JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been filed by the accused petitioner against the judgment and order dated 18.6.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur in Criminal Appeal No. 13/2001 by which he dismissed the appeal of the accused petitioner and confirmed the judgment and order dated 8.1.2001 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pipar City in Criminal Case No. 168/91 whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate convicted the accused petitioner for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and sentenced in the following manner: Name of accused-petitioner Convicted Under Section Sentence awarded Ram Niwas 279 IPC Three months SI and a fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 15 days SI. 337 IPC Three months' SI and a fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 7 days' SI. 304-A IPC Two years RI and a fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one month RI. All the above substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision petition, in short, are as follows: On 13.4.1991 at about 12.45 AM, PW-9 Kewal Krishna lodged a written report Ex.P/7 with the Police Station Khedapa District Jodhpur stating inter-alia that on 12.4.1991, he alongwith Jeep Driver Lalji (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) came to Jodhpur in Jeep No. RRF 3640 which was being driven by deceased and at about 11.00 PM in the night, they left Jodhpur for Bikaner and in the night at about 12.15 AM before Police Station, Khedapa, a Truck bearing No. RJW 4797 from the opposite side which was being driven by the accused petitioner came with fast speed and the accused petitioner dashed that Truck against the Jeep, as a result of which deceased died on the spot and PW9 Kewal Krishna also received some injuries on his head and PW-7 Ravindra Singh and PW-4 Mohandan, both Constables in the Police Station, Khedapa also rushed towards the spot and body of the deceased was taken out from the Jeep and the accused petitioner was caught and on being asked, he told his name as Ram Niwas (present accused petitioner). On this report, police registered the case for the offence Under Sections 279, 304-A and 337 IPC against the accused petitioner and chalked out regular FIR Ex.P/8 and started investigation. After usual investigation, the police submitted challan in the Court of Magistrate, Pipar City against the accused petitioner for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC. The contents of the charges for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC were read over to the accused petitioner on 21.10.1992. The accused petitioner denied the contents of the charges and claimed trial. During trial, in support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and got exhibited some documents. Thereafter the statement of the accused petitioner Under Sections 313 Cr. P.C. was recorded. No evidence was led in defence by the accused petitioner. After recording evidence and conclusion of trial, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pipar vide his judgment and order dated 8.1.2001 convicted the accused petitioner for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and sentenced in the manner as indicated above, holding inter-alia: (1) That prosecution has proved that on the relevant day, the Truck in question was being driven by the accused petitioner and the Truck in question was being driven by the accused petitioner rashly and negligently and the accused petitioner dashed that Truck against the Jeep in question, as a result of which, deceased died on the spot and PW-9 Kewal Krishna received injuries. (2) That the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused petitioner for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC. Aggrieved from the said judgment and order dated 8.1.2001 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pipar City, the accused petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, which was transferred to the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, who vide his judgment and order dated 18.6.2001 dismissed the appeal of the accused petitioner and confirmed the judgment and order dated 8.12001 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Calss, Pipar City by which accused petitioner was convicted for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and sentenced in the manner as indicated above. Aggrieved from the said judgment and order dated 18.6.2001 passed by the learned Addl. Aggrieved from the said judgment and order dated 18.6.2001 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, the accused petitioner has preferred this revision petition before this Court. 3. In this revision petition, the learned Counsel appearing for the accused petitioner has not much assailed the findings of conviction recorded by both the courts below against the accused petitioner for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC, but his main contention is two fold: (i) That the accused petitioner be released under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act; or (ii) That in awarding sentence, lenient view be taken and the sentence of the accused petitioner be reduced to the period already undergone by him, as he is in jail since 18.6.2001. 4. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor supported the impugned judgments and orders of the courts below. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the records of the case. 6. So far as the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below that the accused petitioner was driving the Truck in question at the relevant time and he was driving the Truck rashly and negligently and he dashed his Truck against the Jeep in question, as a result of which, deceased died on the spot and PW-9 Kewal Krishna received injuries are concerned, they are based on correct appreciation of evidence and there is sufficient evidence on record to prove all above facts and in this case, PW-9 Kewal Krishna, injured himself is an eye witness of the alleged accident and PW-4 Mohandan and PW-7 Ravindra Singh are also eye witnesses as the accident took place near the Police Station, Khedapa and after examining the evidence of these eye witnesses and other evidence led by the prosecution in a very meticulous manner, both the courts below recorded findings of facts stated above. 7. The question that arises for consideration is whether the above concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below can be re-appreciated by this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction? 8. 7. The question that arises for consideration is whether the above concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below can be re-appreciated by this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction? 8. In State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, AIR 1993 SC 1126 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that ordinarily, it is not open for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below specially by re-appreciating the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction. 9. A Court of revision is not entitled to reassess and reappraise the evidence unless it finds that the judgment to be revised suffers from some illegality or perversity or when there is glaring defect in procedure. The revisional Court cannot weigh the sufficiency of evidence. 10. The High Court while sitting in revisional jurisdiction Under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not and cannot re-appreciate and re-appraise the evidence and the finding of fact recorded by the two courts below can only be interfered with if such findings are perverse or based on no evidence or suffered from any error of law. 11. In Pathumma v. Muhammad, AIR 1986 SC 1436 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the Magistrate has observed that the husband neglected to maintain his wife and never tried to take her back, it is a finding of fact and revisional court is not competent to reassess the evidence. 12. Applying the above principles in the present case, the findings of both the courts below that the accused petitioner was driving the Truck in question at the relevant time and he was driving the Truck rashly and negligently and he dashed his Truck against the Jeep in question, as a result of which, deceased died on the spot and PW-9 Kewal Krishna received injuries are purely findings of facts and thus, this Court in revisional jurisdiction should not re-assess the evidence. From this point of view the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below are to be maintained and no interference with them is called for. 13. From this point of view the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below are to be maintained and no interference with them is called for. 13. In State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu, AIR 1979 SC 663 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that although the revisional power of the High Court is as wide as the power of court of appeal, it is now well settled that normally this jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. Inspite of the wide language of Section 397, the High Court is not expected to act Under Section 397 or Section 401 as if it is hearing an appeal. 14. In my considered opinion, in the present case, the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below that the accused petitioner was driving the Truck in question at the relevant time and he was driving the Truck rashly and negligently and he dashed his Truck against the Jeep in question, as a result of which, deceased died on the spot and PW-9 Kewal Krishna received injuries are based on correct appreciation of evidence and they cannot be regarded as perverse or based on no evidence or suffered from any error of law. It does not appear that there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. It also does not appear that there exists a manifest illegality in the impugned judgments of the court below. 15. Thus, in the present case, scrutiny having been made by both the Court of Magistrate and the Court of Session and the same having been based on cogent material and proper appreciation of evidence, it is not permissible to re-appreciate the same in the revisional jurisdiction. 16. For the reasons stated above, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below holding the accused petitioner guilty for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC are based on evidence, warranting no interference.On point of sentence for the offence Under Section 304 IPC 17. 16. For the reasons stated above, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below holding the accused petitioner guilty for the offence Under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC are based on evidence, warranting no interference.On point of sentence for the offence Under Section 304 IPC 17. The argument of the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner is that looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, either the accused petitioner be released on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act on in awarding sentence, lenient view be taken and the sentence awarded to the accused petitioner be reduced to the period already undergone by him. 18. A question of sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere with it. Sentencing an accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. 19. In Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 84 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "Penal Code (1860) Section 304-A. Rash and negligent driving. Fatal accident. Sentence. No compassion to be shown." 20. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna Alias Raju, AIR 1987 SC 861 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "Criminal Procedure Code (2 of 1974). Section 377. Enhancement of sentence. Driver convicted for killing one person and injuring another for offence Under Section 304-A and under other provision. Sentence of fine of Rs. 250/- Refusal of High Court to enhance sentence. Not proper." 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 82 has held as under: (1) When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the sterling of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic. (2) The conditions for applying Section 4 of the PO Act have been delineated in the commencing portion of the provision. In it Parliament made it clear that only if the court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release the accused on probation for his good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is "the nature of the offence". Thus Parliament has left it to the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion. It provided sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the court to be expedient. The word "expedient" has been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as apt and suitable to the end in view. 22. Thus, from the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh's case (supra), it clearly appears that benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 cannot be extended to persons convicted of offence of causing death by rash and negligent driving. 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh's case (supra) has made clear distinction between the professional drivers and non-professional drivers and in the cases of professional drivers, the deterrent element is sentencing such drivers should be maintained and should be kept in mind by the Judges. 24. Since in the present case, accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the Truck in question by the present accused petitioner, who is a professional driver, therefore, it is not a fit case where any leniency can be showered on the accused petitioner. The drivers of public vehicles carrying and boarding goods and passengers on high way whether State or National for a consideration can be termed as professional drivers. 25. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the sentence awarded by both the courts below to the accused petitioner for the offence Under Section 304A IPC is excessive. 25. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the sentence awarded by both the courts below to the accused petitioner for the offence Under Section 304A IPC is excessive. Hence, it is not a fit case for taking lenient view in awarding sentence.For the reasons stated above, the revision petition filed by the accused petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed, after confirming the impugned judgments and orders of both the courts below.Revision petition dismissed. *******