V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant is an association statedly espousing the cause of slum dwellers. The association filed the writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and other Revenue Officials, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority and the District Collector, Hyderabad to grant pattas to the members of the appellant-association who are allegedly in occupation of the land comprised in S. Nos. 125 to 128 of Gaddiannaram Village, Saroornagar Mandal. It is alleged that these slum dwellers have been in occupation of the land situated behind the Fruit Market, Gaddiannaram for the last twenty years. They seek to draw support from the orders of the Government in G. O. Ms. No. 508, dated 20. 10. 1995. ( 2 ) IN the affidavit they alleged that the appellant-association made representation on 17. 4. 1996. It appears that earlier writ petitioner being V/p No. 24299 of 1996 was filed against respondents 1 to 4 seeking pattas and that this Court by judgment dated 18. 11. 1996 directed the respondents to consider the applications of the appellant-association. As the respondents have not passed any orders they again filed the present writ petition seeking a direction to implement the Government Orders mentioned hereinabove. ( 3 ) THE fifth respondent, namely, Gaddiannaram and Chaitanyapuri Development Organisation filed a counter-affidavit inter alia contending that the members of the appellant-association have encroached 40 feet wide road which is a connecting road between Hyderabad-Vijayawada National High Way and Kothapet Road adjacent to Gaddiannaram market. The fifth respondent brought to the notice of the sixth respondent stating that the residents of the colonies are facing problems due to encroachment made by the appellant as well as squalid conditions, which resulted therefrom. The Special Architect in the Department of Housing and Municipal Administration, Government of Andhra Pradesh addressed a letter on 17. 10. 1986 to all the concerned to remove encroachments on the alignment of the 40 feet wide road in S. No. 123 of Gaddiannaram. Suitable instructions were also issued to the District Collector to allot suitable land to hut dwellers. Accordingly, the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, granted pattas to hut dwellers or encroachers of the Saroornagar Village who are members of appellant in proceedings No. B2/1266 of 1986 dated 1. 4. 1989. Suitable instructions were also issued to the District Collector to allot suitable land to hut dwellers. Accordingly, the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, granted pattas to hut dwellers or encroachers of the Saroornagar Village who are members of appellant in proceedings No. B2/1266 of 1986 dated 1. 4. 1989. Inspite of granting pattas by providing rehabilitation to the members of the appellant-association who had encroached 40 feet wide road the appellants still did not vacate the land earmarked for road. In those circumstances, the fifth respondent filed writ petition, being WP No. 5700 of 1997 seeking appropriate directions to the authorities to remove the hut dwellers. This Court issued such directions on 21. 3. 1997, but the respondents failed to do so, as a result of which, unhealthy and unhygienic conditions are prevailing in the area. ( 4 ) THE learned single Judge by impugned judgment dated 2. 7. 2001 dismissed the writ petition and further directed the respondents to clear encroachments on the public road in question without further delay. The learned single Judge observed as under: admittedly the list of members of the petitioner association has not been furnished and vague averments have been made stating that the members are living in S. Nos. 125, 126, 127 and 128, behind Fruit Market, Gaddiannaram Village, Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. On this ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Further, the members of the petitioner Society have no right to squat on the road which was sanctioned in the lay out in 1968. This certainly obstructs the plot-holders of the Society from reaching their houses and so far as G. O. Ms. No. 508 is concerned, it applies only to the Government land and not to a private land. Further the Government has already taken a decision to allot house sites in S. No. 9/1 of Saroornagar Village and Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and it is open for the members of the petitioner Society to occupy the sites allotted. Therefore, the petitioners Society has no right to agitate the requirement of the members. More over, squatting on the public road cannot be claimed as fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Such a right cannot be extended to the extent of illegally occupying a public road by erecting huts and thereafter to demand grant of patta. Therefore, the petitioners Society has no right to agitate the requirement of the members. More over, squatting on the public road cannot be claimed as fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Such a right cannot be extended to the extent of illegally occupying a public road by erecting huts and thereafter to demand grant of patta. This type of modus operandi will lead to a chatoic situation and the process adopted is highly undemocratic. Under these circumstances, I am not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner association, (emphasis supplied) ( 5 ) SRI V. Raghunath, learned Counsel for the appellant/petitioner submits that the slum dwellers have been residing on the land for the last two decades and eking out their livelihood by doing cooli work as rickshaw pullers and servant maids etc. In this background the learned Counsel submits that the learned single Judge erred in placing reliance on the counter-affidavit filed by the fifth respondent without directing the other respondents to file counter-affidavit to know the ground reality existing on the land. He also submits that the land does not belong to fifth respondent society and therefore they have no say in the matter. He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn,, AIR 1986 SC 180 and Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Nawab Khan, AIR 1997 SC 152 and submits that, should there be a finding that the members of the petitioner-association are encroachers even then the principles of natural justice have to be followed. ( 6 ) THE short question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant-association and its members can be said to have suffered any prejudice by reason of the order of the learned single Judge directing the authorities to clear the encroachments from the road? ( 7 ) THE law of the streets is well-settled. The road is primarily meant for citizens to pass and repass and use for conveyance. The right to carry on business, trade or profession being a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India any total prohibition of carrying on business on the road is unconstitutional. However, no citizen can claim absolute right to squat on the road either for the purpose of business or for the purpose of residence. Roads are not meant for building houses and residential huts. However, no citizen can claim absolute right to squat on the road either for the purpose of business or for the purpose of residence. Roads are not meant for building houses and residential huts. Roads are basically meant for citizens for passing and repassing. As long as the citizens activity in relation to road does not offend or effect the rights of other citizens, in that the use of the road does not obstruct the other citizens, no objection can be taken. But, when once a citizen claims a right to squat on the road either by raising temporary structure or permanent structure for business or residence, the law does not recognise such right. The principles are well settled. If any authority is required we may mention all these cases-Manglaur Municipality v. Mahadeoji, AIR 1965 SC 1147 , Pyare Lal v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1968 SC 133 , Himat Lal v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad, AIR 1973 SC 87 , K. Sudarshan v. Commissioner, Corpn, of Madras, AIR 1984 Mad. 292 , M. A. Pal Mohammed v. R. K. Sadarangani, AIR 1985 Mad. 23 , Bombay Hawkers Union v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. , AIR 1985 SC 1206 , Olga Tellis case (supra), Sodan Singh (I) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1989 SC 1988 , Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Gurnamkaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 , P. K. Wariyar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 Ker. 218 , Sodan Singh (11) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1992 SC 1153 , Gainda Ram (I) v. M. C. D. Town Hall, (1993) 3 SCC 178 , Gaindaram (II) v. M. C. D. , (1994) 5 SCC 52 , S. B. (Kiosks) Owners Assn. v. Commissioner, Municipal Corpn. , Hyderabad, AIR 1994 AP 35 , Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (supra), N. Jagadeesan v. Dist. Collector, North Arcot, AIR 1997 SC 1197 , Bapujinagar Khudra Byabasai Assn. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1997 Ori. 189 , Sodan Singh (III) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1998 SC 1174 = (1998) 2 SCC 727 , Sodan Singh (IV) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1998) 2 SCC 743 , Gainda Ram (III) v. M. C. D. , (1998) 1 SCC 188 and State of Maharashtra v. Alka B. Hindge, (1998) 4 SCC 315 . 189 , Sodan Singh (III) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1998 SC 1174 = (1998) 2 SCC 727 , Sodan Singh (IV) v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1998) 2 SCC 743 , Gainda Ram (III) v. M. C. D. , (1998) 1 SCC 188 and State of Maharashtra v. Alka B. Hindge, (1998) 4 SCC 315 . ( 8 ) IN Sodhan Singh (I) (supra) a Constitution Bench of the Court considered the common law right of trading on pavements of the streets and Article 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution of India and laid down that: the right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or repassing and for no other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition as otherwise the very object of laying out roads - to facilitate traffic - may by defeated. Allowing the right to trade without appropriate control is likely to lead to unhealthy competition and quarrel between traders and travelling public and sometimes amongst the traders themselves resulting in chaos. The right is subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (6) of Article 19. If the matter is examined in this light, it will appear that the principles stated in Saghir Ahmad s case ( AIR 1954 SC 728 ) in connection with transport business applies to the hawkers case also. ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court also pointed out that if the situation so warrant in larger public interest appropriate authority can prohibit the use of pavements and roads for the purpose of trade and/or may prohibit such trade on specified streets/roads or may regulate on certain given days. If the road is not wide enough it can be prohibited. It is apposite to excerpt the following from the said judgment. We would, however, make it clear that the demand of the petitioners that the hawkers must be permitted on every road in the city cannot be allowed, if a road is not wide enough to conveniently manage the traffic on it, no hawking may be permitted at all, or may be sanctioned only once a week, say on Sundays when the rush considerably thins out. Hawking may also be justifiably prohibited near hospitals or where necessity of security measures so demands. Hawking may also be justifiably prohibited near hospitals or where necessity of security measures so demands. There may still be other circumstances justifying refusal to permit any kind of business on a particular road. ( 10 ) ALL the authorities deal with the right of a citizen to engage in trade and business on the pavements of the roads or to hawk their merchandise on the roads without causing inconvenience for the users of the road. The fundamental right under Article 19 (l) (g) to use pavements of the roads for the purpose of business cannot be elevated or extended further to a right to construct hut or a residential tenement on the road or on the land which forms part of the road and for that matter, even on the pavement. The slum dwellers, whose cause is espoused by the appellant, are admittedly, raised huts on a part of the road and not on the pavement and therefore it is not possible to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that they should be given notice in such a case. ( 11 ) IN Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (supra), the question of giving notice to encroachers was considered by the Supreme Court. It was a case where 29 persons unauthorisedly occupied foothpaths on the main road of Ahmedabad and constructed huts thereon. When they were sought to be removed the High Court of Gujarat directed the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation not to remove their huts until suitable accommodation is provided to them. The Supreme Court considered the questions whether the hut dwellers are liable to ejectment from encroachment of pavements of the roads, and whether the principle of natural justice requires to be followed and to what extent, and whether the Municipal Corporation had obligation to provide permanent structures to the hut dwellers. On the first question, the Supreme Court ruled that whether or not principles of natural justice are to be followed depends on circumstances of each case and that there could be cases where hut dwellers can be evicted without notice also. It was also held that failure to provide alternative accommodation does not divest the authority from ejecting the encroachers from public place. It is apposite to quote the following observations : no inflexible rule of hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. It was also held that failure to provide alternative accommodation does not divest the authority from ejecting the encroachers from public place. It is apposite to quote the following observations : no inflexible rule of hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each case depends upon its own backdrop. The removal of encroachment needs urgent action. But in this behalf what requires to be done by the competent authority is to ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the public places. Sooner the encroachment is removed when sighted, better would be the facilities or convenience for passing or repassing of the pedestrians on the pavements or footpaths facilitating free flow of regulated traffic on the road or use of public places. On the contrary, the longer the delay, the greater will be the danger of permitting the encroachers claiming semblance of right to obstruct removal of the encroachment. If the encroachment is of a recent origin the need to follow the procedure of principle of natural justice could be obviated in that no one has a right to encroach upon the public property and claim the procedure of opportunity of hearing which would be a tardious and time-consuming process leading to putting a premium for high-handed and unauthorized acts of encroachment and unlawful squatting. On the other hand, if the Corporation allows settlement of encroachers for a long time for reasons best known to them, and reasons are not far to seek, then necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two weeks or 10 days, and personal service on the encroachers or substituted service by fixing notice on the property is necessary. If the encroachment is not removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at liberty to have it removed. ( 12 ) DEALING with the question of alternative accommodation the Supreme Court laid down as under: it is true that in all cases it may not be necessary, as a condition for ejectment of the encroacher, that he should be provided with an alternative accommodation at the expense of the State which if given due credence, is likely to result in abuse of the judicial process. But no absolute principle of universal application would be laid in this behalf. But no absolute principle of universal application would be laid in this behalf. Each case is required to be examined on the given set of facts and appropriate direction or remedy be evolved by the Court suitable to the facts of the case. Normally, the Court may not, as a rule, directs that the encroacher should be provided with an alternative accommodation before ejectment when they encroached public properties, but, as stated earlier, each case requires examination and suitable direction appropriate to the facts requires modulation. Considered from this perspective, the apprehension of the appellant is without force. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on Olga Tellis case (supra) in support of the contention that even while removing encroachments principles of natural justice are to be complied with. We may mention that in Olga Tellis case (supra) the pavement dwellers of Bombay city took objection to forceful eviction by Bombay Municipal Corporation. It is not a case where encroachers of the roads itself approached the Court complaint violation of principles of natural justice. No right inheres in any citizen to make either permanent or temporary constructions on the road causing inconvenience to the users of the road. Be that as it may, the following observations of the Supreme Court go against the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter. No one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without the requisite authorization and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that the pavement dwellers have the right to encroach upon pavements by constructing dwellings thereon. Public streets, of which pavements from a part, are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even the pedestrians have but the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. ( 14 ) THE rule of audi alteram partem is not Tarakamanthra for redressal of every grievance of the citizen. Whether or not the rule natural justice be applied depends on circumstances of each case. To what extent natural justice requires to be complied with by the decision-maker or law enforcer again is a different question. In either view of the matter, every violation of rule of natural justice without proof of prejudice cannot be a ground to visit the impugned action or decision with invalidation. The Court of judicial review must be cautious to apply the rule of natural justice with great circumspection and vision. In the guise of enforcing rules of natural justice, the larger public interest and public convenience cannot be ignored nor denied to those faceless public who are not before the Court. No doubt, it is the law of the land that right to shelter is a fundamental right available to every citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (See Chameli Singh v. State of U. P. , (1996) 2 SCC 549 ), but the enforcement of right for shelter cannot and should not result in deprivation of the right of either citizens to move freely on the roads. Further, as observed hereinabove, in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (supra) the Supreme Court did not accept the contention that in every case of removal of encroachments from public roads, the State should provide alternative accommodation as a condition precedent. As observed by the learned single Judge such a situation would lead to chaos and Court cannot be a party in creating it. As observed by the learned single Judge such a situation would lead to chaos and Court cannot be a party in creating it. ( 15 ) THESE is yet another aspect of the matter. The fifth respondent in the counter-affidavit categorically stated that the Special Architect, Urban Development Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh addressed a letter to the District Collector to provide alternative site to the encroachers on the road. Accordingly, it appears the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, the first respondent herein, granted pattas to hut dwellers/encroachers. This allegation remains un-rebutted and the appellant-association has not filed any reply denying the same. This would show that inspite of the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District granting pattas in favour of at least some of the members of the appellant-association, the appellant-association still insisting that they should not be evicted or removed till pattas are granted to all slum dwellers. If the appellant or any of its members make appropriate representation to the revenue authorities, the same may be considered subject to availability of Government land for grant of pattas. As held by us merely because the Government has not granted pattas for house sites the same does not give any right to the petitioner or members of the appellant-association to encroach into private land or the land eatmarked for roads. ( 16 ) IN the result, we see no merit in the writ appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed subject to above observations. There shall be no order as to costs.