JUDGMENT V. Gopala Gowda, J.—This second appeal is filed by the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 130 of 1989 and Defendant in O.S. No. 542 of 1989 on the file of II Additional Munsiff, Bangalore, against the judgment and decree dated 6.1.1995 passed by the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore District, in Regular Appeal No. 64 of 1994 which was filed by the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 542 of 1989 against the common judgment and decree dated 17.9.1994 passed in the aforesaid two suits. 2. The Plaintiff in O.S. No. 130 of 1989 filed the suit for eviction of the Defendant from the suit schedule premises on the ground that he was a tenant. The Plaintiff in O.S. No. 542 of 1989 filed the suit seeking specific performance on the basis of an agreement of sale dated 28.4.1980 executed by the Defendant in respect of the suit schedule property. Both the suits pertain to the same property. The trial Court conducted separate trial for each suit but since the parties and the property involved is the same, a common judgment was passed on 19.7.1994 dismissing O.S. No. 542 of 1989 and decreeing O.S. No. 130 of 1989 giving two months time to the Defendant to vacate the suit schedule property. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendant in O.S. No. 130 of 1989 filed appeal in Regular Appeal No. 64 of 1994. The first appellate Court by its judgment dated 6.1.1995 allowed the appeal, set aside the common judgment and decree of the trial Court. Consequently, it has decreed the suit in O.S. No. 542 of 1989 directing the Defendant to execute the registered sale deed within a period of two months and the suit for eviction in O.S. No. 130 of 1989 was dismissed. Challenging the correctness of the said judgment and decree of the first appellate Court the appellant/Plaintiff in O.S. No. 130 of 1989 (Defendant in O.S. No. 542 of 1989) has preferred this second appeals and another appeal in Regular Second Appeal No. 90 of 1996, which has been disposed of separately. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank in the this appeal. 4. This appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial questions of law: 1. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank in the this appeal. 4. This appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the first appellate Court was justified in entertaining a single appeal against the judgment and decrees passed in two separate cases, one for specific performance and another for possession in O.S. Nos. 542 of 1989 and 130 of 1989? 2. Whether the first appellate Court was justified in rejecting the suit claiming possession? 3. Whether the first appellate Court was justified in holding that relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end on execution of the agreement of sale? 5. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. 6. The case of the appellant was that the Respondent was a tenant of the suit schedule property from 24.9.1978 on a monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. He got issued a legal notice dated 2.1.1989 to the Respondent to vacate the premises. At that juncture the Respondent came forward to purchase the property and an agreement of sale was entered into on 28.4.1980. Since he failed to got the sale deed registered within the stipulated time, the agreement of sale was rescinded and the suit was filed for the eviction of the Respondent. The plea of Respondent was total denial of relationship of landlord and tenant. According to him, he came in possession of the suit property under the agreement of sale and he was not a tenant prior to that. The trial Court considered the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in paragraph 22 of its judgment elaborately. Ex.P-1 the rent agreement executed by the Respondent has been considered. The Plaintiff got examined himself and deposed that Ex.P-1 was executed by the Respondent. Another witness examined as PW-2 has identified the signature of Respondent at Ex.P-1(a). In addition to that, the appellant had produced Ex.P-2 the certified copy of deposition of PW-2 recorded in O.S. No. 542 of 1989 in which PW-2 had deposed that he had written Ex.P1 and he identified the LTM of Respondent. Thus, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has proved execution of rent deed by Respondent. On that basis the trial Court ordered eviction of Respondent. But the lower appellate Court took a different view. Thus, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has proved execution of rent deed by Respondent. On that basis the trial Court ordered eviction of Respondent. But the lower appellate Court took a different view. It has reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court wrongly on the ground that O.S. No. 130 of 1989 has been decreed by the trial Court because it was held that the other suit filed by the appellant for specific performance was barred by time. The first appellate Court has totally discarded the rental deed Ex.P-1, execution of which by the Respondent was duly proved before the trial Court. Hence, the dismissal of O.S. No. 130 of 1989 by the appellate Court is wholly unsustainable. 7. Point No. 4 posed by the lower appellate Court was, whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing O.S. 542 of 1989 and in decreeing O.S. 130 of 1989? This point has been considered in paragraph 26 of its judgment. It held that the trial Court was not justified in doing so. The reasons assigned for holding so are as under: 26. POINT No. 4: The trial Court has dismissed O.S. 542 of 1989. The reasoning of the trial Court is perverse and not proper and therefore the conclusion arrived thereupon cannot be upheld. On the other hand, the trial Court has decreed O.S. 130 of 1989 which again is on account of the perverse reasoning of the trial Court. Therefore, the Court is not justified in passing the impugned judgment dismissing O.S. 542 of 1989 and decreeing O.S. 130 of 1989. Though the lower appellate Court has termed the reasonings of the trial Court as perverse, why and how they are perverse is not stated. In fact, no reason is assigned to arrive at such a conclusion. Such conclusion not supported by valid and cogent reasons rendered is wholly unsustainable and liable to be set aside. The first appellate Court has not considered the matter in the manner it ought to have been considered. 8. The trial Court has applied the law laid down in Chinna Thevar Vs. Gnanaprakasi Ammal and Anr., AIR 1979 Mad 47 & Azmathulla Khan Vs. Thankamma Mathews, ILR (1994) KAR 1665 . The first appellate Court has not considered the matter in the manner it ought to have been considered. 8. The trial Court has applied the law laid down in Chinna Thevar Vs. Gnanaprakasi Ammal and Anr., AIR 1979 Mad 47 & Azmathulla Khan Vs. Thankamma Mathews, ILR (1994) KAR 1665 . In those decisions, the position of a tenant after becoming an agreement holder of the property in his possession has been considered and held that the lessee remains as such even after becoming an agreement holder of the same property. But, the lower appellate Court has not taken strains to consider any of the decisions. Thus, the findings of the trial Court were supported with the decisions. On the other hand, the judgment of lower appellate Court suffers for want of reasonings and non-consideration of law applicable to the facts of the case. 9. Mr. C.B. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that the trial Court was not justified in relying upon Ex.P2, the deposition of Nanjundappa as the same does not constitute substantial evidence. According to him, the same should have been confronted to the witness for admission or denial as to the contents thereof. This submission cannot be accepted. Section 80 of Indian Evidence Act stipulates that such documents shall be presumed to be genuine and that such evidence, statement or confession was duly taken. 10. In Ex.P-2 Mr. Nanjundappa, the scribe of Ex.P-1 had clearly stated that the Respondent executed the rental agreement in respect of the suit schedule property. His statement was recorded in O.S. No. 542 of 1989 filed by the Respondent seeking specific performance of the agreement. That evidence was recorded in the original suit proceedings between the same parties by following the procedure contemplated under Order 18, Rules 5 and 6 Code of Civil Procedure . After separate trial of those suits, both the suits were clubbed together and common judgment was passed. The said evidence has passed the test of cross-examination by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination which favours the Respondent. Since the contents of the said statement were not challenged, they are presumed to be genuine under Section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act. A catena of decisions of Supreme Court and various High Courts are there to this effect Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath Vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination which favours the Respondent. Since the contents of the said statement were not challenged, they are presumed to be genuine under Section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act. A catena of decisions of Supreme Court and various High Courts are there to this effect Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath Vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1958 P & H 440 , Babulall Choukhani Vs. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1967 Cal 205 , A.E.G. Carapiet Vs. A.Y. Derderian, AIR 1961 Cal 359 . Respondent has not adduced rebuttal evidence. Hence, the trial Court was justified in relying upon the said statement of the witness and recording a finding that Respondent had been in possession of the suit schedule property as a tenant even prior to the agreement of sale. The lower appellate Court has misdirected itself in not considering this aspect of the matter. Hence, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court warrants interference. 12. Mr. Srinivasan also submitted that the recitals of agreement of sale are clear that Respondent was put in possession of the suit schedule property as part performance of the agreement of sale on the date of execution of the agreement of sale. He further submits that there is no document to show that Respondent was in possession of the suit property prior to that agreement of sale. This submission is devoid of merit. The execution of rental deed as per Ex.P-1 was sufficient to hold that Respondent was in possession of the suit property as tenant even prior to the sale agreement. Added to that, the categorical plea of appellant is that prior to filing of the suit for eviction, he got issued legal notice to Respondent. The same is not denied or disputed by Respondent. So, it was not open to the learned Counsel to contend that Respondent has been in possession of suit property from the date of agreement of sale. 13. A fervent submission was made by Mr. Srinivasan that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below be set aside and the matter be remanded for fresh disposal. According to him, the matter requires re-consideration as certain aspects have not at all been considered by the Courts below. The submission made to remand the matter is wholly unnecessary. 13. A fervent submission was made by Mr. Srinivasan that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below be set aside and the matter be remanded for fresh disposal. According to him, the matter requires re-consideration as certain aspects have not at all been considered by the Courts below. The submission made to remand the matter is wholly unnecessary. Section 103 Code of Civil Procedure empowers this Court to determine any issue if any evidence is not considered and applied to the case. When such a power is available to this Court, there is no scope for making the submission to remand the matter. 14. Thus, viewed from any angle, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is bad in law and unsustainable. It follows that the appellant entitled to succeed. 15. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court in so far as it dismissed the suit in O.S. No. 130 of 1989 is set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored. No order as to costs.