P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) CRP No. 3473/99 is filed under Section 22 of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, in short hereinafter called as "act", as against an order in RCA No. 12/96 on the file of appellate authority under the Act-Principal Senior Civil Judge Rajahmundry, reversing an order made in RCC No. 33/89 on the file of Rent Controller-Principal District Munsif; Rajahmundry. CRP No. 3594/99 is filed under Section 22 of the Act as against an order made in RCA No. 11/96 on the file of appellate authority reversing the order in RCC No. 32/89 on the file of Rent Controller-Principal District Munsif, Rajahmundry. ( 2 ) BOTH RCA Nos. 11/96 and 12/96 were disposed of by the appellate authority by a common order dated 7-7-1999 and hence for the purpose of convenience, a Common Order is being made in these two civil revision petitions also. ( 3 ) THE pleadings of the respective parties in both RCC No. 32/89 and 33/89 are almost similar. But, however for the purpose of convenience, the allegations made in the respective pleadings are also dealt with. ( 4 ) THE pleadings in RCC No. 32/89 are as under: the entire building bearing D. No. 10-15-1 situate at Forte Gate, Rajahmundry, originally belonged to the father of the petitioner by name Kaki Suryanarayana Murthy and his brother K. Satyanaraycma Murthy and it was the joint family. Though the brothers partitioned other properties they kept the building bearing No. 10-15-1 as joint property. Both brothers are enjoying the rents equally from the shops. There was a family settlement among the joint owners of the said building and as per that settlement, half of the rear side shop in the tenancy of the respondent and half of the front shop situate and abutting the main road in the tenancy of one Dandamudi Sobanachalapathi Rao and the shop adjoining the said portion to the north also fell to the share of the petitioner. The other half of the rear side in the tenancy of the respondent fell to the share of K. N. V. S, Subrarnanyam and K. V. S. S. Srihanth. The petitioner is in possession and enjoyment of the shop situated to the north of schedule shop and he has been carrying on the business in musical equipment etc. The petitioner proposed to expand the present business. The petitioner is in possession and enjoyment of the shop situated to the north of schedule shop and he has been carrying on the business in musical equipment etc. The petitioner proposed to expand the present business. For that the petitioner requested the respondent to vacate and deliver the schedule shop portion to him. The petitioner proposed to remove the wall existing in between the shop in his occupation and the schedule shop and likewise he requested Dandamudi Sobhanachalapathi Rao to vacate and deliver the northen side house portion adjoining the shop of the petitioner. After the respondent and Dandamudi Sobhanachalapathi Rao vacates the portions, the petitioner will convert those portions and the shop in his possession into one big shop to expand his present business. All these facts were apprised to the respondent and Sobhanachalapathi Rao and they refused to vacate the shop and instead of vacating them they filed petitions under Section 3 of the Rent Control Act. The petitioner bona fide requires the petition schedule shop portion for his own occupation for the expansion of the business which he is carrying on. The respondent is not willing to vacate the portion as it is clear from his conduct in filing RCC No. 123/88 under Section 8 of the Act. The respondent filed a counter admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant, but denying other allegations. It was averred that the respondents are running a printing press in the name and style of Venkatachalapathi Printing Press in two shop rooms in the building bearing D. No. 10-15-1, Fort Gate, Rajahmundry and he is paying a monthly rent of Rs. 125/- in respect of the shops which is facing the main road and he is paying Rs. 75/- in respect of the shop which is behind the shop in the occuption of Dandamudi Sobhanachalapathi Rao. Prior to the respondent his father was carrying on business in these two shops and therefore, the two shops are in the occuption of the respondent and his father for the last 50 years. The petitioner is now seeking eviction of the respondent from half of the shop room which is just behind the shop in which Dandamudi Sobhanachalapathi Rao is the tenant. The petitioner ought to have given the measurement of the shops as he is claiming only part of the premises. The petitioner is now seeking eviction of the respondent from half of the shop room which is just behind the shop in which Dandamudi Sobhanachalapathi Rao is the tenant. The petitioner ought to have given the measurement of the shops as he is claiming only part of the premises. The allegation of the petitioner that he is entitled to rear side shop room is contrary to the allegation made in the notice issued through D. V. K. Ramesh, Advocate, on behalf of K. S. R. V. Sitbba Rao and others and Smt. K. Ratnaprabha and the petitioner herein. In the said notice it is mentioned that the entire rear side shop fell to the share of the petitioner. When the petitioner failed to receive the rents in respect of the said shop, the respondent filed RCC No. 128/88 under Section 8 of the Rent Control Act and started depositing the rents at the rate of Rs. 75/- to the credit of the said petition and the petitioner has been withdrawing them. To the surprise of the respondent the petitioner now says that he is entitled to only half of the rear side shop. The petitioner never requested the respondent to vacate and deliver possession of the schedule shop. The contention of the petitioner that he proposed to remove the wall existing in between the schedule shop and the shop in his occuption in order to expand his business is not correct. The premises in the occuption of the petitioner is sufficient a bigger one and is sufficient to carry 01. his existing business. In the present premises the petitioner and his father during his life time have been carrying on the present business since more than 50 years. Therefore, the proposal of the petitioner to expand his business and for that he requires the specific premises is not bona fide and it is only a created nor to evict the respondent and the ground is created with intention to lease out the premises to third parties for higher rent. As the respondent and his father have been carrying their printing press business since about more than 50 years, in their two shops, if the eviction is ordered it would cause hardship to them and the said hardship outweight the advantage that would be derived by the petitioner. As the respondent and his father have been carrying their printing press business since about more than 50 years, in their two shops, if the eviction is ordered it would cause hardship to them and the said hardship outweight the advantage that would be derived by the petitioner. As the schedule shop which is in the occupation of the respondent is itself a building within the definition of Section 2 (iii) of the Act, the petitioner cannot maintain this petition under Section 10 (3) (c) for the additional accommodation. As the petitioner is admittedly, entitled to only half of the portion of the leasehold premises, he cannot maintain the present application without adding the other co-owners. As the lease is in favour of the respondent in respect of the entire shop room, the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek the eviction from the portion of the lease hold. ( 5 ) LIKEWISE, in RCC No. 33/89 also the respective pleadings of the parties are as follows:- the entire premises bearing D. No. 10-15-1 situate at Forte Gate, Rajahmundry, originally belonged to the father of the petitioner by name Kaki Suryanaraycina Murthy and his brother K. Satyanarayana Murthy and it was the joint family property. Though the petitioners partitioned other properties they kept the building bearing No. 10-15-1 as the joint property. Both brothers are enjoying the rents equally from the shops. There was a family settlement among the joint owners of the said building and as per that settlement, half of the rear side shop in the tenancy of the respondent and half of the front shop situate and abutting the main road in the tenancy of one M/s. Venkata Chalapathi Printing Works and the shop adjoining the said portion to the north also fell to the share of the petitioner. The other half of the rear side in the tenancy of the respondent fell to the share of K. V. S. S. Srikanth. The petitioner is in possession and enjoyment of the shop situate to the north of the schedule shop and he has been carrying on the business in musical equipment etc. The petitioner proposed to expand the present business. For that the petitioner requested the respondent to vacate and deliver the schedule shop portion to him. The petitioner is in possession and enjoyment of the shop situate to the north of the schedule shop and he has been carrying on the business in musical equipment etc. The petitioner proposed to expand the present business. For that the petitioner requested the respondent to vacate and deliver the schedule shop portion to him. The petitioner proposed to remove the wall existing in between the shop in his occuption and the schedule shop and likewise he requested Polisetti Venkata Ramana Rao who is the owner of the printing press to vacate and deliver the northen side house portion adjoining the shop of the petitioner. After the respondent and the said Polisetti Venkata Ramana Rao vacates the portions, the petitioner will convert those portions and the shop in his possession into one big shop to expand his present business. All these facts were apprised to the respondent and Polisetti Venkata Ramana Rao and they refused to vacate the shop and instead of vacating them, they filed petitions under Section 8 of the Rent Control Act. The petitioner bona fide requires the petition schedule shop portion for his own occuption for the expansion of the business which he is carrying on. The respondent is not willing to vacate the portion as it is clear from his conduct in filing RCC No. 122/88 under Section 8 of the Act. A counter was filed admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant, but stating that he has been the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 400/- and has been carrying on business in the name and style of M/s. Vijayalakshmi Kadhi Shop since 1971. It was further pleaded that the said shop was originally let out to the respondent by K. S. R. V. Subha Rao and brothers and they were issuing the receipts for the rents they received. From the petition, the respondent understands that the schedule premises is half of the shop room under the possession of the respondent. The petitioner failed to give the measurements in the schedule and therefore, the schedule given in the petition is ambiguous. It cannot be understood to what extent the petitioner is now seeking for eviction. From the petition, the respondent understands that the schedule premises is half of the shop room under the possession of the respondent. The petitioner failed to give the measurements in the schedule and therefore, the schedule given in the petition is ambiguous. It cannot be understood to what extent the petitioner is now seeking for eviction. On 12-8-1988 the respondent received a notice from Sri D. V. K. Ramesh, Advocate, on behalf of K. S. R. V. Subba Rao and brothers, the petitioner and K. Ratna Prabha, stating that there was a family settlement and the premises in the occuption of the respondent fell to the share of the petitioner herein and Ratna Prabha and directed the respondent to pay the rents in equal shares to them from the date of receipt of the notice. In that notice also the specific share of the petitioner is not mentioned. Since then the respondent started sending the rents in equal shares to the petitioner and Ratna Prabha and after some time, the petitioner refused to receive the rents and on that the respondents filed RCC No. 122/88 under Section 8 of the Rent Control Act and final orders were passed on 1-5-1989 directing the respondents to pay the rents directly to the owners. The petitioner never requested the respondent to vacate the shop. The contention of the petitioner that he proposed to remove the wall existing in between the schedule shop and the shop in his possession to convert the same into a bigger shop to expand his business, is not correct. The shop in the occuption of the petitioner is a big premises and it is more than sufficient to carry on the present business. There is no necessity to expand the business of the petitioner. The petitioner and his father during his life time have been carrying on the present business in the same premises since more than 50 years. The alleged proposal to expand the business is only a ruse to evict the respondent. The relative hardship is more to the respondent if he vacates the premises and it outweighs the advantage which the petitioner may derive. As the premises is in the occuption of the respondent itself if a building within the definition of Section 2 (iii) of the Act, the petitioner cannot maintain this petition under Section 10 (3) (c) for additional accommodation. As the premises is in the occuption of the respondent itself if a building within the definition of Section 2 (iii) of the Act, the petitioner cannot maintain this petition under Section 10 (3) (c) for additional accommodation. As admittedly the petitioner is only the owner of the half of the lease hold premises he cannot maintain the eviction petition and cannot seek eviction in respect of half of the portion by splitting the lease. ( 6 ) IN fact, even in the Court of first instance, a joint memo was filed and common evidence was recorded in RCC No. 32/89. On behalf of the petitioner, PW1 was examined and Exs. Al and A2 were marked and on behalf of the respondent, RW1 to RW3 were-examined. PW1 is none other than the petitioner. Ex. A1 is a copy of the partition deed dated 31-3-1989 between the petitioner and his family members and Ex. A2 is the plan showing the schedule premises. RW1 is the brother of the respondent in RCC No. 32/89 and RW2 is the respondent in RCC No. 33/89. RW3 is a person doing business in the locality. The Court of first instance after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence had dismissed the said RCCs. and aggrieved by the same, the landlord had filed RCA Nos. 11 and 12 of 1996 on the file of the appellate authority-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry and the appellate authority by an order dated 7-7-1999 had reversed the orders of the learned Rent Controller and had allowed the appeals granting the tenants-revision petitioners in both the appeals two months time and the tenants aggrieved by the same, had preferred the present civil revision petitions. ( 7 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to as arrayed in the Court of first instance i. e. , landlord-respondent in the civil revision petitions as petitioner and the tenants-revision petitioners in civil revision petitions as respondents . ( 8 ) HEARD Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners and Sri M. S. K. Sastry, the learned senior Counsel representing the respondents in both the revisions. ( 9 ) SRI Ramachander Rao, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners had brought to my notice CMP Nos. ( 8 ) HEARD Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners and Sri M. S. K. Sastry, the learned senior Counsel representing the respondents in both the revisions. ( 9 ) SRI Ramachander Rao, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners had brought to my notice CMP Nos. 19641/ 2001 in CRP No. 3374/99 and CMP No. 20110/2001 in CRP No. 3594/99 and had contended that these applications may be allowed since the ground raised in these applications does not need any further evidence to be adduced and the said ground is a pure question of law which can be permitted to be raised. The learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in. J. Jermons v. Aliammal, 1999 (7) SCC 382 and also State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2018 in this regard. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the other side is not taken by surprise and a specific pleading had been taken relating to the additional ground in the pleadings itself. The learned Counsel further contended that the question that there cannot be splitting up of tenancy and a petition for partial eviction is maintainable, does not require any further evidence at all and it is a pure question of law which can be raised at any point of time. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision in Habeebunnisa Begum v. G. Doraikamnu Chettiar, (2000) 1 SCC 74 . The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the pleadings and also the evidence available on record and had pointed out that there is no pleading at all about the allied business and the appellate authority had made unnecessary observations about the allied business. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that there is no identifiable portion at all and there was no partition by metes and bounds and further Ex. A2 plan does not even contain measurements and hence the eviction petition is bad even for vagueness. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the pleadings and had pointed out that pleadings is different from evidence. What is contemplated by Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act is additional accommodation in relation to "business which he is carrying on" and not "new business". The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the pleadings and had pointed out that pleadings is different from evidence. What is contemplated by Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act is additional accommodation in relation to "business which he is carrying on" and not "new business". The learned Counsel also had contended that in the absence of co-owners, the eviction petition cannot be maintained. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision in Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari v. Goundappa Ambadas Bukale, AIR 1997 SC 998 . The learned Counsel also had pointed out that though the hardship was specifically pleaded, the comparative hardship was not properly considered at all. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on B. Kandaswamy Reddiar v. O. Gomathi Ammal, 1998 (7) SCC 138 . It was also further contended that the appellate authority had erred in placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Hardhayandas v. Hifazat Huaaain (died) per LRs. , 1994 (3) ALT 550, since that decision is distinguishable on facts and in the said case there was a pleading relating to allied business, whereas there is no such pleading in the present case. The learned Counsel also had pointed out certain admissions of PW1 relating to the fact that no shop is vacant in the said center. ( 10 ) SRI M. S. K. Sastry, the learned senior Counsel representing M. V. Suresh, on behalf of the respondent had pointed out that the additional ground cannot be permitted to be raised at this belated stage and there is no evidence and no such argument had been advanced in the Court below and such question cannot be permitted to be raised at a belated stage i. e. , at the stage of revision. The learned Counsel also had contended that the events which had happened and the conduct of the parties also should be looked into while appreciating the facts of a particular case. The learned Counsel also had contended that the events which had happened and the conduct of the parties also should be looked into while appreciating the facts of a particular case. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the definition of the word building under the Act and the learned Counsel also had submitted that the partition had taken place with the knowledge of the Revision Petitioners-tenants which had been duly attorned to also and further they themselves had gone to Court seeking permission to deposit rents by filing petitions under Section 8 of the Act and this itself shows that there is no question of splitting up of tenancy at all. Further, nowhere in the evidence this aspect was stated by the revision petitioners. The learned Counsel also had submitted that there is no new business at all, but it is only an allied business and for the purpose of expansion of business, the landlord-respondent in the RCCs require the building and the appellate authority after appreciating all the facts and circumstances had arrived at a correct conclusion that the revision petitioners are liable to be evicted. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on Paster J. S. Singh v. Smt. Jyotsana Singh and another, AIR 1982 Mad 122, Ch. Ramanjaneyulu v. R. Nagura Hamma, 1988 (2) ALT 499 and Mohd. Moinuddin v. A. Yadagiri, 1983 (1) An. WR. 168. ( 11 ) HAVING heard both the parties at length, now the question is whether the common order of the appellate authority made in RCA Nos. ll and 12 of 1996 is liable to be interfered with or to be confirmed in these revisions. ( 12 ) THE additional grounds which the revision petitioners intend to raise for the first time in these revisions are as follows:- (a) The Lower appellate Court ought to have seen that partial eviction of single indivisible lease is impermissible in view of the settled legal position. (b) The Lower appellate Court failed to consider the specific averment in the counter-affidavit tiled by the petitioner in RCC. No. 32/98 that lease in favour of this respondent is in respect of the entire shop room and that the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek eviction from part of it by segregating the same from the original lease hold premises and that the RCC. 32/89 is not maintainable". No. 32/98 that lease in favour of this respondent is in respect of the entire shop room and that the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek eviction from part of it by segregating the same from the original lease hold premises and that the RCC. 32/89 is not maintainable". It is pertinent to note that this aspect of partial eviction of a single indivisible lease is being raised for the first time in these revisions. It is no doubt true that a plea had been taken, but the mere taking of the plea will not amount to proof unless it is a plea in relation to a pure question of law. It is pertinent to note that this aspect was not spoken to by the witnesses nor it was canvassed as a ground by the revision petitioners either in the grounds of revision or atleast before the Courts below. In the decision referred (supra), the Apex Court had observed:- "it may be noted here that there is a fundamental difference between a case of raising additional ground based on the pleadings and the material available on record and a case of taking a new plea not borne out by the pleadings. In the former case no amendment of pleadings is required whereas in its discretion, with a view to do complete justice between the parties, may allow a party either to raise additional ground or take a new plea, as the case may be, if the circumstances so justify like a plea based on subsequent events. Whereas in the former situation, the case can be disposed of on the material on record but in the latter case the pleadings will have to be amended and for that reason the parties have to be given reasonable opportunity to file the further pleadings and adduce necessary evidence. in the decision referred (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that the plea of non-maintainability of a suit is a legal plea and can be accepted although no specific plea was taken or precise issue framed. in the decision referred (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that the plea of non-maintainability of a suit is a legal plea and can be accepted although no specific plea was taken or precise issue framed. Section 2 (iii) of the Act defines building as building means any house or hut or part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes: (a) the gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses if any, appurtenant to such house, hut or part of such house or hut and let or to be let along with such house or hut or part of such house or hut; (b) any furniture supplied or any fittings, affixed by the landlord for use in such house or hut or part of a house or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house; from the definition, it is clear that even a part of a house or hut let or to be let out separately for non-residential purposes can fall under the definition of building . As already staled supra, the revision petitioners who had examined themselves as witnesses had not spoken to about these aspects. In my considered opinion, the question of pleading of tenancy or partial eviction cannot be said to be a pure question of law and at the best it can be a mixed question of fact and law and hence for deciding this aspect, the factual foundation also is always essential. But however in the present case though a vague plea was raised by the revision petitioners, as can be seen from the record, the revision petitioners were not particular of canvassing this question at any point of time either by letting any necessary evidence or at least by raising such contentions before the Courts below. But however in the present case though a vague plea was raised by the revision petitioners, as can be seen from the record, the revision petitioners were not particular of canvassing this question at any point of time either by letting any necessary evidence or at least by raising such contentions before the Courts below. If the revision petitioners are permitted to raise these additional grounds at the stage of arguments in this civil revision petitions, the respondent in the civil revision petitions will be much prejudiced and further in view of the conduct of the revision petitioners in not raising this question at all before the Courts below, it can be taken that this plea was either waived or abandoned by the revision petitioners and hence the revision petitioners cannot be permitted to raise this ground at the stage of revisions and accordingly CMP No. 19641/2001 in CRP No. 3374/99 and CMP No. 20l 10/2001 in CRP No. 3594/99 cannot be allowed and are liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed. ( 13 ) THE appellate authority had discussed the evidence available on record in detail in paragraphs II to 15 and had ultimately allowed the appeals directing the revision petitioners-tenants to vacate the premises within a period of two months from the date of the order. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners no doubt had raised several contentions pointing out to the respective pleadings of the parties and also had drawn the attention of the Court to the schedules specified in the petitions. The learned Counsel also had strenuously contended that what is contemplated is only new business and hence it cannot be said to be an allied business. It is pertinent to note that the landlord has been doing business in selling amplifiers, gramophone disks and cassettes and the proposed business of T. Vs. and V. C. Rs. definitely will fall under allied business since this is also ancillary business concerned with music system only. In fact, in the decision referred above, where additional accommodation for expanding business for opening glass and aluminum sections to the original business of plywood and hardware was pleaded, it was held to be allied business. and V. C. Rs. definitely will fall under allied business since this is also ancillary business concerned with music system only. In fact, in the decision referred above, where additional accommodation for expanding business for opening glass and aluminum sections to the original business of plywood and hardware was pleaded, it was held to be allied business. However, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners tried to distinguish the said decision on facts stating that there was a specific plea raised in the said case, but such plea is not available in the present case. The pleadings of the respective parties, in my opinion, have to be construed in the context of the matter and not too technically and undoubtedly the landlord even in the present matter had taken a specific plea relating to the expansion of the business and the appellate authority had discussed this matter in detail at paragraph 14 of the impugned order and had given a clear finding that the business of gramophone disks, amplifiers and cassettes and the business of T. Vs. and V. C. Rs. can be definitely said to be allied business and hence the ground of additional accommodation had been established. This is a clear finding of fact recorded by the appellate authority on appreciation of evidence. In Mohd. Moinuddin v. A. Yadagiri, 1983 (1) An. WR 168, it was held that the requirement of the landlord, a manufacturer of bangles having factory at a different place seeking the premises for doing retail business, can be said to be bonafide requirement for ordering eviction. RW1 is the respondent in RCC No. 32/89 and RW2 is respondent in RCC No. 33/89 and RW3 is no doubt a third party doing business in the locality. It is not in dispute that there was partition on 31-3-1989 between the landlord and his family members and the schedule premises had fallen to the share of the landlord, Ex. A1 is the said partition deed. RW1 had deposed that in the beginning the schedule property and the adjacent properties originally belonged to the landlord, his father and brother of his father and on 12-8-1988 in fact a notice was given stating that they have partitioned the property and it was specifically mentioned that the entire portion behind the shop of the tenant in RCC No. 33/89 fell to the share of the landlord. But however, the contention of the landlord is that he got only half of the portion behind the shop of the tenant in RCC No. 33/89 and this was filed with a view to extract more rent only. However in cross-examination it was admitted that expect this share of the property, the landlord had no other non-residential accommodation in the main road of Rajahmundry and even on the aspect of additional accommodation if the wall is removed the shop will become more spacious and will become more convenient for the landlord to run his business, had been admitted. The financial capacity and other aspects for running the business by the landlord also was not disputed. It is pertinent to note that the tenants had filed petitions under Section 8 of the Act and the partition in fact was to the knowledge of the tenants. No doubt, certain submissions had been made relating to the aspect that these are not identifiable portions and the tenants sought permission to deposit of rents and had been acting under a mistaken impression by virtue of a notice since the contents of the notice had misled them. In the light of the clear and categorical findings recorded by the appellate authority after appreciating the evidence of RW1 and RW1 and in particular at paragraphs 11 and 12, I do not think that these minor discrepancies, if any, can tilt the case in favour of the revision petitioners. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners also made a serious attempt to point out that the aspect of relative hardship had not been considered at all. But however, a careful reading of the order of the appellate authority clearly goes to show that both at paragraphs 14 and 15, the question of relative hardship also had been considered and in fact it was observed by the appellate authority ultimately that the inconvenience of the tenant cannot deprive the landlord of his bona fide right and had ultimately allowed the appeals with costs. It may be true that it is very difficult to secure accommodation in a busy center. It may be true that it is very difficult to secure accommodation in a busy center. But equally in such cases, the hardship of the landlord also may have to be taken into consideration since the aspect of difficulty in securing another accommodation either for expansion of business or otherwise, has to be appreciated in the point of view of the landlord also and in facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the appellate authority taking the over all facts and circumstances and also considering the peculiar facts involved in the matter in detail had arrived at the conclusion that the landlord is entitled to the relief of eviction. In the appreciation of evidence and in recording the findings, I do not see any perversity warranting interference under Section 22 of the Act. ( 14 ) HENCE both the civil revision petitions are devoid of merits and accordingly they are dismissed. But however in view of the fact that the tenants have been occupying the respective premises for the purpose of doing business, I deem it fit to grant six months time to vacate the premises. Accordingly both the revisions are dismissed, with costs.

Dandamudi Sobhanachalapathi Rao v. Kaki Visweswara Rao