Judgment :- K.A. Mohamed Shafi, J. This C.R.P. is directed against the Order in I. A. No. 147/97 in C.M.A. No. 42/98, dated 19th January 2000 passed by the District Court, Alappuzha. The C.M.A was preferred by the petitioner against the Order in I.A. 1763/92 in O.S.72/83 passed by the Munsiff s Court, Mavelikkara with the above petition to condone the delay of 397 days in filing the appeal. 2. The petitioner has contended that against the Order in I.A. No. 1763/92 he preferred C.R.P. No. 347/96 before this Court as per wrong legal advice given by his counsel and that C.R.P. was dismissed holding that the Order passed by the Munsiff's Court cannot be said to be erroneous, perverse or unreasonable and the revision petition is of no merits, by Order, dated 12th February, 1996. Subsequently on proper advice from another counsel it was revealed that no revision will lie against the order passed by the lower court and the petitioner can prefer appeal before the appellate court. Therefore, appeal was filed before the District Court with a petition to condone the delay in preferring the same, alleging that the delay occurred due to the wrong advice given by his counsel. The lower appellate court dismissed the I.A. Filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay finding that there is no sufficient reason to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Hence this revision is preferred before this Court challenging the Order passed by the lower appellate court. 3. A preliminary Decree for partition was passed in O.S.72/83 on 26th July 1984. Subsequently the 1st defendant died on 9th November 1987. The respondent -2nd defendant in the suit filed I.A. No. 684/92 to amend the preliminary Decree in respect of some items of properties in the Decree. Thereafter he filed I.A. 1763/92 to implead the legal representatives of the 1st defendant as additional respondent 3 to 8 in I.A. 684/92. The plaintiff-1st respondent in the I.A. contended that the deceased 1st defendant has not left any legal representatives since he died unmarried and issueless and therefore, respondents 3 to 8 cannot be impleaded as his heirs and legal representatives. The trial court took evidence in the matter and after enquiry allowed I.A. 1763/92 to implead respondents 3 to 8 in I.A. 684/92 as legal representatives of deceased 1st defendant as per order, dated 20th November, 1995. The trial court took evidence in the matter and after enquiry allowed I.A. 1763/92 to implead respondents 3 to 8 in I.A. 684/92 as legal representatives of deceased 1st defendant as per order, dated 20th November, 1995. The plaintiff preferred C.R.P. No. 347/96 before this Court and this Court dismissed the C.R.P. on merits by order, dated 12th February 1996 at the admission stage itself holding that the C.R.P. is of no merits. It is thereafter the C.M.A. is filed before the lower appellate court challenging the order in I.A. 1763/92 with the above petition to condone the delay of 397 days under S.5 of the Limitation Act. 4. The lower appellate court did not accept the contention of the petitioner that no revision against the order in the I.A. 1763/92 under S, 115 of the C.P.C. will lie before the High Court and only appeal lies before the lower appellate court and therefore, the order passed by this Court in the C.R.P. being without jurisdiction is a nullity. The lower appellate court also found that the contention of the petitioner that he preferred C.R.P. before this Court against the order passed by the trial court by a wrong advice given by his counsel and therefore, the delay in preferring the appeal should be condoned, is not acceptable. 5. It is well settled that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the court or a pure question of law unrelated to the rights of the parties to a previous suit is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding and there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law. It is also well settled that jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court which has no jurisdiction by consent of the parties and the principles of res judicata or estoppel on a pure question of law. 6. In the decision in Premananda Bharathi v. Yogananda Bharathi, 1985 KLT 144, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows: "9. It is settled law that the decision of a court on a question relating to jurisdiction, cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the court and such decision cannot operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings- Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai (AIR 1971 SC 2355). It is settled law that the decision of a court on a question relating to jurisdiction, cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the court and such decision cannot operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings- Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai (AIR 1971 SC 2355). Since the appointment of the second commissioner in this case is without jurisdiction, the Order of the Trial Court, dated 21st December 1974 as affirmed by this Court in C.R.P. 41 of 1975, dated 19th February, 1975 cannot be a bar in ignoring or eschewing or discarding Exts. C-6 and C-10. The interlocutory Order passed by the Trial Court, dated 21st December 1974 as also the order passed in revision, C.R.P. No. 41 of 1975, cannot be a deter in considering the matter afresh when it comes up before a Bench of this Court in the appeal filed from the final decree in the suit." 7. In the decision in Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Sitsai, (1991) 1 SCC 494, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "We find that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy ((1970) 1 SCC 613) a Bench comprising three learned judges of this Court has taken the view that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the Court or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. xxx xxx xxx xxx In our opinion a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law". 8. The position of law that issue regarding jurisdiction is a pure question of law and a decision on pure question of law will not operate as res judicata between the same parties in a subsequent proceedings and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court which has no jurisdiction by consent of the parties or applying the principle of res judicata and there cannot be any estoppel on the question of jurisdiction which is a question of law, cannot be disputed. But the question to be considered is whether those principles are applicable to the facts of this case. 9. But the question to be considered is whether those principles are applicable to the facts of this case. 9. It is not disputed that as against the order in LA. 1763/92, dated 20th November 1995 passed by the Trial Court, the petitioner herein preferred C.R.P. No. 347/96 before this Court and the same was dismissed on merits at the admission stage by: order, dated 12th February, 1996 and no petition is filed by the petitioner before this Court to review that order or any S.L.P. is filed before the Supreme Court for leave to challenge that order. But the petitioner filed the C.M.A. before the lower appellate, court with the above petition to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. 10. The counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner invited an adverse decision from this Court by filing C.R.P. No. 347/96 against the order in I.A. 1763/92 passed by the Trial Court and therefore, he cannot approbate and reprobate and now turn round and contend that the Order passed by this Court in the C.R.P. is without jurisdiction since no revision lies against that impugned Order and only appeal lies before the appellate court and therefore the order is a nullity. He submitted that the C.M.A. before the lower appellate court filed with the above petition to condone the delay is a sheer abuse of the process of court and intended to re-litigate the issues already settled between the parties which is not permissible under law. 11. In the decision in K.K. Modi v, K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the Court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and cited earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in liti gation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in liti gation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of the court's discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to b exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, am exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no chance the suit succeeding". 12. In the decision in Sabia Khan v. State ofU.P., (1999) 1 SCC 271, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "4. After hearing Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, it is obvious that the petition is misconceived and based on a total misconception. It is an obvious attempt to question the correctness of the orders of this Court through a Writ Petition under Art.32, which is not permissible. The objection with regard to the office report is also not tenable. Filing of such a petition is an abuse of the process of the Court and waste of time of the Court. We do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 10,000". 13. In the decision in Rajendra Kumar v. Kglyan, (2000) 8 SCC 99, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "14. The doctrine of resjudicata has received a statutory sanction in the Code as a matter of prudence and to give due weightage to a finding or a decision so as to reach a finality in the matter of a dispute between the same parties or litigating under the same parties. The doctrine of resjudicata has received a statutory sanction in the Code as a matter of prudence and to give due weightage to a finding or a decision so as to reach a finality in the matter of a dispute between the same parties or litigating under the same parties. The doctrine thus is to achieve finality or dispute between the parties being a principle of prudence so as to give efficacy to a finding of the court rather than permit the parties to go to trial more or less on the same issues over again and thus introducing a possibility of conflict of views. Judicial verdict has its special sanctity and cannot be the subject matter of discussion at any future time involving identical or similar issues. The facts in issue is one where more than one attempt has been made to establish a fact and in every attempt that particular fact stands negated. 15. In the present context, the issue is placed before the Apex Court, and as such therefore, should have to be considered in its proper perspective so that similar issues are not raised before the Court for adjudication on occasions more than one since it has a salutary effect on the jurisprudential system of the country" 14. The above decision of the Supreme Court lays down the finality of the decisions between the parties and prevents parties from raking up the issues already settled by the competent courts again and again and re-litigating the very same issues already settled over again. 15. In this case the Trial Court allowed I.A. 1763/92 to implead the legal representatives of the 1st defendant by order, dated 20th November 1995 and this court confirmed that Order by Order, dated 12th February, 1996 in C.R.P. No. 347/96 preferred by the petitioner herein. It is thereafter the petitioner filed the C.M.A. before the District Court along with the petition to condone the long delay of 397 days alleging that he has been prosecuting the case in a wrong court which has no jurisdiction on the basis of a wrong advice given by his counsel and contending that the Order passed by this Court in the C.R.P. is a nullity being without jurisdiction, without challenging that order passed by this Court in appropriate proceedings. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner is attempting to re-litigate the issue already settled again by the above proceedings which is only a sheer abuse of the process of the court, which cannot be permitted under law. 16. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of O. XXII, R.10 of the C.P.C. applies to the facts of this case and therefore, an appeal against that Order is provided under O. XXII, R.12 of the CPC Order XXII, R.10 of the CPC deals with procedure in case of assignment before final Order in the suit which reads as follows: "10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.- (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved." 17. From the above provision of O. XXII, R.10, it is clear that the provision is applicable only in cases of assignment or creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of the suit. The assignee or the persons on whom any interest in the property is devolved or created during the pendency of the suit, have to be impleaded. It is true that appeal is provided against the order passed under O. XXII, R.10 of CPC. But it has to be noted that, I.A. 1763/92 was filed by the respondent to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased 1st defendant in the suit. Therefore, O. XXII, R.4 and not O. XXII, R.10 of the C.P.C. applies to the facts of this case. 18. O. XXII, R.4 of the CPC reads as follows: "4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant. (1) Whereof one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit." 19. In this case, it is admitted that a preliminary Decree for partition was passed in the suit O.S.72/83 filed by the petitioner against both the defendants and 1st defendant passed away after passing of the final Decree. In I.A. 684/92 filed by the 2nd defendant-respondent herein to amend the preliminary Decree, I.A. 1763/92 was filed to implead the legal representatives of the deceased 1st defendant which was opposed by the petitioner herein contending that no legal representatives are liable to be impleaded in the suit. The Trial Court took evidence in the matter and passed the Order allowing the application to implead additional respondents 3 to 8 as the legal representatives of the deceased 1st defendant. .Therefore, the facts and circumstances of the case squarely come within the ambit of O. XXII, R.4 and not 0. XXII, R.10 of the CPC as contended by the petitioner. 20. In the decision in Kamta Prasad v. Vidyqwati, AIR 1994 MP 181, a Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed as follows: "12. In fact, O. I, R.10(2), C.P.C. empowers the Court to implead any person as party suo mote, who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. True, the plaintiff is dominus litis, but a Court has to see that it may not be that a collusive decree is obtained against the real owner or interested person without impleading him as a party and it may not become final affecting vitally the rights of such person. Therefore, to avoid such a situation and also to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, a Court should permit such a person to be added as a party. 13. Therefore, to avoid such a situation and also to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, a Court should permit such a person to be added as a party. 13. In the opinion of this Court, a reading of the two provisions of O. XXII, R.10 and O. I, R.10 CPC it is amply clear that under O. XXII, R.10, if the interest is assigned of the subject-matter of the suit, the assignee may apply to be impleaded as a party even at an appellate stage and if a person is vitally interested in the litigation and ultimate decree which may be passed in the said litigation vitally affecting his rights, he may apply to be added as a party under O. I, R.10(2), C.P.C." 21. In the light of the above observations from the Orders passed by the Trial Court in I.A. 1763/92 and this Court in C.R.P. No. 347/96 it is clear that the impleadment of additional respondents 3 to 8 allowed by the Trial Court is perfectly justified and this Court has rightly held so in revision. 22. In view of my finding that the Order passed by the Trial Court in I.A. No. 1763/92 is under O. XXII, R.4 of the CPC a revision lies before this Court and in that view the Order passed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 347/96 is valid and binding upon the petitioner herein. Therefore, his contention that the Order passed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 347/96 without jurisdiction is a nullity, is not sustainable. 23. The petitioner has contended that he had been prosecuting the case in a wrong forum on a wrong advice given by his counsel and it is only after proper advice obtained from another counsel he realised that only appeal will lie and revision is not maintainable against the Order passed by the Trial Court in I.A. No. 1763/92. Though a wrong advice given by the Counsel may be sufficient ground to condone the delay in preferring the appeal or revision under certain circumstances, that question is not germane to the facts of this case. Though a wrong advice given by the Counsel may be sufficient ground to condone the delay in preferring the appeal or revision under certain circumstances, that question is not germane to the facts of this case. I have already held that the Order in I.A. No. 1763/92 passed by the Trial Court in this case is under O. XXII, R.4 of the CPC which is revisable by this Court under S.115 of the CPC and therefore, the revision in C.R.P. No. 347/96 filed by the petitioner challenging that Order before this Court is jurisdiction and competent and the Order passed by this Court in the C.R.P. is perfectly legal and proper. Therefore, the contention that the petitioner was led by a wrong advice given by his counsel does not arise in this case. From what is stated above, it is clear that all the contentions raised by the petitioner to condone the delay in preferring the C.M.A. before the lower appellate court are untenable and the lower appellate Court rightly found so and dismissed the application to condone the delay in preferring the C.M.A. Therefore, I find absolutely no ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court. Hence the impugned Order passed by the