P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE revision petitioners are the legal representatives of the original landlord who had filed the RC. The respondent is the tenant. ( 2 ) ONE Linga Seetaramulu, the original landlord filed RC No. 38/89 on the file of I Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad against the respondent-tenant seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default, bona fide requirement and also sub-letting and the learned Rent Controller after recording the evidence of PW1, the landlord and also RW1, the tenant, and after perusing Exs. Al and A2 and after appreciating the evidence of PW1 and RW1, had arrived at the conclusion that the landlord is entitled for the relief of eviction. The tenant, aggrieved by the same, had preferred R. A. No. 647/94 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, at Hyderabad and during the pendency of the appeal, the landlord died and the legal representatives were brought on record. The appellate authority had reversed the order of the Court of first instance by an order dated 30-7-1999. Aggrieved by the same, the legal representatives of the landlord had preferred the present civil revision petition under Section 22 of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, ( 3 ) THE pleadings of the respective parties in brief are as follows:- the petitioner is the landlord of the mulgi bearing No. 5-5-1037, situate at Hindi Nagar, Goshamahal, Hyderabad. That the father of the respondent is the tenant and after his demise the respondent is continuing the tenancy being his legal representative. According to the landlord the rent is Rs. 150/- per month and they committed wilful default in payment of rent from September, 1988 onwards. Inspite of repeated demands the respondent failed to pay rents and she is liable for eviction. The petitioner got issued notice dated 8-12-1988 and the respondent gave reply notice together with bank draft for Rs. 450/- representing the rents from September to October, 1988. The other ground that was urged by the landlord is that he is intending to start his own business in the petition mulgi and his children were grown up and they are unemployed and they shall be fixed up some business as they are not highly educated and he has got sufficient funds to start the business in the disputed premises. Hence the requirement of the petition premises for his business is a bona fide one and thus sought eviction. The respondent resisted the petition contending inter alia denying the allegations made in the petition. According to the respondent originally the petition schedule premises was obtained on rent of Rs. 150/- per month by the respondent husband. After his death she has been continuing as a tenant and running a barber shop with the help of her employee who was alone in service during the lifetime of her husband and she never sublet the petition premises to anybody. There is no wilful default in payment of rents. There is no genuine need of the personal requirement of the petitioner and the said ground is invented by the petitioner in order to evict her from the petition premises. ( 4 ) THE appellate authority had framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the respondent has sublet the petition premises to Ganesh for running barber shop? 2. Whether the appellant committed wilful default in payment of rents and if so liable for eviction? 3. Whether the requirement of the disputed premises for the proposed business of the landlord is a bona fide one or not? but however for reasons best known, on the ground that he tenant had sent money order along with reply notice and as the landlord admitted that there are no arrears of rent at all, the ground of wilful default was not pressed and inasmuch as the ground of wilful default was not pressed by the landlords, the appellate authority at paragraph 10 of the order had specifically observed that it needs no further discussion. ( 5 ) HOARD Sri Sarathy, the learned senior Counsel representing Smt. Jaya Sree Sarathy for the revision petitioners and Sri Rajeevan, the learned Counsel for the respondent. ( 6 ) SRI Sarathy, the learned senior Counsel had taken me through the impugned order made by the appellate authority and had contended that the appellate authority had totally erred in reversing the well considered judgment of the learned Rent Controller. The learned senior Counsel also had made an attempt to canvass that even not pressing the ground of wilful default is unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, inasmuch as that ground was specifically given up, the learned senior Counsel had not seriously urged this point. The learned senior Counsel also had made an attempt to canvass that even not pressing the ground of wilful default is unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, inasmuch as that ground was specifically given up, the learned senior Counsel had not seriously urged this point. The learned senior Counsel had contended that inspite of the particulars given and inspite of the clear evidence relating to the bona fide requirement, the appellate authority had totally erred in negativing the relief. The learned Counsel had placed strong reliance on B. Ataullah v. K. Nisar Ahmed, 2001 (5) ALD 517 = 2001 (5) ALT 103 . The learned Counsel also had contended that better particulars had been furnished and despite the same, the ground was negatived. The learned Counsel had taken me through the evidence of PW1 and RW1 in this regard. It was further contended that the ground sub-letting was well established in this case. The learned Counsel would maintain that the appellate authority had totally erred in observing that the subtenant also should be added as a party. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on Rupchand Gupta v. Raghuvanshi (Pvt.) Ltd. , AIR 1964 SC 1889 . ( 7 ) SRI Rajeevan, the learned Counsel representing the respondent-tenant had taken me through paragraphs 9, 11, 12 and 13 of the order of the appellate authority and had contended that the appellate authority had recorded reasons while reversing the order of the learned Rent Controller and these reasons cannot be said to be unsustainable reasons. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the plea of bona fide requirement is vague and even otherwise, the original landlord died and only legal representatives were prosecuting the litigation and hence the ground of bona fide requirement is not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Counsel further submitted that the aspect of sub-letting was not proved in accordance with law. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on Jagdish Prasad v, Smt, Angoori Devi, AIR 1984 SC 1447 , Devkumar v. Swarna Lata, AIR 1996 SC 510 and also P. Rajanna v. Smt. K. Lalitha Reddi @ Chinnama Devi and another, 1995 (3) ALD 922 = 1995 (3) ALT 789 . The learned Counsel had placed reliance on Jagdish Prasad v, Smt, Angoori Devi, AIR 1984 SC 1447 , Devkumar v. Swarna Lata, AIR 1996 SC 510 and also P. Rajanna v. Smt. K. Lalitha Reddi @ Chinnama Devi and another, 1995 (3) ALD 922 = 1995 (3) ALT 789 . ( 8 ) AFTER the demise of the husband, the respondent-tenant has been continuing the business of barbar shop through one Ganesh who is an employee even during the lifetime of her husband. This Ganesh, it is now contended by the landlords, is a sub-tenant and hence on the ground of subletting the landlords are entitled to the relief of eviction. It is pertinent to note that there is no allegation about the particulars of the sub-lease and in the absence of such particulars it cannot be said that the ground of sub-letting had been established. In the decision referred (supra), in a suit brought by the landlord against his lessee for ejectment it was observed by the Apex Court that mere fact that the sublessee was not impleaded or that the lessee did not actually contest the suit will not render the decree passed in the suit as collusive, especially when it was not suggested by the sub-lessee that the lessor had even a plausible defence to the claim for ejectment. In the decision referred (supra), this Court while dealing with the ground of sub-letting at page 837 observed as follows: "although subletting or sub-lease is the subject-matter of the ground of eviction, legally it amounts to transfer of the right under the lease by the tenant even according to the opening expressions made in Section 10 (2) (") (a) of the Act. Technically speaking sub-lease would be an assignment of the right of tenancy by the tenant or lessee in favour of a person other than the landlord. The expression sub-lease is thus not defined in the Transfer of Property Act. Because sub-lease is an assignment of a lesser term and accordingly there is no privity of contract between the lesser and the sublessee (Page 706 of the Mulla s T. P. Act VI Edition ). But for a restraint under the Rent Control Act on the act of assignment or transfer of lease on the lesse without written consent of the landlord, a lease can be transferred in law. But for a restraint under the Rent Control Act on the act of assignment or transfer of lease on the lesse without written consent of the landlord, a lease can be transferred in law. A lease may be granted by a person who is himself a lessee and such a lease is commonly called as underlease, sub-lease, derivative, lease, but it is still a lease within the Section (Page 642 of Mutta s T. P. Act supra ). This Rule of English Law has been made applicable in India also as declared by the Supreme Court in The Mineral Development Ltd. v. The Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 1373 ). While dealing with a sub-lease in the context of mining lease defined under Section 3 (d) and Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948. it was declared therein that mining, lease includes a mining sub-lease. In that context a sub-lease in law is held to be a lease within the meaning of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the very words of the Supreme Court: ". . . . The terms sub-lease , under-lease and derivative lease are used conveniently to indicate not only that the transfer is a lease but also that the transfer is a owner of the property but is a lessee; but the transfer as between a lessee and a sub-lessee is nonetheless a lease provided it satisfies the definition of Section 105. We may add that Chapter Valuation of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with leases of immovable property has nowhere made any distinction between a lease and a sub-lease and all the provisions of that Chapter which apply to a lease also apply to a sub-lease. It is only when dealing with the rights and liabilities of the lessee that Section 108 (j) of the , Transfer of Property Act lays down that the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and that is where one finds mention of a sub-lease namely, that it is a lease by a person who is himself a lessee. But the fact that the lessor is himself a lessee and the transaction between him and the person in whose favour he makes the transfer by way of lease is called a sub-lease does not in any way change the nature of the transfer as between them. . . " to conclude, the sub-lease or transfer of lease for the purpose of Section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act should be a lease within the meaning of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, a landlord alleging sub-lease as a ground for eviction should prove all the ingredients of the lease under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act". The appellate authority in fact had discussed this aspect in detail and arrived at the conclusion that the revision petitioners failed to substantiate the plea of sub-letting and I do not see any ground to interfere with the said finding. ( 9 ) THE next ground on which the learned senior Counsel had made serious and elaborate submissions is about the bonafide requirement. As already stated supra, the original landlord is no more and the legal representatives are brought on record. It is pertinent to note that there is no pleading in the petition about the nature of business and subsequently better particulars had been furnished to the effect that they intend to start Kirana business. But however in the course of evidence, PW1 had stated about timber business. Apart from it, the disputed mulgi is only 6 x 8 in area and the stand of the landlords is to the effect that they are trying to get the adjoining mulgi also. But however as a finding of fact, the appellate authority had arrived at the conclusion that there is no pleading relating to the nature of business and even the better particulars furnished by the original landlord are at variance to his evidence and hence the appellate authority came to the conclusion that even the ground of bonafide requirement is not sustainable. The learned senior Counsel had placed strong reliance on the decision referred (supra), a decision of mine in CRP No. 364/99 decided on 27-7-2001 wherein it was observed that non-mentioning to details of requirement in notice and pleadings cannot be a ground to reject the relief of eviction of tenant when it is supported by evidence. The learned senior Counsel had placed strong reliance on the decision referred (supra), a decision of mine in CRP No. 364/99 decided on 27-7-2001 wherein it was observed that non-mentioning to details of requirement in notice and pleadings cannot be a ground to reject the relief of eviction of tenant when it is supported by evidence. The present case is definitely distinguishable on facts since the facts of the case cited by the learned senior Counsel are different. Be that as it may, here is a case where there is lack of particulars in the pleadings and even the better particulars are at variance to the evidence and hence the plea of bona fide requirement in such circumstances cannot be sustained and the findings of the appellate authority in this regard cannot be said to be unsustainable. ( 10 ) HENCE, for the foregoing reasons, the civil revision petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed, with costs.