materially impaired the demised premises by closing it for two years as alleged? OPP. 4. Relief. 5. The learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties. Smt. Kamla Devi mother of the respondent was held to be the tenant of the shop premises. Issues No. 2 and 3 were, therefore, decided against the petitioner and consequently, the petition filed by the petitioner for the ejectment of the respondent was dismissed on 13.12.1996. 6. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority was also dismissed on 30.12.1997.
Issues No. 2 and 3 were, therefore, decided against the petitioner and consequently, the petition filed by the petitioner for the ejectment of the respondent was dismissed on 13.12.1996. 6. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority was also dismissed on 30.12.1997. The findings of the Rent Controller on all the issues were affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. 7. Feeling aggrieved by and being dissatisfied that the findings of the two authorities below, the petitioner is before this Court by way of the present revision petition under Section 24(5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. 8. At the very out-set, an objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the power of this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act, is limited in seeing whether any illegality or impropriety has been committed by the two authorities below in exercise of the powers under the Rent Act and that in exercise of such limited revisional powers, this Court cannot reappreciate and reassess the evidence in order to disturb the concurrent findings on a question of fact. 9. The Apex Court in. M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma and others, 1988 (1) SCC 70, while dealing with the extent of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Delhi. Rent Control Act, 1958 (the provisions of which are similar to the provisions contained in Section 24(5) of the Rent Act in the present case) has held that the questions whether there was a sub-tenant and whether the written consent of the landlord had been obtained, were questions of fact. Concurrent findings on such questions cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. 10. Again in Fatima Bee (Smt.) v. Mahmood Siddiqui, (1996) 9 SCC 450, it has been held by the Apex Court that the High Courts power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact under the Rent Act would be limited and if there is no misreading of evidence by the two courts below, it is not open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and reverse the findings recorded by the Courts below in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 11.
11. In Patel Valmik Himatlal and others v. Patel Mohan Lai Muljibhai, (1998) 7 SCC 383, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court had concurrently found sub-letting as proved. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, after re-appreciating the evidence, held that it was not a case of sub-letting but a case of partnership. The Honble Supreme Court observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence, which it could not do. It was held that mere fact that a different view was possible on reappreciation of evidence was no ground for the High Court to substitute its own finding in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 12. In C ha man Prakash Puri v. Ishwar Dass Rajput and another, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 445, and in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1999 (1) RCJ 158, it has been held that it is not permissible for the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the two courts below, on the facts of the case, are so unreasonable that no Court could have reached such a finding on the material available. 13. Dealing with the similar provision contained in Section 21(5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (as then in force) which provision is pari materia to Section 24(5) of the present Rent Act, the Honble Supreme Court in Dr. Gyan Parkash v. Som Nath and others, 1996 (1) RCR 342 (SC), has held that on questions of fact, the findings recorded by the authorities below must be accepted and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such finding in exercise of limited scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Act. The High Court is not exercising the powers of a Court of Appeal and, as such, is not expected to re-appreciate the entire evidence coming on record and to come to a contrary finding. 14. In lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201, the Honble Supreme Court considered the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity.
It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity. The two jurisdictions (appellate and revisional) are different from each other in scope and content. The use of the expression "legality or propriety of such orders or proceedings" makes the revisional powers of the High Court wider than powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nonetheless it is not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb findings of fact arrived at by the courts below without recording a finding that the conclusions arrived at were perverse or based on "no evidence" or were arrived at on a superficial or perfunctory approach. It was further observed:— "If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the above mentioned well recognized principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision." 15. In the present case, on the basis of the evidence coming on the record, the two courts below have arrived at a concurrent finding that no relationship of a landlord and tenant exists between the parties and that Smt. Kamla Devi, the mother of the respondent is the tenant in respect of the shop premises under the petitioner. Such concurrent findings are purely on a question of fact. I have gone through the evidence coming on the record and it can be safely held that there has been no misreading or misappreciation of evidence by the two courts below. 16. The only conclusion which can be arrived at is the one arrived at by the two courts below. Therefore, the concurrent findings of the two courts below cannot be interfered with in the present revision petition. Such findings are affirmed. 17. Resultantly, the present revision petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.-